linux/net/core/net_namespace.c

1381 lines
32 KiB

bpf, net: Rework cookie generator as per-cpu one With its use in BPF, the cookie generator can be called very frequently in particular when used out of cgroup v2 hooks (e.g. connect / sendmsg) and attached to the root cgroup, for example, when used in v1/v2 mixed environments. In particular, when there's a high churn on sockets in the system there can be many parallel requests to the bpf_get_socket_cookie() and bpf_get_netns_cookie() helpers which then cause contention on the atomic counter. As similarly done in f991bd2e1421 ("fs: introduce a per-cpu last_ino allocator"), add a small helper library that both can use for the 64 bit counters. Given this can be called from different contexts, we also need to deal with potential nested calls even though in practice they are considered extremely rare. One idea as suggested by Eric Dumazet was to use a reverse counter for this situation since we don't expect 64 bit overflows anyways; that way, we can avoid bigger gaps in the 64 bit counter space compared to just batch-wise increase. Even on machines with small number of cores (e.g. 4) the cookie generation shrinks from min/max/med/avg (ns) of 22/50/40/38.9 down to 10/35/14/17.3 when run in parallel from multiple CPUs. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/8a80b8d27d3c49f9a14e1d5213c19d8be87d1dc8.1601477936.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-09-30 17:18:16 +02:00
net: Introduce net_sem for protection of pernet_list Currently, the mutex is mostly used to protect pernet operations list. It orders setup_net() and cleanup_net() with parallel {un,}register_pernet_operations() calls, so ->exit{,batch} methods of the same pernet operations are executed for a dying net, as were used to call ->init methods, even after the net namespace is unlinked from net_namespace_list in cleanup_net(). But there are several problems with scalability. The first one is that more than one net can't be created or destroyed at the same moment on the node. For big machines with many cpus running many containers it's very sensitive. The second one is that it's need to synchronize_rcu() after net is removed from net_namespace_list(): Destroy net_ns: cleanup_net() mutex_lock(&net_mutex) list_del_rcu(&net->list) synchronize_rcu() <--- Sleep there for ages list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list) list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list) mutex_unlock(&net_mutex) This primitive is not fast, especially on the systems with many processors and/or when preemptible RCU is enabled in config. So, all the time, while cleanup_net() is waiting for RCU grace period, creation of new net namespaces is not possible, the tasks, who makes it, are sleeping on the same mutex: Create net_ns: copy_net_ns() mutex_lock_killable(&net_mutex) <--- Sleep there for ages I observed 20-30 seconds hangs of "unshare -n" on ordinary 8-cpu laptop with preemptible RCU enabled after CRIU tests round is finished. The solution is to convert net_mutex to the rw_semaphore and add fine grain locks to really small number of pernet_operations, what really need them. Then, pernet_operations::init/::exit methods, modifying the net-related data, will require down_read() locking only, while down_write() will be used for changing pernet_list (i.e., when modules are being loaded and unloaded). This gives signify performance increase, after all patch set is applied, like you may see here: %for i in {1..10000}; do unshare -n bash -c exit; done *before* real 1m40,377s user 0m9,672s sys 0m19,928s *after* real 0m17,007s user 0m5,311s sys 0m11,779 (5.8 times faster) This patch starts replacing net_mutex to net_sem. It adds rw_semaphore, describes the variables it protects, and makes to use, where appropriate. net_mutex is still present, and next patches will kick it out step-by-step. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-13 12:26:23 +03:00
net: Introduce net_sem for protection of pernet_list Currently, the mutex is mostly used to protect pernet operations list. It orders setup_net() and cleanup_net() with parallel {un,}register_pernet_operations() calls, so ->exit{,batch} methods of the same pernet operations are executed for a dying net, as were used to call ->init methods, even after the net namespace is unlinked from net_namespace_list in cleanup_net(). But there are several problems with scalability. The first one is that more than one net can't be created or destroyed at the same moment on the node. For big machines with many cpus running many containers it's very sensitive. The second one is that it's need to synchronize_rcu() after net is removed from net_namespace_list(): Destroy net_ns: cleanup_net() mutex_lock(&net_mutex) list_del_rcu(&net->list) synchronize_rcu() <--- Sleep there for ages list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list) list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list) mutex_unlock(&net_mutex) This primitive is not fast, especially on the systems with many processors and/or when preemptible RCU is enabled in config. So, all the time, while cleanup_net() is waiting for RCU grace period, creation of new net namespaces is not possible, the tasks, who makes it, are sleeping on the same mutex: Create net_ns: copy_net_ns() mutex_lock_killable(&net_mutex) <--- Sleep there for ages I observed 20-30 seconds hangs of "unshare -n" on ordinary 8-cpu laptop with preemptible RCU enabled after CRIU tests round is finished. The solution is to convert net_mutex to the rw_semaphore and add fine grain locks to really small number of pernet_operations, what really need them. Then, pernet_operations::init/::exit methods, modifying the net-related data, will require down_read() locking only, while down_write() will be used for changing pernet_list (i.e., when modules are being loaded and unloaded). This gives signify performance increase, after all patch set is applied, like you may see here: %for i in {1..10000}; do unshare -n bash -c exit; done *before* real 1m40,377s user 0m9,672s sys 0m19,928s *after* real 0m17,007s user 0m5,311s sys 0m11,779 (5.8 times faster) This patch starts replacing net_mutex to net_sem. It adds rw_semaphore, describes the variables it protects, and makes to use, where appropriate. net_mutex is still present, and next patches will kick it out step-by-step. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-13 12:26:23 +03:00
