linux/net/sched/act_api.c

1548 lines
36 KiB

include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 17:04:11 +09:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
net: sched: fix refcount imbalance in actions Since commit 55334a5db5cd ("net_sched: act: refuse to remove bound action outside"), we end up with a wrong reference count for a tc action. Test case 1: FOO="1,6 0 0 4294967295," BAR="1,6 0 0 4294967294," tc filter add dev foo parent 1: bpf bytecode "$FOO" flowid 1:1 \ action bpf bytecode "$FOO" tc actions show action bpf action order 0: bpf bytecode '1,6 0 0 4294967295' default-action pipe index 1 ref 1 bind 1 tc actions replace action bpf bytecode "$BAR" index 1 tc actions show action bpf action order 0: bpf bytecode '1,6 0 0 4294967294' default-action pipe index 1 ref 2 bind 1 tc actions replace action bpf bytecode "$FOO" index 1 tc actions show action bpf action order 0: bpf bytecode '1,6 0 0 4294967295' default-action pipe index 1 ref 3 bind 1 Test case 2: FOO="1,6 0 0 4294967295," tc filter add dev foo parent 1: bpf bytecode "$FOO" flowid 1:1 action ok tc actions show action gact action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 1 bind 1 tc actions add action drop index 1 RTNETLINK answers: File exists [...] tc actions show action gact action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 2 bind 1 tc actions add action drop index 1 RTNETLINK answers: File exists [...] tc actions show action gact action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 3 bind 1 What happens is that in tcf_hash_check(), we check tcf_common for a given index and increase tcfc_refcnt and conditionally tcfc_bindcnt when we've found an existing action. Now there are the following cases: 1) We do a late binding of an action. In that case, we leave the tcfc_refcnt/tcfc_bindcnt increased and are done with the ->init() handler. This is correctly handeled. 2) We replace the given action, or we try to add one without replacing and find out that the action at a specific index already exists (thus, we go out with error in that case). In case of 2), we have to undo the reference count increase from tcf_hash_check() in the tcf_hash_check() function. Currently, we fail to do so because of the 'tcfc_bindcnt > 0' check which bails out early with an -EPERM error. Now, while commit 55334a5db5cd prevents 'tc actions del action ...' on an already classifier-bound action to drop the reference count (which could then become negative, wrap around etc), this restriction only accounts for invocations outside a specific action's ->init() handler. One possible solution would be to add a flag thus we possibly trigger the -EPERM ony in situations where it is indeed relevant. After the patch, above test cases have correct reference count again. Fixes: 55334a5db5cd ("net_sched: act: refuse to remove bound action outside") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-29 23:35:25 +02:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: add time filter for action dumping This patch adds support for filtering based on time since last used. When we are dumping a large number of actions it is useful to have the option of filtering based on when the action was last used to reduce the amount of data crossing to user space. With this patch the user space app sets the TCA_ROOT_TIME_DELTA attribute with the value in milliseconds with "time of interest since now". The kernel converts this to jiffies and does the filtering comparison matching entries that have seen activity since then and returns them to user space. Old kernels and old tc continue to work in legacy mode since they dont specify this attribute. Some example (we have 400 actions bound to 400 filters); at installation time. Using updated when tc setting the time of interest to 120 seconds earlier (we see 400 actions): prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000| grep index | wc -l 400 go get some coffee and wait for > 120 seconds and try again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000 | grep index | wc -l 0 Lets see a filter bound to one of these actions: .... filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2 success 1) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 1 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1145 sec used 802 sec Action statistics: Sent 84 bytes 1 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 .... that coffee took long, no? It was good. Now lets ping -c 1 127.0.0.2, then run the actions again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120 | grep index | wc -l 1 More details please: prompt$ hackedtc -s actions ls action gact since 120000 action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1270 sec used 30 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 And the filter? filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 4 success 2) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 2 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1324 sec used 84 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:52 -04:00
net sched actions: fix dumping which requires several messages to user space Fixes a bug in the tcf_dump_walker function that can cause some actions to not be reported when dumping a large number of actions. This issue became more aggrevated when cookies feature was added. In particular this issue is manifest when large cookie values are assigned to the actions and when enough actions are created that the resulting table must be dumped in multiple batches. The number of actions returned in each batch is limited by the total number of actions and the memory buffer size. With small cookies the numeric limit is reached before the buffer size limit, which avoids the code path triggering this bug. When large cookies are used buffer fills before the numeric limit, and the erroneous code path is hit. For example after creating 32 csum actions with the cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd $ tc actions ls action csum total acts 26 action order 0: csum (tcp) action continue index 1 ref 1 bind 0 cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd ..... action order 25: csum (tcp) action continue index 26 ref 1 bind 0 cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd total acts 6 action order 0: csum (tcp) action continue index 28 ref 1 bind 0 cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd ...... action order 5: csum (tcp) action continue index 32 ref 1 bind 0 cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd Note that the action with index 27 is omitted from the report. Fixes: 4b3550ef530c ("[NET_SCHED]: Use nla_nest_start/nla_nest_end")" Signed-off-by: Craig Dillabaugh <cdillaba@mojatatu.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-26 14:58:32 -04:00
