linux/security/loadpin/loadpin.c

252 lines
6.7 KiB

proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 15:58:50 -07:00
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-02 10:38:20 -07:00