License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
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2012-07-06 15:25:11 -05:00
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2023-10-03 11:15:54 +02:00
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2012-07-06 15:25:11 -05:00
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2023-05-31 15:08:43 +02:00
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2025-11-07 14:51:24 +01:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:41 +09:00
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mm/slab: change stride type from unsigned short to unsigned int
Commit 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
defined the type of slab->stride as unsigned short, because the author
initially planned to store stride within the lower 16 bits of the
page_type field, but later stored it in unused bits in the counters
field instead.
However, the idea of having only 2-byte stride turned out to be a
serious mistake. On systems with 64k pages, order-1 pages are 128k,
which is larger than USHRT_MAX. It triggers a debug warning because
s->size is 128k while stride, truncated to 2 bytes, becomes zero:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Warning! stride (0) != s->size (131072)
WARNING: mm/slub.c:2231 at alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534, CPU#6: systemd-sysctl/307
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 307 Comm: systemd-sysctl Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #6 PREEMPTLAZY
Hardware name: IBM,9009-22A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.E0 (VL950_179) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000008a9ac0 LR: c0000000008a9abc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000141f7390 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (7.0.0-rc1+)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28004400 XER: 00000005
CFAR: c000000000279318 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0000000008a9abc c0000000141f7630 c00000000252a300 c00000001427b200
GPR04: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 c000000000278fd0 0000000000000000
GPR08: fffffffffffe0000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000022004400
GPR12: c000000000f644b0 c000000017ff8f00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7aa0 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7a88
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000400cc0 ffffffffffffffff c00000001427b180
GPR24: 0000000000000004 00000000000c0cc0 c000000004e89a20 c00000005de90011
GPR28: 0000000000010010 c00000005df00000 c000000006017f80 c00c000000177a00
NIP [c0000000008a9ac0] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534
LR [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534
Call Trace:
[c0000000141f7630] [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534 (unreliable)
[c0000000141f76c0] [c0000000008aafbc] allocate_slab+0x154/0x94c
[c0000000141f7760] [c0000000008b41c0] refill_objects+0x124/0x16c
[c0000000141f77c0] [c0000000008b4be0] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2b0/0x444
[c0000000141f7810] [c0000000008b9600] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x840/0x914
[c0000000141f7900] [c000000000a3dd40] seq_read_iter+0x60c/0xb00
[c0000000141f7a10] [c000000000b36b24] proc_reg_read_iter+0x154/0x1fc
[c0000000141f7a50] [c0000000009cee7c] vfs_read+0x39c/0x4e4
[c0000000141f7b30] [c0000000009d0214] ksys_read+0x9c/0x180
[c0000000141f7b90] [c00000000003a8d0] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4b0
[c0000000141f7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
This leads to slab_obj_ext() returning the first slabobj_ext or all
objects and confuses the reference counting of object cgroups [1] and
memory (un)charging for memory cgroups [2].
Fortunately, the counters field has 32 unused bits instead of 16
on 64-bit CPUs, which is wide enough to hold any value of s->size.
Change the type to unsigned int.
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ca241daa-e7e7-4604-a48d-de91ec9184a5@linux.ibm.com [1]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ddff7c7d-c0c3-4780-808f-9a83268bbf0c@linux.ibm.com [2]
Fixes: 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303135722.2680521-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>
2026-03-03 22:57:22 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:41 +09:00
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2025-11-07 14:51:24 +01:00
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2023-05-31 15:08:43 +02:00
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2025-11-07 14:51:24 +01:00
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2023-05-31 15:08:43 +02:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-08-05 18:22:55 +01:00
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2021-11-04 11:30:58 +01:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2021-11-04 11:30:58 +01:00
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2026-01-23 07:52:52 +01:00
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2022-08-26 11:09:12 +02:00
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2025-11-07 14:51:24 +01:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2022-08-26 11:09:12 +02:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2021-11-04 11:30:58 +01:00
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2024-03-21 14:24:45 +00:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-06-11 16:59:05 +01:00
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2026-02-27 19:42:41 +00:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2024-07-12 12:14:35 +08:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2024-07-12 12:14:35 +08:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2023-10-02 17:43:38 +02:00
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2025-11-07 14:51:24 +01:00
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2022-08-26 11:09:12 +02:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-01-10 22:32:57 -08:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-11-13 00:09:15 +00:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-11-13 00:09:15 +00:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-11-13 00:09:15 +00:00
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2026-02-27 19:42:56 +00:00
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2025-11-13 00:09:15 +00:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-01-10 22:32:57 -08:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-08-05 18:22:56 +01:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-08-05 18:22:56 +01:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2025-11-13 00:09:30 +00:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2024-05-31 13:29:02 +01:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:51 +01:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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2026-03-11 09:25:55 +01:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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slab: add opt-in caching layer of percpu sheaves
Specifying a non-zero value for a new struct kmem_cache_args field
sheaf_capacity will setup a caching layer of percpu arrays called
sheaves of given capacity for the created cache.
Allocations from the cache will allocate via the percpu sheaves (main or
spare) as long as they have no NUMA node preference. Frees will also
put the object back into one of the sheaves.
When both percpu sheaves are found empty during an allocation, an empty
sheaf may be replaced with a full one from the per-node barn. If none
are available and the allocation is allowed to block, an empty sheaf is
refilled from slab(s) by an internal bulk alloc operation. When both
percpu sheaves are full during freeing, the barn can replace a full one
with an empty one, unless over a full sheaves limit. In that case a
sheaf is flushed to slab(s) by an internal bulk free operation. Flushing
sheaves and barns is also wired to the existing cpu flushing and cache
shrinking operations.
The sheaves do not distinguish NUMA locality of the cached objects. If
an allocation is requested with kmem_cache_alloc_node() (or a mempolicy
with strict_numa mode enabled) with a specific node (not NUMA_NO_NODE),
the sheaves are bypassed.
The bulk operations exposed to slab users also try to utilize the
sheaves as long as the necessary (full or empty) sheaves are available
on the cpu or in the barn. Once depleted, they will fallback to bulk
alloc/free to slabs directly to avoid double copying.
The sheaf_capacity value is exported in sysfs for observability.
Sysfs CONFIG_SLUB_STATS counters alloc_cpu_sheaf and free_cpu_sheaf
count objects allocated or freed using the sheaves (and thus not
counting towards the other alloc/free path counters). Counters
sheaf_refill and sheaf_flush count objects filled or flushed from or to
slab pages, and can be used to assess how effective the caching is. The
refill and flush operations will also count towards the usual
alloc_fastpath/slowpath, free_fastpath/slowpath and other counters for
the backing slabs. For barn operations, barn_get and barn_put count how
many full sheaves were get from or put to the barn, the _fail variants
count how many such requests could not be satisfied mainly because the
barn was either empty or full. While the barn also holds empty sheaves
to make some operations easier, these are not as critical to mandate own
counters. Finally, there are sheaf_alloc/sheaf_free counters.
Access to the percpu sheaves is protected by local_trylock() when
potential callers include irq context, and local_lock() otherwise (such
as when we already know the gfp flags allow blocking). The trylock
failures should be rare and we can easily fallback. Each per-NUMA-node
barn has a spin_lock.
When slub_debug is enabled for a cache with sheaf_capacity also
specified, the latter is ignored so that allocations and frees reach the
slow path where debugging hooks are processed. Similarly, we ignore it
with CONFIG_SLUB_TINY which prefers low memory usage to performance.