net sched actions: fix dumping which requires several messages to user space Fixes a bug in the tcf_dump_walker function that can cause some actions to not be reported when dumping a large number of actions. This issue became more aggrevated when cookies feature was added. In particular this issue is manifest when large cookie values are assigned to the actions and when enough actions are created that the resulting table must be dumped in multiple batches. The number of actions returned in each batch is limited by the total number of actions and the memory buffer size. With small cookies the numeric limit is reached before the buffer size limit, which avoids the code path triggering this bug. When large cookies are used buffer fills before the numeric limit, and the erroneous code path is hit. For example after creating 32 csum actions with the cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd $ tc actions ls action csum total acts 26 action order 0: csum (tcp) action continue index 1 ref 1 bind 0 cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd ..... action order 25: csum (tcp) action continue index 26 ref 1 bind 0 cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd total acts 6 action order 0: csum (tcp) action continue index 28 ref 1 bind 0 cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd ...... action order 5: csum (tcp) action continue index 32 ref 1 bind 0 cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd Note that the action with index 27 is omitted from the report. Fixes: 4b3550ef530c ("[NET_SCHED]: Use nla_nest_start/nla_nest_end")" Signed-off-by: Craig Dillabaugh <cdillaba@mojatatu.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-26 14:58:32 -04:00
net sched actions: add time filter for action dumping This patch adds support for filtering based on time since last used. When we are dumping a large number of actions it is useful to have the option of filtering based on when the action was last used to reduce the amount of data crossing to user space. With this patch the user space app sets the TCA_ROOT_TIME_DELTA attribute with the value in milliseconds with "time of interest since now". The kernel converts this to jiffies and does the filtering comparison matching entries that have seen activity since then and returns them to user space. Old kernels and old tc continue to work in legacy mode since they dont specify this attribute. Some example (we have 400 actions bound to 400 filters); at installation time. Using updated when tc setting the time of interest to 120 seconds earlier (we see 400 actions): prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000| grep index | wc -l 400 go get some coffee and wait for > 120 seconds and try again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000 | grep index | wc -l 0 Lets see a filter bound to one of these actions: .... filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2 success 1) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 1 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1145 sec used 802 sec Action statistics: Sent 84 bytes 1 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 .... that coffee took long, no? It was good. Now lets ping -c 1 127.0.0.2, then run the actions again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120 | grep index | wc -l 1 More details please: prompt$ hackedtc -s actions ls action gact since 120000 action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1270 sec used 30 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 And the filter? filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 4 success 2) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 2 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1324 sec used 84 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:52 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: Complete the JUMPX opcode per discussion at netconf/netdev: When we have an action that is capable of branching (example a policer), we can achieve a continuation of the action graph by programming a "continue" where we find an exact replica of the same filter rule with a lower priority and the remainder of the action graph. When you have 100s of thousands of filters which require such a feature it gets very inefficient to do two lookups. This patch completes a leftover feature of action codes. Its time has come. Example below where a user labels packets with a different skbmark on ingress of a port depending on whether they have/not exceeded the configured rate. This mark is then used to make further decisions on some egress port. #rate control, very low so we can easily see the effect sudo $TC actions add action police rate 1kbit burst 90k \ conform-exceed pipe/jump 2 index 10 # skbedit index 11 will be used if the user conforms sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 11 ok index 11 # skbedit index 12 will be used if the user does not conform sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 12 ok index 12 #lets bind the user .. sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip prio 8 u32 \ match ip dst 127.0.0.8/32 flowid 1:10 \ action police index 10 \ action skbedit index 11 \ action skbedit index 12 #run a ping -f and see what happens.. # jhs@foobar:~$ sudo $TC -s filter ls dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip filter pref 8 u32 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2800 success 1005) match 7f000008/ffffffff at 16 (success 1005 ) action order 1: police 0xa rate 1Kbit burst 23440b mtu 2Kb action pipe/jump 2 overhead 0b ref 2 bind 1 installed 207 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 84420 bytes 1005 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 721 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 2: skbedit mark 11 pass index 11 ref 2 bind 1 installed 204 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 60564 bytes 721 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 3: skbedit mark 12 pass index 12 ref 2 bind 1 installed 201 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 23856 bytes 284 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Not bad, about 28% non-conforming packets.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-23 13:17:28 -04:00