net: Introduce net_sem for protection of pernet_list Currently, the mutex is mostly used to protect pernet operations list. It orders setup_net() and cleanup_net() with parallel {un,}register_pernet_operations() calls, so ->exit{,batch} methods of the same pernet operations are executed for a dying net, as were used to call ->init methods, even after the net namespace is unlinked from net_namespace_list in cleanup_net(). But there are several problems with scalability. The first one is that more than one net can't be created or destroyed at the same moment on the node. For big machines with many cpus running many containers it's very sensitive. The second one is that it's need to synchronize_rcu() after net is removed from net_namespace_list(): Destroy net_ns: cleanup_net() mutex_lock(&net_mutex) list_del_rcu(&net->list) synchronize_rcu() <--- Sleep there for ages list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list) list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list) ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list) mutex_unlock(&net_mutex) This primitive is not fast, especially on the systems with many processors and/or when preemptible RCU is enabled in config. So, all the time, while cleanup_net() is waiting for RCU grace period, creation of new net namespaces is not possible, the tasks, who makes it, are sleeping on the same mutex: Create net_ns: copy_net_ns() mutex_lock_killable(&net_mutex) <--- Sleep there for ages I observed 20-30 seconds hangs of "unshare -n" on ordinary 8-cpu laptop with preemptible RCU enabled after CRIU tests round is finished. The solution is to convert net_mutex to the rw_semaphore and add fine grain locks to really small number of pernet_operations, what really need them. Then, pernet_operations::init/::exit methods, modifying the net-related data, will require down_read() locking only, while down_write() will be used for changing pernet_list (i.e., when modules are being loaded and unloaded). This gives signify performance increase, after all patch set is applied, like you may see here: %for i in {1..10000}; do unshare -n bash -c exit; done *before* real 1m40,377s user 0m9,672s sys 0m19,928s *after* real 0m17,007s user 0m5,311s sys 0m11,779 (5.8 times faster) This patch starts replacing net_mutex to net_sem. It adds rw_semaphore, describes the variables it protects, and makes to use, where appropriate. net_mutex is still present, and next patches will kick it out step-by-step. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-13 12:26:23 +03:00
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 04:21:32 +03:00
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 00:41:38 +00:00
bpf, net: Rework cookie generator as per-cpu one With its use in BPF, the cookie generator can be called very frequently in particular when used out of cgroup v2 hooks (e.g. connect / sendmsg) and attached to the root cgroup, for example, when used in v1/v2 mixed environments. In particular, when there's a high churn on sockets in the system there can be many parallel requests to the bpf_get_socket_cookie() and bpf_get_netns_cookie() helpers which then cause contention on the atomic counter. As similarly done in f991bd2e1421 ("fs: introduce a per-cpu last_ino allocator"), add a small helper library that both can use for the 64 bit counters. Given this can be called from different contexts, we also need to deal with potential nested calls even though in practice they are considered extremely rare. One idea as suggested by Eric Dumazet was to use a reverse counter for this situation since we don't expect 64 bit overflows anyways; that way, we can avoid bigger gaps in the 64 bit counter space compared to just batch-wise increase. Even on machines with small number of cores (e.g. 4) the cookie generation shrinks from min/max/med/avg (ns) of 22/50/40/38.9 down to 10/35/14/17.3 when run in parallel from multiple CPUs. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/8a80b8d27d3c49f9a14e1d5213c19d8be87d1dc8.1601477936.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-09-30 17:18:16 +02:00
bpf: Add netns cookie and enable it for bpf cgroup hooks In Cilium we're mainly using BPF cgroup hooks today in order to implement kube-proxy free Kubernetes service translation for ClusterIP, NodePort (*), ExternalIP, and LoadBalancer as well as HostPort mapping [0] for all traffic between Cilium managed nodes. While this works in its current shape and avoids packet-level NAT for inter Cilium managed node traffic, there is one major limitation we're facing today, that is, lack of netns awareness. In Kubernetes, the concept of Pods (which hold one or multiple containers) has been built around network namespaces, so while we can use the global scope of attaching to root BPF cgroup hooks also to our advantage (e.g. for exposing NodePort ports on loopback addresses), we also have the need to differentiate between initial network namespaces and non-initial one. For example, ExternalIP services mandate that non-local service IPs are not to be translated from the host (initial) network namespace as one example. Right now, we have an ugly work-around in place where non-local service IPs for ExternalIP services are not xlated from connect() and friends BPF hooks but instead via less efficient packet-level NAT on the veth tc ingress hook for Pod traffic. On top of determining whether we're in initial or non-initial network namespace we also have a need for a socket-cookie like mechanism for network