[boot failure: https://lore.kernel.org/all/583eacf5-c971-451a-9f76-fed0e341b815@linux.ibm.com/ ]
Reported-and-tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2025-09-03 14:59:45 +02:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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slab: add opt-in caching layer of percpu sheaves
Specifying a non-zero value for a new struct kmem_cache_args field
sheaf_capacity will setup a caching layer of percpu arrays called
sheaves of given capacity for the created cache.
Allocations from the cache will allocate via the percpu sheaves (main or
spare) as long as they have no NUMA node preference. Frees will also
put the object back into one of the sheaves.
When both percpu sheaves are found empty during an allocation, an empty
sheaf may be replaced with a full one from the per-node barn. If none
are available and the allocation is allowed to block, an empty sheaf is
refilled from slab(s) by an internal bulk alloc operation. When both
percpu sheaves are full during freeing, the barn can replace a full one
with an empty one, unless over a full sheaves limit. In that case a
sheaf is flushed to slab(s) by an internal bulk free operation. Flushing
sheaves and barns is also wired to the existing cpu flushing and cache
shrinking operations.
The sheaves do not distinguish NUMA locality of the cached objects. If
an allocation is requested with kmem_cache_alloc_node() (or a mempolicy
with strict_numa mode enabled) with a specific node (not NUMA_NO_NODE),
the sheaves are bypassed.
The bulk operations exposed to slab users also try to utilize the
sheaves as long as the necessary (full or empty) sheaves are available
on the cpu or in the barn. Once depleted, they will fallback to bulk
alloc/free to slabs directly to avoid double copying.
The sheaf_capacity value is exported in sysfs for observability.
Sysfs CONFIG_SLUB_STATS counters alloc_cpu_sheaf and free_cpu_sheaf
count objects allocated or freed using the sheaves (and thus not
counting towards the other alloc/free path counters). Counters
sheaf_refill and sheaf_flush count objects filled or flushed from or to
slab pages, and can be used to assess how effective the caching is. The
refill and flush operations will also count towards the usual
alloc_fastpath/slowpath, free_fastpath/slowpath and other counters for
the backing slabs. For barn operations, barn_get and barn_put count how
many full sheaves were get from or put to the barn, the _fail variants
count how many such requests could not be satisfied mainly because the
barn was either empty or full. While the barn also holds empty sheaves
to make some operations easier, these are not as critical to mandate own
counters. Finally, there are sheaf_alloc/sheaf_free counters.
Access to the percpu sheaves is protected by local_trylock() when
potential callers include irq context, and local_lock() otherwise (such
as when we already know the gfp flags allow blocking). The trylock
failures should be rare and we can easily fallback. Each per-NUMA-node
barn has a spin_lock.
When slub_debug is enabled for a cache with sheaf_capacity also
specified, the latter is ignored so that allocations and frees reach the
slow path where debugging hooks are processed. Similarly, we ignore it
with CONFIG_SLUB_TINY which prefers low memory usage to performance.
[boot failure: https://lore.kernel.org/all/583eacf5-c971-451a-9f76-fed0e341b815@linux.ibm.com/ ]
Reported-and-tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2025-09-03 14:59:45 +02:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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2026-01-23 07:52:54 +01:00
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2026-03-11 09:25:55 +01:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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slab: introduce percpu sheaves bootstrap
Until now, kmem_cache->cpu_sheaves was !NULL only for caches with
sheaves enabled. Since we want to enable them for almost all caches,
it's suboptimal to test the pointer in the fast paths, so instead
allocate it for all caches in do_kmem_cache_create(). Instead of testing
the cpu_sheaves pointer to recognize caches (yet) without sheaves, test
kmem_cache->sheaf_capacity for being 0, where needed, using a new
cache_has_sheaves() helper.
However, for the fast paths sake we also assume that the main sheaf
always exists (pcs->main is !NULL), and during bootstrap we cannot
allocate sheaves yet.
Solve this by introducing a single static bootstrap_sheaf that's
assigned as pcs->main during bootstrap. It has a size of 0, so during
allocations, the fast path will find it's empty. Since the size of 0
matches sheaf_capacity of 0, the freeing fast paths will find it's
"full". In the slow path handlers, we use cache_has_sheaves() to
recognize that the cache doesn't (yet) have real sheaves, and fall back.
Thus sharing the single bootstrap sheaf like this for multiple caches
and cpus is safe.
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2026-01-23 07:52:45 +01:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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mm, slab: fix use of SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS in kmem_cache_release()
The fix implemented in commit 4ec10268ed98 ("mm, slab: unlink slabinfo,
sysfs and debugfs immediately") caused a subtle side effect due to which
while destroying the kmem cache, the code path would never get into
sysfs_slab_release() function even though SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS is defined
and slab state is FULL. Due to this side effect, we would never release
kobject defined for kmem cache and leak the associated memory.
The issue here's with the use of __is_defined() macro in kmem_cache_
release(). The __is_defined() macro expands to __take_second_arg(
arg1_or_junk 1, 0). If "arg1_or_junk" is defined to 1 then it expands to
__take_second_arg(0, 1, 0) and returns 1. If "arg1_or_junk" is NOT defined
to any value then it expands to __take_second_arg(... 1, 0) and returns 0.
In this particular issue, SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS is defined without any
associated value and that causes __is_defined(SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS) to
always evaluate to 0 and hence it would never invoke sysfs_slab_release().
This patch helps fix this issue by defining SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS to 1.
Fixes: 4ec10268ed98 ("mm, slab: unlink slabinfo, sysfs and debugfs immediately")
Reported-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHj4cs9YCCcfmdxN43-9H3HnTYQsRtTYw1Kzq-L468GfLKAENA@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2024-10-01 19:32:35 +05:30
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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2026-01-23 07:52:42 +01:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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2026-01-23 07:52:42 +01:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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2026-02-25 08:34:07 -08:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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2026-02-25 08:34:07 -08:00
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2023-10-03 09:59:48 +02:00
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2014-10-09 15:26:00 -07:00
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2012-07-06 15:25:11 -05:00
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2012-07-06 15:25:12 -05:00
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2012-09-05 00:20:33 +00:00
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2012-07-06 15:25:12 -05:00
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2012-09-05 00:20:33 +00:00
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2017-02-22 15:41:05 -08:00
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mm, slab: make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names
Patch series "mm, slab: Make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names", v6.
There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM
and KMALLOC_DMA.
The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name,
but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically
generated by kmalloc_cache_name().
Patch1 predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save
the time spent dynamically generating names.
These changes make sense, and the time spent by new_kmalloc_cache()
has been reduced by approximately 36.3%.
Time spent by new_kmalloc_cache()
(CPU cycles)
5.3-rc7 66264
5.3-rc7+patch 42188
This patch (of 3):
There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and
KMALLOC_DMA.
The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the
names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by
kmalloc_cache_name().
This patch predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time
spent dynamically generating names.
