linux/include/crypto/hash.h

1055 lines
37 KiB

crypto - shash: reduce minimum alignment of shash_desc structure Unlike many other structure types defined in the crypto API, the 'shash_desc' structure is permitted to live on the stack, which implies its contents may not be accessed by DMA masters. (This is due to the fact that the stack may be located in the vmalloc area, which requires a different virtual-to-physical translation than the one implemented by the DMA subsystem) Our definition of CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR is based on ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN, which may take DMA constraints into account on architectures that support non-cache coherent DMA such as ARM and arm64. In this case, the value is chosen to reflect the largest cacheline size in the system, in order to ensure that explicit cache maintenance as required by non-coherent DMA masters does not affect adjacent, unrelated slab allocations. On arm64, this value is currently set at 128 bytes. This means that applying CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR to struct shash_desc is both unnecessary (as it is never used for DMA), and undesirable, given that it wastes stack space (on arm64, performing the alignment costs 112 bytes in the worst case, and the hole between the 'tfm' and '__ctx' members takes up another 120 bytes, resulting in an increased stack footprint of up to 232 bytes.) So instead, let's switch to the minimum SLAB alignment, which does not take DMA constraints into account. Note that this is a no-op for x86. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-01-13 10:11:35 +01:00
crypto: hash - fix incorrect HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE The "hmac(sha3-224-generic)" algorithm has a descsize of 368 bytes, which is greater than HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE (360) which is only enough for sha3-224-generic. The check in shash_prepare_alg() doesn't catch this because the HMAC template doesn't set descsize on the algorithms, but rather sets it on each individual HMAC transform. This causes a stack buffer overflow when SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() is used with hmac(sha3-224-generic). Fix it by increasing HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE to the real maximum. Also add a sanity check to hmac_init(). This was detected by the improved crypto self-tests in v5.2, by loading the tcrypt module with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y enabled. I didn't notice this bug when I ran the self-tests by requesting the algorithms via AF_ALG (i.e., not using tcrypt), probably because the stack layout differs in the two cases and that made a difference here. KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223 Write of size 360 at addr ffff8880651defc8 by task insmod/3689 CPU: 2 PID: 3689 Comm: insmod Tainted: G E 5.1.0-10741-g35c99ffa20edd #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x86/0xc5 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x7f/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report+0x144/0x187 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:125 memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline] shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto_shash_import include/crypto/hash.h:880 [inline] hmac_import+0x184/0x240 crypto/hmac.c:102 hmac_init+0x96/0xc0 crypto/hmac.c:107 crypto_shash_init include/crypto/hash.h:902 [inline] shash_digest_unaligned+0x9f/0xf0 crypto/shash.c:194 crypto_shash_digest+0xe9/0x1b0 crypto/shash.c:211 generate_random_hash_testvec.constprop.11+0x1ec/0x5b0 crypto/testmgr.c:1331 test_hash_vs_generic_impl+0x3f7/0x5c0 crypto/testmgr.c:1420 __alg_test_hash+0x26d/0x340 crypto/testmgr.c:1502 alg_test_hash+0x22e/0x330 crypto/testmgr.c:1552 alg_test.part.7+0x132/0x610 crypto/testmgr.c:4931 alg_test+0x1f/0x40 crypto/testmgr.c:4952 Fixes: b68a7ec1e9a3 ("crypto: hash - Remove VLA usage") Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-05-14 16:13:15 -07:00
crypto: hash - fix incorrect HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE The "hmac(sha3-224-generic)" algorithm has a descsize of 368 bytes, which is greater than HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE (360) which is only enough for sha3-224-generic. The check in shash_prepare_alg() doesn't catch this because the HMAC template doesn't set descsize on the algorithms, but rather sets it on each individual HMAC transform. This causes a stack buffer overflow when SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() is used with hmac(sha3-224-generic). Fix it by increasing HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE to the real maximum. Also add a sanity check to hmac_init(). This was detected by the improved crypto self-tests in v5.2, by loading the tcrypt module with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y enabled. I didn't notice this bug when I ran the self-tests by requesting the algorithms via AF_ALG (i.e., not