linux/net/can/raw.c

1142 lines
26 KiB

include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 17:04:11 +09:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: reorder struct raw_sock's members to optimise packing struct raw_sock has several holes. Reorder the fields to save 8 bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ struct net_device * dev; /* 776 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 784 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 784 16 */ int ifindex; /* 800 4 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 804: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 804: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 804: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 804: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 804: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 804: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 805 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 812 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 820 4 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 848 8 */ /* size: 856, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 1, sum holes: 3 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 24 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-3-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:26 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: raw: reorder struct raw_sock's members to optimise packing struct raw_sock has several holes. Reorder the fields to save 8 bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ struct net_device * dev; /* 776 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 784 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 784 16 */ int ifindex; /* 800 4 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 804: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 804: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 804: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 804: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 804: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 804: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 805 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 812 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 820 4 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 848 8 */ /* size: 856, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 1, sum holes: 3 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 24 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-3-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:26 +09:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: Fix kernel panic at security_sock_rcv_skb Zhang Yanmin reported crashes [1] and provided a patch adding a synchronize_rcu() call in can_rx_unregister() The main problem seems that the sockets themselves are not RCU protected. If CAN uses RCU for delivery, then sockets should be freed only after one RCU grace period. Recent kernels could use sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE), but let's ease stable backports with the following fix instead. [1] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff81495e25>] selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x65/0x2a0 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff81485d8c>] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x60 [<ffffffff81d55771>] sk_filter+0x41/0x210 [<ffffffff81d12913>] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x53/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81f0a2b3>] raw_rcv+0x2a3/0x3c0 [<ffffffff81f06eab>] can_rcv_filter+0x12b/0x370 [<ffffffff81f07af9>] can_receive+0xd9/0x120 [<ffffffff81f07beb>] can_rcv+0xab/0x100 [<ffffffff81d362ac>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xd8c/0x11f0 [<ffffffff81d36734>] __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0xb0 [<ffffffff81d37f67>] process_backlog+0x127/0x280 [<ffffffff81d36f7b>] net_rx_action+0x33b/0x4f0 [<ffffffff810c88d4>] __do_softirq+0x184/0x440 [<ffffffff81f9e86c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 <EOI> [<ffffffff810c76fb>] do_softirq.part.18+0x3b/0x40 [<ffffffff810c8bed>] do_softirq+0x1d/0x20 [<ffffffff81d30085>] netif_rx_ni+0xe5/0x110 [<ffffffff8199cc87>] slcan_receive_buf+0x507/0x520 [<ffffffff8167ef7c>] flush_to_ldisc+0x21c/0x230 [<ffffffff810e3baf>] process_one_work+0x24f/0x670 [<ffffffff810e44ed>] worker_thread+0x9d/0x6f0 [<ffffffff810e4450>] ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480 [<ffffffff810ebafc>] kthread+0x12c/0x150 [<ffffffff81f9ccef>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 Reported-by: Zhang Yanmin <yanmin.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-27 08:11:44 -08:00
can: Fix kernel panic at security_sock_rcv_skb Zhang Yanmin reported crashes [1] and provided a patch adding a synchronize_rcu() call in can_rx_unregister() The main problem seems that the sockets themselves are not RCU protected. If CAN uses RCU for delivery, then sockets should be freed only after one RCU grace period. Recent kernels could use sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE), but let's ease stable backports with the following fix instead. [1] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff81495e25>] selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x65/0x2a0 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff81485d8c>] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x60 [<ffffffff81d55771>] sk_filter+0x41/0x210 [<ffffffff81d12913>] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x53/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81f0a2b3>] raw_rcv+0x2a3/0x3c0 [<ffffffff81f06eab>] can_rcv_filter+0x12b/0x370 [<ffffffff81f07af9>] can_receive+0xd9/0x120 [<ffffffff81f07beb>] can_rcv+0xab/0x100 [<ffffffff81d362ac>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xd8c/0x11f0 [<ffffffff81d36734>] __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0xb0 [<ffffffff81d37f67>] process_backlog+0x127/0x280 [<ffffffff81d36f7b>] net_rx_action+0x33b/0x4f0 [<ffffffff810c88d4>] __do_softirq+0x184/0x440 [<ffffffff81f9e86c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 <EOI> [<ffffffff810c76fb>] do_softirq.part.18+0x3b/0x40 [<ffffffff810c8bed>] do_softirq+0x1d/0x20 [<ffffffff81d30085>] netif_rx_ni+0xe5/0x110 [<ffffffff8199cc87>] slcan_receive_buf+0x507/0x520 [<ffffffff8167ef7c>] flush_to_ldisc+0x21c/0x230 [<ffffffff810e3baf>] process_one_work+0x24f/0x670 [<ffffffff810e44ed>] worker_thread+0x9d/0x6f0 [<ffffffff810e4450>] ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480 [<ffffffff810ebafc>] kthread+0x12c/0x150 [<ffffffff81f9ccef>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 Reported-by: Zhang Yanmin <yanmin.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-27 08:11:44 -08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix lockdep issue in raw_release() syzbot complained about a lockdep issue [1] Since raw_bind() and raw_setsockopt() first get RTNL before locking the socket, we must adopt the same order in raw_release() [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.0/14110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e3df368 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: raw_bind+0xa7/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:434 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 raw_release+0x1c6/0x9b0 net/can/raw.c:391 __sock_release+0xcd/0x290 net/socket.c:654 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1386 __fput+0x3fd/0xac0 fs/file_table.c:384 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x210/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.0/14110: stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 14110 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/03/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x311/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd89007cb29 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd890d2a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd89019bf80 RCX: 00007fd89007cb29 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd8900c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd89019bf80 R15: 00007ffebf8124f8 </TASK> Fixes: ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230720114438.172434-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-20 11:44:38 +00:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix lockdep issue in raw_release() syzbot complained about a lockdep issue [1] Since raw_bind() and raw_setsockopt() first get RTNL before locking the socket, we must adopt the same order in raw_release() [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.0/14110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] ffff88804e4b6130 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e3df368 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: raw_bind+0xa7/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:434 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x181/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 raw_release+0x1c6/0x9b0 net/can/raw.c:391 __sock_release+0xcd/0x290 net/socket.c:654 sock_close+0x1c/0x20 net/socket.c:1386 __fput+0x3fd/0xac0 fs/file_table.c:384 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x210/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_CAN){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(sk_lock-AF_CAN); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.0/14110: stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 14110 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-syzkaller-00192-g78adb4bcf99e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/03/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x311/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2e3d/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3492 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1708 [inline] raw_bind+0xb1/0xab0 net/can/raw.c:435 __sys_bind+0x1ec/0x220 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1801 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fd89007cb29 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd890d2a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd89019bf80 RCX: 00007fd89007cb29 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd8900c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd89019bf80 R15: 00007ffebf8124f8 </TASK> Fixes: ee8b94c8510c ("can: raw: fix receiver memory leak") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230720114438.172434-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-20 11:44:38 +00:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