Besides, remove the kmalloc_cache_name() that is no longer used.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569241648-26908-2-git-send-email-lpf.vector@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pengfei Li <lpf.vector@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-11-30 17:49:21 -08:00
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2018-04-05 16:20:29 -07:00
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2017-02-22 15:41:05 -08:00
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2013-01-10 19:12:17 +00:00
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2015-06-24 16:55:57 -07:00
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2024-01-30 09:41:07 +08:00
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2013-01-10 19:14:19 +00:00
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2023-11-13 12:02:02 +01:00
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2024-07-01 12:12:59 -07:00
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2023-11-13 12:02:02 +01:00
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2024-07-01 12:12:59 -07:00
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2023-11-13 12:02:02 +01:00
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2024-07-01 12:12:59 -07:00
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2023-11-13 12:02:02 +01:00
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2022-08-17 19:18:20 +09:00
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2020-08-06 23:18:28 -07:00
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2013-01-10 19:12:17 +00:00
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2012-09-05 00:20:33 +00:00
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2024-09-05 09:56:51 +02:00
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2012-07-06 15:25:11 -05:00
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2023-10-03 11:15:54 +02:00
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2012-11-28 16:23:07 +00:00
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2018-04-05 16:20:33 -07:00
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2012-11-28 16:23:07 +00:00
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2014-10-09 15:26:22 -07:00
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2026-01-27 19:31:51 +09:00
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2014-10-09 15:26:22 -07:00
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2024-02-21 12:12:53 +00:00
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2012-09-05 00:18:32 +00:00
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2023-01-04 14:06:04 +08:00
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2012-09-05 00:18:32 +00:00
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2024-09-05 10:34:22 -07:00
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slab: add sheaf support for batching kfree_rcu() operations
Extend the sheaf infrastructure for more efficient kfree_rcu() handling.
For caches with sheaves, on each cpu maintain a rcu_free sheaf in
addition to main and spare sheaves.
kfree_rcu() operations will try to put objects on this sheaf. Once full,
the sheaf is detached and submitted to call_rcu() with a handler that
will try to put it in the barn, or flush to slab pages using bulk free,
when the barn is full. Then a new empty sheaf must be obtained to put
more objects there.
It's possible that no free sheaves are available to use for a new
rcu_free sheaf, and the allocation in kfree_rcu() context can only use
GFP_NOWAIT and thus may fail. In that case, fall back to the existing
kfree_rcu() implementation.
Expected advantages:
- batching the kfree_rcu() operations, that could eventually replace the
existing batching
- sheaves can be reused for allocations via barn instead of being
flushed to slabs, which is more efficient
- this includes cases where only some cpus are allowed to process rcu
callbacks (CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU)
Possible disadvantage:
- objects might be waiting for more than their grace period (it is
determined by the last object freed into the sheaf), increasing memory
usage - but the existing batching does that too.
Only implement this for CONFIG_KVFREE_RCU_BATCHED as the tiny
implementation favors smaller memory footprint over performance.
Also for now skip the usage of rcu sheaf for CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT as the
contexts where kfree_rcu() is called might not be compatible with taking
a barn spinlock or a GFP_NOWAIT allocation of a new sheaf taking a
spinlock - the current kfree_rcu() implementation avoids doing that.
Teach kvfree_rcu_barrier() to flush all rcu_free sheaves from all caches
that have them. This is not a cheap operation, but the barrier usage is
rare - currently kmem_cache_destroy() or on module unload.
Add CONFIG_SLUB_STATS counters free_rcu_sheaf and free_rcu_sheaf_fail to
count how many kfree_rcu() used the rcu_free sheaf successfully and how
many had to fall back to the existing implementation.
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2025-09-03 14:59:46 +02:00
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2025-12-08 00:41:47 +09:00
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slab: add sheaf support for batching kfree_rcu() operations
Extend the sheaf infrastructure for more efficient kfree_rcu() handling.
For caches with sheaves, on each cpu maintain a rcu_free sheaf in
addition to main and spare sheaves.
kfree_rcu() operations will try to put objects on this sheaf. Once full,
the sheaf is detached and submitted to call_rcu() with a handler that
will try to put it in the barn, or flush to slab pages using bulk free,
when the barn is full. Then a new empty sheaf must be obtained to put
more objects there.
It's possible that no free sheaves are available to use for a new
rcu_free sheaf, and the allocation in kfree_rcu() context can only use
GFP_NOWAIT and thus may fail. In that case, fall back to the existing
kfree_rcu() implementation.
Expected advantages:
- batching the kfree_rcu() operations, that could eventually replace the
existing batching
- sheaves can be reused for allocations via barn instead of being
flushed to slabs, which is more efficient
- this includes cases where only some cpus are allowed to process rcu
callbacks (CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU)
Possible disadvantage:
- objects might be waiting for more than their grace period (it is
determined by the last object freed into the sheaf), increasing memory
usage - but the existing batching does that too.
Only implement this for CONFIG_KVFREE_RCU_BATCHED as the tiny
implementation favors smaller memory footprint over performance.
Also for now skip the usage of rcu sheaf for CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT as the
contexts where kfree_rcu() is called might not be compatible with taking
a barn spinlock or a GFP_NOWAIT allocation of a new sheaf taking a
spinlock - the current kfree_rcu() implementation avoids doing that.
Teach kvfree_rcu_barrier() to flush all rcu_free sheaves from all caches
that have them. This is not a cheap operation, but the barrier usage is
rare - currently kmem_cache_destroy() or on module unload.
Add CONFIG_SLUB_STATS counters free_rcu_sheaf and free_rcu_sheaf_fail to
count how many kfree_rcu() used the rcu_free sheaf successfully and how
many had to fall back to the existing implementation.
Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2025-09-03 14:59:46 +02:00
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mm: add support for kmem caches in DMA32 zone
Patch series "iommu/io-pgtable-arm-v7s: Use DMA32 zone for page tables",
v6.
This is a followup to the discussion in [1], [2].
IOMMUs using ARMv7 short-descriptor format require page tables (level 1
and 2) to be allocated within the first 4GB of RAM, even on 64-bit
systems.
For L1 tables that are bigger than a page, we can just use
__get_free_pages with GFP_DMA32 (on arm64 systems only, arm would still
use GFP_DMA).
For L2 tables that only take 1KB, it would be a waste to allocate a full
page, so we considered 3 approaches:
1. This series, adding support for GFP_DMA32 slab caches.
2. genalloc, which requires pre-allocating the maximum number of L2 page
tables (4096, so 4MB of memory).
3. page_frag, which is not very memory-efficient as it is unable to reuse
freed fragments until the whole page is freed. [3]
This series is the most memory-efficient approach.
stable@ note:
We confirmed that this is a regression, and IOMMU errors happen on 4.19
and linux-next/master on MT8173 (elm, Acer Chromebook R13). The issue
most likely starts from commit ad67f5a6545f ("arm64: replace ZONE_DMA
with ZONE_DMA32"), i.e. 4.15, and presumably breaks a number of Mediatek
platforms (and maybe others?).
[1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/iommu/2018-November/030876.html
[2] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/iommu/2018-December/031696.html
[3] https://patchwork.codeaurora.org/patch/671639/
This patch (of 3):
IOMMUs using ARMv7 short-descriptor format require page tables to be
allocated within the first 4GB of RAM, even on 64-bit systems. On arm64,
this is done by passing GFP_DMA32 flag to memory allocation functions.
For IOMMU L2 tables that only take 1KB, it would be a waste to allocate
a full page using get_free_pages, so we considered 3 approaches:
1. This patch, adding support for GFP_DMA32 slab caches.
2. genalloc, which requires pre-allocating the maximum number of L2
page tables (4096, so 4MB of memory).
3. page_frag, which is not very memory-efficient as it is unable
to reuse freed fragments until the whole page is freed.
This change makes it possible to create a custom cache in DMA32 zone using
kmem_cache_create, then allocate memory using kmem_cache_alloc.
