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linux/security/apparmor/capability.c

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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation version 2 of the license extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-01 10:08:55 +02:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: update cap audit to check SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT apparmor should be checking the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT constant. Also in complain mode make it so apparmor can elect to log a message, informing of the check. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 00:43:08 -08:00
apparmor: add a cache entry expiration time aging out capability audit cache When auditing capabilities, AppArmor uses a per-CPU, per-profile cache such that the same capability for the same profile doesn't get repeatedly audited, with the original goal of reducing audit logspam. However, this cache does not have an expiration time, resulting in confusion when a profile is shared across binaries (for example) and an expected DENIED audit entry doesn't appear, despite the cache entry having been populated much longer ago. This confusion was exacerbated by the per-CPU nature of the cache resulting in the expected entries sporadically appearing when the later denial+audit occurred on a different CPU. To resolve this, record the last time a capability was audited for a profile and add a timestamp expiration check before doing the audit. v1 -> v2: - Hardcode a longer timeout and drop the patches making it a sysctl, after discussion with John Johansen. - Cache the expiration time instead of the last-audited time. This value can never be zero, which lets us drop the kernel_cap_t caps field from the cache struct. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-20 12:53:15 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: move context.h to cred.h Now that file contexts have been moved into file, and task context fns() and data have been split from the context, only the cred context remains in context.h so rename to cred.h to better reflect what it deals with. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-10-11 01:04:48 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: rename apparmor file fns and data to indicate use prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c with the prefixes being aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or securityfs Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-25 06:23:42 -07:00
apparmor: export set of capabilities supported by the apparmor module Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:27:32 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: audit_cap dedup based on subj_cred instead of profile The previous audit_cap cache deduping was based on the profile that was being audited. This could cause confusion due to the deduplication then occurring across multiple processes, which could happen if multiple instances of binaries matched the same profile attachment (and thus ran under the same profile) or a profile was attached to a container and its processes. Instead, perform audit_cap deduping over ad->subj_cred, which ensures the deduping only occurs across a single process, instead of across all processes that match the current one's profile. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-25 11:30:11 -07:00
apparmor: add a cache entry expiration time aging out capability audit cache When auditing capabilities, AppArmor uses a per-CPU, per-profile cache such that the same capability for the same profile doesn't get repeatedly audited, with the original goal of reducing audit logspam. However, this cache does not have an expiration time, resulting in confusion when a profile is shared across binaries (for example) and an expected DENIED audit entry doesn't appear, despite the cache entry having been populated much longer ago. This confusion was exacerbated by the per-CPU nature of the cache resulting in the expected entries sporadically appearing when the later denial+audit occurred on a different CPU. To resolve this, record the last time a capability was audited for a profile and add a timestamp expiration check before doing the audit. v1 -> v2: - Hardcode a longer timeout and drop the patches making it a sysctl, after discussion with John Johansen. - Cache the expiration time instead of the last-audited time. This value can never be zero, which lets us drop the kernel_cap_t caps field from the cache struct. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-20 12:53:15 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: Fix kernel-doc warnings in apparmor/capability.c Fix kernel-doc warnings: security/apparmor/capability.c:45: warning: Function parameter or member 'ab' not described in 'audit_cb' security/apparmor/capability.c:45: warning: Function parameter or member 'va' not described in 'audit_cb' Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2023-06-25 09:13:40 +08:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments Fix some kernel-doc comments to silence the warnings: security/apparmor/capability.c:66: warning: Function parameter or member 'ad' not described in 'audit_caps' security/apparmor/capability.c:66: warning: Excess function parameter 'as' description in 'audit_caps' security/apparmor/capability.c:154: warning: Function parameter or member 'subj_cred' not described in 'aa_capable' security/apparmor/capability.c:154: warning: Excess function parameter 'subj_cread' description in 'aa_capable' Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=7035 Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2023-10-23 08:55:17 +08:00
apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting Mediation is based off of the cred but auditing includes the current task which may not be related to the actual request. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-10-08 05:37:18 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: add a cache entry expiration time aging out capability audit cache When auditing capabilities, AppArmor uses a per-CPU, per-profile cache such that the same capability for the same profile doesn't get repeatedly audited, with the original goal of reducing audit logspam. However, this cache does not have an expiration time, resulting in confusion when a profile is shared across binaries (for example) and an expected DENIED audit entry doesn't appear, despite the cache entry having been populated much longer ago. This confusion was exacerbated by the per-CPU nature of the cache resulting in the expected entries sporadically appearing when the later denial+audit occurred on a different CPU. To resolve this, record the last time a capability was audited for a profile and add a timestamp expiration check before doing the audit. v1 -> v2: - Hardcode a longer timeout and drop the patches making it a sysctl, after discussion with John Johansen. - Cache the expiration time instead of the last-audited time. This value can never be zero, which lets us drop the kernel_cap_t caps field from the cache struct. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-20 12:53:15 -07:00