net sched actions: Complete the JUMPX opcode per discussion at netconf/netdev: When we have an action that is capable of branching (example a policer), we can achieve a continuation of the action graph by programming a "continue" where we find an exact replica of the same filter rule with a lower priority and the remainder of the action graph. When you have 100s of thousands of filters which require such a feature it gets very inefficient to do two lookups. This patch completes a leftover feature of action codes. Its time has come. Example below where a user labels packets with a different skbmark on ingress of a port depending on whether they have/not exceeded the configured rate. This mark is then used to make further decisions on some egress port. #rate control, very low so we can easily see the effect sudo $TC actions add action police rate 1kbit burst 90k \ conform-exceed pipe/jump 2 index 10 # skbedit index 11 will be used if the user conforms sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 11 ok index 11 # skbedit index 12 will be used if the user does not conform sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 12 ok index 12 #lets bind the user .. sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip prio 8 u32 \ match ip dst 127.0.0.8/32 flowid 1:10 \ action police index 10 \ action skbedit index 11 \ action skbedit index 12 #run a ping -f and see what happens.. # jhs@foobar:~$ sudo $TC -s filter ls dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip filter pref 8 u32 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2800 success 1005) match 7f000008/ffffffff at 16 (success 1005 ) action order 1: police 0xa rate 1Kbit burst 23440b mtu 2Kb action pipe/jump 2 overhead 0b ref 2 bind 1 installed 207 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 84420 bytes 1005 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 721 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 2: skbedit mark 11 pass index 11 ref 2 bind 1 installed 204 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 60564 bytes 721 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 3: skbedit mark 12 pass index 12 ref 2 bind 1 installed 201 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 23856 bytes 284 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Not bad, about 28% non-conforming packets.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-23 13:17:28 -04:00
net sched actions: Complete the JUMPX opcode per discussion at netconf/netdev: When we have an action that is capable of branching (example a policer), we can achieve a continuation of the action graph by programming a "continue" where we find an exact replica of the same filter rule with a lower priority and the remainder of the action graph. When you have 100s of thousands of filters which require such a feature it gets very inefficient to do two lookups. This patch completes a leftover feature of action codes. Its time has come. Example below where a user labels packets with a different skbmark on ingress of a port depending on whether they have/not exceeded the configured rate. This mark is then used to make further decisions on some egress port. #rate control, very low so we can easily see the effect sudo $TC actions add action police rate 1kbit burst 90k \ conform-exceed pipe/jump 2 index 10 # skbedit index 11 will be used if the user conforms sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 11 ok index 11 # skbedit index 12 will be used if the user does not conform sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 12 ok index 12 #lets bind the user .. sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip prio 8 u32 \ match ip dst 127.0.0.8/32 flowid 1:10 \ action police index 10 \ action skbedit index 11 \ action skbedit index 12 #run a ping -f and see what happens.. # jhs@foobar:~$ sudo $TC -s filter ls dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip filter pref 8 u32 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2800 success 1005) match 7f000008/ffffffff at 16 (success 1005 ) action order 1: police 0xa rate 1Kbit burst 23440b mtu 2Kb action pipe/jump 2 overhead 0b ref 2 bind 1 installed 207 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 84420 bytes 1005 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 721 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 2: skbedit mark 11 pass index 11 ref 2 bind 1 installed 204 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 60564 bytes 721 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 3: skbedit mark 12 pass index 12 ref 2 bind 1 installed 201 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 23856 bytes 284 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Not bad, about 28% non-conforming packets.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-23 13:17:28 -04:00