We do not create a DMA32 kmalloc cache array, as there are currently no
users of kmalloc(..., GFP_DMA32). These calls will continue to trigger a
warning, as we keep GFP_DMA32 in GFP_SLAB_BUG_MASK.
This implies that calls to kmem_cache_*alloc on a SLAB_CACHE_DMA32
kmem_cache must _not_ use GFP_DMA32 (it is anyway redundant and
unnecessary).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181210011504.122604-2-drinkcat@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Sasha Levin <Alexander.Levin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Yong Wu <yong.wu@mediatek.com>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@google.com>
Cc: Yingjoe Chen <yingjoe.chen@mediatek.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-28 20:43:42 -07:00
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2025-01-24 16:48:58 +00:00
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2012-10-17 15:36:51 +04:00
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2016-03-15 14:55:06 -07:00
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2012-10-17 15:36:51 +04:00
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2025-01-24 16:48:58 +00:00
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2016-12-12 16:41:38 -08:00
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2018-04-05 16:21:57 -07:00
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2012-09-04 23:18:33 +00:00
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2016-02-17 13:11:37 -08:00
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2017-02-22 15:41:27 -08:00
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2014-05-06 12:50:08 -07:00
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2012-09-04 23:18:33 +00:00
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2012-10-19 18:20:25 +04:00
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2012-10-19 18:20:27 +04:00
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2012-12-18 14:22:27 -08:00
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2020-08-06 23:19:05 -07:00
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2021-06-28 19:34:33 -07:00
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2021-07-14 21:26:34 -07:00
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2020-08-06 23:19:05 -07:00
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2021-07-14 21:26:34 -07:00
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2020-08-06 23:19:05 -07:00
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2023-12-15 11:41:48 +08:00
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2020-08-06 23:19:05 -07:00
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2021-07-14 21:26:34 -07:00
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2020-08-06 23:19:05 -07:00
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2024-10-01 18:20:48 +02:00
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mm/memcontrol,alloc_tag: handle slabobj_ext access under KASAN poison
In the near future, slabobj_ext may reside outside the allocated slab
object range within a slab, which could be reported as an out-of-bounds
access by KASAN.
As suggested by Andrey Konovalov [1], explicitly disable KASAN and KMSAN
checks when accessing slabobj_ext within slab allocator, memory profiling,
and memory cgroup code. While an alternative approach could be to unpoison
slabobj_ext, out-of-bounds accesses outside the slab allocator are
generally more common.
Move metadata_access_enable()/disable() helpers to mm/slab.h so that
it can be used outside mm/slub.c. However, as suggested by Suren
Baghdasaryan [2], instead of calling them directly from mm code (which is
more prone to errors), change users to access slabobj_ext via get/put
APIs:
- Users should call get_slab_obj_exts() to access slabobj_metadata
and call put_slab_obj_exts() when it's done.
- From now on, accessing it outside the section covered by
get_slab_obj_exts() ~ put_slab_obj_exts() is illegal.
This ensures that accesses to slabobj_ext metadata won't be reported
as access violations.
Call kasan_reset_tag() in slab_obj_ext() before returning the address to
prevent SW or HW tag-based KASAN from reporting false positives.
Suggested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CA+fCnZezoWn40BaS3cgmCeLwjT+5AndzcQLc=wH3BjMCu6_YCw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAJuCfpG=Lb4WhYuPkSpdNO4Ehtjm1YcEEK0OM=3g9i=LxmpHSQ@mail.gmail.com [2]
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113061845.159790-7-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2026-01-13 15:18:42 +09:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +01:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +01:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:40 +09:00
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mm/memcontrol,alloc_tag: handle slabobj_ext access under KASAN poison
In the near future, slabobj_ext may reside outside the allocated slab
object range within a slab, which could be reported as an out-of-bounds
access by KASAN.
As suggested by Andrey Konovalov [1], explicitly disable KASAN and KMSAN
checks when accessing slabobj_ext within slab allocator, memory profiling,
and memory cgroup code. While an alternative approach could be to unpoison
slabobj_ext, out-of-bounds accesses outside the slab allocator are
generally more common.
Move metadata_access_enable()/disable() helpers to mm/slab.h so that
it can be used outside mm/slub.c. However, as suggested by Suren
Baghdasaryan [2], instead of calling them directly from mm code (which is
more prone to errors), change users to access slabobj_ext via get/put
APIs:
- Users should call get_slab_obj_exts() to access slabobj_metadata
and call put_slab_obj_exts() when it's done.
- From now on, accessing it outside the section covered by
get_slab_obj_exts() ~ put_slab_obj_exts() is illegal.
This ensures that accesses to slabobj_ext metadata won't be reported
as access violations.
Call kasan_reset_tag() in slab_obj_ext() before returning the address to
prevent SW or HW tag-based KASAN from reporting false positives.
Suggested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CA+fCnZezoWn40BaS3cgmCeLwjT+5AndzcQLc=wH3BjMCu6_YCw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAJuCfpG=Lb4WhYuPkSpdNO4Ehtjm1YcEEK0OM=3g9i=LxmpHSQ@mail.gmail.com [2]
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113061845.159790-7-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2026-01-13 15:18:42 +09:00
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +01:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:40 +09:00
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +01:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +01:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2025-09-15 13:09:17 -07:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:40 +09:00
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mm/memcontrol,alloc_tag: handle slabobj_ext access under KASAN poison
In the near future, slabobj_ext may reside outside the allocated slab
object range within a slab, which could be reported as an out-of-bounds
access by KASAN.
As suggested by Andrey Konovalov [1], explicitly disable KASAN and KMSAN
checks when accessing slabobj_ext within slab allocator, memory profiling,
and memory cgroup code. While an alternative approach could be to unpoison
slabobj_ext, out-of-bounds accesses outside the slab allocator are
generally more common.
Move metadata_access_enable()/disable() helpers to mm/slab.h so that
it can be used outside mm/slub.c. However, as suggested by Suren
Baghdasaryan [2], instead of calling them directly from mm code (which is
more prone to errors), change users to access slabobj_ext via get/put
APIs:
- Users should call get_slab_obj_exts() to access slabobj_metadata
and call put_slab_obj_exts() when it's done.
- From now on, accessing it outside the section covered by
get_slab_obj_exts() ~ put_slab_obj_exts() is illegal.
This ensures that accesses to slabobj_ext metadata won't be reported
as access violations.
Call kasan_reset_tag() in slab_obj_ext() before returning the address to
prevent SW or HW tag-based KASAN from reporting false positives.
Suggested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CA+fCnZezoWn40BaS3cgmCeLwjT+5AndzcQLc=wH3BjMCu6_YCw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAJuCfpG=Lb4WhYuPkSpdNO4Ehtjm1YcEEK0OM=3g9i=LxmpHSQ@mail.gmail.com [2]
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113061845.159790-7-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2026-01-13 15:18:42 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:41 +09:00
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mm/slab: change stride type from unsigned short to unsigned int
Commit 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
defined the type of slab->stride as unsigned short, because the author
initially planned to store stride within the lower 16 bits of the
page_type field, but later stored it in unused bits in the counters
field instead.
