linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c

1694 lines
43 KiB

include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 17:04:11 +09:00
ipv4: Convert ->flowi4_tos to dscp_t. Convert the ->flowic_tos field of struct flowi_common from __u8 to dscp_t, rename it ->flowic_dscp and propagate these changes to struct flowi and struct flowi4. We've had several bugs in the past where ECN bits could interfere with IPv4 routing, because these bits were not properly cleared when setting ->flowi4_tos. These bugs should be fixed now and the dscp_t type has been introduced to ensure that variables carrying DSCP values don't accidentally have any ECN bits set. Several variables and structure fields have been converted to dscp_t already, but the main IPv4 routing structure, struct flowi4, is still using a __u8. To avoid any future regression, this patch converts it to dscp_t. There are many users to convert at once. Fortunately, around half of ->flowi4_tos users already have a dscp_t value at hand, which they currently convert to __u8 using inet_dscp_to_dsfield(). For all of these users, we just need to drop that conversion. But, although we try to do the __u8 <-> dscp_t conversions at the boundaries of the network or of user space, some places still store TOS/DSCP variables as __u8 in core networking code. Those can hardly be converted either because the data structure is part of UAPI or because the same variable or field is also used for handling ECN in other parts of the code. In all of these cases where we don't have a dscp_t variable at hand, we need to use inet_dsfield_to_dscp() when interacting with ->flowi4_dscp. Changes since v1: * Fix space alignment in __bpf_redirect_neigh_v4() (Ido). Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/29acecb45e911d17446b9a3dbdb1ab7b821ea371.1756128932.git.gnault@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2025-08-25 15:37:43 +02:00
tcp: add datapath logic for PSP with inline key exchange Add validation points and state propagation to support PSP key exchange inline, on TCP connections. The expectation is that application will use some well established mechanism like TLS handshake to establish a secure channel over the connection and if both endpoints are PSP-capable - exchange and install PSP keys. Because the connection can existing in PSP-unsecured and PSP-secured state we need to make sure that there are no race conditions or retransmission leaks. On Tx - mark packets with the skb->decrypted bit when PSP key is at the enqueue time. Drivers should only encrypt packets with this bit set. This prevents retransmissions getting encrypted when original transmission was not. Similarly to TLS, we'll use sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb to make sure PSP skbs can't "escape" via a PSP-unaware device without being encrypted. On Rx - validation is done under socket lock. This moves the validation point later than xfrm, for example. Please see the documentation patch for more details on the flow of securing a connection, but for the purpose of this patch what's important is that we want to enforce the invariant that once connection is secured any skb in the receive queue has been encrypted with PSP. Add GRO and coalescing checks to prevent PSP authenticated data from being combined with cleartext data, or data with non-matching PSP state. On Rx, check skb's with psp_skb_coalesce_diff() at points before psp_sk_rx_policy_check(). After skb's are policy checked and on the socket receive queue, skb_cmp_decrypted() is sufficient for checking for coalescable PSP state. On Tx, tcp_write_collapse_fence() should be called when transitioning a socket into PSP Tx state to prevent data sent as cleartext from being coalesced with PSP encapsulated data. This change only adds the validation points, for ease of review. Subsequent change will add the ability to install keys, and flesh the enforcement logic out Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Co-developed-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917000954.859376-5-daniel.zahka@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2025-09-16 17:09:31 -07:00
net: fix IPSTATS_MIB_OUTPKGS increment in OutForwDatagrams. Reproduce environment: network with 3 VM linuxs is connected as below: VM1<---->VM2(latest kernel 6.5.0-rc7)<---->VM3 VM1: eth0 ip: 192.168.122.207 MTU 1500 VM2: eth0 ip: 192.168.122.208, eth1 ip: 192.168.123.224 MTU 1500 VM3: eth0 ip: 192.168.123.240 MTU 1500 Reproduce: VM1 send 1400 bytes UDP data to VM3 using tools scapy with flags=0. scapy command: send(IP(dst="192.168.123.240",flags=0)/UDP()/str('0'*1400),count=1, inter=1.000000) Result: Before IP data is sent. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- root@qemux86-64:~# cat /proc/net/snmp Ip: Forwarding DefaultTTL InReceives InHdrErrors InAddrErrors ForwDatagrams InUnknownProtos InDiscards InDelivers OutRequests OutDiscards OutNoRoutes ReasmTimeout ReasmReqds ReasmOKs ReasmFails FragOKs FragFails FragCreates Ip: 1 64 11 0 3 4 0 0 4 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...... ---------------------------------------------------------------------- After IP data is sent. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- root@qemux86-64:~# cat /proc/net/snmp Ip: Forwarding DefaultTTL InReceives InHdrErrors InAddrErrors ForwDatagrams InUnknownProtos InDiscards InDelivers OutRequests OutDiscards OutNoRoutes ReasmTimeout ReasmReqds ReasmOKs ReasmFails FragOKs FragFails FragCreates Ip: 1 64 12 0 3 5 0 0 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...... ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "ForwDatagrams" increase from 4 to 5 and "OutRequests" also increase from 7 to 8. Issue description and patch: IPSTATS_MIB_OUTPKTS("OutRequests") is counted with IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS ("OutOctets") in ip_finish_output2(). According to RFC 4293, it is "OutOctets" counted with "OutTransmits" but not "OutRequests". "OutRequests" does not include any datagrams counted in "ForwDatagrams". ipSystemStatsOutOctets OBJECT-TYPE DESCRIPTION "The total number of octets in IP datagrams delivered to the lower layers for transmission. Octets from datagrams counted in ipIfStatsOutTransmits MUST be counted here. ipSystemStatsOutRequests OBJECT-TYPE DESCRIPTION "The total number of IP datagrams that local IP user- protocols (including ICMP) supplied to IP in requests for transmission. Note that this counter does not include any datagrams counted in ipSystemStatsOutForwDatagrams. So do patch to define IPSTATS_MIB_OUTPKTS to "OutTransmits" and add IPSTATS_MIB_OUTREQUESTS for "OutRequests". Add IPSTATS_MIB_OUTREQUESTS counter in __ip_local_out() for ipv4 and add IPSTATS_MIB_OUT counter in ip6_finish_output2() for ipv6. Test result with patch: Before IP data is sent. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- root@qemux86-64:~# cat /proc/net/snmp Ip: Forwarding DefaultTTL InReceives InHdrErrors InAddrErrors ForwDatagrams InUnknownProtos InDiscards InDelivers OutRequests OutDiscards OutNoRoutes ReasmTimeout ReasmReqds ReasmOKs ReasmFails FragOKs FragFails FragCreates OutTransmits Ip: 1 64 9 0 5 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 ...... root@qemux86-64:~# cat /proc/net/netstat ...... IpExt: InNoRoutes InTruncatedPkts InMcastPkts OutMcastPkts InBcastPkts OutBcastPkts InOctets OutOctets InMcastOctets OutMcastOctets InBcastOctets OutBcastOctets InCsumErrors InNoECTPkts InECT1Pkts InECT0Pkts InCEPkts ReasmOverlaps IpExt: 0 0 0 0 0 0 2976 1896 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- After IP data is sent. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- root@qemux86-64:~# cat /proc/net/snmp Ip: Forwarding DefaultTTL InReceives InHdrErrors InAddrErrors ForwDatagrams InUnknownProtos InDiscards InDelivers OutRequests OutDiscards OutNoRoutes ReasmTimeout ReasmReqds ReasmOKs ReasmFails FragOKs FragFails FragCreates OutTransmits Ip: 1 64 10 0 5 2 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 ...... root@qemux86-64:~# cat /proc/net/netstat ...... IpExt: InNoRoutes InTruncatedPkts InMcastPkts OutMcastPkts InBcastPkts OutBcastPkts InOctets OutOctets InMcastOctets OutMcastOctets InBcastOctets OutBcastOctets InCsumErrors InNoECTPkts InECT1Pkts InECT0Pkts InCEPkts ReasmOverlaps IpExt: 0 0 0 0 0 0 4404 3324 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- "ForwDatagrams" increase from 1 to 2 and "OutRequests" is keeping 3. "OutTransmits" increase from 4 to 5 and "OutOctets" increase 1428. Signed-off-by: Heng Guo <heng.guo@windriver.com> Reviewed-by: Kun Song <Kun.Song@windriver.com> Reviewed-by: Filip Pudak <filip.pudak@windriver.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2023-10-19 09:20:53 +08:00
2015-09-15 20:04:16 -05:00
treewide: use get_random_{u8,u16}() when possible, part 1 Rather than truncate a 32-bit value to a 16-bit value or an 8-bit value, simply use the get_random_{u8,u16}() functions, which are faster than wasting the additional bytes from a 32-bit value. This was done mechanically with this coccinelle script: @@ expression E; identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; typedef u16; typedef __be16; typedef __le16; typedef u8; @@ ( - (get_random_u32() & 0xffff) + get_random_u16() | - (get_random_u32() & 0xff) + get_random_u8() | - (get_random_u32() % 65536) + get_random_u16() | - (get_random_u32() % 256) + get_random_u8() | - (get_random_u32() >> 16) + get_random_u16() | - (get_random_u32() >> 24) + get_random_u8() | - (u16)get_random_u32() + get_random_u16() | - (u8)get_random_u32() + get_random_u8() | - (__be16)get_random_u32() + (__be16)get_random_u16() | - (__le16)get_random_u32() + (__le16)get_random_u16() | - prandom_u32_max(65536) + get_random_u16() | - prandom_u32_max(256) + get_random_u8() | - E->inet_id = get_random_u32() + E->inet_id = get_random_u16() ) @@ identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; typedef u16; identifier v; @@ - u16 v = get_random_u32(); + u16 v = get_random_u16(); @@ identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; typedef u8; identifier v; @@ - u8 v = get_random_u32(); + u8 v = get_random_u8(); @@ identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; typedef u16; u16 v; @@ - v = get_random_u32(); + v = get_random_u16(); @@ identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; typedef u8; u8 v; @@ - v = get_random_u32(); + v = get_random_u8(); // Find a potential literal @literal_mask@ expression LITERAL; type T; identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; position p; @@ ((T)get_random_u32()@p & (LITERAL)) // Examine limits @script:python add_one@ literal << literal_mask.LITERAL; RESULT; @@ value = None if literal.startswith('0x'): value = int(literal, 16) elif literal[0] in '123456789': value = int(literal, 10) if value is None: print("I don't know how to handle %s" % (literal)) cocci.include_match(False) elif value < 256: coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_ident("get_random_u8") elif value < 65536: coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_ident("get_random_u16") else: print("Skipping large mask of %s" % (literal)) cocci.include_match(False) // Replace the literal mask with the calculated result. @plus_one@ expression literal_mask.LITERAL; position literal_mask.p; identifier add_one.RESULT; identifier FUNC; @@ - (FUNC()@p & (LITERAL)) + (RESULT() & LITERAL) Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk> # for sch_cake Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-10-05 17:23:53 +02:00
