2005-04-29 16:23:29 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2007-03-06 01:42:17 -08:00
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2006-04-27 00:11:01 +01:00
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2005-04-29 16:08:28 +01:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2005-11-03 15:48:08 +00:00
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2005-12-03 08:39:35 -05:00
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2005-11-03 15:48:08 +00:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2005-11-03 15:48:08 +00:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01:00
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2006-02-07 12:05:27 -05:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2006-02-07 12:05:27 -05:00
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[PATCH] audit: watching subtrees
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree".
The part that can be sanely implemented, that is. Limitations:
* if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch
it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously)
* if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit
that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees
* if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted
elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there. New command
tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false
positives.
Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places
(multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does
_not_ depend on which one we are using for access.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04:00
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2007-08-23 10:19:53 +01:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2005-06-22 14:56:47 +01:00
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Audit: add TTY input auditing
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-15 23:40:56 -07:00
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2005-05-18 10:21:07 +01:00
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2005-11-03 15:48:08 +00:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2006-09-29 11:56:49 -04:00
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2005-05-27 12:17:28 +01:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01:00
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2005-05-27 12:17:28 +01:00
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2006-04-26 14:04:08 -04:00
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2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2006-09-29 11:56:49 -04:00
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2007-02-07 01:48:00 -05:00
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2007-03-20 13:58:35 -04:00
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Audit: add TTY input auditing
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-15 23:40:56 -07:00
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2005-05-13 18:17:42 +01:00
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2005-05-21 00:15:52 +01:00
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2006-01-04 14:08:39 +00:00
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2006-09-29 17:05:05 -07:00
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2007-09-17 11:51:22 -07:00
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2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01:00
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2005-12-03 08:39:35 -05:00
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2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04:00
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2005-12-03 08:39:35 -05:00
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2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-06-19 19:35:50 +01:00
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2005-11-03 16:12:36 +00:00
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2005-06-19 19:35:50 +01:00
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2005-11-03 16:12:36 +00:00
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2005-06-19 19:35:50 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-06-14 18:45:21 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-07-01 03:56:16 -04:00
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2006-08-31 19:05:56 -04:00
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2007-03-29 18:00:37 -04:00
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2006-07-01 03:56:16 -04:00
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|
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2005-11-03 15:41:46 +00:00
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2007-06-04 17:00:14 -04:00
|
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|
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2005-11-03 15:41:46 +00:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-04-29 16:08:28 +01:00
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2005-11-03 16:12:36 +00:00
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2006-06-29 16:56:39 -05:00
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2006-05-06 08:26:27 -04:00
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2006-06-29 16:56:39 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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[PATCH] audit: path-based rules
In this implementation, audit registers inotify watches on the parent
directories of paths specified in audit rules. When audit's inotify
event handler is called, it updates any affected rules based on the
filesystem event. If the parent directory is renamed, removed, or its
filesystem is unmounted, audit removes all rules referencing that
inotify watch.
To keep things simple, this implementation limits location-based
auditing to the directory entries in an existing directory. Given
a path-based rule for /foo/bar/passwd, the following table applies:
passwd modified -- audit event logged
passwd replaced -- audit event logged, rules list updated
bar renamed -- rule removed
foo renamed -- untracked, meaning that the rule now applies to
the new location
Audit users typically want to have many rules referencing filesystem
objects, which can significantly impact filtering performance. This
patch also adds an inode-number-based rule hash to mitigate this
situation.
The patch is relative to the audit git tree:
http://kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current.git;a=summary
and uses the inotify kernel API:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/6/1/145
Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-04-07 16:55:56 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-08-31 19:26:40 -04:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] audit: watching subtrees
New kind of audit rule predicates: "object is visible in given subtree".
The part that can be sanely implemented, that is. Limitations:
* if you have hardlink from outside of tree, you'd better watch
it too (or just watch the object itself, obviously)
* if you mount something under a watched tree, tell audit
that new chunk should be added to watched subtrees
* if you umount something in a watched tree and it's still mounted
elsewhere, you will get matches on events happening there. New command
tells audit to recalculate the trees, trimming such sources of false
positives.
