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linux/security/apparmor/policy.c

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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation version 2 of the license extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-01 10:08:55 +02:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
sched/headers: Prepare to remove <linux/cred.h> inclusion from <linux/sched.h> Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h doing that for them. Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high, it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over 2,200 files ... Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-02-02 17:54:15 +01:00
sched/headers: Prepare to use <linux/rcuupdate.h> instead of <linux/rculist.h> in <linux/sched.h> We don't actually need the full rculist.h header in sched.h anymore, we will be able to include the smaller rcupdate.h header instead. But first update code that relied on the implicit header inclusion. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-02-04 01:27:20 +01:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level. This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces lands. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:50 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: move context.h to cred.h Now that file contexts have been moved into file, and task context fns() and data have been split from the context, only the cred context remains in context.h so rename to cred.h to better reflect what it deals with. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-10-11 01:04:48 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: split apparmor policy namespaces code into its own file Policy namespaces will be diverging from profile management and expanding so put it in its own file. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:15 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level. This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces lands. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:50 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state Allow emulating the default profile behavior from boot, by allowing loading of a profile in the unconfined state into a new NS. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:12:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: split apparmor policy namespaces code into its own file Policy namespaces will be diverging from profile management and expanding so put it in its own file. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:15 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: rename apparmor file fns and data to indicate use prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c with the prefixes being aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or securityfs Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-25 06:23:42 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: split apparmor policy namespaces code into its own file Policy namespaces will be diverging from profile management and expanding so put it in its own file. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:15 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: split apparmor policy namespaces code into its own file Policy namespaces will be diverging from profile management and expanding so put it in its own file. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:15 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace. This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted helper can extract and use from live policy. Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-15 16:49:28 -08:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace. This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted helper can extract and use from live policy. Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-15 16:49:28 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.c Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:11:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.c Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:11:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace. This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted helper can extract and use from live policy. Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-15 16:49:28 -08:00
apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value Make it possible to tie Apparmor profiles to the presence of one or more extended attributes, and optionally their values. An example usecase for this is to automatically transition to a more privileged Apparmor profile if an executable has a valid IMA signature, which can then be appraised by the IMA subsystem. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-02-08 12:37:19 -08:00
apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace. This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted helper can extract and use from live policy. Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-15 16:49:28 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: split out shared policy_XXX fns to lib Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:14 -08:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:16 -08:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matching This converts profile attachment based on xattrs to a fixed extended conditional using dfa matching. This has a couple of advantages - pattern matching can be used for the xattr match - xattrs can be optional for an attachment or marked as required - the xattr attachment conditional will be able to be combined with other extended conditionals when the flexible extended conditional work lands. The xattr fixed extended conditional is appended to the xmatch conditional. If an xattr attachment is specified the profile xmatch will be generated regardless of whether there is a pattern match on the executable name. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2017-12-12 15:28:05 -08:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
apparmor: fix checkpatch error in Parse secmark policy Fix missed spacing error reported by checkpatch for 9caafbe2b4cf ("Parse secmark policy") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-11-01 22:28:17 -07:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy Add the base support for the new policy extensions. This does not bring any additional functionality, or change current semantics. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2012-02-16 07:07:53 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace. This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted helper can extract and use from live policy. Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-15 16:49:28 -08:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace. This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted helper can extract and use from live policy. Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-15 16:49:28 -08:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint and restore for containers. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:55 -08:00