using tcrypt), probably because the stack layout differs in the two cases and that made a difference here. KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223 Write of size 360 at addr ffff8880651defc8 by task insmod/3689 CPU: 2 PID: 3689 Comm: insmod Tainted: G E 5.1.0-10741-g35c99ffa20edd #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x86/0xc5 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x7f/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report+0x144/0x187 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:125 memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline] shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto_shash_import include/crypto/hash.h:880 [inline] hmac_import+0x184/0x240 crypto/hmac.c:102 hmac_init+0x96/0xc0 crypto/hmac.c:107 crypto_shash_init include/crypto/hash.h:902 [inline] shash_digest_unaligned+0x9f/0xf0 crypto/shash.c:194 crypto_shash_digest+0xe9/0x1b0 crypto/shash.c:211 generate_random_hash_testvec.constprop.11+0x1ec/0x5b0 crypto/testmgr.c:1331 test_hash_vs_generic_impl+0x3f7/0x5c0 crypto/testmgr.c:1420 __alg_test_hash+0x26d/0x340 crypto/testmgr.c:1502 alg_test_hash+0x22e/0x330 crypto/testmgr.c:1552 alg_test.part.7+0x132/0x610 crypto/testmgr.c:4931 alg_test+0x1f/0x40 crypto/testmgr.c:4952 Fixes: b68a7ec1e9a3 ("crypto: hash - Remove VLA usage") Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-05-14 16:13:15 -07:00
crypto: hash - fix incorrect HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE The "hmac(sha3-224-generic)" algorithm has a descsize of 368 bytes, which is greater than HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE (360) which is only enough for sha3-224-generic. The check in shash_prepare_alg() doesn't catch this because the HMAC template doesn't set descsize on the algorithms, but rather sets it on each individual HMAC transform. This causes a stack buffer overflow when SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() is used with hmac(sha3-224-generic). Fix it by increasing HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE to the real maximum. Also add a sanity check to hmac_init(). This was detected by the improved crypto self-tests in v5.2, by loading the tcrypt module with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y enabled. I didn't notice this bug when I ran the self-tests by requesting the algorithms via AF_ALG (i.e., not using tcrypt), probably because the stack layout differs in the two cases and that made a difference here. KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223 Write of size 360 at addr ffff8880651defc8 by task insmod/3689 CPU: 2 PID: 3689 Comm: insmod Tainted: G E 5.1.0-10741-g35c99ffa20edd #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x86/0xc5 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x7f/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report+0x144/0x187 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:125 memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline] shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto_shash_import include/crypto/hash.h:880 [inline] hmac_import+0x184/0x240 crypto/hmac.c:102 hmac_init+0x96/0xc0 crypto/hmac.c:107 crypto_shash_init include/crypto/hash.h:902 [inline] shash_digest_unaligned+0x9f/0xf0 crypto/shash.c:194 crypto_shash_digest+0xe9/0x1b0 crypto/shash.c:211 generate_random_hash_testvec.constprop.11+0x1ec/0x5b0 crypto/testmgr.c:1331 test_hash_vs_generic_impl+0x3f7/0x5c0 crypto/testmgr.c:1420 __alg_test_hash+0x26d/0x340 crypto/testmgr.c:1502 alg_test_hash+0x22e/0x330 crypto/testmgr.c:1552 alg_test.part.7+0x132/0x610 crypto/testmgr.c:4931 alg_test+0x1f/0x40 crypto/testmgr.c:4952 Fixes: b68a7ec1e9a3 ("crypto: hash - Remove VLA usage") Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-05-14 16:13:15 -07:00
crypto: hash - fix incorrect HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE The "hmac(sha3-224-generic)" algorithm has a descsize of 368 bytes, which is greater than HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE (360) which is only enough for sha3-224-generic. The check in shash_prepare_alg() doesn't catch this because the HMAC template doesn't set descsize on the algorithms, but rather sets it on each individual HMAC transform. This causes a stack buffer overflow when SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() is used with hmac(sha3-224-generic). Fix it by increasing HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE to the real maximum. Also add a sanity check to hmac_init(). This was detected by the improved crypto self-tests in v5.2, by loading the tcrypt module with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y enabled. I didn't notice this bug when I ran the self-tests by requesting the algorithms via AF_ALG (i.e., not using tcrypt), probably because the stack layout differs in the two cases and that made a difference here. KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223 Write of size 360 at addr ffff8880651defc8 by task insmod/3689 CPU: 2 PID: 3689 Comm: insmod Tainted: G E 5.1.0-10741-g35c99ffa20edd #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x86/0xc5 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x7f/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report+0x144/0x187 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191 memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:125 memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline] shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223 crypto_shash_import include/crypto/hash.h:880 [inline] hmac_import+0x184/0x240 crypto/hmac.c:102 hmac_init+0x96/0xc0 crypto/hmac.c:107 crypto_shash_init include/crypto/hash.h:902 [inline] shash_digest_unaligned+0x9f/0xf0 crypto/shash.c:194 crypto_shash_digest+0xe9/0x1b0 crypto/shash.c:211 generate_random_hash_testvec.constprop.11+0x1ec/0x5b0 crypto/testmgr.c:1331 test_hash_vs_generic_impl+0x3f7/0x5c0 crypto/testmgr.c:1420 __alg_test_hash+0x26d/0x340 crypto/testmgr.c:1502 alg_test_hash+0x22e/0x330 crypto/testmgr.c:1552 alg_test.part.7+0x132/0x610 crypto/testmgr.c:4931 alg_test+0x1f/0x40 crypto/testmgr.c:4952 Fixes: b68a7ec1e9a3 ("crypto: hash - Remove VLA usage") Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-05-14 16:13:15 -07:00
crypto - shash: reduce minimum alignment of shash_desc structure Unlike many other structure types defined in the crypto API, the 'shash_desc' structure is permitted to live on the stack, which implies its contents may not be accessed by DMA masters. (This is due to the fact that the stack may be located in the vmalloc area, which requires a different virtual-to-physical translation than the one implemented by the DMA subsystem) Our definition of CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR is based on ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN, which may take DMA constraints into account on architectures that support non-cache coherent DMA such as ARM and arm64. In this case, the value is chosen to reflect the largest cacheline size in the system, in order to ensure that explicit cache maintenance as required by non-coherent DMA masters does not affect adjacent, unrelated slab allocations. On arm64, this value is currently set at 128 bytes. This means that applying CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR to struct shash_desc is both unnecessary (as it is never used for DMA), and undesirable, given that it wastes stack space (on arm64, performing the alignment costs 112 bytes in the worst case, and the hole between the 'tfm' and '__ctx' members takes up another 120 bytes, resulting in an increased stack footprint of up to 232 bytes.) So instead, let's switch to the minimum SLAB alignment, which does not take DMA constraints into account. Note that this is a no-op for x86. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-01-13 10:11:35 +01:00
dm-crypt: Extend state buffer size in crypt_iv_lmk_one Add a macro CRYPTO_MD5_STATESIZE for the Crypto API export state size of md5 and use that in dm-crypt instead of relying on the size of struct md5_state (the latter is currently undergoing a transition and may shrink). This commit fixes a crash on 32-bit machines: Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2+ #993 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 Workqueue: kcryptd-254:0-1 kcryptd_crypt [dm_crypt] EIP: __crypto_shash_export+0xf/0x90 Code: 4a c1 c7 40 20 a0 b4 4a c1 81 cf 0e 00 04 08 89 78 50 e9 2b ff ff ff 8d 74 26 00 55 89 e5 57 56 53 89 c3 89 d6 8b 00 8b 40 14 <8b> 50 fc f6 40 13 01 74 04 4a 2b 50 14 85 c9 74 10 89 f2 89 d8 ff EAX: 303a3435 EBX: c3007c90 ECX: 00000000 EDX: c3007c38 ESI: c3007c38 EDI: c3007c90 EBP: c3007bfc ESP: c3007bf0 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010216 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 303a3431 CR3: 04fbe000 CR4: 00350e90 Call Trace: crypto_shash_export+0x65/0xc0 crypt_iv_lmk_one+0x106/0x1a0 [dm_crypt] Fixes: efd62c85525e ("crypto: md5-generic - Use API partial block handling") Reported-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/f1625ddc-e82e-4b77-80c2-dc8e45b54848@gmail.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
2025-06-23 19:11:50 +08:00
mm: change inlined allocation helpers to account at the call site Main goal of memory allocation profiling patchset is to provide accounting that is cheap enough to run in production. To achieve that we inject counters using codetags at the allocation call sites to account every time allocation is made. This injection allows us to perform accounting efficiently because injected counters are immediately available as opposed to the alternative methods, such as using _RET_IP_, which would require counter lookup and appropriate locking that makes accounting much more expensive. This method requires all allocation functions to inject separate counters at their call sites so that their callers can be individually accounted. Counter injection is implemented by allocation hooks which should wrap all allocation functions. Inlined functions which perform allocations but