net sched actions: Complete the JUMPX opcode per discussion at netconf/netdev: When we have an action that is capable of branching (example a policer), we can achieve a continuation of the action graph by programming a "continue" where we find an exact replica of the same filter rule with a lower priority and the remainder of the action graph. When you have 100s of thousands of filters which require such a feature it gets very inefficient to do two lookups. This patch completes a leftover feature of action codes. Its time has come. Example below where a user labels packets with a different skbmark on ingress of a port depending on whether they have/not exceeded the configured rate. This mark is then used to make further decisions on some egress port. #rate control, very low so we can easily see the effect sudo $TC actions add action police rate 1kbit burst 90k \ conform-exceed pipe/jump 2 index 10 # skbedit index 11 will be used if the user conforms sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 11 ok index 11 # skbedit index 12 will be used if the user does not conform sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 12 ok index 12 #lets bind the user .. sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip prio 8 u32 \ match ip dst 127.0.0.8/32 flowid 1:10 \ action police index 10 \ action skbedit index 11 \ action skbedit index 12 #run a ping -f and see what happens.. # jhs@foobar:~$ sudo $TC -s filter ls dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip filter pref 8 u32 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2800 success 1005) match 7f000008/ffffffff at 16 (success 1005 ) action order 1: police 0xa rate 1Kbit burst 23440b mtu 2Kb action pipe/jump 2 overhead 0b ref 2 bind 1 installed 207 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 84420 bytes 1005 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 721 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 2: skbedit mark 11 pass index 11 ref 2 bind 1 installed 204 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 60564 bytes 721 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 3: skbedit mark 12 pass index 12 ref 2 bind 1 installed 201 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 23856 bytes 284 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Not bad, about 28% non-conforming packets.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-23 13:17:28 -04:00
net sched actions: Complete the JUMPX opcode per discussion at netconf/netdev: When we have an action that is capable of branching (example a policer), we can achieve a continuation of the action graph by programming a "continue" where we find an exact replica of the same filter rule with a lower priority and the remainder of the action graph. When you have 100s of thousands of filters which require such a feature it gets very inefficient to do two lookups. This patch completes a leftover feature of action codes. Its time has come. Example below where a user labels packets with a different skbmark on ingress of a port depending on whether they have/not exceeded the configured rate. This mark is then used to make further decisions on some egress port. #rate control, very low so we can easily see the effect sudo $TC actions add action police rate 1kbit burst 90k \ conform-exceed pipe/jump 2 index 10 # skbedit index 11 will be used if the user conforms sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 11 ok index 11 # skbedit index 12 will be used if the user does not conform sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 12 ok index 12 #lets bind the user .. sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip prio 8 u32 \ match ip dst 127.0.0.8/32 flowid 1:10 \ action police index 10 \ action skbedit index 11 \ action skbedit index 12 #run a ping -f and see what happens.. # jhs@foobar:~$ sudo $TC -s filter ls dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip filter pref 8 u32 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2800 success 1005) match 7f000008/ffffffff at 16 (success 1005 ) action order 1: police 0xa rate 1Kbit burst 23440b mtu 2Kb action pipe/jump 2 overhead 0b ref 2 bind 1 installed 207 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 84420 bytes 1005 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 721 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 2: skbedit mark 11 pass index 11 ref 2 bind 1 installed 204 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 60564 bytes 721 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 3: skbedit mark 12 pass index 12 ref 2 bind 1 installed 201 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 23856 bytes 284 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Not bad, about 28% non-conforming packets.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-23 13:17:28 -04:00
net sched actions: Complete the JUMPX opcode per discussion at netconf/netdev: When we have an action that is capable of branching (example a policer), we can achieve a continuation of the action graph by programming a "continue" where we find an exact replica of the same filter rule with a lower priority and the remainder of the action graph. When you have 100s of thousands of filters which require such a feature it gets very inefficient to do two lookups. This patch completes a leftover feature of action codes. Its time has come. Example below where a user labels packets with a different skbmark on ingress of a port depending on whether they have/not exceeded the configured rate. This mark is then used to make further decisions on some egress port. #rate control, very low so we can easily see the effect sudo $TC actions add action police rate 1kbit burst 90k \ conform-exceed pipe/jump 2 index 10 # skbedit index 11 will be used if the user conforms sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 11 ok index 11 # skbedit index 12 will be used if the user does not conform sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 12 ok index 12 #lets bind the user .. sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip prio 8 u32 \ match ip dst 127.0.0.8/32 flowid 1:10 \ action police index 10 \ action skbedit index 11 \ action skbedit index 12 #run a ping -f and see what happens.. # jhs@foobar:~$ sudo $TC -s filter ls dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip filter pref 8 u32 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2800 success 1005) match 7f000008/ffffffff at 16 (success 1005 ) action order 1: police 0xa rate 1Kbit burst 23440b mtu 2Kb action pipe/jump 2 overhead 0b ref 2 bind 1 installed 207 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 84420 bytes 1005 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 721 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 2: skbedit mark 11 pass index 11 ref 2 bind 1 installed 204 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 60564 bytes 721 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 3: skbedit mark 12 pass index 12 ref 2 bind 1 installed 201 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 23856 bytes 284 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Not bad, about 28% non-conforming packets.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-23 13:17:28 -04:00