However, the idea of having only 2-byte stride turned out to be a
serious mistake. On systems with 64k pages, order-1 pages are 128k,
which is larger than USHRT_MAX. It triggers a debug warning because
s->size is 128k while stride, truncated to 2 bytes, becomes zero:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Warning! stride (0) != s->size (131072)
WARNING: mm/slub.c:2231 at alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534, CPU#6: systemd-sysctl/307
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 307 Comm: systemd-sysctl Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #6 PREEMPTLAZY
Hardware name: IBM,9009-22A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.E0 (VL950_179) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000008a9ac0 LR: c0000000008a9abc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000141f7390 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (7.0.0-rc1+)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28004400 XER: 00000005
CFAR: c000000000279318 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0000000008a9abc c0000000141f7630 c00000000252a300 c00000001427b200
GPR04: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 c000000000278fd0 0000000000000000
GPR08: fffffffffffe0000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000022004400
GPR12: c000000000f644b0 c000000017ff8f00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7aa0 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7a88
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000400cc0 ffffffffffffffff c00000001427b180
GPR24: 0000000000000004 00000000000c0cc0 c000000004e89a20 c00000005de90011
GPR28: 0000000000010010 c00000005df00000 c000000006017f80 c00c000000177a00
NIP [c0000000008a9ac0] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534
LR [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534
Call Trace:
[c0000000141f7630] [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534 (unreliable)
[c0000000141f76c0] [c0000000008aafbc] allocate_slab+0x154/0x94c
[c0000000141f7760] [c0000000008b41c0] refill_objects+0x124/0x16c
[c0000000141f77c0] [c0000000008b4be0] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2b0/0x444
[c0000000141f7810] [c0000000008b9600] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x840/0x914
[c0000000141f7900] [c000000000a3dd40] seq_read_iter+0x60c/0xb00
[c0000000141f7a10] [c000000000b36b24] proc_reg_read_iter+0x154/0x1fc
[c0000000141f7a50] [c0000000009cee7c] vfs_read+0x39c/0x4e4
[c0000000141f7b30] [c0000000009d0214] ksys_read+0x9c/0x180
[c0000000141f7b90] [c00000000003a8d0] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4b0
[c0000000141f7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
This leads to slab_obj_ext() returning the first slabobj_ext or all
objects and confuses the reference counting of object cgroups [1] and
memory (un)charging for memory cgroups [2].
Fortunately, the counters field has 32 unused bits instead of 16
on 64-bit CPUs, which is wide enough to hold any value of s->size.
Change the type to unsigned int.
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ca241daa-e7e7-4604-a48d-de91ec9184a5@linux.ibm.com [1]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ddff7c7d-c0c3-4780-808f-9a83268bbf0c@linux.ibm.com [2]
Fixes: 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303135722.2680521-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>
2026-03-03 22:57:22 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:41 +09:00
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mm/slab: change stride type from unsigned short to unsigned int
Commit 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
defined the type of slab->stride as unsigned short, because the author
initially planned to store stride within the lower 16 bits of the
page_type field, but later stored it in unused bits in the counters
field instead.
However, the idea of having only 2-byte stride turned out to be a
serious mistake. On systems with 64k pages, order-1 pages are 128k,
which is larger than USHRT_MAX. It triggers a debug warning because
s->size is 128k while stride, truncated to 2 bytes, becomes zero:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Warning! stride (0) != s->size (131072)
WARNING: mm/slub.c:2231 at alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534, CPU#6: systemd-sysctl/307
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 307 Comm: systemd-sysctl Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #6 PREEMPTLAZY
Hardware name: IBM,9009-22A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.E0 (VL950_179) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000008a9ac0 LR: c0000000008a9abc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000141f7390 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (7.0.0-rc1+)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28004400 XER: 00000005
CFAR: c000000000279318 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0000000008a9abc c0000000141f7630 c00000000252a300 c00000001427b200
GPR04: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 c000000000278fd0 0000000000000000
GPR08: fffffffffffe0000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000022004400
GPR12: c000000000f644b0 c000000017ff8f00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7aa0 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7a88
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000400cc0 ffffffffffffffff c00000001427b180
GPR24: 0000000000000004 00000000000c0cc0 c000000004e89a20 c00000005de90011
GPR28: 0000000000010010 c00000005df00000 c000000006017f80 c00c000000177a00
NIP [c0000000008a9ac0] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534
LR [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534
Call Trace:
[c0000000141f7630] [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534 (unreliable)
[c0000000141f76c0] [c0000000008aafbc] allocate_slab+0x154/0x94c
[c0000000141f7760] [c0000000008b41c0] refill_objects+0x124/0x16c
[c0000000141f77c0] [c0000000008b4be0] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2b0/0x444
[c0000000141f7810] [c0000000008b9600] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x840/0x914
[c0000000141f7900] [c000000000a3dd40] seq_read_iter+0x60c/0xb00
[c0000000141f7a10] [c000000000b36b24] proc_reg_read_iter+0x154/0x1fc
[c0000000141f7a50] [c0000000009cee7c] vfs_read+0x39c/0x4e4
[c0000000141f7b30] [c0000000009d0214] ksys_read+0x9c/0x180
[c0000000141f7b90] [c00000000003a8d0] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4b0
[c0000000141f7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
This leads to slab_obj_ext() returning the first slabobj_ext or all
objects and confuses the reference counting of object cgroups [1] and
memory (un)charging for memory cgroups [2].
Fortunately, the counters field has 32 unused bits instead of 16
on 64-bit CPUs, which is wide enough to hold any value of s->size.
Change the type to unsigned int.
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ca241daa-e7e7-4604-a48d-de91ec9184a5@linux.ibm.com [1]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ddff7c7d-c0c3-4780-808f-9a83268bbf0c@linux.ibm.com [2]
Fixes: 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303135722.2680521-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>
2026-03-03 22:57:22 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:41 +09:00
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mm/slab: change stride type from unsigned short to unsigned int
Commit 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
defined the type of slab->stride as unsigned short, because the author
initially planned to store stride within the lower 16 bits of the
page_type field, but later stored it in unused bits in the counters
field instead.
However, the idea of having only 2-byte stride turned out to be a
serious mistake. On systems with 64k pages, order-1 pages are 128k,
which is larger than USHRT_MAX. It triggers a debug warning because
s->size is 128k while stride, truncated to 2 bytes, becomes zero:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Warning! stride (0) != s->size (131072)
WARNING: mm/slub.c:2231 at alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534, CPU#6: systemd-sysctl/307
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 307 Comm: systemd-sysctl Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #6 PREEMPTLAZY
Hardware name: IBM,9009-22A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.E0 (VL950_179) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000008a9ac0 LR: c0000000008a9abc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000141f7390 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (7.0.0-rc1+)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28004400 XER: 00000005
CFAR: c000000000279318 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0000000008a9abc c0000000141f7630 c00000000252a300 c00000001427b200
GPR04: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 c000000000278fd0 0000000000000000
GPR08: fffffffffffe0000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000022004400
GPR12: c000000000f644b0 c000000017ff8f00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7aa0 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7a88
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000400cc0 ffffffffffffffff c00000001427b180
GPR24: 0000000000000004 00000000000c0cc0 c000000004e89a20 c00000005de90011
GPR28: 0000000000010010 c00000005df00000 c000000006017f80 c00c000000177a00
NIP [c0000000008a9ac0] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534
LR [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534
Call Trace:
[c0000000141f7630] [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534 (unreliable)
[c0000000141f76c0] [c0000000008aafbc] allocate_slab+0x154/0x94c
[c0000000141f7760] [c0000000008b41c0] refill_objects+0x124/0x16c
[c0000000141f77c0] [c0000000008b4be0] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2b0/0x444
[c0000000141f7810] [c0000000008b9600] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x840/0x914
[c0000000141f7900] [c000000000a3dd40] seq_read_iter+0x60c/0xb00
[c0000000141f7a10] [c000000000b36b24] proc_reg_read_iter+0x154/0x1fc
[c0000000141f7a50] [c0000000009cee7c] vfs_read+0x39c/0x4e4
[c0000000141f7b30] [c0000000009d0214] ksys_read+0x9c/0x180
[c0000000141f7b90] [c00000000003a8d0] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4b0
[c0000000141f7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
This leads to slab_obj_ext() returning the first slabobj_ext or all
objects and confuses the reference counting of object cgroups [1] and
memory (un)charging for memory cgroups [2].