ipv4: Add helpers for neigh lookup for nexthop A common theme in the output path is looking up a neigh entry for a nexthop, either the gateway in an rtable or a fallback to the daddr in the skb: nexthop = (__force u32)rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); To allow the nexthop to be an IPv6 address we need to consider the family of the nexthop and then call __ipv{4,6}_neigh_lookup_noref based on it. To make this simpler, add a ip_neigh_gw4 helper similar to ip_neigh_gw6 added in an earlier patch which handles: neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); And then add a second one, ip_neigh_for_gw, that calls either ip_neigh_gw4 or ip_neigh_gw6 based on the address family of the gateway. Update the output paths in the VRF driver and core v4 code to use ip_neigh_for_gw simplifying the family based lookup and making both ready for a v6 nexthop. ipv4_neigh_lookup has a different need - the potential to resolve a passed in address in addition to any gateway in the rtable or skb. Since this is a one-off, add ip_neigh_gw4 and ip_neigh_gw6 diectly. The difference between __neigh_create used by the helpers and neigh_create called by ipv4_neigh_lookup is taking a refcount, so add rcu_read_lock_bh and bump the refcnt on the neigh entry. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-05 16:30:34 -07:00
ipv4: Add helpers for neigh lookup for nexthop A common theme in the output path is looking up a neigh entry for a nexthop, either the gateway in an rtable or a fallback to the daddr in the skb: nexthop = (__force u32)rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); To allow the nexthop to be an IPv6 address we need to consider the family of the nexthop and then call __ipv{4,6}_neigh_lookup_noref based on it. To make this simpler, add a ip_neigh_gw4 helper similar to ip_neigh_gw6 added in an earlier patch which handles: neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); And then add a second one, ip_neigh_for_gw, that calls either ip_neigh_gw4 or ip_neigh_gw6 based on the address family of the gateway. Update the output paths in the VRF driver and core v4 code to use ip_neigh_for_gw simplifying the family based lookup and making both ready for a v6 nexthop. ipv4_neigh_lookup has a different need - the potential to resolve a passed in address in addition to any gateway in the rtable or skb. Since this is a one-off, add ip_neigh_gw4 and ip_neigh_gw6 diectly. The difference between __neigh_create used by the helpers and neigh_create called by ipv4_neigh_lookup is taking a refcount, so add rcu_read_lock_bh and bump the refcnt on the neigh entry. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-05 16:30:34 -07:00
ipv4: Add helpers for neigh lookup for nexthop A common theme in the output path is looking up a neigh entry for a nexthop, either the gateway in an rtable or a fallback to the daddr in the skb: nexthop = (__force u32)rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); To allow the nexthop to be an IPv6 address we need to consider the family of the nexthop and then call __ipv{4,6}_neigh_lookup_noref based on it. To make this simpler, add a ip_neigh_gw4 helper similar to ip_neigh_gw6 added in an earlier patch which handles: neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, nexthop); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &nexthop, dev, false); And then add a second one, ip_neigh_for_gw, that calls either ip_neigh_gw4 or ip_neigh_gw6 based on the address family of the gateway. Update the output paths in the VRF driver and core v4 code to use ip_neigh_for_gw simplifying the family based lookup and making both ready for a v6 nexthop. ipv4_neigh_lookup has a different need - the potential to resolve a passed in address in addition to any gateway in the rtable or skb. Since this is a one-off, add ip_neigh_gw4 and ip_neigh_gw6 diectly. The difference between __neigh_create used by the helpers and neigh_create called by ipv4_neigh_lookup is taking a refcount, so add rcu_read_lock_bh and bump the refcnt on the neigh entry. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-05 16:30:34 -07:00
net: ip: always refragment ip defragmented packets Conntrack reassembly records the largest fragment size seen in IPCB. However, when this gets forwarded/transmitted, fragmentation will only be forced if one of the fragmented packets had the DF bit set. In that case, a flag in IPCB will force fragmentation even if the MTU is large enough. This should work fine, but this breaks with ip tunnels. Consider client that sends a UDP datagram of size X to another host. The client fragments the datagram, so two packets, of size y and z, are sent. DF bit is not set on any of these packets. Middlebox netfilter reassembles those packets back to single size-X packet, before routing decision. packet-size-vs-mtu checks in ip_forward are irrelevant, because DF bit isn't set. At output time, ip refragmentation is skipped as well because x is still smaller than the mtu of the output device. If ttransmit device is an ip tunnel, the packet size increases to x+overhead. Also, tunnel might be configured to force DF bit on outer header. In this case, packet will be dropped (exceeds MTU) and an ICMP error is generated back to sender. But sender already respects the announced MTU, all the packets that it sent did fit the announced mtu. Force refragmentation as per original sizes unconditionally so ip tunnel will encapsulate the fragments instead. The only other solution I see is to place ip refragmentation in the ip_tunnel code to handle this case. Fixes: d6b915e29f4ad ("ip_fragment: don't forward defragmented DF packet") Reported-by: Christian Perle <christian.perle@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-01-06 00:15:23 +01:00
2015-09-15 20:04:16 -05:00
2015-09-15 20:04:16 -05:00
2015-09-15 20:04:16 -05:00
net: Add locking to protect skb->dev access in ip_output In ip_output() skb->dev is updated from the skb_dst(skb)->dev this can become invalid when the interface is unregistered and freed, Introduced new skb_dst_dev_rcu() function to be used instead of skb_dst_dev() within rcu_locks in ip_output.This will ensure that all the skb's associated with the dev being deregistered will be transnmitted out first, before freeing the dev. Given that ip_output() is called within an rcu_read_lock() critical section or from a bottom-half context, it is safe to introduce an RCU read-side critical section within it. Multiple panic call stacks were observed when UL traffic was run in concurrency with device deregistration from different functions, pasting one sample for reference. [496733.627565][T13385] Call trace: [496733.627570][T13385] bpf_prog_ce7c9180c3b128ea_cgroupskb_egres+0x24c/0x7f0 [496733.627581][T13385] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb+0x128/0x498 [496733.627595][T13385] ip_finish_output+0xa4/0xf4 [496733.627605][T13385] ip_output+0x100/0x1a0 [496733.627613][T13385] ip_send_skb+0x68/0x100 [496733.627618][T13385] udp_send_skb+0x1c4/0x384 [496733.627625][T13385] udp_sendmsg+0x7b0/0x898 [496733.627631][T13385] inet_sendmsg+0x5c/0x7c [496733.627639][T13385] __sys_sendto+0x174/0x1e4 [496733.627647][T13385] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x3c [496733.627653][T13385] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x11c [496733.627662][T13385] el0_svc_common+0x88/0xf4 [496733.627669][T13385] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0 [496733.627676][T13385] el0_svc+0x2c/0xa4 [496733.627683][T13385] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xb4 [496733.627689][T13385] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v3: - Replaced WARN_ON() with WARN_ON_ONCE(), as suggested by Willem de Bruijn. - Dropped legacy lines mistakenly pulled in from an outdated branch. Changes in v2: - Addressed review comments from Eric Dumazet - Used READ_ONCE() to prevent potential load/store tearing - Added skb_dst_dev_rcu() and used along with rcu_read_lock() in ip_output Signed-off-by: Sharath Chandra Vurukala <quic_sharathv@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250730105118.GA26100@hu-sharathv-hyd.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2025-07-30 16:21:18 +05:30
net: Add locking to protect skb->dev access in ip_output In ip_output() skb->dev is updated from the skb_dst(skb)->dev this can become invalid when the interface is unregistered and freed, Introduced new skb_dst_dev_rcu() function to be used instead of skb_dst_dev() within rcu_locks in ip_output.This will ensure that all the skb's associated with the dev being deregistered will be transnmitted out first, before freeing the dev. Given that ip_output() is called within an rcu_read_lock() critical section or from a bottom-half context, it is safe to introduce an RCU read-side critical section within it. Multiple panic call stacks were observed when UL traffic was run in concurrency with device deregistration from different functions, pasting one sample for reference. [496733.627565][T13385] Call trace: [496733.627570][T13385] bpf_prog_ce7c9180c3b128ea_cgroupskb_egres+0x24c/0x7f0 [496733.627581][T13385] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb+0x128/0x498 [496733.627595][T13385] ip_finish_output+0xa4/0xf4 [496733.627605][T13385] ip_output+0x100/0x1a0 [496733.627613][T13385] ip_send_skb+0x68/0x100 [496733.627618][T13385] udp_send_skb+0x1c4/0x384 [496733.627625][T13385] udp_sendmsg+0x7b0/0x898 [496733.627631][T13385] inet_sendmsg+0x5c/0x7c [496733.627639][T13385] __sys_sendto+0x174/0x1e4 [496733.627647][T13385] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x3c [496733.627653][T13385] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x11c [496733.627662][T13385] el0_svc_common+0x88/0xf4 [496733.627669][T13385] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0 [496733.627676][T13385] el0_svc+0x2c/0xa4 [496733.627683][T13385] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xb4 [496733.627689][T13385] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v3: - Replaced WARN_ON() with WARN_ON_ONCE(), as suggested by Willem de Bruijn. - Dropped legacy lines mistakenly pulled in from an outdated branch. Changes in v2: - Addressed review comments from Eric Dumazet - Used READ_ONCE() to prevent potential load/store tearing - Added skb_dst_dev_rcu() and used along with rcu_read_lock() in ip_output Signed-off-by: Sharath Chandra Vurukala <quic_sharathv@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250730105118.GA26100@hu-sharathv-hyd.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2025-07-30 16:21:18 +05:30