net: make getname() functions return length rather than use int* parameter Changes since v1: Added changes in these files: drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_transport.c drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/lnet/lib-socket.c drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c drivers/vhost/net.c fs/dlm/lowcomms.c fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c security/tomoyo/network.c Before: All these functions either return a negative error indicator, or store length of sockaddr into "int *socklen" parameter and return zero on success. "int *socklen" parameter is awkward. For example, if caller does not care, it still needs to provide on-stack storage for the value it does not need. None of the many FOO_getname() functions of various protocols ever used old value of *socklen. They always just overwrite it. This change drops this parameter, and makes all these functions, on success, return length of sockaddr. It's always >= 0 and can be differentiated from an error. Tests in callers are changed from "if (err)" to "if (err < 0)", where needed. rpc_sockname() lost "int buflen" parameter, since its only use was to be passed to kernel_getsockname() as &buflen and subsequently not used in any way. Userspace API is not changed. text data bss dec hex filename 30108430 2633624 873672 33615726 200ef6e vmlinux.before.o 30108109 2633612 873672 33615393 200ee21 vmlinux.o Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-decnet-user@lists.sourceforge.net CC: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-x25@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-12 20:00:20 +01:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF We get a bug during ltp can_filter test as following. =========================================== [60919.264984] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 [60919.265223] PGD 8000003dda726067 P4D 8000003dda726067 PUD 3dda727067 PMD 0 [60919.265443] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [60919.265550] CPU: 30 PID: 3638365 Comm: can_filter Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 4.19.90+ #1 [60919.266068] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x3e/0x200 [60919.293289] RSP: 0018:ffff8d53bfc03cf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [60919.307140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000001d RCX: 0000000000000007 [60919.320756] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8d5104a8ed00 RDI: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.334319] RBP: ffff8d9338056800 R08: ffff8d53bfc29d80 R09: 0000000000000001 [60919.347969] R10: ffff8d53bfc03ec0 R11: ffffb8526ef47c98 R12: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.350320] perf: interrupt took too long (3063 > 2500), lowering kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to 65000 [60919.361148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8d53bcf90000 R15: 0000000000000000 [60919.361151] FS: 00007fb78b6b3600(0000) GS:ffff8d53bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [60919.400812] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [60919.413730] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000003e3f784006 CR4: 00000000007606e0 [60919.426479] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [60919.439339] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [60919.451608] PKRU: 55555554 [60919.463622] Call Trace: [60919.475617] <IRQ> [60919.487122] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.498478] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.509822] ? account_entity_enqueue+0xc5/0xf0 [60919.520709] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40 [60919.531413] sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x1b0 [60919.542178] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x38/0x1b0 [60919.552444] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x17/0x30 [60919.562477] raw_rcv+0x110/0x190 [can_raw] [60919.572539] can_rcv_filter+0xbc/0x1b0 [can] [60919.582173] can_receive+0x6b/0xb0 [can] [60919.591595] can_rcv+0x31/0x70 [can] [60919.600783] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5a/0x80 [60919.609864] process_backlog+0x9b/0x150 [60919.618691] net_rx_action+0x156/0x400 [60919.627310] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0 [60919.635714] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e9 [60919.644161] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [60919.652154] </IRQ> [60919.659899] do_softirq.part.17+0x4f/0x60 [60919.667475] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x60/0x70 [60919.675089] __dev_queue_xmit+0x539/0x920 [60919.682267] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.689218] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.695886] ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x211/0x230 [60919.702395] ? can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.708882] can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.715037] raw_sendmsg+0x16d/0x268 [can_raw] It's because raw_setsockopt() concurrently with unregister_netdevice_many(). Concurrent scenario as following. cpu0 cpu1 raw_bind raw_setsockopt unregister_netdevice_many unlist_netdevice dev_get_by_index raw_notifier raw_enable_filters ...... can_rx_register can_rcv_list_find(..., net->can.rx_alldev_list) ...... sock_close raw_release(sock_a) ...... can_receive can_rcv_filter(net->can.rx_alldev_list, ...) raw_rcv(skb, sock_a) BUG After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list. Then the sock is closed. Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter(). Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered. We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device in raw_setsockopt(). Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722070819.1048263-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2021-07-22 15:08:19 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF We get a bug during ltp can_filter test as following. =========================================== [60919.264984] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 [60919.265223] PGD 8000003dda726067 P4D 8000003dda726067 PUD 3dda727067 PMD 0 [60919.265443] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [60919.265550] CPU: 30 PID: 3638365 Comm: can_filter Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 4.19.90+ #1 [60919.266068] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x3e/0x200 [60919.293289] RSP: 0018:ffff8d53bfc03cf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [60919.307140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000001d RCX: 0000000000000007 [60919.320756] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8d5104a8ed00 RDI: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.334319] RBP: ffff8d9338056800 R08: ffff8d53bfc29d80 R09: 0000000000000001 [60919.347969] R10: ffff8d53bfc03ec0 R11: ffffb8526ef47c98 R12: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.350320] perf: interrupt took too long (3063 > 2500), lowering kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to 65000 [60919.361148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8d53bcf90000 R15: 0000000000000000 [60919.361151] FS: 00007fb78b6b3600(0000) GS:ffff8d53bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [60919.400812] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [60919.413730] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000003e3f784006 CR4: 00000000007606e0 [60919.426479] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [60919.439339] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [60919.451608] PKRU: 55555554 [60919.463622] Call Trace: [60919.475617] <IRQ> [60919.487122] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.498478] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.509822] ? account_entity_enqueue+0xc5/0xf0 [60919.520709] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40 [60919.531413] sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x1b0 [60919.542178] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x38/0x1b0 [60919.552444] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x17/0x30 [60919.562477] raw_rcv+0x110/0x190 [can_raw] [60919.572539] can_rcv_filter+0xbc/0x1b0 [can] [60919.582173] can_receive+0x6b/0xb0 [can] [60919.591595] can_rcv+0x31/0x70 [can] [60919.600783] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5a/0x80 [60919.609864] process_backlog+0x9b/0x150 [60919.618691] net_rx_action+0x156/0x400 [60919.627310] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0 [60919.635714] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e9 [60919.644161] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [60919.652154] </IRQ> [60919.659899] do_softirq.part.17+0x4f/0x60 [60919.667475] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x60/0x70 [60919.675089] __dev_queue_xmit+0x539/0x920 [60919.682267] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.689218] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.695886] ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x211/0x230 [60919.702395] ? can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.708882] can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.715037] raw_sendmsg+0x16d/0x268 [can_raw] It's because raw_setsockopt() concurrently with unregister_netdevice_many(). Concurrent scenario as following. cpu0 cpu1 raw_bind raw_setsockopt unregister_netdevice_many unlist_netdevice dev_get_by_index raw_notifier raw_enable_filters ...... can_rx_register can_rcv_list_find(..., net->can.rx_alldev_list) ...... sock_close raw_release(sock_a) ...... can_receive can_rcv_filter(net->can.rx_alldev_list, ...) raw_rcv(skb, sock_a) BUG After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list. Then the sock is closed. Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter(). Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered. We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device in raw_setsockopt(). Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722070819.1048263-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2021-07-22 15:08:19 +08:00
can: raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF We get a bug during ltp can_filter test as following. =========================================== [60919.264984] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 [60919.265223] PGD 8000003dda726067 P4D 8000003dda726067 PUD 3dda727067 PMD 0 [60919.265443] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [60919.265550] CPU: 30 PID: 3638365 Comm: can_filter Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 4.19.90+ #1 [60919.266068] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x3e/0x200 [60919.293289] RSP: 0018:ffff8d53bfc03cf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [60919.307140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000001d RCX: 0000000000000007 [60919.320756] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8d5104a8ed00 RDI: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.334319] RBP: ffff8d9338056800 R08: ffff8d53bfc29d80 R09: 0000000000000001 [60919.347969] R10: ffff8d53bfc03ec0 R11: ffffb8526ef47c98 R12: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.350320] perf: interrupt took too long (3063 > 2500), lowering kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to 65000 [60919.361148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8d53bcf90000 R15: 0000000000000000 [60919.361151] FS: 00007fb78b6b3600(0000) GS:ffff8d53bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [60919.400812] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [60919.413730] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000003e3f784006 CR4: 00000000007606e0 [60919.426479] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [60919.439339] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [60919.451608] PKRU: 