Fortunately, the counters field has 32 unused bits instead of 16
on 64-bit CPUs, which is wide enough to hold any value of s->size.
Change the type to unsigned int.
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ca241daa-e7e7-4604-a48d-de91ec9184a5@linux.ibm.com [1]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ddff7c7d-c0c3-4780-808f-9a83268bbf0c@linux.ibm.com [2]
Fixes: 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303135722.2680521-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>
2026-03-03 22:57:22 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:41 +09:00
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mm/slab: change stride type from unsigned short to unsigned int
Commit 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
defined the type of slab->stride as unsigned short, because the author
initially planned to store stride within the lower 16 bits of the
page_type field, but later stored it in unused bits in the counters
field instead.
However, the idea of having only 2-byte stride turned out to be a
serious mistake. On systems with 64k pages, order-1 pages are 128k,
which is larger than USHRT_MAX. It triggers a debug warning because
s->size is 128k while stride, truncated to 2 bytes, becomes zero:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Warning! stride (0) != s->size (131072)
WARNING: mm/slub.c:2231 at alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534, CPU#6: systemd-sysctl/307
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 307 Comm: systemd-sysctl Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #6 PREEMPTLAZY
Hardware name: IBM,9009-22A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.E0 (VL950_179) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000008a9ac0 LR: c0000000008a9abc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000141f7390 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (7.0.0-rc1+)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28004400 XER: 00000005
CFAR: c000000000279318 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: c0000000008a9abc c0000000141f7630 c00000000252a300 c00000001427b200
GPR04: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 c000000000278fd0 0000000000000000
GPR08: fffffffffffe0000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000022004400
GPR12: c000000000f644b0 c000000017ff8f00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7aa0 0000000000000000 c0000000141f7a88
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000400cc0 ffffffffffffffff c00000001427b180
GPR24: 0000000000000004 00000000000c0cc0 c000000004e89a20 c00000005de90011
GPR28: 0000000000010010 c00000005df00000 c000000006017f80 c00c000000177a00
NIP [c0000000008a9ac0] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x524/0x534
LR [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534
Call Trace:
[c0000000141f7630] [c0000000008a9abc] alloc_slab_obj_exts_early.constprop.0+0x520/0x534 (unreliable)
[c0000000141f76c0] [c0000000008aafbc] allocate_slab+0x154/0x94c
[c0000000141f7760] [c0000000008b41c0] refill_objects+0x124/0x16c
[c0000000141f77c0] [c0000000008b4be0] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2b0/0x444
[c0000000141f7810] [c0000000008b9600] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x840/0x914
[c0000000141f7900] [c000000000a3dd40] seq_read_iter+0x60c/0xb00
[c0000000141f7a10] [c000000000b36b24] proc_reg_read_iter+0x154/0x1fc
[c0000000141f7a50] [c0000000009cee7c] vfs_read+0x39c/0x4e4
[c0000000141f7b30] [c0000000009d0214] ksys_read+0x9c/0x180
[c0000000141f7b90] [c00000000003a8d0] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4b0
[c0000000141f7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
This leads to slab_obj_ext() returning the first slabobj_ext or all
objects and confuses the reference counting of object cgroups [1] and
memory (un)charging for memory cgroups [2].
Fortunately, the counters field has 32 unused bits instead of 16
on 64-bit CPUs, which is wide enough to hold any value of s->size.
Change the type to unsigned int.
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ca241daa-e7e7-4604-a48d-de91ec9184a5@linux.ibm.com [1]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ddff7c7d-c0c3-4780-808f-9a83268bbf0c@linux.ibm.com [2]
Fixes: 7a8e71bc619d ("mm/slab: use stride to access slabobj_ext")
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303135722.2680521-1-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>
Tested-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>
2026-03-03 22:57:22 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:41 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:40 +09:00
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mm/memcontrol,alloc_tag: handle slabobj_ext access under KASAN poison
In the near future, slabobj_ext may reside outside the allocated slab
object range within a slab, which could be reported as an out-of-bounds
access by KASAN.
As suggested by Andrey Konovalov [1], explicitly disable KASAN and KMSAN
checks when accessing slabobj_ext within slab allocator, memory profiling,
and memory cgroup code. While an alternative approach could be to unpoison
slabobj_ext, out-of-bounds accesses outside the slab allocator are
generally more common.
Move metadata_access_enable()/disable() helpers to mm/slab.h so that
it can be used outside mm/slub.c. However, as suggested by Suren
Baghdasaryan [2], instead of calling them directly from mm code (which is
more prone to errors), change users to access slabobj_ext via get/put
APIs:
- Users should call get_slab_obj_exts() to access slabobj_metadata
and call put_slab_obj_exts() when it's done.
- From now on, accessing it outside the section covered by
get_slab_obj_exts() ~ put_slab_obj_exts() is illegal.
This ensures that accesses to slabobj_ext metadata won't be reported
as access violations.
Call kasan_reset_tag() in slab_obj_ext() before returning the address to
prevent SW or HW tag-based KASAN from reporting false positives.
Suggested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CA+fCnZezoWn40BaS3cgmCeLwjT+5AndzcQLc=wH3BjMCu6_YCw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAJuCfpG=Lb4WhYuPkSpdNO4Ehtjm1YcEEK0OM=3g9i=LxmpHSQ@mail.gmail.com [2]
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113061845.159790-7-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2026-01-13 15:18:42 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:40 +09:00
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mm/memcontrol,alloc_tag: handle slabobj_ext access under KASAN poison
In the near future, slabobj_ext may reside outside the allocated slab
object range within a slab, which could be reported as an out-of-bounds
access by KASAN.
As suggested by Andrey Konovalov [1], explicitly disable KASAN and KMSAN
checks when accessing slabobj_ext within slab allocator, memory profiling,
and memory cgroup code. While an alternative approach could be to unpoison
slabobj_ext, out-of-bounds accesses outside the slab allocator are
generally more common.
Move metadata_access_enable()/disable() helpers to mm/slab.h so that
it can be used outside mm/slub.c. However, as suggested by Suren
Baghdasaryan [2], instead of calling them directly from mm code (which is
more prone to errors), change users to access slabobj_ext via get/put
APIs:
- Users should call get_slab_obj_exts() to access slabobj_metadata
and call put_slab_obj_exts() when it's done.
- From now on, accessing it outside the section covered by
get_slab_obj_exts() ~ put_slab_obj_exts() is illegal.
This ensures that accesses to slabobj_ext metadata won't be reported
as access violations.
Call kasan_reset_tag() in slab_obj_ext() before returning the address to
prevent SW or HW tag-based KASAN from reporting false positives.