net: Add locking to protect skb->dev access in ip_output In ip_output() skb->dev is updated from the skb_dst(skb)->dev this can become invalid when the interface is unregistered and freed, Introduced new skb_dst_dev_rcu() function to be used instead of skb_dst_dev() within rcu_locks in ip_output.This will ensure that all the skb's associated with the dev being deregistered will be transnmitted out first, before freeing the dev. Given that ip_output() is called within an rcu_read_lock() critical section or from a bottom-half context, it is safe to introduce an RCU read-side critical section within it. Multiple panic call stacks were observed when UL traffic was run in concurrency with device deregistration from different functions, pasting one sample for reference. [496733.627565][T13385] Call trace: [496733.627570][T13385] bpf_prog_ce7c9180c3b128ea_cgroupskb_egres+0x24c/0x7f0 [496733.627581][T13385] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_skb+0x128/0x498 [496733.627595][T13385] ip_finish_output+0xa4/0xf4 [496733.627605][T13385] ip_output+0x100/0x1a0 [496733.627613][T13385] ip_send_skb+0x68/0x100 [496733.627618][T13385] udp_send_skb+0x1c4/0x384 [496733.627625][T13385] udp_sendmsg+0x7b0/0x898 [496733.627631][T13385] inet_sendmsg+0x5c/0x7c [496733.627639][T13385] __sys_sendto+0x174/0x1e4 [496733.627647][T13385] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x28/0x3c [496733.627653][T13385] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x11c [496733.627662][T13385] el0_svc_common+0x88/0xf4 [496733.627669][T13385] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0 [496733.627676][T13385] el0_svc+0x2c/0xa4 [496733.627683][T13385] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xb4 [496733.627689][T13385] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v3: - Replaced WARN_ON() with WARN_ON_ONCE(), as suggested by Willem de Bruijn. - Dropped legacy lines mistakenly pulled in from an outdated branch. Changes in v2: - Addressed review comments from Eric Dumazet - Used READ_ONCE() to prevent potential load/store tearing - Added skb_dst_dev_rcu() and used along with rcu_read_lock() in ip_output Signed-off-by: Sharath Chandra Vurukala <quic_sharathv@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250730105118.GA26100@hu-sharathv-hyd.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2025-07-30 16:21:18 +05:30
ipv4: Convert ->flowi4_tos to dscp_t. Convert the ->flowic_tos field of struct flowi_common from __u8 to dscp_t, rename it ->flowic_dscp and propagate these changes to struct flowi and struct flowi4. We've had several bugs in the past where ECN bits could interfere with IPv4 routing, because these bits were not properly cleared when setting ->flowi4_tos. These bugs should be fixed now and the dscp_t type has been introduced to ensure that variables carrying DSCP values don't accidentally have any ECN bits set. Several variables and structure fields have been converted to dscp_t already, but the main IPv4 routing structure, struct flowi4, is still using a __u8. To avoid any future regression, this patch converts it to dscp_t. There are many users to convert at once. Fortunately, around half of ->flowi4_tos users already have a dscp_t value at hand, which they currently convert to __u8 using inet_dscp_to_dsfield(). For all of these users, we just need to drop that conversion. But, although we try to do the __u8 <-> dscp_t conversions at the boundaries of the network or of user space, some places still store TOS/DSCP variables as __u8 in core networking code. Those can hardly be converted either because the data structure is part of UAPI or because the same variable or field is also used for handling ECN in other parts of the code. In all of these cases where we don't have a dscp_t variable at hand, we need to use inet_dsfield_to_dscp() when interacting with ->flowi4_dscp. Changes since v1: * Fix space alignment in __bpf_redirect_neigh_v4() (Ido). Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/29acecb45e911d17446b9a3dbdb1ab7b821ea371.1756128932.git.gnault@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2025-08-25 15:37:43 +02:00
ip: hash fragments consistently The skb hash for locally generated ip[v6] fragments belonging to the same datagram can vary in several circumstances: * for connected UDP[v6] sockets, the first fragment get its hash via set_owner_w()/skb_set_hash_from_sk() * for unconnected IPv6 UDPv6 sockets, the first fragment can get its hash via ip6_make_flowlabel()/skb_get_hash_flowi6(), if auto_flowlabel is enabled For the following frags the hash is usually computed via skb_get_hash(). The above can cause OoO for unconnected IPv6 UDPv6 socket: in that scenario the egress tx queue can be selected on a per packet basis via the skb hash. It may also fool flow-oriented schedulers to place fragments belonging to the same datagram in different flows. Fix the issue by copying the skb hash from the head frag into the others at fragmentation time. Before this commit: perf probe -a "dev_queue_xmit skb skb->hash skb->l4_hash:b1@0/8 skb->sw_hash:b1@1/8" netperf -H $IPV4 -t UDP_STREAM -l 5 -- -m 2000 -n & perf record -e probe:dev_queue_xmit -e probe:skb_set_owner_w -a sleep 0.1 perf script probe:dev_queue_xmit: (ffffffff8c6b1b20) hash=3713014309 l4_hash=1 sw_hash=0 probe:dev_queue_xmit: (ffffffff8c6b1b20) hash=0 l4_hash=0 sw_hash=0 After this commit: probe:dev_queue_xmit: (ffffffff8c6b1b20) hash=2171763177 l4_hash=1 sw_hash=0 probe:dev_queue_xmit: (ffffffff8c6b1b20) hash=2171763177 l4_hash=1 sw_hash=0 Fixes: b73c3d0e4f0e ("net: Save TX flow hash in sock and set in skbuf on xmit") Fixes: 67800f9b1f4e ("ipv6: Call skb_get_hash_flowi6 to get skb->hash in ip6_make_flowlabel") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-07-23 16:50:48 +02:00
sk_buff: add skb extension infrastructure This adds an optional extension infrastructure, with ispec (xfrm) and bridge netfilter as first users. objdiff shows no changes if kernel is built without xfrm and br_netfilter support. The third (planned future) user is Multipath TCP which is still out-of-tree. MPTCP needs to map logical mptcp sequence numbers to the tcp sequence numbers used by individual subflows. This DSS mapping is read/written from tcp option space on receive and written to tcp option space on transmitted tcp packets that are part of and MPTCP connection. Extending skb_shared_info or adding a private data field to skb fclones doesn't work for incoming skb, so a different DSS propagation method would be required for the receive side. mptcp has same requirements as secpath/bridge netfilter: 1. extension memory is released when the sk_buff is free'd. 2. data is shared after cloning an skb (clone inherits extension) 3. adding extension to an skb will COW the extension buffer if needed. The "MPTCP upstreaming" effort adds SKB_EXT_MPTCP extension to store the mapping for tx and rx processing. Two new members are added to sk_buff: 1. 'active_extensions' byte (filling a hole), telling which extensions are available for this skb. This has two purposes. a) avoids the need to initialize the pointer. b) allows to "delete" an extension by clearing its bit value in ->active_extensions. While it would be possible to store the active_extensions byte in the extension struct instead of sk_buff, there is one problem with this: When an extension has to be disabled, we can always clear the bit in skb->active_extensions. But in case it would be stored in the extension buffer itself, we might have to COW it first, if we are dealing with a cloned skb. On kmalloc failure we would be unable to turn an extension off. 2. extension pointer, located at the end of the sk_buff. If the active_extensions byte is 0, the pointer is undefined, it is not initialized on skb allocation. This adds extra code to skb clone and free paths (to deal with refcount/free of extension area) but this replaces similar code that manages skb->nf_bridge and skb->sp structs in the followup patches of the series. It is possible to add support for extensions that are not preseved on clones/copies. To do this, it would be needed to define a bitmask of all extensions that need copy/cow semantics, and change __skb_ext_copy() to check ->active_extensions & SKB_EXT_PRESERVE_ON_CLONE, then just set ->active_extensions to 0 on the new clone. This isn't done here because all extensions that get added here need the copy/cow semantics. v2: Allocate entire extension space using kmem_cache. Upside is that this allows better tracking of used memory, downside is that we will allocate more space than strictly needed in most cases (its unlikely that all extensions are active/needed at same time for same skb). The allocated memory (except the small extension header) is not cleared, so no additonal overhead aside from memory usage. Avoid atomic_dec_and_test operation on skb_ext_put() by using similar trick as kfree_skbmem() does with fclone_ref: If recount is 1, there is no concurrent user and we can free right away. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-12-18 17:15:16 +01:00
2015-05-22 16:32:51 +02:00
2015-05-22 16:32:51 +02:00
net: fix use-after-free in kfree_skb_list syzbot reported nasty use-after-free [1] Lets remove frag_list field from structs ip_fraglist_iter and ip6_fraglist_iter. This seens not needed anyway. [1] : BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kfree_skb_list+0x5d/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:706 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888085a3cbc0 by task syz-executor303/8947 CPU: 0 PID: 8947 Comm: syz-executor303 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc2+ #12 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 kfree_skb_list+0x5d/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:706 ip6_fragment+0x1ef4/0x2680 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:882 __ip6_finish_output+0x577/0xaa0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:144 ip6_finish_output+0x38/0x1f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:156 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline] ip6_output+0x235/0x7f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:179 dst_output include/net/dst.h:433 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xbb/0x1b0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179 ip6_send_skb+0xbb/0x350 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1796 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xc8/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1816 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:617 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2993/0x35e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:947 inet_sendmsg+0x141/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:671 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2292 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2330 