apparmor: Fix memory leak of profile proxy When the proxy isn't replaced and the profile is removed, the proxy is being leaked resulting in a kmemleak check message of unreferenced object 0xffff888077a3a490 (size 16): comm "apparmor_parser", pid 128041, jiffies 4322684109 (age 1097.028s) hex dump (first 16 bytes): 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 92 fd 4b 81 88 ff ff ...........K.... backtrace: [<0000000084d5daf2>] aa_alloc_proxy+0x58/0xe0 [<00000000ecc0e21a>] aa_alloc_profile+0x159/0x1a0 [<000000004cc9ce15>] unpack_profile+0x275/0x1c40 [<000000007332b3ca>] aa_unpack+0x1e7/0x7e0 [<00000000e25e31bd>] aa_replace_profiles+0x18a/0x1d10 [<00000000350d9415>] policy_update+0x237/0x650 [<000000003fbf934e>] profile_load+0x122/0x160 [<0000000047f7b781>] vfs_write+0x139/0x290 [<000000008ad12358>] ksys_write+0xcd/0x170 [<000000001a9daa7b>] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x310 [<00000000b9efb0cf>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 Make sure to cleanup the profile's embedded label which will result on the proxy being properly freed. Fixes: 637f688dc3dc ("apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-07 04:10:33 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile Move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile so it can be used in aa_alloc_profile without a forward declaration. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2013-02-18 16:11:34 -08:00
apparmor: pass gfp_t parameter into profile allocation Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:35 -08:00
apparmor: move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile Move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile so it can be used in aa_alloc_profile without a forward declaration. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2013-02-18 16:11:34 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile Move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile so it can be used in aa_alloc_profile without a forward declaration. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2013-02-18 16:11:34 -08:00
apparmor: Use struct_size() helper in kzalloc() Make use of the struct_size() helper instead of an open-coded version, in order to avoid any potential type mistakes or integer overflows that, in the worse scenario, could lead to heap overflows. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/160 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2021-09-29 17:05:26 -05:00
apparmor: move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile Move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile so it can be used in aa_alloc_profile without a forward declaration. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2013-02-18 16:11:34 -08:00
apparmor: pass gfp_t parameter into profile allocation Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:35 -08:00
apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done remove the use of replaced by chaining and move to profile invalidation and lookup to handle task replacement. Replacement chaining can result in large chains of profiles being pinned in memory when one profile in the chain is use. With implicit labeling this will be even more of a problem, so move to a direct lookup method. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:07:43 -07:00
apparmor: add support for mapping secids and using secctxes Use a radix tree to provide a map between the secid and the label, and along with it a basic ability to provide secctx conversion. Shared/cached secctx will be added later. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-07-31 17:36:45 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile Move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile so it can be used in aa_alloc_profile without a forward declaration. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2013-02-18 16:11:34 -08:00
apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done remove the use of replaced by chaining and move to profile invalidation and lookup to handle task replacement. Replacement chaining can result in large chains of profiles being pinned in memory when one profile in the chain is use. With implicit labeling this will be even more of a problem, so move to a direct lookup method. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:07:43 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: change how profile replacement update is done remove the use of replaced by chaining and move to profile invalidation and lookup to handle task replacement. Replacement chaining can result in large chains of profiles being pinned in memory when one profile in the chain is use. With implicit labeling this will be even more of a problem, so move to a direct lookup method. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:07:43 -07:00
apparmor: move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile Move the free_profile fn ahead of aa_alloc_profile so it can be used in aa_alloc_profile without a forward declaration. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
2013-02-18 16:11:34 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: cleanup __find_child() Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-02 13:50:22 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile When finding a child profile via an rcu critical section, the profile may be put and scheduled for deletion after the child is found but before its refcount is incremented. Protect against this by repeating the lookup if the profiles refcount is 0 and is one its way to deletion. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2015-12-16 18:09:10 -08:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:16 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/978038 also affects apparmor portion of BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/987371 The unconfined profile is not stored in the regular profile list, but change_profile and exec transitions may want access to it when setting up specialized transitions like switch to the unconfined profile of a new policy namespace. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2012-05-16 11:00:05 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
apparmor: update how unconfined is handled ns->unconfined is being used read side without locking, nor rcu but is being updated when a namespace is removed. This works for the root ns which is never removed but has a race window and can cause failures when children namespaces are removed. Also ns and ns->unconfined have a circular refcounting dependency that is problematic and must be broken. Currently this is done incorrectly when the namespace is destroyed. Fix this by forward referencing unconfined via the replacedby infrastructure instead of directly updating the ns->unconfined pointer. Remove the circular refcount dependency by making the ns and its unconfined profile share the same refcount. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:08:43 -07:00
apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/978038 also affects apparmor portion of BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/987371 The unconfined profile is not stored in the regular profile list, but change_profile and exec transitions may want access to it when setting up specialized transitions like switch to the unconfined profile of a new policy namespace. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2012-05-16 11:00:05 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add strn version of lookup_profile fn Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:21 -08:00