Suggested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CA+fCnZezoWn40BaS3cgmCeLwjT+5AndzcQLc=wH3BjMCu6_YCw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAJuCfpG=Lb4WhYuPkSpdNO4Ehtjm1YcEEK0OM=3g9i=LxmpHSQ@mail.gmail.com [2]
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113061845.159790-7-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2026-01-13 15:18:42 +09:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:40 +09:00
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mm/memcontrol,alloc_tag: handle slabobj_ext access under KASAN poison
In the near future, slabobj_ext may reside outside the allocated slab
object range within a slab, which could be reported as an out-of-bounds
access by KASAN.
As suggested by Andrey Konovalov [1], explicitly disable KASAN and KMSAN
checks when accessing slabobj_ext within slab allocator, memory profiling,
and memory cgroup code. While an alternative approach could be to unpoison
slabobj_ext, out-of-bounds accesses outside the slab allocator are
generally more common.
Move metadata_access_enable()/disable() helpers to mm/slab.h so that
it can be used outside mm/slub.c. However, as suggested by Suren
Baghdasaryan [2], instead of calling them directly from mm code (which is
more prone to errors), change users to access slabobj_ext via get/put
APIs:
- Users should call get_slab_obj_exts() to access slabobj_metadata
and call put_slab_obj_exts() when it's done.
- From now on, accessing it outside the section covered by
get_slab_obj_exts() ~ put_slab_obj_exts() is illegal.
This ensures that accesses to slabobj_ext metadata won't be reported
as access violations.
Call kasan_reset_tag() in slab_obj_ext() before returning the address to
prevent SW or HW tag-based KASAN from reporting false positives.
Suggested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CA+fCnZezoWn40BaS3cgmCeLwjT+5AndzcQLc=wH3BjMCu6_YCw@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAJuCfpG=Lb4WhYuPkSpdNO4Ehtjm1YcEEK0OM=3g9i=LxmpHSQ@mail.gmail.com [2]
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113061845.159790-7-harry.yoo@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2026-01-13 15:18:42 +09:00
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +01:00
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2024-03-26 11:37:39 +01:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:40 +09:00
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +01:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:41 +09:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2024-03-26 11:37:39 +01:00
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2020-08-06 23:20:52 -07:00
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2024-03-26 11:37:39 +01:00
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2020-08-06 23:20:52 -07:00
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2024-03-26 11:37:39 +01:00
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2024-07-01 11:31:15 -04:00
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2024-03-26 11:37:39 +01:00
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2026-01-13 15:18:40 +09:00
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2024-03-21 09:36:28 -07:00
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2012-12-18 14:22:46 -08:00
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2025-02-03 10:28:49 +01:00
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2025-11-13 00:09:16 +00:00
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2023-10-02 17:43:38 +02:00
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2017-11-15 17:32:07 -08:00
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mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to
KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine
instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent
access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is
able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated.
When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes
KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the
allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens,
it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it
retains the allocation/deallocation stacks).
When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old
allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this
object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning.
Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't
reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a
use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place.
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a
cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are
moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows
memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue
until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the
maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical
memory).
As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report
accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is
increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse
it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect
incorrect accesses to it.
Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been
suggested by Andrey Ryabinin.
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-20 16:59:11 -07:00
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2016-07-26 15:21:56 -07:00
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mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10.
Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options.
These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the
page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes. SLOB allocator
isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates
handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly.
Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are
initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access
stale data by using a dangling pointer.
As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to
disable initialization for certain allocations. There's not enough
evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways
to opt-out may result in things going out of control.
This patch (of 2):
The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it
gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the
boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks
where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)
init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the
places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.
init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data
doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.
Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with
constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never
zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.
Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take
precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only
applied to unpoisoned allocations.
Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0:
hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)
The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline
is within the standard error.
The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the
same cost as memory initialization.
Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various
arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
it seems reasonable to include it in this series.
[glider@google.com: v8]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v10]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> [page and dmapool parts
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>]
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-11 20:59:19 -07:00
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2021-04-01 16:23:43 -07:00
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mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10.
Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options.
These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the
page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes. SLOB allocator
isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates
handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly.
Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are
initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access
stale data by using a dangling pointer.
As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to
disable initialization for certain allocations. There's not enough
evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways
to opt-out may result in things going out of control.
This patch (of 2):
The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it
gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the
boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks
where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)
init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the
places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.
init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data
doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.
Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with
constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never
zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.
Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take
precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only
applied to unpoisoned allocations.
Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0:
hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)
The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline
is within the standard error.
The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the
same cost as memory initialization.
Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various
arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
it seems reasonable to include it in this series.
[glider@google.com: v8]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v10]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> [page and dmapool parts
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>]
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-11 20:59:19 -07:00
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2021-04-01 16:23:43 -07:00
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mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10.
Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options.
These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the
page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes. SLOB allocator
isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates
handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly.
Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are
initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access
stale data by using a dangling pointer.
As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to
disable initialization for certain allocations. There's not enough
evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways
to opt-out may result in things going out of control.
This patch (of 2):
The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.
This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it
gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the
boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks
where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)
init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the
places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.
init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data
doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.
Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with
constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never
zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.
Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.
If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take
precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only
applied to unpoisoned allocations.
Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0:
hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)
The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline
is within the standard error.
The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the
same cost as memory initialization.
Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various
arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
it seems reasonable to include it in this series.
[glider@google.com: v8]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v10]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> [page and dmapool parts
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>]
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-11 20:59:19 -07:00
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2021-06-28 19:34:55 -07:00
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2021-01-07 13:46:11 -08:00
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mm: Add mem_dump_obj() to print source of memory block
There are kernel facilities such as per-CPU reference counts that give
error messages in generic handlers or callbacks, whose messages are
unenlightening. In the case of per-CPU reference-count underflow, this
is not a problem when creating a new use of this facility because in that
case the bug is almost certainly in the code implementing that new use.
However, trouble arises when deploying across many systems, which might
exercise corner cases that were not seen during development and testing.
Here, it would be really nice to get some kind of hint as to which of
several uses the underflow was caused by.
This commit therefore exposes a mem_dump_obj() function that takes
a pointer to memory (which must still be allocated if it has been
dynamically allocated) and prints available information on where that
memory came from. This pointer can reference the middle of the block as
well as the beginning of the block, as needed by things like RCU callback
functions and timer handlers that might not know where the beginning of
the memory block is. These functions and handlers can use mem_dump_obj()
to print out better hints as to where the problem might lie.
The information printed can depend on kernel configuration. For example,
the allocation return address can be printed only for slab and slub,
and even then only when the necessary debug has been enabled. For slab,
build with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB=y, and either use sizes with ample space
to the next power of two or use the SLAB_STORE_USER when creating the
kmem_cache structure. For slub, build with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y and
boot with slub_debug=U, or pass SLAB_STORE_USER to kmem_cache_create()
if more focused use is desired. Also for slub, use CONFIG_STACKTRACE
to enable printing of the allocation-time stack trace.
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
[ paulmck: Convert to printing and change names per Joonsoo Kim. ]
[ paulmck: Move slab definition per Stephen Rothwell and kbuild test robot. ]
[ paulmck: Handle CONFIG_MMU=n case where vmalloc() is kmalloc(). ]
[ paulmck: Apply Vlastimil Babka feedback on slab.c kmem_provenance(). ]
[ paulmck: Extract more info from !SLUB_DEBUG per Joonsoo Kim. ]
[ paulmck: Explicitly check for small pointers per Naresh Kamboju. ]
Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
2020-12-07 17:41:02 -08:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:55 +01:00
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mm: Add mem_dump_obj() to print source of memory block
There are kernel facilities such as per-CPU reference counts that give
error messages in generic handlers or callbacks, whose messages are
unenlightening. In the case of per-CPU reference-count underflow, this
is not a problem when creating a new use of this facility because in that
case the bug is almost certainly in the code implementing that new use.