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2337 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x44add9 Code: e8 7c e6 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 1b 05 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f826f33bce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e7a18 RCX: 000000000044add9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000006e7a10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e7a1c R13: 00007ffcec4f7ebf R14: 00007f826f33c9c0 R15: 20c49ba5e353f7cf Allocated by task 8947: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:497 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3269 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x131/0x710 mm/slab.c:3579 __alloc_skb+0xd5/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:199 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1058 [inline] __ip6_append_data.isra.0+0x2a24/0x3640 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1519 ip6_append_data+0x1e5/0x320 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1688 rawv6_sendmsg+0x1467/0x35e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:940 inet_sendmsg+0x141/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:671 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2292 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2330 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2337 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 8947: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3698 kfree_skbmem net/core/skbuff.c:625 [inline] kfree_skbmem+0xc5/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:619 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:682 [inline] kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:699 [inline] kfree_skb+0xf0/0x390 net/core/skbuff.c:693 kfree_skb_list+0x44/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:708 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3551 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x3034/0x36b0 net/core/dev.c:3850 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3914 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1532 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x1034/0x2550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120 ip6_fragment+0x1ebb/0x2680 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:863 __ip6_finish_output+0x577/0xaa0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:144 ip6_finish_output+0x38/0x1f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:156 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline] ip6_output+0x235/0x7f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:179 dst_output include/net/dst.h:433 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xbb/0x1b0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179 ip6_send_skb+0xbb/0x350 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1796 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xc8/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1816 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:617 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2993/0x35e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:947 inet_sendmsg+0x141/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:671 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2292 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2330 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2337 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888085a3cbc0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 224-byte region [ffff888085a3cbc0, ffff888085a3cca0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002168f00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821b6f63c0 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea00027bbf88 ffffea0002105b88 ffff88821b6f63c0 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888085a3c080 000000010000000c 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888085a3ca80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888085a3cb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc >ffff888085a3cb80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888085a3cc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888085a3cc80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 0feca6190f88 ("net: ipv6: add skbuff fraglist splitter") Fixes: c8b17be0b7a4 ("net: ipv4: add skbuff fraglist splitter") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-02 11:24:18 -07:00
2015-05-22 16:32:51 +02:00
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 10:01:15 +01:00
ipv4: fix ip option filtering for locally generated fragments During IP fragmentation we sanitize IP options. This means overwriting options which should not be copied with NOPs. Only the first fragment has the original, full options. ip_fraglist_prepare() copies the IP header and options from previous fragment to the next one. Commit 19c3401a917b ("net: ipv4: place control buffer handling away from fragmentation iterators") moved sanitizing options before ip_fraglist_prepare() which means options are sanitized and then overwritten again with the old values. Fixing this is not enough, however, nor did the sanitization work prior to aforementioned commit. ip_options_fragment() (which does the sanitization) uses ipcb->opt.optlen for the length of the options. ipcb->opt of fragments is not populated (it's 0), only the head skb has the state properly built. So even when called at the right time ip_options_fragment() does nothing. This seems to date back all the way to v2.5.44 when the fast path for pre-fragmented skbs had been introduced. Prior to that ip_options_build() would have been called for every fragment (in fact ever since v2.5.44 the fragmentation handing in ip_options_build() has been dead code, I'll clean it up in -next). In the original patch (see Link) caixf mentions fixing the handling for fragments other than the second one, but I'm not sure how _any_ fragment could have had their options sanitized with the code as it stood. Tested with python (MTU on lo lowered to 1000 to force fragmentation): import socket s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) s.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IP, socket.IP_OPTIONS, bytearray([7,4,5,192, 20|0x80,4,1,0])) s.sendto(b'1'*2000, ('127.0.0.1', 1234)) Before: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 0, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost.36500 > localhost.search-agent: UDP, length 2000 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 968, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 1936, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 100, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp After: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 0, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost.51607 > localhost.search-agent: UDP, bad length 2000 > 960 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 968, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (NOP,NOP,NOP,NOP,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 1936, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 100, options (NOP,NOP,NOP,NOP,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp RA (20 | 0x80) is now copied as expected, RR (7) is "NOPed out". Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220107080559.122713-1-ooppublic@163.com/ Fixes: 19c3401a917b ("net: ipv4: place control buffer handling away from fragmentation iterators") Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: caixf <ooppublic@163.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-01-21 16:57:31 -08:00
ipv4: fix ip option filtering for locally generated fragments During IP fragmentation we sanitize IP options. This means overwriting options which should not be copied with NOPs. Only the first fragment has the original, full options. ip_fraglist_prepare() copies the IP header and options from previous fragment to the next one. Commit 19c3401a917b ("net: ipv4: place control buffer handling away from fragmentation iterators") moved sanitizing options before ip_fraglist_prepare() which means options are sanitized and then overwritten again with the old values. Fixing this is not enough, however, nor did the sanitization work prior to aforementioned commit. ip_options_fragment() (which does the sanitization) uses ipcb->opt.optlen for the length of the options. ipcb->opt of fragments is not populated (it's 0), only the head skb has the state properly built. So even when called at the right time ip_options_fragment() does nothing. This seems to date back all the way to v2.5.44 when the fast path for pre-fragmented skbs had been introduced. Prior to that ip_options_build() would have been called for every fragment (in fact ever since v2.5.44 the fragmentation handing in ip_options_build() has been dead code, I'll clean it up in -next). In the original patch (see Link) caixf mentions fixing the handling for fragments other than the second one, but I'm not sure how _any_ fragment could have had their options sanitized with the code as it stood. Tested with python (MTU on lo lowered to 1000 to force fragmentation): import socket s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) s.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IP, socket.IP_OPTIONS, bytearray([7,4,5,192, 20|0x80,4,1,0])) s.sendto(b'1'*2000, ('127.0.0.1', 1234)) Before: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 0, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost.36500 > localhost.search-agent: UDP, length 2000 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 968, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 1936, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 100, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp After: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 0, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost.51607 > localhost.search-agent: UDP, bad length 2000 > 960 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 968, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (NOP,NOP,NOP,NOP,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 1936, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 100, options (NOP,NOP,NOP,NOP,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp RA (20 | 0x80) is now copied as expected, RR (7) is "NOPed out". Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220107080559.122713-1-ooppublic@163.com/ Fixes: 19c3401a917b ("net: ipv4: place control buffer handling away from fragmentation iterators") Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: caixf <ooppublic@163.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-01-21 16:57:31 -08:00