net sched actions: Complete the JUMPX opcode per discussion at netconf/netdev: When we have an action that is capable of branching (example a policer), we can achieve a continuation of the action graph by programming a "continue" where we find an exact replica of the same filter rule with a lower priority and the remainder of the action graph. When you have 100s of thousands of filters which require such a feature it gets very inefficient to do two lookups. This patch completes a leftover feature of action codes. Its time has come. Example below where a user labels packets with a different skbmark on ingress of a port depending on whether they have/not exceeded the configured rate. This mark is then used to make further decisions on some egress port. #rate control, very low so we can easily see the effect sudo $TC actions add action police rate 1kbit burst 90k \ conform-exceed pipe/jump 2 index 10 # skbedit index 11 will be used if the user conforms sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 11 ok index 11 # skbedit index 12 will be used if the user does not conform sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 12 ok index 12 #lets bind the user .. sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip prio 8 u32 \ match ip dst 127.0.0.8/32 flowid 1:10 \ action police index 10 \ action skbedit index 11 \ action skbedit index 12 #run a ping -f and see what happens.. # jhs@foobar:~$ sudo $TC -s filter ls dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip filter pref 8 u32 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2800 success 1005) match 7f000008/ffffffff at 16 (success 1005 ) action order 1: police 0xa rate 1Kbit burst 23440b mtu 2Kb action pipe/jump 2 overhead 0b ref 2 bind 1 installed 207 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 84420 bytes 1005 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 721 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 2: skbedit mark 11 pass index 11 ref 2 bind 1 installed 204 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 60564 bytes 721 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 3: skbedit mark 12 pass index 12 ref 2 bind 1 installed 201 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 23856 bytes 284 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Not bad, about 28% non-conforming packets.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-23 13:17:28 -04:00
net sched actions: Complete the JUMPX opcode per discussion at netconf/netdev: When we have an action that is capable of branching (example a policer), we can achieve a continuation of the action graph by programming a "continue" where we find an exact replica of the same filter rule with a lower priority and the remainder of the action graph. When you have 100s of thousands of filters which require such a feature it gets very inefficient to do two lookups. This patch completes a leftover feature of action codes. Its time has come. Example below where a user labels packets with a different skbmark on ingress of a port depending on whether they have/not exceeded the configured rate. This mark is then used to make further decisions on some egress port. #rate control, very low so we can easily see the effect sudo $TC actions add action police rate 1kbit burst 90k \ conform-exceed pipe/jump 2 index 10 # skbedit index 11 will be used if the user conforms sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 11 ok index 11 # skbedit index 12 will be used if the user does not conform sudo $TC actions add action skbedit mark 12 ok index 12 #lets bind the user .. sudo $TC filter add dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip prio 8 u32 \ match ip dst 127.0.0.8/32 flowid 1:10 \ action police index 10 \ action skbedit index 11 \ action skbedit index 12 #run a ping -f and see what happens.. # jhs@foobar:~$ sudo $TC -s filter ls dev $ETH parent ffff: protocol ip filter pref 8 u32 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 8 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2800 success 1005) match 7f000008/ffffffff at 16 (success 1005 ) action order 1: police 0xa rate 1Kbit burst 23440b mtu 2Kb action pipe/jump 2 overhead 0b ref 2 bind 1 installed 207 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 84420 bytes 1005 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 721 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 2: skbedit mark 11 pass index 11 ref 2 bind 1 installed 204 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 60564 bytes 721 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 action order 3: skbedit mark 12 pass index 12 ref 2 bind 1 installed 201 sec used 122 sec Action statistics: Sent 23856 bytes 284 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Not bad, about 28% non-conforming packets.. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-23 13:17:28 -04:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
