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zig/lib/std/crypto.zig

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2020-09-29 21:33:14 +02:00
2020-09-29 21:33:14 +02:00
crypto: add the Xoodoo permutation, prepare for Gimli deprecation (#11866) Gimli was a game changer. A permutation that is large enough to be used in sponge-like constructions, yet small enough to be compact to implement and fast on a wide range of platforms. And Gimli being part of the Zig standard library was awesome. But since then, Gimli entered the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Competition, competing againt other candidates sharing a similar set of properties. Unfortunately, Gimli didn't pass the 3rd round. There are no practical attacks against Gimli when used correctly, but NIST's decision means that Gimli is unlikely to ever get any traction. So, maybe the time has come to move Gimli from the standard library to another repository. We shouldn't do it without providing an alternative, though. And the best candidate for this is probably Xoodoo. Xoodoo is the core function of Xoodyak, one of the finalists of the NIST LWC competition, and the most direct competitor to Gimli. It is also a 384-bit permutation, so it can easily be used everywhere Gimli was used with no parameter changes. It is the building block of Xoodyak (for actual encryption and hashing) as well as Charm, that some Zig applications are already using. Like Gimli that it was heavily inspired from, it is compact and suitable for constrained environments. This change adds the Xoodoo permutation to std.crypto.core. The set of public functions includes everything required to later implement existing Xoodoo-based constructions. In order to prepare for the Gimli deprecation, the default CSPRNG was changed to a Xoodoo-based that works exactly the same way.
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std/crypto: add support for ECDSA signatures (#11855) ECDSA is the most commonly used signature scheme today, mainly for historical and conformance reasons. It is a necessary evil for many standard protocols such as TLS and JWT. It is tricky to implement securely and has been the root cause of multiple security disasters, from the Playstation 3 hack to multiple critical issues in OpenSSL and Java. This implementation combines lessons learned from the past with recent recommendations. In Zig, the NIST curves that ECDSA is almost always instantied with use formally verified field arithmetic, giving us peace of mind even on edge cases. And the API rejects neutral elements where it matters, and unconditionally checks for non-canonical encoding for scalars and group elements. This automatically eliminates common vulnerabilities such as https://sk.tl/2LpS695v . ECDSA's security heavily relies on the security of the random number generator, which is a concern in some environments. This implementation mitigates this by computing deterministic nonces using the conservative scheme from Pornin et al. with the optional addition of randomness as proposed in Ericsson's "Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness" document. This approach mitigates both the implications of a weak RNG and the practical implications of fault attacks. Project Wycheproof is a Google project to test crypto libraries against known attacks by triggering edge cases. It discovered vulnerabilities in virtually all major ECDSA implementations. The entire set of ECDSA-P256-SHA256 test vectors from Project Wycheproof is included here. Zero defects were found in this implementation. The public API differs from the Ed25519 one. Instead of raw byte strings for keys and signatures, we introduce Signature, PublicKey and SecretKey structures. The reason is that a raw byte representation would not be optimal. There are multiple standard representations for keys and signatures, and decoding/encoding them may not be cheap (field elements have to be converted from/to the montgomery domain). So, the intent is to eventually move ed25519 to the same API, which is not going to introduce any performance regression, but will bring us a consistent API, that we can also reuse for RSA.
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2020-09-13 23:00:33 +03:00
std/crypto: add support for ECDSA signatures (#11855) ECDSA is the most commonly used signature scheme today, mainly for historical and conformance reasons. It is a necessary evil for many standard protocols such as TLS and JWT. It is tricky to implement securely and has been the root cause of multiple security disasters, from the Playstation 3 hack to multiple critical issues in OpenSSL and Java. This implementation combines lessons learned from the past with recent recommendations. In Zig, the NIST curves that ECDSA is almost always instantied with use formally verified field arithmetic, giving us peace of mind even on edge cases. And the API rejects neutral elements where it matters, and unconditionally checks for non-canonical encoding for scalars and group elements. This automatically eliminates common vulnerabilities such as https://sk.tl/2LpS695v . ECDSA's security heavily relies on the security of the random number generator, which is a concern in some environments. This implementation mitigates this by computing deterministic nonces using the conservative scheme from Pornin et al. with the optional addition of randomness as proposed in Ericsson's "Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness" document. This approach mitigates both the implications of a weak RNG and the practical implications of fault attacks. Project Wycheproof is a Google project to test crypto libraries against known attacks by triggering edge cases. It discovered vulnerabilities in virtually all major ECDSA implementations. The entire set of ECDSA-P256-SHA256 test vectors from Project Wycheproof is included here. Zero defects were found in this implementation. The public API differs from the Ed25519 one. Instead of raw byte strings for keys and signatures, we introduce Signature, PublicKey and SecretKey structures. The reason is that a raw byte representation would not be optimal. There are multiple standard representations for keys and signatures, and decoding/encoding them may not be cheap (field elements have to be converted from/to the montgomery domain). So, the intent is to eventually move ed25519 to the same API, which is not going to introduce any performance regression, but will bring us a consistent API, that we can also reuse for RSA.
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