[IPV6]: SNMPv2 "ipv6IfStatsOutFragCreates" counter error When I tested linux kernel 2.6.71.7 about statistics "ipv6IfStatsOutFragCreates", and found that it couldn't increase correctly. The criteria is RFC 2465: ipv6IfStatsOutFragCreates OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of output datagram fragments that have been generated as a result of fragmentation at this output interface." ::= { ipv6IfStatsEntry 15 } I think there are two issues in Linux kernel. 1st: RFC2465 specifies the counter is "The number of output datagram fragments...". I think increasing this counter after output a fragment successfully is better. And it should not be increased even though a fragment is created but failed to output. 2nd: If we send a big ICMP/ICMPv6 echo request to a host, and receive ICMP/ICMPv6 echo reply consisted of some fragments. As we know that in Linux kernel first fragmentation occurs in ICMP layer(maybe saying transport layer is better), but this is not the "real" fragmentation,just do some "pre-fragment" -- allocate space for date, and form a frag_list, etc. The "real" fragmentation happens in IP layer -- set offset and MF flag and so on. So I think in "fast path" for ip_fragment/ip6_fragment, if we send a fragment which "pre-fragment" by upper layer we should also increase "ipv6IfStatsOutFragCreates". Signed-off-by: Wei Dong <weid@nanjing-fnst.com> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-02 13:41:21 -07:00
net: fix use-after-free in kfree_skb_list syzbot reported nasty use-after-free [1] Lets remove frag_list field from structs ip_fraglist_iter and ip6_fraglist_iter. This seens not needed anyway. [1] : BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kfree_skb_list+0x5d/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:706 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888085a3cbc0 by task syz-executor303/8947 CPU: 0 PID: 8947 Comm: syz-executor303 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc2+ #12 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188 __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 kfree_skb_list+0x5d/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:706 ip6_fragment+0x1ef4/0x2680 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:882 __ip6_finish_output+0x577/0xaa0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:144 ip6_finish_output+0x38/0x1f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:156 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline] ip6_output+0x235/0x7f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:179 dst_output include/net/dst.h:433 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xbb/0x1b0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179 ip6_send_skb+0xbb/0x350 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1796 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xc8/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1816 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:617 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2993/0x35e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:947 inet_sendmsg+0x141/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:671 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2292 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2330 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2337 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x44add9 Code: e8 7c e6 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 1b 05 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f826f33bce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e7a18 RCX: 000000000044add9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000006e7a10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e7a1c R13: 00007ffcec4f7ebf R14: 00007f826f33c9c0 R15: 20c49ba5e353f7cf Allocated by task 8947: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:497 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3269 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x131/0x710 mm/slab.c:3579 __alloc_skb+0xd5/0x5e0 net/core/skbuff.c:199 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1058 [inline] __ip6_append_data.isra.0+0x2a24/0x3640 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1519 ip6_append_data+0x1e5/0x320 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1688 rawv6_sendmsg+0x1467/0x35e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:940 inet_sendmsg+0x141/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:671 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2292 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2330 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2337 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 8947: save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3698 kfree_skbmem net/core/skbuff.c:625 [inline] kfree_skbmem+0xc5/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:619 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:682 [inline] kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:699 [inline] kfree_skb+0xf0/0x390 net/core/skbuff.c:693 kfree_skb_list+0x44/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:708 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3551 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x3034/0x36b0 net/core/dev.c:3850 dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3914 neigh_direct_output+0x16/0x20 net/core/neighbour.c:1532 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x1034/0x2550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120 ip6_fragment+0x1ebb/0x2680 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:863 __ip6_finish_output+0x577/0xaa0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:144 ip6_finish_output+0x38/0x1f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:156 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline] ip6_output+0x235/0x7f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:179 dst_output include/net/dst.h:433 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xbb/0x1b0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179 ip6_send_skb+0xbb/0x350 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1796 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xc8/0xf0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1816 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:617 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2993/0x35e0 net/ipv6/raw.c:947 inet_sendmsg+0x141/0x5d0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:671 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2292 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2330 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2337 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888085a3cbc0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 224-byte region [ffff888085a3cbc0, ffff888085a3cca0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002168f00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88821b6f63c0 index:0x0 flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea00027bbf88 ffffea0002105b88 ffff88821b6f63c0 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888085a3c080 000000010000000c 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888085a3ca80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888085a3cb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc >ffff888085a3cb80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888085a3cc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888085a3cc80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 0feca6190f88 ("net: ipv6: add skbuff fraglist splitter") Fixes: c8b17be0b7a4 ("net: ipv4: add skbuff fraglist splitter") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-02 11:24:18 -07:00
[IPV6]: SNMPv2 "ipv6IfStatsOutFragCreates" counter error When I tested linux kernel 2.6.71.7 about statistics "ipv6IfStatsOutFragCreates", and found that it couldn't increase correctly. The criteria is RFC 2465: ipv6IfStatsOutFragCreates OBJECT-TYPE SYNTAX Counter32 MAX-ACCESS read-only STATUS current DESCRIPTION "The number of output datagram fragments that have been generated as a result of fragmentation at this output interface." ::= { ipv6IfStatsEntry 15 } I think there are two issues in Linux kernel. 1st: RFC2465 specifies the counter is "The number of output datagram fragments...". I think increasing this counter after output a fragment successfully is better. And it should not be increased even though a fragment is created but failed to output. 2nd: If we send a big ICMP/ICMPv6 echo request to a host, and receive ICMP/ICMPv6 echo reply consisted of some fragments. As we know that in Linux kernel first fragmentation occurs in ICMP layer(maybe saying transport layer is better), but this is not the "real" fragmentation,just do some "pre-fragment" -- allocate space for date, and form a frag_list, etc. The "real" fragmentation happens in IP layer -- set offset and MF flag and so on. So I think in "fast path" for ip_fragment/ip6_fragment, if we send a fragment which "pre-fragment" by upper layer we should also increase "ipv6IfStatsOutFragCreates". Signed-off-by: Wei Dong <weid@nanjing-fnst.com> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-02 13:41:21 -07:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
udp: generate gso with UDP_SEGMENT Support generic segmentation offload for udp datagrams. Callers can concatenate and send at once the payload of multiple datagrams with the same destination. To set segment size, the caller sets socket option UDP_SEGMENT to the length of each discrete payload. This value must be smaller than or equal to the relevant MTU. A follow-up patch adds cmsg UDP_SEGMENT to specify segment size on a per send call basis. Total byte length may then exceed MTU. If not an exact multiple of segment size, the last segment will be shorter. The implementation adds a gso_size field to the udp socket, ip(v6) cmsg cookie and inet_cork structure to be able to set the value at setsockopt or cmsg time and to work with both lockless and corked paths. Initial benchmark numbers show UDP GSO about as expensive as TCP GSO. tcp tso 3197 MB/s 54232 msg/s 54232 calls/s 6,457,754,262 cycles tcp gso 1765 MB/s 29939 msg/s 29939 calls/s 11,203,021,806 cycles tcp without tso/gso * 739 MB/s 12548 msg/s 12548 calls/s 11,205,483,630 cycles udp 876 MB/s 14873 msg/s 624666 calls/s 11,205,777,429 cycles udp gso 2139 MB/s 36282 msg/s 36282 calls/s 11,204,374,561 cycles [*] after reverting commit 0a6b2a1dc2a2 ("tcp: switch to GSO being always on") Measured total system cycles ('-a') for one core while pinning both the network receive path and benchmark process to that core: perf stat -a -C 12 -e cycles \ ./udpgso_bench_tx -C 12 -4 -D "$DST" -l 4 Note the reduction in calls/s with GSO. Bytes per syscall drops increases from 1470 to 61818. Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-26 13:42:17 -04:00