apparmor: add fn to lookup profiles by fqname Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:24 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: add fn to lookup profiles by fqname Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:24 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: add fn to lookup profiles by fqname Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:24 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: add fn to lookup profiles by fqname Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:24 -08:00
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns() new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns() so move instead of doing forward fn declarations. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-08-16 08:59:57 -07:00
apparmor: fix race condition in null profile creation There is a race when null- profile is being created between the initial lookup/creation of the profile and lock/addition of the profile. This could result in multiple version of a profile being added to the list which need to be removed/replaced. Since these are learning profile their is no affect on mediation. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-08-16 05:40:49 -07:00
apparmor: fix leak of null profile name if profile allocation fails Fixes: d07881d2edb0 ("apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns()") Reported-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-11-15 15:25:30 -08:00
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns() new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns() so move instead of doing forward fn declarations. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-08-16 08:59:57 -07:00
apparmor: fix race condition in null profile creation There is a race when null- profile is being created between the initial lookup/creation of the profile and lock/addition of the profile. This could result in multiple version of a profile being added to the list which need to be removed/replaced. Since these are learning profile their is no affect on mediation. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-08-16 05:40:49 -07:00
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns() new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns() so move instead of doing forward fn declarations. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-08-16 08:59:57 -07:00
apparmor: fix possible recursive lock warning in __aa_create_ns Use mutex_lock_nested to provide lockdep the parent child lock ordering of the tree. This fixes the lockdep Warning [ 305.275177] ============================================ [ 305.275178] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 305.275179] 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 Not tainted [ 305.275180] -------------------------------------------- [ 305.275181] apparmor_parser/1339 is trying to acquire lock: [ 305.275182] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff970544dd>] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275187] but task is already holding lock: [ 305.275187] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0 [ 305.275190] other info that might help us debug this: [ 305.275191] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 305.275192] CPU0 [ 305.275193] ---- [ 305.275193] lock(&ns->lock); [ 305.275194] lock(&ns->lock); [ 305.275195] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 305.275196] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 305.275198] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1339: [ 305.275198] #0: (sb_writers#10){.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff96e9c6b7>] vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0 [ 305.275202] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0 [ 305.275205] stack backtrace: [ 305.275207] CPU: 1 PID: 1339 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 [ 305.275208] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 305.275209] Call Trace: [ 305.275212] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb [ 305.275214] __lock_acquire+0x141c/0x1460 [ 305.275216] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275218] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540 [ 305.275219] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540 [ 305.275221] lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0 [ 305.275223] ? lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0 [ 305.275224] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275227] __mutex_lock+0x89/0x920 [ 305.275228] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275230] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190 [ 305.275231] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275233] ? __lockdep_init_map+0x57/0x1d0 [ 305.275234] ? lockdep_init_map+0x9/0x10 [ 305.275236] ? __rwlock_init+0x32/0x60 [ 305.275238] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 305.275240] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 305.275241] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275243] aa_prepare_ns+0xc2/0xd0 [ 305.275245] aa_replace_profiles+0x168/0xf30 [ 305.275247] ? __might_fault+0x85/0x90 [ 305.275250] policy_update+0xb9/0x380 [ 305.275252] profile_load+0x7e/0x90 [ 305.275254] __vfs_write+0x28/0x150 [ 305.275256] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x72/0x80 [ 305.275257] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2f/0x60 [ 305.275259] ? __sb_start_write+0xdc/0x1c0 [ 305.275261] ? vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0 [ 305.275262] vfs_write+0xca/0x1d0 [ 305.275264] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190 [ 305.275266] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [ 305.275268] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2 [ 305.275271] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6b22e8c74 [ 305.275272] RSP: 002b:00007ffeaaee6288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 305.275273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffeaaee62a4 RCX: 00007fa6b22e8c74 [ 305.275274] RDX: 0000000000000a51 RSI: 00005566a8198c10 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 305.275275] RBP: 0000000000000a39 R08: 0000000000000a51 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 305.275276] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005566a8198c10 [ 305.275277] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00005566a72ecb88 R15: 00005566a72ec3a8 Fixes: 73688d1ed0b8 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-11-20 23:24:09 -08:00
apparmor: fix race condition in null profile creation There is a race when null- profile is being created between the initial lookup/creation of the profile and lock/addition of the profile. This could result in multiple version of a profile being added to the list which need to be removed/replaced. Since these are learning profile their is no affect on mediation. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-08-16 05:40:49 -07:00
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns() new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns() so move instead of doing forward fn declarations. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-08-16 08:59:57 -07:00
apparmor: fix leak of null profile name if profile allocation fails Fixes: d07881d2edb0 ("apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns()") Reported-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-11-15 15:25:30 -08:00
