2019-06-03 07:44:50 +02:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2025-10-10 15:01:16 +02:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2017-07-14 16:39:21 +01:00
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2016-11-03 20:23:05 +00:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2016-07-01 16:53:00 +01:00
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2018-09-20 10:26:40 +01:00
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2020-04-27 09:00:16 -07:00
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2020-05-15 14:11:05 +01:00
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arm64: mpam: Context switch the MPAM registers
MPAM allows traffic in the SoC to be labeled by the OS, these labels are
used to apply policy in caches and bandwidth regulators, and to monitor
traffic in the SoC. The label is made up of a PARTID and PMG value. The x86
equivalent calls these CLOSID and RMID, but they don't map precisely.
MPAM has two CPU system registers that is used to hold the PARTID and PMG
values that traffic generated at each exception level will use. These can
be set per-task by the resctrl file system. (resctrl is the defacto
interface for controlling this stuff).
Add a helper to switch this.
struct task_struct's separate CLOSID and RMID fields are insufficient to
implement resctrl using MPAM, as resctrl can change the PARTID (CLOSID) and
PMG (sort of like the RMID) separately. On x86, the rmid is an independent
number, so a race that writes a mismatched closid and rmid into hardware is
benign. On arm64, the pmg bits extend the partid.
(i.e. partid-5 has a pmg-0 that is not the same as partid-6's pmg-0). In
this case, mismatching the values will 'dirty' a pmg value that resctrl
believes is clean, and is not tracking with its 'limbo' code.
To avoid this, the partid and pmg are always read and written as a
pair. This requires a new u64 field. In struct task_struct there are two
u32, rmid and closid for the x86 case, but as we can't use them here do
something else. Add this new field, mpam_partid_pmg, to struct thread_info
to avoid adding more architecture specific code to struct task_struct.
Always use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() when accessing this field.
Resctrl allows a per-cpu 'default' value to be set, this overrides the
values when scheduling a task in the default control-group, which has
PARTID 0. The way 'code data prioritisation' gets emulated means the
register value for the default group needs to be a variable.
The current system register value is kept in a per-cpu variable to avoid
writing to the system register if the value isn't going to change. Writes
to this register may reset the hardware state for regulating bandwidth.
Finally, there is no reason to context switch these registers unless there
is a driver changing the values in struct task_struct. Hide the whole thing
behind a static key. This also allows the driver to disable MPAM in
response to errors reported by hardware. Move the existing static key to
belong to the arch code, as in the future the MPAM driver may become a
loadable module.
All this should depend on whether there is an MPAM driver, hide it behind
CONFIG_ARM64_MPAM.
Tested-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com>
Tested-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@oss.qualcomm.com>
Tested-by: Jesse Chick <jessechick@os.amperecomputing.com>
CC: Amit Singh Tomar <amitsinght@marvell.com>
Reviewed-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Ben Horgan <ben.horgan@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Horgan <ben.horgan@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
2026-03-13 14:45:43 +00:00
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2020-04-27 09:00:16 -07:00
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2021-09-14 14:10:29 +02:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2017-08-20 13:20:48 +03:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2019-07-31 15:35:20 +02:00
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2025-03-05 11:49:25 +01:00
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2019-07-31 15:35:20 +02:00
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2025-06-30 10:45:02 -07:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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arm64/sve: Core task context handling
This patch adds the core support for switching and managing the SVE
architectural state of user tasks.
Calls to the existing FPSIMD low-level save/restore functions are
factored out as new functions task_fpsimd_{save,load}(), since SVE
now dynamically may or may not need to be handled at these points
depending on the kernel configuration, hardware features discovered
at boot, and the runtime state of the task. To make these
decisions as fast as possible, const cpucaps are used where
feasible, via the system_supports_sve() helper.
The SVE registers are only tracked for threads that have explicitly
used SVE, indicated by the new thread flag TIF_SVE. Otherwise, the
FPSIMD view of the architectural state is stored in
thread.fpsimd_state as usual.
When in use, the SVE registers are not stored directly in
thread_struct due to their potentially large and variable size.
Because the task_struct slab allocator must be configured very
early during kernel boot, it is also tricky to configure it
correctly to match the maximum vector length provided by the
hardware, since this depends on examining secondary CPUs as well as
the primary. Instead, a pointer sve_state in thread_struct points
to a dynamically allocated buffer containing the SVE register data,
and code is added to allocate and free this buffer at appropriate
times.