udp: generate gso with UDP_SEGMENT Support generic segmentation offload for udp datagrams. Callers can concatenate and send at once the payload of multiple datagrams with the same destination. To set segment size, the caller sets socket option UDP_SEGMENT to the length of each discrete payload. This value must be smaller than or equal to the relevant MTU. A follow-up patch adds cmsg UDP_SEGMENT to specify segment size on a per send call basis. Total byte length may then exceed MTU. If not an exact multiple of segment size, the last segment will be shorter. The implementation adds a gso_size field to the udp socket, ip(v6) cmsg cookie and inet_cork structure to be able to set the value at setsockopt or cmsg time and to work with both lockless and corked paths. Initial benchmark numbers show UDP GSO about as expensive as TCP GSO. tcp tso 3197 MB/s 54232 msg/s 54232 calls/s 6,457,754,262 cycles tcp gso 1765 MB/s 29939 msg/s 29939 calls/s 11,203,021,806 cycles tcp without tso/gso * 739 MB/s 12548 msg/s 12548 calls/s 11,205,483,630 cycles udp 876 MB/s 14873 msg/s 624666 calls/s 11,205,777,429 cycles udp gso 2139 MB/s 36282 msg/s 36282 calls/s 11,204,374,561 cycles [*] after reverting commit 0a6b2a1dc2a2 ("tcp: switch to GSO being always on") Measured total system cycles ('-a') for one core while pinning both the network receive path and benchmark process to that core: perf stat -a -C 12 -e cycles \ ./udpgso_bench_tx -C 12 -4 -D "$DST" -l 4 Note the reduction in calls/s with GSO. Bytes per syscall drops increases from 1470 to 61818. Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-26 13:42:17 -04:00
udp: generate gso with UDP_SEGMENT Support generic segmentation offload for udp datagrams. Callers can concatenate and send at once the payload of multiple datagrams with the same destination. To set segment size, the caller sets socket option UDP_SEGMENT to the length of each discrete payload. This value must be smaller than or equal to the relevant MTU. A follow-up patch adds cmsg UDP_SEGMENT to specify segment size on a per send call basis. Total byte length may then exceed MTU. If not an exact multiple of segment size, the last segment will be shorter. The implementation adds a gso_size field to the udp socket, ip(v6) cmsg cookie and inet_cork structure to be able to set the value at setsockopt or cmsg time and to work with both lockless and corked paths. Initial benchmark numbers show UDP GSO about as expensive as TCP GSO. tcp tso 3197 MB/s 54232 msg/s 54232 calls/s 6,457,754,262 cycles tcp gso 1765 MB/s 29939 msg/s 29939 calls/s 11,203,021,806 cycles tcp without tso/gso * 739 MB/s 12548 msg/s 12548 calls/s 11,205,483,630 cycles udp 876 MB/s 14873 msg/s 624666 calls/s 11,205,777,429 cycles udp gso 2139 MB/s 36282 msg/s 36282 calls/s 11,204,374,561 cycles [*] after reverting commit 0a6b2a1dc2a2 ("tcp: switch to GSO being always on") Measured total system cycles ('-a') for one core while pinning both the network receive path and benchmark process to that core: perf stat -a -C 12 -e cycles \ ./udpgso_bench_tx -C 12 -4 -D "$DST" -l 4 Note the reduction in calls/s with GSO. Bytes per syscall drops increases from 1470 to 61818. Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-26 13:42:17 -04:00
net: devmem: Implement TX path Augment dmabuf binding to be able to handle TX. Additional to all the RX binding, we also create tx_vec needed for the TX path. Provide API for sendmsg to be able to send dmabufs bound to this device: - Provide a new dmabuf_tx_cmsg which includes the dmabuf to send from. - MSG_ZEROCOPY with SCM_DEVMEM_DMABUF cmsg indicates send from dma-buf. Devmem is uncopyable, so piggyback off the existing MSG_ZEROCOPY implementation, while disabling instances where MSG_ZEROCOPY falls back to copying. We additionally pipe the binding down to the new zerocopy_fill_skb_from_devmem which fills a TX skb with net_iov netmems instead of the traditional page netmems. We also special case skb_frag_dma_map to return the dma-address of these dmabuf net_iovs instead of attempting to map pages. The TX path may release the dmabuf in a context where we cannot wait. This happens when the user unbinds a TX dmabuf while there are still references to its netmems in the TX path. In that case, the netmems will be put_netmem'd from a context where we can't unmap the dmabuf, Resolve this by making __net_devmem_dmabuf_binding_free schedule_work'd. Based on work by Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>. A lot of the meat of the implementation came from devmem TCP RFC v1[1], which included the TX path, but Stan did all the rebasing on top of netmem/net_iov. Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Signed-off-by: Kaiyuan Zhang <kaiyuanz@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250508004830.4100853-5-almasrymina@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2025-05-08 00:48:24 +00:00
ip, ip6: Fix splice to raw and ping sockets Splicing to SOCK_RAW sockets may set MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, but in such a case, __ip_append_data() will call skb_splice_from_iter() to access the 'from' data, assuming it to point to a msghdr struct with an iter, instead of using the provided getfrag function to access it. In the case of raw_sendmsg(), however, this is not the case and 'from' will point to a raw_frag_vec struct and raw_getfrag() will be the frag-getting function. A similar issue may occur with rawv6_sendmsg(). Fix this by ignoring MSG_SPLICE_PAGES if getfrag != ip_generic_getfrag as ip_generic_getfrag() expects "from" to be a msghdr*, but the other getfrags don't. Note that this will prevent MSG_SPLICE_PAGES from being effective for udplite. This likely affects ping sockets too. udplite looks like it should be okay as it expects "from" to be a msghdr. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot+d8486855ef44506fd675@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000ae4cbf05fdeb8349@google.com/ Fixes: 2dc334f1a63a ("splice, net: Use sendmsg(MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) rather than ->sendpage()") Tested-by: syzbot+d8486855ef44506fd675@syzkaller.appspotmail.com cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1410156.1686729856@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-06-14 09:04:16 +01:00
udp: Fix __ip_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES __ip_append_data() can get into an infinite loop when asked to splice into a partially-built UDP message that has more than the frag-limit data and up to the MTU limit. Something like: pipe(pfd); sfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); connect(sfd, ...); send(sfd, buffer, 8161, MSG_CONFIRM|MSG_MORE); write(pfd[1], buffer, 8); splice(pfd[0], 0, sfd, 0, 0x4ffe0ul, 0); where the amount of data given to send() is dependent on the MTU size (in this instance an interface with an MTU of 8192). The problem is that the calculation of the amount to copy in __ip_append_data() goes negative in two places, and, in the second place, this gets subtracted from the length remaining, thereby increasing it. This happens when pagedlen > 0 (which happens for MSG_ZEROCOPY and MSG_SPLICE_PAGES), because the terms in: copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen; then mostly cancel when pagedlen is substituted for, leaving just -fraggap. This causes: length -= copy + transhdrlen; to increase the length to more than the amount of data in msg->msg_iter, which causes skb_splice_from_iter() to be unable to fill the request and it returns less than 'copied' - which means that length never gets to 0 and we never exit the loop. Fix this by: (1) Insert a note about the dodgy calculation of 'copy'. (2) If MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, clear copy if it is negative from the above equation, so that 'offset' isn't regressed and 'length' isn't increased, which will mean that length and thus copy should match the amount left in the iterator. (3) When handling MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, give a warning and return -EIO if we're asked to splice more than is in the iterator. It might be better to not give the warning or even just give a 'short' write. [!] Note that this ought to also affect MSG_ZEROCOPY, but MSG_ZEROCOPY avoids the problem by simply assuming that everything asked for got copied, not just the amount that was in the iterator. This is a potential bug for the future. Fixes: 7ac7c987850c ("udp: Convert udp_sendpage() to use MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: syzbot+f527b971b4bdc8e79f9e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000881d0606004541d1@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1420063.1690904933@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-08-01 16:48:53 +01:00
udp: Fix __ip_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES __ip_append_data() can get into an infinite loop when asked to splice into a partially-built UDP message that has more than the frag-limit data and up to the MTU limit. Something like: pipe(pfd); sfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); connect(sfd, ...); send(sfd, buffer, 8161, MSG_CONFIRM|MSG_MORE); write(pfd[1], buffer, 8); splice(pfd[0], 0, sfd, 0, 0x4ffe0ul, 0); where the amount of data given to send() is dependent on the MTU size (in this instance an interface with an MTU of 8192). The problem is that the calculation of the amount to copy in __ip_append_data() goes negative in two places, and, in the second place, this gets subtracted from the length remaining, thereby increasing it. This happens when pagedlen > 0 (which happens for MSG_ZEROCOPY and MSG_SPLICE_PAGES), because the terms in: copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen; then mostly cancel when pagedlen is substituted for, leaving just -fraggap. This causes: length -= copy + transhdrlen; to increase the length to more than the amount of data in msg->msg_iter, which causes skb_splice_from_iter() to be unable to fill the request and it returns less than 'copied' - which means that length never gets to 0 and we never exit the loop. Fix this by: (1) Insert a note about the dodgy calculation of 'copy'. (2) If MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, clear copy if it is negative from the above equation, so that 'offset' isn't regressed and 'length' isn't increased, which will mean that length and thus copy should match the amount left in the iterator. (3) When handling MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, give a warning and return -EIO if we're asked to splice more than is in the iterator. It might be better to not give the warning or even just give a 'short' write. [!] Note that this ought to also affect MSG_ZEROCOPY, but MSG_ZEROCOPY avoids the problem by simply assuming that everything asked for got copied, not just the amount that was in the iterator. This is a potential bug for the future. Fixes: 7ac7c987850c ("udp: Convert udp_sendpage() to use MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: syzbot+f527b971b4bdc8e79f9e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000881d0606004541d1@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1420063.1690904933@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-08-01 16:48:53 +01:00