net/sched: prepare TC actions to properly validate the control action - pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler, to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain exists and (eventually) refcounting it. - remove code that validates the control action after a successful call to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at the same time. - add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init() handler. - add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one. This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact() to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently. By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid 'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats like the following one: # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto tcp action drop # tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \ > ip_proto udp action drop # tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 42 index 66 # tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \ > action gact goto chain 43 index 66 # echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak <...> unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0 [<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0 [<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 [<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250 [<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0 [<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 [<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0 [<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 [<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain") Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values") Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 14:59:59 +01:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
net: sched: null actions array pointer before releasing action Currently, tcf_action_delete() nulls actions array pointer after putting and deleting it. However, if tcf_idr_delete_index() returns an error, pointer to action is not set to null. That results it being released second time in error handling code of tca_action_gd(). Kasan error: [ 807.367755] ================================================================== [ 807.375844] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250 [ 807.382763] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88033e636000 by task tc/2732 [ 807.391289] CPU: 0 PID: 2732 Comm: tc Tainted: G W 4.19.0-rc1+ #799 [ 807.399542] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-2028TP-DECR/X10DRT-P, BIOS 2.0b 03/30/2017 [ 807.407948] Call Trace: [ 807.410763] dump_stack+0x92/0xeb [ 807.414456] print_address_description+0x70/0x360 [ 807.419549] kasan_report+0x14d/0x300 [ 807.423582] ? tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250 [ 807.428150] tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250 [ 807.432539] ? nla_put+0x65/0xe0 [ 807.436146] fl_dump+0x394/0x3f0 [cls_flower] [ 807.440890] ? fl_tmplt_dump+0x140/0x140 [cls_flower] [ 807.446327] ? lock_downgrade+0x320/0x320 [ 807.450702] ? lock_acquire+0xe2/0x220 [ 807.454819] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0x140 [ 807.459475] ? memcpy+0x34/0x50 [ 807.462980] ? nla_put+0x65/0xe0 [ 807.466582] tcf_fill_node+0x341/0x430 [ 807.470717] ? tcf_block_put+0xe0/0xe0 [ 807.474859] tcf_node_dump+0xdb/0xf0 [ 807.478821] fl_walk+0x8e/0x170 [cls_flower] [ 807.483474] tcf_chain_dump+0x35a/0x4d0 [ 807.487703] ? tfilter_notify+0x170/0x170 [ 807.492091] ? tcf_fill_node+0x430/0x430 [ 807.496411] tc_dump_tfilter+0x362/0x3f0 [ 807.500712] ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850 [ 807.505104] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40 [ 807.509940] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xcf/0x410 [ 807.515031] netlink_dump+0x263/0x4f0 [ 807.519077] __netlink_dump_start+0x2a0/0x300 [ 807.523817] ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850 [ 807.528198] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x46a/0x6d0 [ 807.532671] ? rtnl_fdb_del+0x3f0/0x3f0 [ 807.536878] ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850 [ 807.541280] netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200 [ 807.545570] ? rtnl_fdb_del+0x3f0/0x3f0 [ 807.549773] ? netlink_ack+0x500/0x500 [ 807.553913] netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370 [ 807.558212] ? netlink_attachskb+0x340/0x340 [ 807.562855] ? _copy_from_iter_full+0xe9/0x3e0 [ 807.567677] ? import_iovec+0x11e/0x1c0 [ 807.571890] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0 [ 807.576192] ? netlink_unicast+0x370/0x370 [ 807.580684] ? netlink_unicast+0x370/0x370 [ 807.585154] sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80 [ 807.589015] ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520 [ 807.593230] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x210/0x210 [ 807.598232] ? do_wp_page+0x174/0x880 [ 807.602276] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x749/0x1c10 [ 807.607021] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1046/0x1c10 [ 807.611849] ? __pmd_alloc+0x320/0x320 [ 807.615973] ? check_chain_key+0x140/0x1f0 [ 807.620450] ? check_chain_key+0x140/0x1f0 [ 807.624929] ? __fget_light+0xbc/0xd0 [ 807.628970] ? __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150 [ 807.633172] __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150 [ 807.637201] ? __ia32_sys_shutdown+0x30/0x30 [ 807.641846] ? up_read+0x53/0x90 [ 807.645442] ? __do_page_fault+0x484/0x780 [ 807.649949] ? do_syscall_64+0x1e/0x2c0 [ 807.654164] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0 [ 807.658198] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 807.663625] RIP: 0033:0x7f42e9870150 [ 807.667568] Code: 8b 15 3c 7d 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb cd 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d b9 d5 2b 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be cd 00 00 48 89 04 24 [ 807.687328] RSP: 002b:00007ffdbf595b58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 807.695564] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f42e9870150 [ 807.703083] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffdbf595b80 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 807.710605] RBP: 00007ffdbf599d90 R08: 0000000000679bc0 R09: 000000000000000f [ 807.718127] R10: 00000000000005e7 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdbf599d88 [ 