55555554 [60919.463622] Call Trace: [60919.475617] <IRQ> [60919.487122] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.498478] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.509822] ? account_entity_enqueue+0xc5/0xf0 [60919.520709] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40 [60919.531413] sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x1b0 [60919.542178] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x38/0x1b0 [60919.552444] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x17/0x30 [60919.562477] raw_rcv+0x110/0x190 [can_raw] [60919.572539] can_rcv_filter+0xbc/0x1b0 [can] [60919.582173] can_receive+0x6b/0xb0 [can] [60919.591595] can_rcv+0x31/0x70 [can] [60919.600783] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5a/0x80 [60919.609864] process_backlog+0x9b/0x150 [60919.618691] net_rx_action+0x156/0x400 [60919.627310] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0 [60919.635714] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e9 [60919.644161] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [60919.652154] </IRQ> [60919.659899] do_softirq.part.17+0x4f/0x60 [60919.667475] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x60/0x70 [60919.675089] __dev_queue_xmit+0x539/0x920 [60919.682267] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.689218] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.695886] ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x211/0x230 [60919.702395] ? can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.708882] can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.715037] raw_sendmsg+0x16d/0x268 [can_raw] It's because raw_setsockopt() concurrently with unregister_netdevice_many(). Concurrent scenario as following. cpu0 cpu1 raw_bind raw_setsockopt unregister_netdevice_many unlist_netdevice dev_get_by_index raw_notifier raw_enable_filters ...... can_rx_register can_rcv_list_find(..., net->can.rx_alldev_list) ...... sock_close raw_release(sock_a) ...... can_receive can_rcv_filter(net->can.rx_alldev_list, ...) raw_rcv(skb, sock_a) BUG After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list. Then the sock is closed. Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter(). Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered. We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device in raw_setsockopt(). Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722070819.1048263-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2021-07-22 15:08:19 +08:00
can: raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF We get a bug during ltp can_filter test as following. =========================================== [60919.264984] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 [60919.265223] PGD 8000003dda726067 P4D 8000003dda726067 PUD 3dda727067 PMD 0 [60919.265443] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [60919.265550] CPU: 30 PID: 3638365 Comm: can_filter Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 4.19.90+ #1 [60919.266068] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x3e/0x200 [60919.293289] RSP: 0018:ffff8d53bfc03cf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [60919.307140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000001d RCX: 0000000000000007 [60919.320756] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8d5104a8ed00 RDI: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.334319] RBP: ffff8d9338056800 R08: ffff8d53bfc29d80 R09: 0000000000000001 [60919.347969] R10: ffff8d53bfc03ec0 R11: ffffb8526ef47c98 R12: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.350320] perf: interrupt took too long (3063 > 2500), lowering kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to 65000 [60919.361148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8d53bcf90000 R15: 0000000000000000 [60919.361151] FS: 00007fb78b6b3600(0000) GS:ffff8d53bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [60919.400812] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [60919.413730] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000003e3f784006 CR4: 00000000007606e0 [60919.426479] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [60919.439339] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [60919.451608] PKRU: 55555554 [60919.463622] Call Trace: [60919.475617] <IRQ> [60919.487122] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.498478] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.509822] ? account_entity_enqueue+0xc5/0xf0 [60919.520709] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40 [60919.531413] sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x1b0 [60919.542178] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x38/0x1b0 [60919.552444] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x17/0x30 [60919.562477] raw_rcv+0x110/0x190 [can_raw] [60919.572539] can_rcv_filter+0xbc/0x1b0 [can] [60919.582173] can_receive+0x6b/0xb0 [can] [60919.591595] can_rcv+0x31/0x70 [can] [60919.600783] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5a/0x80 [60919.609864] process_backlog+0x9b/0x150 [60919.618691] net_rx_action+0x156/0x400 [60919.627310] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0 [60919.635714] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e9 [60919.644161] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [60919.652154] </IRQ> [60919.659899] do_softirq.part.17+0x4f/0x60 [60919.667475] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x60/0x70 [60919.675089] __dev_queue_xmit+0x539/0x920 [60919.682267] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.689218] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.695886] ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x211/0x230 [60919.702395] ? can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.708882] can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.715037] raw_sendmsg+0x16d/0x268 [can_raw] It's because raw_setsockopt() concurrently with unregister_netdevice_many(). Concurrent scenario as following. cpu0 cpu1 raw_bind raw_setsockopt unregister_netdevice_many unlist_netdevice dev_get_by_index raw_notifier raw_enable_filters ...... can_rx_register can_rcv_list_find(..., net->can.rx_alldev_list) ...... sock_close raw_release(sock_a) ...... can_receive can_rcv_filter(net->can.rx_alldev_list, ...) raw_rcv(skb, sock_a) BUG After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list. Then the sock is closed. Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter(). Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered. We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device in raw_setsockopt(). Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722070819.1048263-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2021-07-22 15:08:19 +08:00
can: raw: fix receiver memory leak Got kmemleak errors with the following ltp can_filter testcase: for ((i=1; i<=100; i++)) do ./can_filter & sleep 0.1 done ============================================================== [<00000000db4a4943>] can_rx_register+0x147/0x360 [can] [<00000000a289549d>] raw_setsockopt+0x5ef/0x853 [can_raw] [<000000006d3d9ebd>] __sys_setsockopt+0x173/0x2c0 [<00000000407dbfec>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 [<00000000fd468496>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [<00000000b7e47d51>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 It's a bug in the concurrent scenario of unregister_netdevice_many() and raw_release() as following: cpu0 cpu1 unregister_netdevice_many(can_dev) unlist_netdevice(can_dev) // dev_get_by_index() return NULL after this net_set_todo(can_dev) raw_release(can_socket) dev = dev_get_by_index(, ro->ifindex); // dev == NULL if (dev) { // receivers in dev_rcv_lists not free because dev is NULL raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); dev_put(dev); } ... ro->bound = 0; ... call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) raw_notify(, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, ) if (ro->bound) // invalid because ro->bound has been set 0 raw_disable_allfilters(, dev, ); // receivers in dev_rcv_lists will never be freed Add a net_device pointer member in struct raw_sock to record bound can_dev, and use rtnl_lock to serialize raw_socket members between raw_bind(), raw_release(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_notify(). Use ro->dev to decide whether to free receivers in dev_rcv_lists. Fixes: 8d0caedb7596 ("can: bcm/raw/isotp: use per module netdevice notifier") Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230711011737.1969582-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2023-07-11 09:17:37 +08:00
can: raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF We get a bug during ltp can_filter test as following. =========================================== [60919.264984] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 [60919.265223] PGD 8000003dda726067 P4D 8000003dda726067 PUD 3dda727067 PMD 0 [60919.265443] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [60919.265550] CPU: 30 PID: 3638365 Comm: can_filter Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 4.19.90+ #1 [60919.266068] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x3e/0x200 [60919.293289] RSP: 0018:ffff8d53bfc03cf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [60919.307140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000001d RCX: 0000000000000007 [60919.320756] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8d5104a8ed00 RDI: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.334319] RBP: ffff8d9338056800 R08: ffff8d53bfc29d80 R09: 0000000000000001 [60919.347969] R10: ffff8d53bfc03ec0 R11: ffffb8526ef47c98 R12: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.350320] perf: interrupt took too long (3063 > 2500), lowering kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to 65000 [60919.361148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8d53bcf90000 R15: 0000000000000000 [60919.361151] FS: 00007fb78b6b3600(0000) GS:ffff8d53bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [60919.400812] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [60919.413730] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000003e3f784006 CR4: 00000000007606e0 [60919.426479] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [60919.439339] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [60919.451608] PKRU: 55555554 [60919.463622] Call Trace: [60919.475617] <IRQ> [60919.487122] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.498478] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.509822] ? account_entity_enqueue+0xc5/0xf0 [60919.520709] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40 [60919.531413] sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x1b0 [60919.542178] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x38/0x1b0 [60919.552444] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x17/0x30 [60919.562477] raw_rcv+0x110/0x190 [can_raw] [60919.572539] can_rcv_filter+0xbc/0x1b0 [can] [60919.582173] can_receive+0x6b/0xb0 [can] [60919.591595] can_rcv+0x31/0x70 [can] [60919.600783] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5a/0x80 [60919.609864] process_backlog+0x9b/0x150 [60919.618691] net_rx_action+0x156/0x400 [60919.627310] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0 [60919.635714] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e9 [60919.644161] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [60919.652154] </IRQ> [60919.659899] do_softirq.part.17+0x4f/0x60 [60919.667475] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x60/0x70 [60919.675089] __dev_queue_xmit+0x539/0x920 [60919.682267] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.689218] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.695886] ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x211/0x230 [60919.702395] ? can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.708882] can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.715037] raw_sendmsg+0x16d/0x268 [can_raw] It's because raw_setsockopt() concurrently with unregister_netdevice_many(). Concurrent scenario as following. cpu0 cpu1 raw_bind raw_setsockopt unregister_netdevice_many unlist_netdevice dev_get_by_index raw_notifier raw_enable_filters ...... can_rx_register can_rcv_list_find(..., net->can.rx_alldev_list) ...... sock_close raw_release(sock_a) ...... can_receive can_rcv_filter(net->can.rx_alldev_list, ...) raw_rcv(skb, sock_a) BUG After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list. Then the sock is closed. Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter(). Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered. We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device in raw_setsockopt(). Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722070819.1048263-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2021-07-22 15:08:19 +08:00
can: raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF We get a bug during ltp can_filter test as following. =========================================== [60919.264984] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 [60919.265223] PGD 8000003dda726067 P4D 8000003dda726067 PUD 3dda727067 PMD 0 [60919.265443] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [60919.265550] CPU: 30 PID: 3638365 Comm: can_filter Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 4.19.90+ #1 [60919.266068] RIP: 0010:selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x3e/0x200 [60919.293289] RSP: 0018:ffff8d53bfc03cf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [60919.307140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000001d RCX: 0000000000000007 [60919.320756] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8d5104a8ed00 RDI: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.334319] RBP: ffff8d9338056800 R08: ffff8d53bfc29d80 R09: 0000000000000001 [60919.347969] R10: ffff8d53bfc03ec0 R11: ffffb8526ef47c98 R12: ffff8d53bfc03d30 [60919.350320] perf: interrupt took too long (3063 > 2500), lowering kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to 65000 [60919.361148] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8d53bcf90000 R15: 0000000000000000 [60919.361151] FS: 00007fb78b6b3600(0000) GS:ffff8d53bfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [60919.400812] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [60919.413730] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000003e3f784006 CR4: 00000000007606e0 [60919.426479] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [60919.439339] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [60919.451608] PKRU: 55555554 [60919.463622] Call Trace: [60919.475617] <IRQ> [60919.487122] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.498478] ? update_load_avg+0x89/0x5d0 [60919.509822] ? account_entity_enqueue+0xc5/0xf0 [60919.520709] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x2a/0x40 [60919.531413] sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x1b0 [60919.542178] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x38/0x1b0 [60919.552444] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x17/0x30 [60919.562477] raw_rcv+0x110/0x190 [can_raw] [60919.572539] can_rcv_filter+0xbc/0x1b0 [can] [60919.582173] can_receive+0x6b/0xb0 [can] [60919.591595] can_rcv+0x31/0x70 [can] [60919.600783] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5a/0x80 [60919.609864] process_backlog+0x9b/0x150 [60919.618691] net_rx_action+0x156/0x400 [60919.627310] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xa0 [60919.635714] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e9 [60919.644161] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [60919.652154] </IRQ> [60919.659899] do_softirq.part.17+0x4f/0x60 [60919.667475] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x60/0x70 [60919.675089] __dev_queue_xmit+0x539/0x920 [60919.682267] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.689218] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [60919.695886] ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x211/0x230 [60919.702395] ? can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.708882] can_send+0xe5/0x1f0 [can] [60919.715037] raw_sendmsg+0x16d/0x268 [can_raw] It's because raw_setsockopt() concurrently with unregister_netdevice_many(). Concurrent scenario as following. cpu0 cpu1 raw_bind raw_setsockopt unregister_netdevice_many unlist_netdevice dev_get_by_index raw_notifier raw_enable_filters ...... can_rx_register can_rcv_list_find(..., net->can.rx_alldev_list) ...... sock_close raw_release(sock_a) ...... can_receive can_rcv_filter(net->can.rx_alldev_list, ...) raw_rcv(skb, sock_a) BUG After unlist_netdevice(), dev_get_by_index() return NULL in raw_setsockopt(). Function raw_enable_filters() will add sock and can_filter to