apparmor: rework profile->rules to be a list Convert profile->rules to a list as the next step towards supporting multiple rulesets in a profile. For this step only support a single list entry item. The logic for iterating the list will come as a separate step. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-05 20:47:36 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments In preparation for moving from a single set of rules and a single attachment to multiple rulesets and attachments separate from the profile refactor attachment information and ruleset info into their own structures. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-07-29 17:17:31 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments In preparation for moving from a single set of rules and a single attachment to multiple rulesets and attachments separate from the profile refactor attachment information and ruleset info into their own structures. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-07-29 17:17:31 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments In preparation for moving from a single set of rules and a single attachment to multiple rulesets and attachments separate from the profile refactor attachment information and ruleset info into their own structures. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-07-29 17:17:31 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: add a cache entry expiration time aging out capability audit cache When auditing capabilities, AppArmor uses a per-CPU, per-profile cache such that the same capability for the same profile doesn't get repeatedly audited, with the original goal of reducing audit logspam. However, this cache does not have an expiration time, resulting in confusion when a profile is shared across binaries (for example) and an expected DENIED audit entry doesn't appear, despite the cache entry having been populated much longer ago. This confusion was exacerbated by the per-CPU nature of the cache resulting in the expected entries sporadically appearing when the later denial+audit occurred on a different CPU. To resolve this, record the last time a capability was audited for a profile and add a timestamp expiration check before doing the audit. v1 -> v2: - Hardcode a longer timeout and drop the patches making it a sysctl, after discussion with John Johansen. - Cache the expiration time instead of the last-audited time. This value can never be zero, which lets us drop the kernel_cap_t caps field from the cache struct. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-20 12:53:15 -07:00
apparmor: audit_cap dedup based on subj_cred instead of profile The previous audit_cap cache deduping was based on the profile that was being audited. This could cause confusion due to the deduplication then occurring across multiple processes, which could happen if multiple instances of binaries matched the same profile attachment (and thus ran under the same profile) or a profile was attached to a container and its processes. Instead, perform audit_cap deduping over ad->subj_cred, which ensures the deduping only occurs across a single process, instead of across all processes that match the current one's profile. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-25 11:30:11 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: audit_cap dedup based on subj_cred instead of profile The previous audit_cap cache deduping was based on the profile that was being audited. This could cause confusion due to the deduplication then occurring across multiple processes, which could happen if multiple instances of binaries matched the same profile attachment (and thus ran under the same profile) or a profile was attached to a container and its processes. Instead, perform audit_cap deduping over ad->subj_cred, which ensures the deduping only occurs across a single process, instead of across all processes that match the current one's profile. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-25 11:30:11 -07:00
apparmor: add a cache entry expiration time aging out capability audit cache When auditing capabilities, AppArmor uses a per-CPU, per-profile cache such that the same capability for the same profile doesn't get repeatedly audited, with the original goal of reducing audit logspam. However, this cache does not have an expiration time, resulting in confusion when a profile is shared across binaries (for example) and an expected DENIED audit entry doesn't appear, despite the cache entry having been populated much longer ago. This confusion was exacerbated by the per-CPU nature of the cache resulting in the expected entries sporadically appearing when the later denial+audit occurred on a different CPU. To resolve this, record the last time a capability was audited for a profile and add a timestamp expiration check before doing the audit. v1 -> v2: - Hardcode a longer timeout and drop the patches making it a sysctl, after discussion with John Johansen. - Cache the expiration time instead of the last-audited time. This value can never be zero, which lets us drop the kernel_cap_t caps field from the cache struct. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-20 12:53:15 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-07 16:10:53 -08:00
apparmor: document capability.c:profile_capable ad ptr not being NULL The profile_capabile function takes a struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, which is documented as possibly being NULL. However, the single place that calls this function never passes it a NULL ad. If we were ever to call profile_capable with a NULL ad elsewhere, we would need to rework the function, as its very first use of ad is to dereference ad->class without checking if ad is NULL. Thus, document profile_capable's ad parameter as not accepting NULL. Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2024-09-24 17:56:05 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-07 16:10:53 -08:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: rework profile->rules to be a list Convert profile->rules to a list as the next step towards supporting multiple rulesets in a profile. For this step only support a single list entry item. The logic for iterating the list will come as a separate step. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-05 20:47:36 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments In preparation for moving from a single set of rules and a single attachment to multiple rulesets and attachments separate from the profile refactor attachment information and ruleset info into their own structures. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-07-29 17:17:31 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-07 16:10:53 -08:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: Fix some kernel-doc comments Fix some kernel-doc comments to silence the warnings: security/apparmor/capability.c:66: warning: Function parameter or member 'ad' not described in 'audit_caps' security/apparmor/capability.c:66: warning: Excess function parameter 'as' description in 'audit_caps' security/apparmor/capability.c:154: warning: Function parameter or member 'subj_cred' not described in 'aa_capable' security/apparmor/capability.c:154: warning: Excess function parameter 'subj_cread' description in 'aa_capable' Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=7035 Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2023-10-23 08:55:17 +08:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-07 16:10:53 -08:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: pass cred through to audit info. The cred is needed to properly audit some messages, and will be needed in the future for uid conditional mediation. So pass it through to where the apparmor_audit_data struct gets defined. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-19 20:48:48 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: pass cred through to audit info. The cred is needed to properly audit some messages, and will be needed in the future for uid conditional mediation. So pass it through to where the apparmor_audit_data struct gets defined. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-19 20:48:48 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2022-09-14 00:20:12 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-09 14:07:02 -07:00
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects ipc: AppArmor ipc is currently limited to mediation done by file mediation and basic ptrace tests. Improved mediation is a wip. rlimits: AppArmor provides basic abilities to set and control rlimits at a per profile level. Only resources specified in a profile are controled or set. AppArmor rules set the hard limit to a value <= to the current hard limit (ie. they can not currently raise hard limits), and if necessary will lower the soft limit to the new hard limit value. AppArmor does not track resource limits to reset them when a profile is left so that children processes inherit the limits set by the parent even if they are not confined by the same profile. Capabilities: AppArmor provides a per profile mask of capabilities, that will further restrict. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-07-29 14:48:05 -07:00