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linux/security/apparmor/include/file.h

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AppArmor: file enforcement routines AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching. Matching is done at file open using a dfa match engine. Permission is against the final file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories as part of the file match is implicitly allowed. In the case of nonexistant files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the directory. eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/. The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table, but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing of wider accept states. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:04 -07:00
headers: path.h redux Remove path.h from sched.h and other files. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-10 08:17:10 +02:00
AppArmor: file enforcement routines AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching. Matching is done at file open using a dfa match engine. Permission is against the final file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories as part of the file match is implicitly allowed. In the case of nonexistant files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the directory. eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/. The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table, but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing of wider accept states. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:04 -07:00
userns: Convert apparmor to use kuid and kgid where appropriate Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-07 16:33:13 -08:00
AppArmor: file enforcement routines AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching. Matching is done at file open using a dfa match engine. Permission is against the final file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories as part of the file match is implicitly allowed. In the case of nonexistant files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the directory. eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/. The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table, but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing of wider accept states. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:04 -07:00
AppArmor: Fix underflow in xindex calculation If the xindex value stored in the accept tables is 0, the extraction of that value will result in an underflow (0 - 4). In properly compiled policy this should not happen for file rules but it may be possible for other rule types in the future. To exploit this underflow a user would have to be able to load a corrupt policy, which requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN, overwrite system policy in kernel memory or know of a compiler error resulting in the flaw being present for loaded policy (no such flaw is known at this time). Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-02-22 00:32:30 -08:00
AppArmor: file enforcement routines AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching. Matching is done at file open using a dfa match engine. Permission is against the final file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories as part of the file match is implicitly allowed. In the case of nonexistant files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the directory. eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/. The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table, but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing of wider accept states. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:04 -07:00
userns: Convert apparmor to use kuid and kgid where appropriate Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-07 16:33:13 -08:00
AppArmor: file enforcement routines AppArmor does files enforcement via pathname matching. Matching is done at file open using a dfa match engine. Permission is against the final file object not parent directories, ie. the traversal of directories as part of the file match is implicitly allowed. In the case of nonexistant files (creation) permissions are checked against the target file not the directory. eg. In case of creating the file /dir/new, permissions are checked against the match /dir/new not against /dir/. The permissions for matches are currently stored in the dfa accept table, but this will change to allow for dfa reuse and also to allow for sharing of wider accept states. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:04 -07:00