udp: Fix __ip_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES __ip_append_data() can get into an infinite loop when asked to splice into a partially-built UDP message that has more than the frag-limit data and up to the MTU limit. Something like: pipe(pfd); sfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); connect(sfd, ...); send(sfd, buffer, 8161, MSG_CONFIRM|MSG_MORE); write(pfd[1], buffer, 8); splice(pfd[0], 0, sfd, 0, 0x4ffe0ul, 0); where the amount of data given to send() is dependent on the MTU size (in this instance an interface with an MTU of 8192). The problem is that the calculation of the amount to copy in __ip_append_data() goes negative in two places, and, in the second place, this gets subtracted from the length remaining, thereby increasing it. This happens when pagedlen > 0 (which happens for MSG_ZEROCOPY and MSG_SPLICE_PAGES), because the terms in: copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen; then mostly cancel when pagedlen is substituted for, leaving just -fraggap. This causes: length -= copy + transhdrlen; to increase the length to more than the amount of data in msg->msg_iter, which causes skb_splice_from_iter() to be unable to fill the request and it returns less than 'copied' - which means that length never gets to 0 and we never exit the loop. Fix this by: (1) Insert a note about the dodgy calculation of 'copy'. (2) If MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, clear copy if it is negative from the above equation, so that 'offset' isn't regressed and 'length' isn't increased, which will mean that length and thus copy should match the amount left in the iterator. (3) When handling MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, give a warning and return -EIO if we're asked to splice more than is in the iterator. It might be better to not give the warning or even just give a 'short' write. [!] Note that this ought to also affect MSG_ZEROCOPY, but MSG_ZEROCOPY avoids the problem by simply assuming that everything asked for got copied, not just the amount that was in the iterator. This is a potential bug for the future. Fixes: 7ac7c987850c ("udp: Convert udp_sendpage() to use MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: syzbot+f527b971b4bdc8e79f9e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000881d0606004541d1@google.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1420063.1690904933@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2023-08-01 16:48:53 +01:00
xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags MSG_SPLICE_PAGES can attach pages from a pipe directly to an skb. TCP marks such skbs with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG after skb_splice_from_iter(), so later paths that may modify packet data can first make a private copy. The IPv4/IPv6 datagram append paths did not set this flag when splicing pages into UDP skbs. That leaves an ESP-in-UDP packet made from shared pipe pages looking like an ordinary uncloned nonlinear skb. ESP input then takes the no-COW fast path for uncloned skbs without a frag_list and decrypts in place over data that is not owned privately by the skb. Mark IPv4/IPv6 datagram splice frags with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, matching TCP. Also make ESP input fall back to skb_cow_data() when the flag is present, so ESP does not decrypt externally backed frags in place. Private nonlinear skb frags still use the existing fast path. This intentionally does not change ESP output. In esp_output_head(), the path that appends the ESP trailer to existing skb tailroom without calling skb_cow_data() is not reachable for nonlinear skbs: skb_tailroom() returns zero when skb->data_len is nonzero, while ESP tailen is positive. Thus ESP output will either use the separate destination-frag path or fall back to skb_cow_data(). Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible") Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible") Fixes: 7da0dde68486 ("ip, udp: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Fixes: 6d8192bd69bb ("ip6, udp6: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Reported-by: Kuan-Ting Chen <h3xrabbit@gmail.com> Tested-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ting Chen <h3xrabbit@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-05-04 23:27:12 +08:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
inet: protect against too small mtu values. syzbot was once again able to crash a host by setting a very small mtu on loopback device. Let's make inetdev_valid_mtu() available in include/net/ip.h, and use it in ip_setup_cork(), so that we protect both ip_append_page() and __ip_append_data() Also add a READ_ONCE() when the device mtu is read. Pairs this lockless read with one WRITE_ONCE() in __dev_set_mtu(), even if other code paths might write over this field. Add a big comment in include/linux/netdevice.h about dev->mtu needing READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations. Hopefully we will add the missing ones in followup patches. [1] refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9464 at lib/refcount.c:22 refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 9464 Comm: syz-executor850 Not tainted 5.4.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 panic+0x2e3/0x75c kernel/panic.c:221 __warn.cold+0x2f/0x3e kernel/panic.c:582 report_bug+0x289/0x300 lib/bug.c:195 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:169 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:267 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:286 invalid_op+0x23/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1027 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22 Code: 06 31 ff 89 de e8 c8 f5 e6 fd 84 db 0f 85 6f ff ff ff e8 7b f4 e6 fd 48 c7 c7 e0 71 4f 88 c6 05 56 a6 a4 06 01 e8 c7 a8 b7 fd <0f> 0b e9 50 ff ff ff e8 5c f4 e6 fd 0f b6 1d 3d a6 a4 06 31 ff 89 RSP: 0018:ffff88809689f550 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815e4336 RDI: ffffed1012d13e9c RBP: ffff88809689f560 R08: ffff88809c50a3c0 R09: fffffbfff15d31b1 R10: fffffbfff15d31b0 R11: ffffffff8ae98d87 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000040100 R14: ffff888099041104 R15: ffff888218d96e40 refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:193 [inline] skb_set_owner_w+0x2b6/0x410 net/core/sock.c:1999 sock_wmalloc+0xf1/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2096 ip_append_page+0x7ef/0x1190 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1383 udp_sendpage+0x1c7/0x480 net/ipv4/udp.c:1276 inet_sendpage+0xdb/0x150 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:821 kernel_sendpage+0x92/0xf0 net/socket.c:3794 sock_sendpage+0x8b/0xc0 net/socket.c:936 pipe_to_sendpage+0x2da/0x3c0 fs/splice.c:458 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:512 [inline] __splice_from_pipe+0x3ee/0x7c0 fs/splice.c:636 splice_from_pipe+0x108/0x170 fs/splice.c:671 generic_splice_sendpage+0x3c/0x50 fs/splice.c:842 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:861 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x123/0x190 fs/splice.c:1035 splice_direct_to_actor+0x3b4/0xa30 fs/splice.c:990 do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1078 do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1464 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1525 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1511 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1dd/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1511 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x441409 Code: e8 ac e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffb64c4f78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000441409 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000073b8a R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000010001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000402180 R13: 0000000000402210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Fixes: 1470ddf7f8ce ("inet: Remove explicit write references to sk/inet in ip_append_data") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-05 20:43:46 -08:00
inet: protect against too small mtu values. syzbot was once again able to crash a host by setting a very small mtu on loopback device. Let's make inetdev_valid_mtu() available in include/net/ip.h, and use it in ip_setup_cork(), so that we protect both ip_append_page() and __ip_append_data() Also add a READ_ONCE() when the device mtu is read. Pairs this lockless read with one WRITE_ONCE() in __dev_set_mtu(), even if other code paths might write over this field. Add a big comment in include/linux/netdevice.h about dev->mtu needing READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations. Hopefully we will add the missing ones in followup patches. [1] refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9464 at lib/refcount.c:22 refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 0 PID: 9464 Comm: syz-executor850 Not tainted 5.4.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118 panic+0x2e3/0x75c kernel/panic.c:221 __warn.cold+0x2f/0x3e kernel/panic.c:582 report_bug+0x289/0x300 lib/bug.c:195 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:169 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:267 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:286 invalid_op+0x23/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1027 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22 Code: 06 31 ff 89 de e8 c8 f5 e6 fd 84 db 0f 85 6f ff ff ff e8 7b f4 e6 fd 48 c7 c7 e0 71 4f 88 c6 05 56 a6 a4 06 01 e8 c7 a8 b7 fd <0f> 0b e9 50 ff ff ff e8 5c f4 e6 fd 0f b6 1d 3d a6 a4 06 31 ff 89 RSP: 0018:ffff88809689f550 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815e4336 RDI: ffffed1012d13e9c RBP: ffff88809689f560 R08: ffff88809c50a3c0 R09: fffffbfff15d31b1 R10: fffffbfff15d31b0 R11: ffffffff8ae98d87 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000040100 R14: ffff888099041104 R15: ffff888218d96e40 refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:193 [inline] skb_set_owner_w+0x2b6/0x410 net/core/sock.c:1999 sock_wmalloc+0xf1/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2096 ip_append_page+0x7ef/0x1190 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1383 udp_sendpage+0x1c7/0x480 net/ipv4/udp.c:1276 inet_sendpage+0xdb/0x150 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:821 kernel_sendpage+0x92/0xf0 net/socket.c:3794 sock_sendpage+0x8b/0xc0 net/socket.c:936 pipe_to_sendpage+0x2da/0x3c0 fs/splice.c:458 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:512 [inline] __splice_from_pipe+0x3ee/0x7c0 fs/splice.c:636 splice_from_pipe+0x108/0x170 fs/splice.c:671 generic_splice_sendpage+0x3c/0x50 fs/splice.c:842 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:861 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x123/0x190 fs/splice.c:1035 splice_direct_to_actor+0x3b4/0xa30 fs/splice.c:990 do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1078 do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1464 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1525 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1511 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1dd/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1511 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x441409 Code: e8 ac e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffb64c4f78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000441409 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000073b8a R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000010001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000402180 R13: 0000000000402210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Fixes: 1470ddf7f8ce ("inet: Remove explicit write references to sk/inet in ip_append_data") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-05 20:43:46 -08:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