807.725651] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 807.735048] Allocated by task 2687: [ 807.738902] kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 [ 807.742852] __kmalloc+0x118/0x2d0 [ 807.746615] tcf_idr_create+0x44/0x320 [ 807.750738] tcf_nat_init+0x41e/0x530 [act_nat] [ 807.755638] tcf_action_init_1+0x4e0/0x650 [ 807.760104] tcf_action_init+0x1ce/0x2d0 [ 807.764395] tcf_exts_validate+0x1d8/0x200 [ 807.768861] fl_change+0x55a/0x26b4 [cls_flower] [ 807.773845] tc_new_tfilter+0x748/0xa20 [ 807.778051] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x56a/0x6d0 [ 807.782517] netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200 [ 807.786804] netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370 [ 807.791095] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0 [ 807.795387] sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80 [ 807.799240] ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520 [ 807.803445] __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150 [ 807.807473] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0 [ 807.811506] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 807.818776] Freed by task 2728: [ 807.822283] __kasan_slab_free+0x122/0x180 [ 807.826752] kfree+0xf4/0x2f0 [ 807.830080] __tcf_action_put+0x5a/0xb0 [ 807.834281] tcf_action_put_many+0x46/0x70 [ 807.838747] tca_action_gd+0x232/0xc40 [ 807.842862] tc_ctl_action+0x215/0x230 [ 807.846977] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x56a/0x6d0 [ 807.851444] netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200 [ 807.855731] netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370 [ 807.860021] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0 [ 807.864312] sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80 [ 807.868166] ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520 [ 807.872372] __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150 [ 807.876401] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0 [ 807.880431] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 807.887704] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88033e636000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [ 807.900909] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff88033e636000, ffff88033e636100) [ 807.913155] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 807.918322] page:ffffea000cf98d80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88036f80ee00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 807.928831] flags: 0x5fff8000008100(slab|head) [ 807.933647] raw: 005fff8000008100 ffffea000db44f00 0000000400000004 ffff88036f80ee00 [ 807.942050] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 807.950456] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 807.958240] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 807.963405] ffff88033e635f00: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb [ 807.971288] ffff88033e635f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 807.979166] >ffff88033e636000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 807.994882] ^ [ 807.998477] ffff88033e636080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 808.006352] ffff88033e636100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 808.014230] ================================================================== [ 808.022108] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: edfaf94fa705 ("net_sched: improve and refactor tcf_action_put_many()") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-09-03 10:04:55 +03:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: add time filter for action dumping This patch adds support for filtering based on time since last used. When we are dumping a large number of actions it is useful to have the option of filtering based on when the action was last used to reduce the amount of data crossing to user space. With this patch the user space app sets the TCA_ROOT_TIME_DELTA attribute with the value in milliseconds with "time of interest since now". The kernel converts this to jiffies and does the filtering comparison matching entries that have seen activity since then and returns them to user space. Old kernels and old tc continue to work in legacy mode since they dont specify this attribute. Some example (we have 400 actions bound to 400 filters); at installation time. Using updated when tc setting the time of interest to 120 seconds earlier (we see 400 actions): prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000| grep index | wc -l 400 go get some coffee and wait for > 120 seconds and try again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000 | grep index | wc -l 0 Lets see a filter bound to one of these actions: .... filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2 success 1) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 1 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1145 sec used 802 sec Action statistics: Sent 84 bytes 1 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 .... that coffee took long, no? It was good. Now lets ping -c 1 127.0.0.2, then run the actions again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120 | grep index | wc -l 1 More details please: prompt$ hackedtc -s actions ls action gact since 120000 action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1270 sec used 30 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 And the filter? filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 4 success 2) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 2 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1324 sec used 84 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:52 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: add time filter for action dumping This patch adds support for filtering based on time since last used. When we are dumping a large number of actions it is useful to have the option of filtering based on when the action was last used to reduce the amount of data crossing to user space. With this patch the user space app sets the TCA_ROOT_TIME_DELTA attribute with the