do not use allocation hooks are directly charged for the allocations they perform. In most cases these functions are just specialized allocation wrappers used from multiple places to allocate objects of a specific type. It would be more useful to do the accounting at their call sites instead. Instrument these helpers to do accounting at the call site. Simple inlined allocation wrappers are converted directly into macros. More complex allocators or allocators with documentation are converted into _noprof versions and allocation hooks are added. This allows memory allocation profiling mechanism to charge allocations to the callers of these functions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415020731.1152108-1-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> [jbd2] Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-04-14 19:07:31 -07:00
mm: change inlined allocation helpers to account at the call site Main goal of memory allocation profiling patchset is to provide accounting that is cheap enough to run in production. To achieve that we inject counters using codetags at the allocation call sites to account every time allocation is made. This injection allows us to perform accounting efficiently because injected counters are immediately available as opposed to the alternative methods, such as using _RET_IP_, which would require counter lookup and appropriate locking that makes accounting much more expensive. This method requires all allocation functions to inject separate counters at their call sites so that their callers can be individually accounted. Counter injection is implemented by allocation hooks which should wrap all allocation functions. Inlined functions which perform allocations but do not use allocation hooks are directly charged for the allocations they perform. In most cases these functions are just specialized allocation wrappers used from multiple places to allocate objects of a specific type. It would be more useful to do the accounting at their call sites instead. Instrument these helpers to do accounting at the call site. Simple inlined allocation wrappers are converted directly into macros. More complex allocators or allocators with documentation are converted into _noprof versions and allocation hooks are added. This allows memory allocation profiling mechanism to charge allocations to the callers of these functions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415020731.1152108-1-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> [jbd2] Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-04-14 19:07:31 -07:00
mm: change inlined allocation helpers to account at the call site Main goal of memory allocation profiling patchset is to provide accounting that is cheap enough to run in production. To achieve that we inject counters using codetags at the allocation call sites to account every time allocation is made. This injection allows us to perform accounting efficiently because injected counters are immediately available as opposed to the alternative methods, such as using _RET_IP_, which would require counter lookup and appropriate locking that makes accounting much more expensive. This method requires all allocation functions to inject separate counters at their call sites so that their callers can be individually accounted. Counter injection is implemented by allocation hooks which should wrap all allocation functions. Inlined functions which perform allocations but do not use allocation hooks are directly charged for the allocations they perform. In most cases these functions are just specialized allocation wrappers used from multiple places to allocate objects of a specific type. It would be more useful to do the accounting at their call sites instead. Instrument these helpers to do accounting at the call site. Simple inlined allocation wrappers are converted directly into macros. More complex allocators or allocators with documentation are converted into _noprof versions and allocation hooks are added. This allows memory allocation profiling mechanism to charge allocations to the callers of these functions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415020731.1152108-1-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> [jbd2] Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-04-14 19:07:31 -07:00
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default. However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using "hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow. A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it is really unkeyed. Examples of this include: - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension - dm-verity - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device) This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no privileges to call. Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the ->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed. The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-01-03 11:16:27 -08:00