ipv4: Fix uninit-value access in __ip_make_skb() KMSAN reported uninit-value access in __ip_make_skb() [1]. __ip_make_skb() tests HDRINCL to know if the skb has icmphdr. However, HDRINCL can cause a race condition. If calling setsockopt(2) with IP_HDRINCL changes HDRINCL while __ip_make_skb() is running, the function will access icmphdr in the skb even if it is not included. This causes the issue reported by KMSAN. Check FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH on fl4->flowi4_flags instead of testing HDRINCL on the socket. Also, fl4->fl4_icmp_type and fl4->fl4_icmp_code are not initialized. These are union in struct flowi4 and are implicitly initialized by flowi4_init_output(), but we should not rely on specific union layout. Initialize these explicitly in raw_sendmsg(). [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __ip_make_skb+0x2b74/0x2d20 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1481 __ip_make_skb+0x2b74/0x2d20 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1481 ip_finish_skb include/net/ip.h:243 [inline] ip_push_pending_frames+0x4c/0x5c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1508 raw_sendmsg+0x2381/0x2690 net/ipv4/raw.c:654 inet_sendmsg+0x27b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x274/0x3c0 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x62c/0x7b0 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x130/0x200 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5f6/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35a/0x7c0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline] __ip_append_data+0x49ab/0x68c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1128 ip_append_data+0x1e7/0x260 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1365 raw_sendmsg+0x22b1/0x2690 net/ipv4/raw.c:648 inet_sendmsg+0x27b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x274/0x3c0 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x62c/0x7b0 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x130/0x200 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 CPU: 1 PID: 15709 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.8.0-11567-gb3603fcb79b1 #25 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 Fixes: 99e5acae193e ("ipv4: Fix potential uninit variable access bug in __ip_make_skb()") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240430123945.2057348-1-syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2024-04-30 21:39:45 +09:00
net: use a per task frag allocator We currently use a per socket order-0 page cache for tcp_sendmsg() operations. This page is used to build fragments for skbs. Its done to increase probability of coalescing small write() into single segments in skbs still in write queue (not yet sent) But it wastes a lot of memory for applications handling many mostly idle sockets, since each socket holds one page in sk->sk_sndmsg_page Its also quite inefficient to build TSO 64KB packets, because we need about 16 pages per skb on arches where PAGE_SIZE = 4096, so we hit page allocator more than wanted. This patch adds a per task frag allocator and uses bigger pages, if available. An automatic fallback is done in case of memory pressure. (up to 32768 bytes per frag, thats order-3 pages on x86) This increases TCP stream performance by 20% on loopback device, but also benefits on other network devices, since 8x less frags are mapped on transmit and unmapped on tx completion. Alexander Duyck mentioned a probable performance win on systems with IOMMU enabled. Its possible some SG enabled hardware cant cope with bigger fragments, but their ndo_start_xmit() should already handle this, splitting a fragment in sub fragments, since some arches have PAGE_SIZE=65536 Successfully tested on various ethernet devices. (ixgbe, igb, bnx2x, tg3, mellanox mlx4) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Cc: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Tested-by: Vijay Subramanian <subramanian.vijay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-23 23:04:42 +00:00
net: Find dst with sk's xfrm policy not ctl_sk If we set XFRM security policy by calling setsockopt with option IPV6_XFRM_POLICY, the policy will be stored in 'sock_policy' in 'sock' struct. However tcp_v6_send_response doesn't look up dst_entry with the actual socket but looks up with tcp control socket. This may cause a problem that a RST packet is sent without ESP encryption & peer's TCP socket can't receive it. This patch will make the function look up dest_entry with actual socket, if the socket has XFRM policy(sock_policy), so that the TCP response packet via this function can be encrypted, & aligned on the encrypted TCP socket. Tested: We encountered this problem when a TCP socket which is encrypted in ESP transport mode encryption, receives challenge ACK at SYN_SENT state. After receiving challenge ACK, TCP needs to send RST to establish the socket at next SYN try. But the RST was not encrypted & peer TCP socket still remains on ESTABLISHED state. So we verified this with test step as below. [Test step] 1. Making a TCP state mismatch between client(IDLE) & server(ESTABLISHED). 2. Client tries a new connection on the same TCP ports(src & dst). 3. Server will return challenge ACK instead of SYN,ACK. 4. Client will send RST to server to clear the SOCKET. 5. Client will retransmit SYN to server on the same TCP ports. [Expected result] The TCP connection should be established. Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Sehee Lee <seheele@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sewook Seo <sewookseo@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-07-07 10:01:39 +00:00
tcp: add datapath logic for PSP with inline key exchange Add validation points and state propagation to support PSP key exchange inline, on TCP connections. The expectation is that application will use some well established mechanism like TLS handshake to establish a secure channel over the connection and if both endpoints are PSP-capable - exchange and install PSP keys. Because the connection can existing in PSP-unsecured and PSP-secured state we need to make sure that there are no race conditions or retransmission leaks. On Tx - mark packets with the skb->decrypted bit when PSP key is at the enqueue time. Drivers should only encrypt packets with this bit set. This prevents retransmissions getting encrypted when original transmission was not. Similarly to TLS, we'll use sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb to make sure PSP skbs can't "escape" via a PSP-unaware device without being encrypted. On Rx - validation is done under socket lock. This moves the validation point later than xfrm, for example. Please see the documentation patch for more details on the flow of securing a connection, but for the purpose of this patch what's important is that we want to enforce the invariant that once connection is secured any skb in the receive queue has been encrypted with PSP. Add GRO and coalescing checks to prevent PSP authenticated data from being combined with cleartext data, or data with non-matching PSP state. On Rx, check skb's with psp_skb_coalesce_diff() at points before psp_sk_rx_policy_check(). After skb's are policy checked and on the socket receive queue, skb_cmp_decrypted() is sufficient for checking for coalescable PSP state. On Tx, tcp_write_collapse_fence() should be called when transitioning a socket into PSP Tx state to prevent data sent as cleartext from being coalesced with PSP encapsulated data. This change only adds the validation points, for ease of review. Subsequent change will add the ability to install keys, and flesh the enforcement logic out Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Co-developed-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917000954.859376-5-daniel.zahka@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2025-09-16 17:09:31 -07:00
tcp: add datapath logic for PSP with inline key exchange Add validation points and state propagation to support PSP key exchange inline, on TCP connections. The expectation is that application will use some well established mechanism like TLS handshake to establish a secure channel over the connection and if both endpoints are PSP-capable - exchange and install PSP keys. Because the connection can existing in PSP-unsecured and PSP-secured state we need to make sure that there are no race conditions or retransmission leaks. On Tx - mark packets with the skb->decrypted bit when PSP key is at the enqueue time. Drivers should only encrypt packets with this bit set. This prevents retransmissions getting encrypted when original transmission was not. Similarly to TLS, we'll use sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb to make sure PSP skbs can't "escape" via a PSP-unaware device without being encrypted. On Rx - validation is done under socket lock. This moves the validation point later than xfrm, for example. Please see the documentation patch for more details on the flow of securing a connection, but for the purpose of this patch what's important is that we want to enforce the invariant that once connection is secured any skb in the receive queue has been encrypted with PSP. Add GRO and coalescing checks to prevent PSP authenticated data from being combined with cleartext data, or data with non-matching PSP state. On Rx, check skb's with psp_skb_coalesce_diff() at points before psp_sk_rx_policy_check(). After skb's are policy checked and on the socket receive queue, skb_cmp_decrypted() is sufficient for checking for coalescable PSP state. On Tx, tcp_write_collapse_fence() should be called when transitioning a socket into PSP Tx state to prevent data sent as cleartext from being coalesced with PSP encapsulated data. This change only adds the validation points, for ease of review. Subsequent change will add the ability to install keys, and flesh the enforcement logic out Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Co-developed-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917000954.859376-5-daniel.zahka@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2025-09-16 17:09:31 -07:00