net->can.rx_alldev_list. Then the sock is closed. Followed by, we sock_sendmsg() to a new vcan device use the same can_filter. Protocol stack match the old receiver whose sock has been released on net->can.rx_alldev_list in can_rcv_filter(). Function raw_rcv() uses the freed sock. UAF BUG is triggered. We can find that the key issue is that net_device has not been protected in raw_setsockopt(). Use rtnl_lock to protect net_device in raw_setsockopt(). Fixes: c18ce101f2e4 ("[CAN]: Add raw protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722070819.1048263-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2021-07-22 15:08:19 +08:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: raw: use bitfields to store flags in struct raw_sock The bound, loopback, recv_own_msgs, fd_frames, xl_frames and join_filters fields of struct raw_sock just need to store one bit of information. Declare all those members as a bitfields of type unsigned int and width one bit. Add a temporary variable to raw_setsockopt() and raw_getsockopt() to make the conversion between the stored bits and the socket interface. This reduces the size of struct raw_sock by sixteen bytes. Statistics before: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int bound; /* 776 4 */ int ifindex; /* 780 4 */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ int loopback; /* 808 4 */ int recv_own_msgs; /* 812 4 */ int fd_frames; /* 816 4 */ int xl_frames; /* 820 4 */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 824 4 */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 832 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 836 4 */ int join_filters; /* 840 4 */ int count; /* 844 4 */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 848 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 856 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 864 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 872 8 */ /* size: 880, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 876, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); ...and after: $ pahole --class_name=raw_sock net/can/raw.o struct raw_sock { struct sock sk __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); /* 0 776 */ /* XXX last struct has 1 bit hole */ /* --- cacheline 12 boundary (768 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ int ifindex; /* 776 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct net_device * dev; /* 784 8 */ netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; /* 792 0 */ struct list_head notifier; /* 792 16 */ unsigned int bound:1; /* 808: 0 4 */ unsigned int loopback:1; /* 808: 1 4 */ unsigned int recv_own_msgs:1; /* 808: 2 4 */ unsigned int fd_frames:1; /* 808: 3 4 */ unsigned int xl_frames:1; /* 808: 4 4 */ unsigned int join_filters:1; /* 808: 5 4 */ /* XXX 2 bits hole, try to pack */ /* Bitfield combined with next fields */ struct can_raw_vcid_options raw_vcid_opts; /* 809 4 */ /* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */ canid_t tx_vcid_shifted; /* 816 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_shifted; /* 820 4 */ canid_t rx_vcid_mask_shifted; /* 824 4 */ int count; /* 828 4 */ /* --- cacheline 13 boundary (832 bytes) --- */ struct can_filter dfilter; /* 832 8 */ struct can_filter * filter; /* 840 8 */ can_err_mask_t err_mask; /* 848 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct uniqframe * uniq; /* 856 8 */ /* size: 864, cachelines: 14, members: 20 */ /* sum members: 852, holes: 3, sum holes: 11 */ /* sum bitfield members: 6 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 2 bits */ /* member types with bit holes: 1, total: 1 */ /* forced alignments: 1 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ } __attribute__((__aligned__(8))); Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250917-can-raw-repack-v2-2-395e8b3a4437@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2025-09-17 13:48:25 +09:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00
can: canxl: add virtual CAN network identifier support CAN XL data frames contain an 8-bit virtual CAN network identifier (VCID). A VCID value of zero represents an 'untagged' CAN XL frame. To receive and send these optional VCIDs via CAN_RAW sockets a new socket option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_OPTS is introduced to define/access VCID content: - tx: set the outgoing VCID value by the kernel (one fixed 8-bit value) - tx: pass through VCID values from the user space (e.g. for traffic replay) - rx: apply VCID receive filter (value/mask) to be passed to the user space With the 'tx pass through' option CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS all valid VCID values can be sent, e.g. to replay full qualified CAN XL traffic. The VCID value provided for the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET option will override the VCID value in the struct canxl_frame.prio defined for CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS when both flags are set. With a rx_vcid_mask of zero all possible VCID values (0x00 - 0xFF) are passed to the user space when the CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER flag is set. Without this flag only untagged CAN XL frames (VCID = 0x00) are delivered to the user space (default). The 8-bit VCID is stored inside the CAN XL prio element (only in CAN XL frames!) to not interfere with other CAN content or the CAN filters provided by the CAN_RAW sockets and kernel infrastruture. Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240212213550.18516-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
2024-02-12 22:35:50 +01:00