However, trouble arises when deploying across many systems, which might
exercise corner cases that were not seen during development and testing.
Here, it would be really nice to get some kind of hint as to which of
several uses the underflow was caused by.
This commit therefore exposes a mem_dump_obj() function that takes
a pointer to memory (which must still be allocated if it has been
dynamically allocated) and prints available information on where that
memory came from. This pointer can reference the middle of the block as
well as the beginning of the block, as needed by things like RCU callback
functions and timer handlers that might not know where the beginning of
the memory block is. These functions and handlers can use mem_dump_obj()
to print out better hints as to where the problem might lie.
The information printed can depend on kernel configuration. For example,
the allocation return address can be printed only for slab and slub,
and even then only when the necessary debug has been enabled. For slab,
build with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB=y, and either use sizes with ample space
to the next power of two or use the SLAB_STORE_USER when creating the
kmem_cache structure. For slub, build with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y and
boot with slub_debug=U, or pass SLAB_STORE_USER to kmem_cache_create()
if more focused use is desired. Also for slub, use CONFIG_STACKTRACE
to enable printing of the allocation-time stack trace.
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
[ paulmck: Convert to printing and change names per Joonsoo Kim. ]
[ paulmck: Move slab definition per Stephen Rothwell and kbuild test robot. ]
[ paulmck: Handle CONFIG_MMU=n case where vmalloc() is kmalloc(). ]
[ paulmck: Apply Vlastimil Babka feedback on slab.c kmem_provenance(). ]
[ paulmck: Extract more info from !SLUB_DEBUG per Joonsoo Kim. ]
[ paulmck: Explicitly check for small pointers per Naresh Kamboju. ]
Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
2020-12-07 17:41:02 -08:00
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2021-03-16 16:07:11 +05:30
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|
mm: Add mem_dump_obj() to print source of memory block
There are kernel facilities such as per-CPU reference counts that give
error messages in generic handlers or callbacks, whose messages are
unenlightening. In the case of per-CPU reference-count underflow, this
is not a problem when creating a new use of this facility because in that
case the bug is almost certainly in the code implementing that new use.
However, trouble arises when deploying across many systems, which might
exercise corner cases that were not seen during development and testing.
Here, it would be really nice to get some kind of hint as to which of
several uses the underflow was caused by.
This commit therefore exposes a mem_dump_obj() function that takes
a pointer to memory (which must still be allocated if it has been
dynamically allocated) and prints available information on where that
memory came from. This pointer can reference the middle of the block as
well as the beginning of the block, as needed by things like RCU callback
functions and timer handlers that might not know where the beginning of
the memory block is. These functions and handlers can use mem_dump_obj()
to print out better hints as to where the problem might lie.
The information printed can depend on kernel configuration. For example,
the allocation return address can be printed only for slab and slub,
and even then only when the necessary debug has been enabled. For slab,
build with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB=y, and either use sizes with ample space
to the next power of two or use the SLAB_STORE_USER when creating the
kmem_cache structure. For slub, build with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y and
boot with slub_debug=U, or pass SLAB_STORE_USER to kmem_cache_create()
if more focused use is desired. Also for slub, use CONFIG_STACKTRACE
to enable printing of the allocation-time stack trace.
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
[ paulmck: Convert to printing and change names per Joonsoo Kim. ]
[ paulmck: Move slab definition per Stephen Rothwell and kbuild test robot. ]
[ paulmck: Handle CONFIG_MMU=n case where vmalloc() is kmalloc(). ]
[ paulmck: Apply Vlastimil Babka feedback on slab.c kmem_provenance(). ]
[ paulmck: Extract more info from !SLUB_DEBUG per Joonsoo Kim. ]
[ paulmck: Explicitly check for small pointers per Naresh Kamboju. ]
Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
2020-12-07 17:41:02 -08:00
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2022-04-14 19:13:40 -07:00
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2021-01-07 13:46:11 -08:00
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mm: Add mem_dump_obj() to print source of memory block
There are kernel facilities such as per-CPU reference counts that give
error messages in generic handlers or callbacks, whose messages are
unenlightening. In the case of per-CPU reference-count underflow, this
is not a problem when creating a new use of this facility because in that
case the bug is almost certainly in the code implementing that new use.
However, trouble arises when deploying across many systems, which might
exercise corner cases that were not seen during development and testing.
Here, it would be really nice to get some kind of hint as to which of
several uses the underflow was caused by.
This commit therefore exposes a mem_dump_obj() function that takes
a pointer to memory (which must still be allocated if it has been
dynamically allocated) and prints available information on where that
memory came from. This pointer can reference the middle of the block as
well as the beginning of the block, as needed by things like RCU callback
functions and timer handlers that might not know where the beginning of
the memory block is. These functions and handlers can use mem_dump_obj()
to print out better hints as to where the problem might lie.
The information printed can depend on kernel configuration. For example,
the allocation return address can be printed only for slab and slub,
and even then only when the necessary debug has been enabled. For slab,
build with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB=y, and either use sizes with ample space
to the next power of two or use the SLAB_STORE_USER when creating the
kmem_cache structure. For slub, build with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y and
boot with slub_debug=U, or pass SLAB_STORE_USER to kmem_cache_create()
if more focused use is desired. Also for slub, use CONFIG_STACKTRACE
to enable printing of the allocation-time stack trace.
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
[ paulmck: Convert to printing and change names per Joonsoo Kim. ]
[ paulmck: Move slab definition per Stephen Rothwell and kbuild test robot. ]
[ paulmck: Handle CONFIG_MMU=n case where vmalloc() is kmalloc(). ]
[ paulmck: Apply Vlastimil Babka feedback on slab.c kmem_provenance(). ]
[ paulmck: Extract more info from !SLUB_DEBUG per Joonsoo Kim. ]
[ paulmck: Explicitly check for small pointers per Naresh Kamboju. ]
Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
2020-12-07 17:41:02 -08:00
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2021-10-04 14:45:56 +01:00
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2025-09-08 18:00:07 -07:00
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2024-09-11 14:45:31 +08:00
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mm/slub: extend redzone check to extra allocated kmalloc space than requested
kmalloc will round up the request size to a fixed size (mostly power
of 2), so there could be a extra space than what is requested, whose
size is the actual buffer size minus original request size.
To better detect out of bound access or abuse of this space, add
redzone sanity check for it.
In current kernel, some kmalloc user already knows the existence of
the space and utilizes it after calling 'ksize()' to know the real
size of the allocated buffer. So we skip the sanity check for objects
which have been called with ksize(), as treating them as legitimate
users. Kees Cook is working on sanitizing all these user cases,
by using kmalloc_size_roundup() to avoid ambiguous usages. And after
this is done, this special handling for ksize() can be removed.
In some cases, the free pointer could be saved inside the latter
part of object data area, which may overlap the redzone part(for
small sizes of kmalloc objects). As suggested by Hyeonggon Yoo,
force the free pointer to be in meta data area when kmalloc redzone
debug is enabled, to make all kmalloc objects covered by redzone
check.
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
2022-10-21 11:24:05 +08:00
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2014-08-06 16:04:14 -07:00
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