namespaces scope. Socket cookies have the nice property that they can be combined as part of the key structure e.g. for BPF LRU maps without having to worry that the cookie could be recycled. We are planning to use this for our sessionAffinity implementation for services. Therefore, add a new bpf_get_netns_cookie() helper which would resolve both use cases at once: bpf_get_netns_cookie(NULL) would provide the cookie for the initial network namespace while passing the context instead of NULL would provide the cookie from the application's network namespace. We're using a hole, so no size increase; the assignment happens only once. Therefore this allows for a comparison on initial namespace as well as regular cookie usage as we have today with socket cookies. We could later on enable this helper for other program types as well as we would see need. (*) Both externalTrafficPolicy={Local|Cluster} types [0] https://github.com/cilium/cilium/blob/master/bpf/bpf_sock.c Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/c47d2346982693a9cf9da0e12690453aded4c788.1585323121.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-03-27 16:58:52 +01:00
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 00:41:38 +00:00
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 04:21:32 +03:00
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 00:41:38 +00:00
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 00:41:38 +00:00
netns: make struct pernet_operations::id unsigned int Make struct pernet_operations::id unsigned. There are 2 reasons to do so: 1) This field is really an index into an zero based array and thus is unsigned entity. Using negative value is out-of-bound access by definition. 2) On x86_64 unsigned 32-bit data which are mixed with pointers via array indexing or offsets added or subtracted to pointers are preffered to signed 32-bit data. "int" being used as an array index needs to be sign-extended to 64-bit before being used. void f(long *p, int i) { g(p[i]); } roughly translates to movsx rsi, esi mov rdi, [rsi+...] call g MOVSX is 3 byte instruction which isn't necessary if the variable is unsigned because x86_64 is zero extending by default. Now, there is net_generic() function which, you guessed it right, uses "int" as an array index: static inline void *net_generic(const struct net *net, int id) { ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... } And this function is used a lot, so those sign extensions add up. Patch snipes ~1730 bytes on allyesconfig kernel (without all junk messing with code generation): add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 70/598 up/down: 396/-2126 (-1730) Unfortunately some functions actually grow bigger. This is a semmingly random artefact of code generation with register allocator being used differently. gcc decides that some variable needs to live in new r8+ registers and every access now requires REX prefix. Or it is shifted into r12, so [r12+0] addressing mode has to be used which is longer than [r8] However, overall balance is in negative direction: add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 70/598 up/down: 396/-2126 (-1730) function old new delta nfsd4_lock 3886 3959 +73 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1096 1140 +44 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2776 2808 +32 tipc_mon_rcv 1032 1058 +26 svcauth_gss_legacy_init 1413 1429 +16 tipc_bcbase_select_primary 379 392 +13 nfsd4_exchange_id 1247 1260 +13 nfsd4_setclientid_confirm 782 793 +11 ... put_client_renew_locked 494 480 -14 ip_set_sockfn_get 730 716 -14 geneve_sock_add 829 813 -16 nfsd4_sequence_done 721 703 -18 nlmclnt_lookup_host 708 686 -22 nfsd4_lockt 1085 1063 -22 nfs_get_client 1077 1050 -27 tcf_bpf_init 1106 1076 -30 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5997 5930 -67 Total: Before=154856051, After=154854321, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-17 04:58:21 +03:00
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 04:21:32 +03:00
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 04:21:32 +03:00
netns: fix net_alloc_generic() When a new net namespace is created, we should attach to it a "struct net_generic" with enough slots (even empty), or we can hit the following BUG_ON() : [ 200.752016] kernel BUG at include/net/netns/generic.h:40! ... [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c3cea>] ? get_cfcnfg+0x3a/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821cf0b0>] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x10/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff825c41be>] caif_device_notify+0x2e/0x530 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d61b7>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d67c1>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821bae82>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2b26>] register_netdevice+0x196/0x300 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821c2ca9>] register_netdev+0x19/0x30 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff81c1c67a>] loopback_net_init+0x4a/0xa0 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b5e62>] ops_init+0x42/0x180 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b600b>] setup_net+0x6b/0x100 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff821b6466>] copy_net_ns+0x86/0x110 [ 200.752016] [<ffffffff810d5789>] create_new_namespaces+0xd9/0x190 net_alloc_generic() should take into account the maximum index into the ptr array, as a subsystem might use net_generic() anytime. This also reduces number of reallocations in net_assign_generic() Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Sjur Brændeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-01-26 00:41:38 +00:00
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 04:21:32 +03:00