Note that it's _not_ about path - if something mounted in several places
(multiple mount, bindings, different namespaces, etc.), the match does
_not_ depend on which one we are using for access.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04:00
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|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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|
2006-06-14 18:45:21 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2005-11-03 15:41:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2005-11-03 15:41:46 +00:00
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2007-06-04 17:00:14 -04:00
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|
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2005-11-03 15:41:46 +00:00
|
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|
2007-06-04 17:00:14 -04:00
|
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[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2005-11-03 15:41:46 +00:00
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2007-06-04 17:00:14 -04:00
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[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F
filter rules.
This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support
for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=".
This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up
using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy.
This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications.
See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h
area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask
assignments clearly.
The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right).
This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults
to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right).
If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This
value is returned.
Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2005-11-03 15:41:46 +00:00
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2007-06-04 17:00:14 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-04-29 16:08:28 +01:00
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2005-07-10 19:29:45 -07:00
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2005-04-29 16:08:28 +01:00
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2006-08-31 19:26:40 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-05-13 18:35:15 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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Audit: add TTY input auditing
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-15 23:40:56 -07:00
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2006-02-07 12:05:27 -05:00
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2006-01-09 09:48:17 -05:00
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2006-02-07 12:05:27 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-04-27 00:11:01 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01:00
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2006-05-25 10:19:47 -04:00
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2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-06-24 14:14:05 +01:00
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2006-04-26 14:04:08 -04:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-04-29 16:08:28 +01:00
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2006-07-01 03:56:16 -04:00
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2006-08-31 19:26:40 -04:00
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2007-03-29 18:01:04 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-03-29 20:23:36 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-03-29 20:23:36 -05:00
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2006-05-18 16:01:30 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04:00
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2006-07-13 13:16:39 -04:00
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2007-03-20 13:58:35 -04:00
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2006-08-03 10:59:26 -04:00
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2006-05-18 16:01:30 -04:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2006-05-18 16:01:30 -04:00
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2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04:00
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2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00:00
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2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04:00
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2006-07-13 13:16:39 -04:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04:00
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2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00:00
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2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2007-03-20 13:58:35 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-05-21 21:08:09 +01:00
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2005-04-29 17:30:07 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-11-27 13:11:54 -06:00
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2006-05-18 16:01:30 -04:00
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2006-04-26 14:04:08 -04:00
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2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01:00
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2007-02-07 01:48:00 -05:00
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2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2006-05-18 16:01:30 -04:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2006-05-18 16:01:30 -04:00
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2007-02-07 01:48:00 -05:00
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2006-05-18 16:01:30 -04:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2006-05-18 16:01:30 -04:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2006-07-10 08:29:24 -04:00
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2007-03-29 18:01:04 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-03-29 20:23:36 -05:00
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2006-08-03 10:59:26 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04:00
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2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00:00
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2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04:00
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2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00:00
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2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04:00
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2005-05-21 21:08:09 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-11-27 13:11:54 -06:00
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2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04:00
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2006-05-16 22:03:48 -04:00
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2006-04-26 14:04:08 -04:00
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2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01:00
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2007-02-07 01:48:00 -05:00
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2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01:00
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2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00:00
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2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05:00
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2007-03-20 13:58:35 -04:00
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2006-07-10 08:29:24 -04:00
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2007-03-29 18:01:04 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-10-21 03:22:03 -04:00
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2005-06-22 15:04:33 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-10-21 03:22:03 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-04-29 15:54:44 +01:00
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2006-04-26 14:04:08 -04:00
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2005-04-29 15:54:44 +01:00
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2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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Audit: add TTY input auditing
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-15 23:40:56 -07:00
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2005-12-15 18:33:52 +00:00
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2006-04-01 18:29:34 -05:00
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Audit: add TTY input auditing
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-15 23:40:56 -07:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-07-02 13:50:40 +01:00
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2005-07-02 13:49:07 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-04-29 15:54:44 +01:00
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2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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Audit: add TTY input auditing
Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is
required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide
non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past
actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system
becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it
necessary to audit TTY output as well.
Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the
audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely
transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still
work).
TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls
within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly
useless audit events.
Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs
by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel.
The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty
attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for
example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the
interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which
might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone).
Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set
e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the
audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file
descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY.
See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a
more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Paul Fulghum <paulkf@microgate.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-15 23:40:56 -07:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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