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns() new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns() so move instead of doing forward fn declarations. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-08-16 08:59:57 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable" There is a spelling mistake in an information message string, fix it. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-04-16 15:42:18 +01:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add ns name to the audit data for policy loads Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:54 -08:00
apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended. Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter which will become useless. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:43:02 -08:00
apparmor: add ns name to the audit data for policy loads Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:54 -08:00
apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended. Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter which will become useless. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:43:02 -08:00
apparmor: add ns name to the audit data for policy loads Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:54 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: add ns name to the audit data for policy loads Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:54 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended. Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter which will become useless. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:43:02 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended. Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter which will become useless. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:43:02 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended. Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter which will become useless. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:43:02 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch to apparmor to internal capable check for policy management With LSM stacking calling back into capable to check for MAC_ADMIN for apparmor policy results in asking the other stacked LSMs for MAC_ADMIN resulting in the other LSMs answering based on their policy management. For apparmor policy management we just need to call apparmor's capability fn directly. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-07-01 02:18:18 -07:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level. This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces lands. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:50 -08:00
apparmor: update policy capable checks to use a label Previously the policy capable checks assumed they were using the current task. Make them take the task label so the query can be made against an arbitrary task. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-30 17:00:11 -07:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level. This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces lands. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:50 -08:00
apparmor: update policy capable checks to use a label Previously the policy capable checks assumed they were using the current task. Make them take the task label so the query can be made against an arbitrary task. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-30 17:00:11 -07:00
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement. split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check, and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2016-06-22 18:01:08 -07:00
apparmor: update policy capable checks to use a label Previously the policy capable checks assumed they were using the current task. Make them take the task label so the query can be made against an arbitrary task. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-30 17:00:11 -07:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level. This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces lands. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:50 -08:00
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement. split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check, and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2016-06-22 18:01:08 -07:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level. This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces lands. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:50 -08:00
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement. split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check, and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2016-06-22 18:01:08 -07:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_view_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level. This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces lands. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:50 -08:00
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement. split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check, and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2016-06-22 18:01:08 -07:00
apparmor: update policy capable checks to use a label Previously the policy capable checks assumed they were using the current task. Make them take the task label so the query can be made against an arbitrary task. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-30 17:00:11 -07:00
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement. split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check, and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2016-06-22 18:01:08 -07:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_admin_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:51 -08:00
apparmor: Fix internal policy capable check for policy management The check was incorrectly treating a returned error as a boolean. Fixes: 31ec99e13346 ("apparmor: switch to apparmor to internal capable check for policy management") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2021-04-03 11:07:37 -07:00
apparmor: add ns being viewed as a param to policy_admin_capable() Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:51 -08:00
apparmor: update policy capable checks to use a label Previously the policy capable checks assumed they were using the current task. Make them take the task label so the query can be made against an arbitrary task. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-30 17:00:11 -07:00
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement. split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check, and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2016-06-22 18:01:08 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add profile and ns params to aa_may_manage_policy() Policy management will be expanded beyond traditional unconfined root. This will require knowning the profile of the task doing the management and the ns view. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:52 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: provide finer control over policy management Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-05-26 01:45:08 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add profile and ns params to aa_may_manage_policy() Policy management will be expanded beyond traditional unconfined root. This will require knowning the profile of the task doing the management and the ns view. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:52 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: provide finer control over policy management Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-05-26 01:45:08 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: update policy capable checks to use a label Previously the policy capable checks assumed they were using the current task. Make them take the task label so the query can be made against an arbitrary task. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-30 17:00:11 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: provide finer control over policy management Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-05-26 01:45:08 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add profile and ns params to aa_may_manage_policy() Policy management will be expanded beyond traditional unconfined root. This will require knowning the profile of the task doing the management and the ns view. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:52 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: rename hname_tail to basename Rename to the shorter and more familiar shell cmd name Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:29 -08:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: rename replacedby to proxy Proxy is shorter and a better fit than replaceby, so rename it. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:19 -08:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: rename apparmor file fns and data to indicate use prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c with the prefixes being aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or securityfs Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-25 06:23:42 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:16 -08:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: share profile name on replacement The profile names are the same, leverage this. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 07:09:05 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: share profile name on replacement The profile names are the same, leverage this. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 07:09:05 -07:00
apparmor: refactor updating profiles to the newest parent Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 07:16:46 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix policy load/remove semantics The namespace being passed into the replace/remove profiles fns() is not the view, but the namespace specified by the inode from the file hook (if present) or the loading tasks ns, if accessing the top level virtualized load/replace file interface. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-04 12:22:22 -07:00
apparmor: pass the subject profile into profile replace/remove This is just setup for new ns specific .load, .replace, .remove interface files. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:57 -08:00
apparmor: provide finer control over policy management Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-05-26 01:45:08 -07:00
apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint and restore for containers. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:55 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: cleanup fixup description of aa_replace_profiles Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-27 04:36:47 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: provide finer control over policy management Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-05-26 01:45:08 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load When blob compression is turned on, if the policy namespace is forced onto a policy load, the policy load will fail as the namespace name being referenced is inside the compressed policy blob, resulting in invalid or names that are too long. So duplicate the name before the blob is compressed. Fixes: 876dd866c084 ("apparmor: Initial implementation of raw policy blob compression") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-03-09 16:58:10 -08:00
apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:16 -08:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: provide finer control over policy management Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-05-26 01:45:08 -07:00
apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:56 -08:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: provide finer control over policy management Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-05-26 01:45:08 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint and restore for containers. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:55 -08:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:56 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:56 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: fix policy load/remove semantics The namespace being passed into the replace/remove profiles fns() is not the view, but the namespace specified by the inode from the file hook (if present) or the loading tasks ns, if accessing the top level virtualized load/replace file interface. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-04 12:22:22 -07:00
apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:56 -08:00
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836 Once the loop on lines 836-853 is complete and exits normally, ent is a pointer to the dummy list head value. The derefernces accessible from eg the goto fail on line 860 or the various goto fail_lock's afterwards thus seem incorrect. Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-04-06 06:55:22 -07:00
apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:56 -08:00
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836 Once the loop on lines 836-853 is complete and exits normally, ent is a pointer to the dummy list head value. The derefernces accessible from eg the goto fail on line 860 or the various goto fail_lock's afterwards thus seem incorrect. Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-04-06 06:55:22 -07:00
apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:56 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix possible recursive lock warning in __aa_create_ns Use mutex_lock_nested to provide lockdep the parent child lock ordering of the tree. This fixes the lockdep Warning [ 305.275177] ============================================ [ 305.275178] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 305.275179] 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 Not tainted [ 305.275180] -------------------------------------------- [ 305.275181] apparmor_parser/1339 is trying to acquire lock: [ 305.275182] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff970544dd>] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275187] but task is already holding lock: [ 305.275187] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0 [ 305.275190] other info that might help us debug this: [ 305.275191] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 305.275192] CPU0 [ 305.275193] ---- [ 305.275193] lock(&ns->lock); [ 305.275194] lock(&ns->lock); [ 305.275195] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 305.275196] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 305.275198] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1339: [ 305.275198] #0: (sb_writers#10){.