net: Use generic ns_common::count Switch over network namespaces to use the newly introduced common lifetime counter. Network namespaces have an additional counter named "passive". This counter does not guarantee that the network namespace is not already de-initialized and so isn't concerned with the actual lifetime of the network namespace; only the "count" counter is. So the latter is moved into struct ns_common. Currently every namespace type has its own lifetime counter which is stored in the specific namespace struct. The lifetime counters are used identically for all namespaces types. Namespaces may of course have additional unrelated counters and these are not altered. This introduces a common lifetime counter into struct ns_common. The ns_common struct encompasses information that all namespaces share. That should include the lifetime counter since its common for all of them. It also allows us to unify the type of the counters across all namespaces. Most of them use refcount_t but one uses atomic_t and at least one uses kref. Especially the last one doesn't make much sense since it's just a wrapper around refcount_t since 2016 and actually complicates cleanup operations by having to use container_of() to cast the correct namespace struct out of struct ns_common. Having the lifetime counter for the namespaces in one place reduces maintenance cost. Not just because after switching all namespaces over we will have removed more code than we added but also because the logic is more easily understandable and we indicate to the user that the basic lifetime requirements for all namespaces are currently identical. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: rewrite commit] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159644977635.604812.1319877322927063560.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-08-19 14:06:36 +02:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id() (I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB) Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr. It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory corruption: put_net(peer) rtnl_lock() atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ... __put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id) spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list) spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id) | get_net(peer) [count=1] | ... | (use after final put) v ... cleanup_net() ... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ... list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ... ... ... ... put_net(peer) ... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list) ... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ... queue_work() ... rtnl_unlock() rtnl_lock() ... for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ... spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ... idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ... ... ... net_drop_ns() ... net_free(peer) ... } ... | v cleanup_net() ... (Second free of peer) Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list will be corrupted. Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely. The patch fixes the problem in standard way. (Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send a separate message to netdev@ later). Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids" Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-12-19 11:27:56 -06:00
net: Use generic ns_common::count Switch over network namespaces to use the newly introduced common lifetime counter. Network namespaces have an additional counter named "passive". This counter does not guarantee that the network namespace is not already de-initialized and so isn't concerned with the actual lifetime of the network namespace; only the "count" counter is. So the latter is moved into struct ns_common. Currently every namespace type has its own lifetime counter which is stored in the specific namespace struct. The lifetime counters are used identically for all namespaces types. Namespaces may of course have additional unrelated counters and these are not altered. This introduces a common lifetime counter into struct ns_common. The ns_common struct encompasses information that all namespaces share. That should include the lifetime counter since its common for all of them. It also allows us to unify the type of the counters across all namespaces. Most of them use refcount_t but one uses atomic_t and at least one uses kref. Especially the last one doesn't make much sense since it's just a wrapper around refcount_t since 2016 and actually complicates cleanup operations by having to use container_of() to cast the correct namespace struct out of struct ns_common. Having the lifetime counter for the namespaces in one place reduces maintenance cost. Not just because after switching all namespaces over we will have removed more code than we added but also because the logic is more easily understandable and we indicate to the user that the basic lifetime requirements for all namespaces are currently identical. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: rewrite commit] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159644977635.604812.1319877322927063560.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-08-19 14:06:36 +02:00