TIF_SVE is set when taking an SVE access trap from userspace, if
suitable hardware support has been detected. This enables SVE for
the thread: a subsequent return to userspace will disable the trap
accordingly. If such a trap is taken without sufficient system-
wide hardware support, SIGILL is sent to the thread instead as if
an undefined instruction had been executed: this may happen if
userspace tries to use SVE in a system where not all CPUs support
it for example.
The kernel will clear TIF_SVE and disable SVE for the thread
whenever an explicit syscall is made by userspace. For backwards
compatibility reasons and conformance with the spirit of the base
AArch64 procedure call standard, the subset of the SVE register
state that aliases the FPSIMD registers is still preserved across a
syscall even if this happens. The remainder of the SVE register
state logically becomes zero at syscall entry, though the actual
zeroing work is currently deferred until the thread next tries to
use SVE, causing another trap to the kernel. This implementation
is suboptimal: in the future, the fastpath case may be optimised
to zero the registers in-place and leave SVE enabled for the task,
where beneficial.
TIF_SVE is also cleared in the following slowpath cases, which are
taken as reasonable hints that the task may no longer use SVE:
* exec
* fork and clone
Code is added to sync data between thread.fpsimd_state and
thread.sve_state whenever enabling/disabling SVE, in a manner
consistent with the SVE architectural programmer's model.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
[will: added #include to fix allnoconfig build]
[will: use enable_daif in do_sve_acc]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-10-31 15:51:05 +00:00
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2021-10-19 18:22:14 +01:00
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2018-05-29 13:11:13 +01:00
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2019-07-23 19:58:39 +02:00
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2022-04-19 12:22:21 +01:00
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2022-04-19 12:22:19 +01:00
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2023-12-08 12:32:21 +01:00
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arm64: Implement prctl(PR_{G,S}ET_TSC)
On arm64, this prctl controls access to CNTVCT_EL0, CNTVCTSS_EL0 and
CNTFRQ_EL0 via CNTKCTL_EL1.EL0VCTEN. Since this bit is also used to
implement various erratum workarounds, check whether the CPU needs
a workaround whenever we potentially need to change it.
This is needed for a correct implementation of non-instrumenting
record-replay debugging on arm64 (i.e. rr; https://rr-project.org/).
rr must trap and record any sources of non-determinism from the
userspace program's perspective so it can be replayed later. This
includes the results of syscalls as well as the results of access
to architected timers exposed directly to the program. This prctl
was originally added for x86 by commit 8fb402bccf20 ("generic, x86:
add prctl commands PR_GET_TSC and PR_SET_TSC"), and rr uses it to
trap RDTSC on x86 for the same reason.
We also considered exposing this as a PTRACE_EVENT. However, prctl
seems like a better choice for these reasons:
1) In general an in-process control seems more useful than an
out-of-process control, since anything that you would be able to
do with ptrace could also be done with prctl (tracer can inject a
call to the prctl and handle signal-delivery-stops), and it avoids
needing an additional process (which will complicate debugging
of the ptraced process since it cannot have more than one tracer,
and will be incompatible with ptrace_scope=3) in cases where that
is not otherwise necessary.
2) Consistency with x86_64. Note that on x86_64, RDTSC has been there
since the start, so it's the same situation as on arm64.
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I233a1867d1ccebe2933a347552e7eae862344421
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240824015415.488474-1-pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2024-08-23 18:54:13 -07:00
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2025-12-15 15:03:19 +00:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2025-03-05 11:49:25 +01:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2014-05-08 11:20:23 +02:00
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2014-04-30 10:51:29 +01:00
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2019-05-23 10:06:18 +01:00
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2025-06-30 10:45:02 -07:00
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2016-11-02 14:40:46 +05:30
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2020-07-02 21:16:20 +01:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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|
|
arm64/sve: Core task context handling
This patch adds the core support for switching and managing the SVE
architectural state of user tasks.
Calls to the existing FPSIMD low-level save/restore functions are
factored out as new functions task_fpsimd_{save,load}(), since SVE
now dynamically may or may not need to be handled at these points
depending on the kernel configuration, hardware features discovered
at boot, and the runtime state of the task. To make these
decisions as fast as possible, const cpucaps are used where
feasible, via the system_supports_sve() helper.