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff96e9c6b7>] vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0 [ 305.275202] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0 [ 305.275205] stack backtrace: [ 305.275207] CPU: 1 PID: 1339 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 [ 305.275208] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 305.275209] Call Trace: [ 305.275212] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb [ 305.275214] __lock_acquire+0x141c/0x1460 [ 305.275216] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275218] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540 [ 305.275219] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540 [ 305.275221] lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0 [ 305.275223] ? lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0 [ 305.275224] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275227] __mutex_lock+0x89/0x920 [ 305.275228] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275230] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190 [ 305.275231] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275233] ? __lockdep_init_map+0x57/0x1d0 [ 305.275234] ? lockdep_init_map+0x9/0x10 [ 305.275236] ? __rwlock_init+0x32/0x60 [ 305.275238] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 305.275240] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 305.275241] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275243] aa_prepare_ns+0xc2/0xd0 [ 305.275245] aa_replace_profiles+0x168/0xf30 [ 305.275247] ? __might_fault+0x85/0x90 [ 305.275250] policy_update+0xb9/0x380 [ 305.275252] profile_load+0x7e/0x90 [ 305.275254] __vfs_write+0x28/0x150 [ 305.275256] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x72/0x80 [ 305.275257] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2f/0x60 [ 305.275259] ? __sb_start_write+0xdc/0x1c0 [ 305.275261] ? vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0 [ 305.275262] vfs_write+0xca/0x1d0 [ 305.275264] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190 [ 305.275266] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [ 305.275268] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2 [ 305.275271] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6b22e8c74 [ 305.275272] RSP: 002b:00007ffeaaee6288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 305.275273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffeaaee62a4 RCX: 00007fa6b22e8c74 [ 305.275274] RDX: 0000000000000a51 RSI: 00005566a8198c10 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 305.275275] RBP: 0000000000000a39 R08: 0000000000000a51 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 305.275276] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005566a8198c10 [ 305.275277] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00005566a72ecb88 R15: 00005566a72ec3a8 Fixes: 73688d1ed0b8 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-11-20 23:24:09 -08:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint and restore for containers. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:55 -08:00
apparmor: provide finer control over policy management Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-05-26 01:45:08 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:16 -08:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: cleanup remove unused and not fully implemented profile rename Remove the partially implemented code, until this can be properly implemented. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 07:24:18 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: rename apparmor file fns and data to indicate use prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c with the prefixes being aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or securityfs Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-25 06:23:42 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: cleanup remove unused and not fully implemented profile rename Remove the partially implemented code, until this can be properly implemented. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 07:24:18 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: fix memory leak when deduping profile load AppArmor is leaking the newly loaded profile and its proxy when the profile is an exact match to the currently loaded version. In this case the dedup check results in the profile being skipped and put without dealing with the proxy ref thus not breaking a circular refcount and causing a leak. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1750594 Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-04-13 22:33:10 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: share profile name on replacement The profile names are the same, leverage this. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 07:09:05 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: refactor updating profiles to the newest parent Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 07:16:46 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: add interface files for profiles and namespaces Add basic interface files to access namespace and profile information. The interface files are created when a profile is loaded and removed when the profile or namespace is removed. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:13:43 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:16 -08:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load When blob compression is turned on, if the policy namespace is forced onto a policy load, the policy load will fail as the namespace name being referenced is inside the compressed policy blob, resulting in invalid or names that are too long. So duplicate the name before the blob is compressed. Fixes: 876dd866c084 ("apparmor: Initial implementation of raw policy blob compression") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-03-09 16:58:10 -08:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint and restore for containers. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:55 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
apparmor: fix log failures for all profiles in a set currently only the profile that is causing the failure is logged. This makes it more confusing than necessary about which profiles loaded and which didn't. So make sure to log success and failure messages for all profiles in the set being loaded. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2016-04-16 14:16:50 -07:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:56 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: fix log failures for all profiles in a set currently only the profile that is causing the failure is logged. This makes it more confusing than necessary about which profiles loaded and which didn't. So make sure to log success and failure messages for all profiles in the set being loaded. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2016-04-16 14:16:50 -07:00
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836 Once the loop on lines 836-853 is complete and exits normally, ent is a pointer to the dummy list head value. The derefernces accessible from eg the goto fail on line 860 or the various goto fail_lock's afterwards thus seem incorrect. Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-04-06 06:55:22 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: fix log failures for all profiles in a set currently only the profile that is causing the failure is logged. This makes it more confusing than necessary about which profiles loaded and which didn't. So make sure to log success and failure messages for all profiles in the set being loaded. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2016-04-16 14:16:50 -07:00
apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once previously profiles had to be loaded one at a time, which could result in cases where a replacement of a set would partially succeed, and then fail resulting in inconsistent policy. Allow multiple profiles to replaced "atomically" so that the replacement either succeeds or fails for the entire set of profiles. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:05:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix policy load/remove semantics The namespace being passed into the replace/remove profiles fns() is not the view, but the namespace specified by the inode from the file hook (if present) or the loading tasks ns, if accessing the top level virtualized load/replace file interface. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-04 12:22:22 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix typo "preconfinement" Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com> Acked-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-04-12 12:34:34 +02:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: pass the subject profile into profile replace/remove This is just setup for new ns specific .load, .replace, .remove interface files. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:57 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix policy load/remove semantics The namespace being passed into the replace/remove profiles fns() is not the view, but the namespace specified by the inode from the file hook (if present) or the loading tasks ns, if accessing the top level virtualized load/replace file interface. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-04 12:22:22 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add namespace lookup fns() Currently lookups are restricted to a single ns component in the path. However when namespaces are allowed to have separate views, and scopes this will not be sufficient, as it will be possible to have a multiple component ns path in scope. Add some ns lookup fns() to allow this and use them. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-02 17:44:27 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: add namespace lookup fns() Currently lookups are restricted to a single ns component in the path. However when namespaces are allowed to have separate views, and scopes this will not be sufficient, as it will be possible to have a multiple component ns path in scope. Add some ns lookup fns() to allow this and use them. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-02 17:44:27 -07:00
apparmor: Fix smatch warning in aa_remove_profiles smatch reports error: potential NULL dereference 'ns'. this can not actually occur because it relies on aa_split_fqname setting both ns_name and name as null but ns_name will actually always have a value in this case. so remove the unnecessary if (ns_name) conditional that is resulting in the false positive further down. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-02-21 01:14:17 -08:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: Fix smatch warning in aa_remove_profiles smatch reports error: potential NULL dereference 'ns'. this can not actually occur because it relies on aa_split_fqname setting both ns_name and name as null but ns_name will actually always have a value in this case. so remove the unnecessary if (ns_name) conditional that is resulting in the false positive further down. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-02-21 01:14:17 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix possible recursive lock warning in __aa_create_ns Use mutex_lock_nested to provide lockdep the parent child lock ordering of the tree. This fixes the lockdep Warning [ 305.275177] ============================================ [ 305.275178] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 305.275179] 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 Not tainted [ 305.275180] -------------------------------------------- [ 305.275181] apparmor_parser/1339 is trying to acquire lock: [ 305.275182] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff970544dd>] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275187] but task is already holding lock: [ 305.275187] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0 [ 305.275190] other info that might help us debug this: [ 305.275191] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 305.275192] CPU0 [ 305.275193] ---- [ 305.275193] lock(&ns->lock); [ 305.275194] lock(&ns->lock); [ 305.275195] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 305.275196] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 305.275198] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1339: [ 305.275198] #0: (sb_writers#10){.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff96e9c6b7>] vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0 [ 305.275202] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0 [ 305.275205] stack backtrace: [ 305.275207] CPU: 1 PID: 1339 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 [ 305.275208] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 305.275209] Call Trace: [ 305.275212] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb [ 305.275214] __lock_acquire+0x141c/0x1460 [ 305.275216] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275218] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540 [ 305.275219] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540 [ 305.275221] lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0 [ 305.275223] ? lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0 [ 305.275224] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275227] __mutex_lock+0x89/0x920 [ 305.275228] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275230] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190 [ 305.275231] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275233] ? __lockdep_init_map+0x57/0x1d0 [ 305.275234] ? lockdep_init_map+0x9/0x10 [ 305.275236] ? __rwlock_init+0x32/0x60 [ 305.275238] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 305.275240] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 305.275241] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275243] aa_prepare_ns+0xc2/0xd0 [ 305.275245] aa_replace_profiles+0x168/0xf30 [ 305.275247] ? __might_fault+0x85/0x90 [ 305.275250] policy_update+0xb9/0x380 [ 305.275252] profile_load+0x7e/0x90 [ 305.275254] __vfs_write+0x28/0x150 [ 305.275256] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x72/0x80 [ 305.275257] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2f/0x60 [ 305.275259] ? __sb_start_write+0xdc/0x1c0 [ 305.275261] ? vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0 [ 305.275262] vfs_write+0xca/0x1d0 [ 305.275264] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190 [ 305.275266] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [ 305.275268] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2 [ 305.275271] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6b22e8c74 [ 305.275272] RSP: 002b:00007ffeaaee6288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 305.275273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffeaaee62a4 RCX: 00007fa6b22e8c74 [ 305.275274] RDX: 0000000000000a51 RSI: 00005566a8198c10 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 305.275275] RBP: 0000000000000a39 R08: 0000000000000a51 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 305.275276] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005566a8198c10 [ 305.275277] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00005566a72ecb88 R15: 00005566a72ec3a8 Fixes: 73688d1ed0b8 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-11-20 23:24:09 -08:00
apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-09 00:08:41 -07:00
apparmor: fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lock aa_xattrs_match() is unfortunately calling vfs_getxattr_alloc() from a context protected by an rcu_read_lock. This can not be done as vfs_getxattr_alloc() may sleep regardles of the gfp_t value being passed to it. Fix this by breaking the rcu_read_lock on the policy search when the xattr match feature is requested and restarting the search if a policy changes occur. Fixes: 8e51f9087f40 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value") Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-01-02 05:31:22 -08:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix possible recursive lock warning in __aa_create_ns Use mutex_lock_nested to provide lockdep the parent child lock ordering of the tree. This fixes the lockdep Warning [ 305.275177] ============================================ [ 305.275178] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 305.275179] 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 Not tainted [ 305.275180] -------------------------------------------- [ 305.275181] apparmor_parser/1339 is trying to acquire lock: [ 305.275182] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff970544dd>] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275187] but task is already holding lock: [ 305.275187] (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0 [ 305.275190] other info that might help us debug this: [ 305.275191] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 305.275192] CPU0 [ 305.275193] ---- [ 305.275193] lock(&ns->lock); [ 305.275194] lock(&ns->lock); [ 305.275195] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 305.275196] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 305.275198] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1339: [ 305.275198] #0: (sb_writers#10){.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff96e9c6b7>] vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0 [ 305.275202] #1: (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0 [ 305.275205] stack backtrace: [ 305.275207] CPU: 1 PID: 1339 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 [ 305.275208] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 305.275209] Call Trace: [ 305.275212] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb [ 305.275214] __lock_acquire+0x141c/0x1460 [ 305.275216] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275218] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540 [ 305.275219] ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540 [ 305.275221] lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0 [ 305.275223] ? lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0 [ 305.275224] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275227] __mutex_lock+0x89/0x920 [ 305.275228] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275230] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190 [ 305.275231] ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275233] ? __lockdep_init_map+0x57/0x1d0 [ 305.275234] ? lockdep_init_map+0x9/0x10 [ 305.275236] ? __rwlock_init+0x32/0x60 [ 305.275238] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 305.275240] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 [ 305.275241] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0 [ 305.275243] aa_prepare_ns+0xc2/0xd0 [ 305.275245] aa_replace_profiles+0x168/0xf30 [ 305.275247] ? __might_fault+0x85/0x90 [ 305.275250] policy_update+0xb9/0x380 [ 305.275252] profile_load+0x7e/0x90 [ 305.275254] __vfs_write+0x28/0x150 [ 305.275256] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x72/0x80 [ 305.275257] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2f/0x60 [ 305.275259] ? __sb_start_write+0xdc/0x1c0 [ 305.275261] ? vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0 [ 305.275262] vfs_write+0xca/0x1d0 [ 305.275264] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190 [ 305.275266] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [ 305.275268] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2 [ 305.275271] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6b22e8c74 [ 305.275272] RSP: 002b:00007ffeaaee6288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 305.275273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffeaaee62a4 RCX: 00007fa6b22e8c74 [ 305.275274] RDX: 0000000000000a51 RSI: 00005566a8198c10 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 305.275275] RBP: 0000000000000a39 R08: 0000000000000a51 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 305.275276] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005566a8198c10 [ 305.275277] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00005566a72ecb88 R15: 00005566a72ec3a8 Fixes: 73688d1ed0b8 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-11-20 23:24:09 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lock aa_xattrs_match() is unfortunately calling vfs_getxattr_alloc() from a context protected by an rcu_read_lock. This can not be done as vfs_getxattr_alloc() may sleep regardles of the gfp_t value being passed to it. Fix this by breaking the rcu_read_lock on the policy search when the xattr match feature is requested and restarting the search if a policy changes occur. Fixes: 8e51f9087f40 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value") Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-01-02 05:31:22 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on the context and converting the label to a singular profile where possible. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 08:14:28 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended. Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter which will become useless. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:43:02 -08:00
apparmor: pass the subject profile into profile replace/remove This is just setup for new ns specific .load, .replace, .remove interface files. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:57 -08:00
apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:16 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: convert profile lists to RCU based locking Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-07-10 21:06:43 -07:00
apparmor: rename namespace to ns to improve code line lengths Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:16 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00
apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended. Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter which will become useless. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:43:02 -08:00
apparmor: pass the subject profile into profile replace/remove This is just setup for new ns specific .load, .replace, .remove interface files. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:42:57 -08:00
AppArmor: core policy routines The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task Profiles tend to be named after an executable that they will attach to but this is not required. namespaces - a container for a set of profiles that will be used during attachment and transitions between profiles. sids - which provide a unique id for each profile Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:00 -07:00