keys: Fix memory leak in copy_net_ns If copy_net_ns() failed after net_alloc(), net->key_domain is leaked. Fix this, by freeing key_domain in error path. syzbot report: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff8881175007e0 (size 32): comm "syz-executor902", pid 7069, jiffies 4294944350 (age 28.400s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000a83ed741>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline] [<00000000a83ed741>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline] [<00000000a83ed741>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline] [<00000000a83ed741>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13d/0x280 mm/slab.c:3553 [<0000000059fc92b9>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:547 [inline] [<0000000059fc92b9>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:742 [inline] [<0000000059fc92b9>] net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:398 [inline] [<0000000059fc92b9>] copy_net_ns+0xb2/0x220 net/core/net_namespace.c:445 [<00000000a9d74bbc>] create_new_namespaces+0x141/0x2a0 kernel/nsproxy.c:103 [<000000008047d645>] unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x7f/0x100 kernel/nsproxy.c:202 [<000000005993ea6e>] ksys_unshare+0x236/0x490 kernel/fork.c:2674 [<0000000019417e75>] __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2742 [inline] [<0000000019417e75>] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2740 [inline] [<0000000019417e75>] __x64_sys_unshare+0x16/0x20 kernel/fork.c:2740 [<00000000f4c5f2c8>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 [<0000000038550184>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 syzbot also reported other leak in copy_net_ns -> setup_net. This problem is already fixed by cf47a0b882a4e5f6b34c7949d7b293e9287f1972. Fixes: 9b242610514f ("keys: Network namespace domain tag") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3b3296d032353c33184b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Takeshi Misawa <jeliantsurux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-10-19 15:34:43 +09:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
net: Move net:netns_ids destruction out of rtnl_lock() and document locking scheme Currently, we unhash a dying net from netns_ids lists under rtnl_lock(). It's a leftover from the time when net::netns_ids was introduced. There was no net::nsid_lock, and rtnl_lock() was mostly need to order modification of alive nets nsid idr, i.e. for: for_each_net(tmp) { ... id = __peernet2id(tmp, net); idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id); ... } Since we have net::nsid_lock, the modifications are protected by this local lock, and now we may introduce better scheme of netns_ids destruction. Let's look at the functions peernet2id_alloc() and get_net_ns_by_id(). Previous commits taught these functions to work well with dying net acquired from rtnl unlocked lists. And they are the only functions which can hash a net to netns_ids or obtain from there. And as easy to check, other netns_ids operating functions works with id, not with net pointers. So, we do not need rtnl_lock to synchronize cleanup_net() with all them. The another property, which is used in the patch, is that net is unhashed from net_namespace_list in the only place and by the only process. So, we avoid excess rcu_read_lock() or rtnl_lock(), when we'are iterating over the list in unhash_nsid(). All the above makes possible to keep rtnl_lock() locked only for net->list deletion, and completely avoid it for netns_ids unhashing and destruction. As these two doings may take long time (e.g., memory allocation to send skb), the patch should positively act on the scalability and signify decrease the time, which rtnl_lock() is held in cleanup_net(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-19 19:14:53 +03:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
Revert "netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"" This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4. To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid(). The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used in this code. Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in the following scenario reported by the lockdep. In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock. Test commands: ip netns del nst ip netns add nst ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 ip link set veth1 netns nst ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1 ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan Splat looks like: [ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted [ ... ] [ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of: [ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock [ 33.670615][ T607] [ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 33.673118][ T607] [ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1 [ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ---- [ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock); [ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable(); [ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key); [ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt> [ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock); [ 33.682579][ T607] [ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK *** [ ... ] [ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace: [ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 [ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace: [ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab [ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720 [ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60 [ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40 [ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180 [ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20 [ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge] [ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70 [ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170 [ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400 [ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0 [ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50 [ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30 [ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0 [ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50 [ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30 [ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0 [ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50 [ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge] [ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge] [ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0 [ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90 [ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60 [ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan] [ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170 [ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0 [ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0 [ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0 [ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20 [ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0 [ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0 [ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"") Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-07 15:54:41 +00:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