The SVE registers are only tracked for threads that have explicitly
used SVE, indicated by the new thread flag TIF_SVE. Otherwise, the
FPSIMD view of the architectural state is stored in
thread.fpsimd_state as usual.
When in use, the SVE registers are not stored directly in
thread_struct due to their potentially large and variable size.
Because the task_struct slab allocator must be configured very
early during kernel boot, it is also tricky to configure it
correctly to match the maximum vector length provided by the
hardware, since this depends on examining secondary CPUs as well as
the primary. Instead, a pointer sve_state in thread_struct points
to a dynamically allocated buffer containing the SVE register data,
and code is added to allocate and free this buffer at appropriate
times.
TIF_SVE is set when taking an SVE access trap from userspace, if
suitable hardware support has been detected. This enables SVE for
the thread: a subsequent return to userspace will disable the trap
accordingly. If such a trap is taken without sufficient system-
wide hardware support, SIGILL is sent to the thread instead as if
an undefined instruction had been executed: this may happen if
userspace tries to use SVE in a system where not all CPUs support
it for example.
The kernel will clear TIF_SVE and disable SVE for the thread
whenever an explicit syscall is made by userspace. For backwards
compatibility reasons and conformance with the spirit of the base
AArch64 procedure call standard, the subset of the SVE register
state that aliases the FPSIMD registers is still preserved across a
syscall even if this happens. The remainder of the SVE register
state logically becomes zero at syscall entry, though the actual
zeroing work is currently deferred until the thread next tries to
use SVE, causing another trap to the kernel. This implementation
is suboptimal: in the future, the fastpath case may be optimised
to zero the registers in-place and leave SVE enabled for the task,
where beneficial.
TIF_SVE is also cleared in the following slowpath cases, which are
taken as reasonable hints that the task may no longer use SVE:
* exec
* fork and clone
Code is added to sync data between thread.fpsimd_state and
thread.sve_state whenever enabling/disabling SVE, in a manner
consistent with the SVE architectural programmer's model.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
[will: added #include to fix allnoconfig build]
[will: use enable_daif in do_sve_acc]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2017-10-31 15:51:05 +00:00
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2019-09-16 11:51:17 +01:00
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2020-10-22 20:09:23 -06:00
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|
arm64: Implement prctl(PR_{G,S}ET_TSC)
On arm64, this prctl controls access to CNTVCT_EL0, CNTVCTSS_EL0 and
CNTFRQ_EL0 via CNTKCTL_EL1.EL0VCTEN. Since this bit is also used to
implement various erratum workarounds, check whether the CPU needs
a workaround whenever we potentially need to change it.
This is needed for a correct implementation of non-instrumenting
record-replay debugging on arm64 (i.e. rr; https://rr-project.org/).
rr must trap and record any sources of non-determinism from the
userspace program's perspective so it can be replayed later. This
includes the results of syscalls as well as the results of access
to architected timers exposed directly to the program. This prctl
was originally added for x86 by commit 8fb402bccf20 ("generic, x86:
add prctl commands PR_GET_TSC and PR_SET_TSC"), and rr uses it to
trap RDTSC on x86 for the same reason.
We also considered exposing this as a PTRACE_EVENT. However, prctl
seems like a better choice for these reasons:
1) In general an in-process control seems more useful than an
out-of-process control, since anything that you would be able to
do with ptrace could also be done with prctl (tracer can inject a
call to the prctl and handle signal-delivery-stops), and it avoids
needing an additional process (which will complicate debugging
of the ptraced process since it cannot have more than one tracer,
and will be incompatible with ptrace_scope=3) in cases where that
is not otherwise necessary.
2) Consistency with x86_64. Note that on x86_64, RDTSC has been there
since the start, so it's the same situation as on arm64.
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I233a1867d1ccebe2933a347552e7eae862344421
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240824015415.488474-1-pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2024-08-23 18:54:13 -07:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2014-04-30 10:51:29 +01:00
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2014-05-30 12:34:15 -07:00
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2020-01-28 13:50:32 +01:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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2020-04-27 09:00:16 -07:00
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2020-05-15 14:11:05 +01:00
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2020-04-27 09:00:16 -07:00
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2018-05-24 15:54:30 +01:00
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2020-04-27 09:00:16 -07:00
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2018-05-24 15:54:30 +01:00
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2012-03-05 11:49:28 +00:00
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