bpf, net: Rework cookie generator as per-cpu one With its use in BPF, the cookie generator can be called very frequently in particular when used out of cgroup v2 hooks (e.g. connect / sendmsg) and attached to the root cgroup, for example, when used in v1/v2 mixed environments. In particular, when there's a high churn on sockets in the system there can be many parallel requests to the bpf_get_socket_cookie() and bpf_get_netns_cookie() helpers which then cause contention on the atomic counter. As similarly done in f991bd2e1421 ("fs: introduce a per-cpu last_ino allocator"), add a small helper library that both can use for the 64 bit counters. Given this can be called from different contexts, we also need to deal with potential nested calls even though in practice they are considered extremely rare. One idea as suggested by Eric Dumazet was to use a reverse counter for this situation since we don't expect 64 bit overflows anyways; that way, we can avoid bigger gaps in the 64 bit counter space compared to just batch-wise increase. Even on machines with small number of cores (e.g. 4) the cookie generation shrinks from min/max/med/avg (ns) of 22/50/40/38.9 down to 10/35/14/17.3 when run in parallel from multiple CPUs. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/8a80b8d27d3c49f9a14e1d5213c19d8be87d1dc8.1601477936.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-09-30 17:18:16 +02:00
netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-02 04:21:32 +03:00
nsproxy: add struct nsset Add a simple struct nsset. It holds all necessary pieces to switch to a new set of namespaces without leaving a task in a half-switched state which we will make use of in the next patch. This patch switches the existing setns logic over without causing a change in setns() behavior. This brings setns() closer to how unshare() works(). The prepare_ns() function is responsible to prepare all necessary information. This has two reasons. First it minimizes dependencies between individual namespaces, i.e. all install handler can expect that all fields are properly initialized independent in what order they are called in. Second, this makes the code easier to maintain and easier to follow if it needs to be changed. The prepare_ns() helper will only be switched over to use a flags argument in the next patch. Here it will still use nstype as a simple integer argument which was argued would be clearer. I'm not particularly opinionated about this if it really helps or not. The struct nsset itself already contains the flags field since its name already indicates that it can contain information required by different namespaces. None of this should have functional consequences. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-05-05 16:04:30 +02:00
nsproxy: add struct nsset Add a simple struct nsset. It holds all necessary pieces to switch to a new set of namespaces without leaving a task in a half-switched state which we will make use of in the next patch. This patch switches the existing setns logic over without causing a change in setns() behavior. This brings setns() closer to how unshare() works(). The prepare_ns() function is responsible to prepare all necessary information. This has two reasons. First it minimizes dependencies between individual namespaces, i.e. all install handler can expect that all fields are properly initialized independent in what order they are called in. Second, this makes the code easier to maintain and easier to follow if it needs to be changed. The prepare_ns() helper will only be switched over to use a flags argument in the next patch. Here it will still use nstype as a simple integer argument which was argued would be clearer. I'm not particularly opinionated about this if it really helps or not. The struct nsset itself already contains the flags field since its name already indicates that it can contain information required by different namespaces. None of this should have functional consequences. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-05-05 16:04:30 +02:00
nsproxy: add struct nsset Add a simple struct nsset. It holds all necessary pieces to switch to a new set of namespaces without leaving a task in a half-switched state which we will make use of in the next patch. This patch switches the existing setns logic over without causing a change in setns() behavior. This brings setns() closer to how unshare() works(). The prepare_ns() function is responsible to prepare all necessary information. This has two reasons. First it minimizes dependencies between individual namespaces, i.e. all install handler can expect that all fields are properly initialized independent in what order they are called in. Second, this makes the code easier to maintain and easier to follow if it needs to be changed. The prepare_ns() helper will only be switched over to use a flags argument in the next patch. Here it will still use nstype as a simple integer argument which was argued would be clearer. I'm not particularly opinionated about this if it really helps or not. The struct nsset itself already contains the flags field since its name already indicates that it can contain information required by different namespaces. None of this should have functional consequences. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-05-05 16:04:30 +02:00