value in milliseconds with "time of interest since now". The kernel converts this to jiffies and does the filtering comparison matching entries that have seen activity since then and returns them to user space. Old kernels and old tc continue to work in legacy mode since they dont specify this attribute. Some example (we have 400 actions bound to 400 filters); at installation time. Using updated when tc setting the time of interest to 120 seconds earlier (we see 400 actions): prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000| grep index | wc -l 400 go get some coffee and wait for > 120 seconds and try again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000 | grep index | wc -l 0 Lets see a filter bound to one of these actions: .... filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2 success 1) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 1 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1145 sec used 802 sec Action statistics: Sent 84 bytes 1 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 .... that coffee took long, no? It was good. Now lets ping -c 1 127.0.0.2, then run the actions again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120 | grep index | wc -l 1 More details please: prompt$ hackedtc -s actions ls action gact since 120000 action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1270 sec used 30 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 And the filter? filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 4 success 2) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 2 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1324 sec used 84 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:52 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: add time filter for action dumping This patch adds support for filtering based on time since last used. When we are dumping a large number of actions it is useful to have the option of filtering based on when the action was last used to reduce the amount of data crossing to user space. With this patch the user space app sets the TCA_ROOT_TIME_DELTA attribute with the value in milliseconds with "time of interest since now". The kernel converts this to jiffies and does the filtering comparison matching entries that have seen activity since then and returns them to user space. Old kernels and old tc continue to work in legacy mode since they dont specify this attribute. Some example (we have 400 actions bound to 400 filters); at installation time. Using updated when tc setting the time of interest to 120 seconds earlier (we see 400 actions): prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000| grep index | wc -l 400 go get some coffee and wait for > 120 seconds and try again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000 | grep index | wc -l 0 Lets see a filter bound to one of these actions: .... filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2 success 1) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 1 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1145 sec used 802 sec Action statistics: Sent 84 bytes 1 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 .... that coffee took long, no? It was good. Now lets ping -c 1 127.0.0.2, then run the actions again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120 | grep index | wc -l 1 More details please: prompt$ hackedtc -s actions ls action gact since 120000 action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1270 sec used 30 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 And the filter? filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 4 success 2) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 2 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1324 sec used 84 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:52 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 14:07:28 +02:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: add time filter for action dumping This patch adds support for filtering based on time since last used. When we are dumping a large number of actions it is useful to have the option of filtering based on when the action was last used to reduce the amount of data crossing to user space. With this patch the user space app sets the TCA_ROOT_TIME_DELTA attribute with the value in milliseconds with "time of interest since now". The kernel converts this to jiffies and does the filtering comparison matching entries that have seen activity since then and returns them to user space. Old kernels and old tc continue to work in legacy mode since they dont specify this attribute. Some example (we have 400 actions bound to 400 filters); at installation time. Using updated when tc setting the time of interest to 120 seconds earlier (we see 400 actions): prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000| grep index | wc -l 400 go get some coffee and wait for > 120 seconds and try again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000 | grep index | wc -l 0 Lets see a filter bound to one of these actions: .... filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2 success 1) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 1 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1145 sec used 802 sec Action statistics: Sent 84 bytes 1 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 .... that coffee took long, no? It was good. Now lets ping -c 1 127.0.0.2, then run the actions again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120 | grep index | wc -l 1 More details please: prompt$ hackedtc -s actions ls action gact since 120000 action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1270 sec used 30 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 And the filter? filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 4 success 2) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 2 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1324 sec used 84 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:52 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: add time filter for action dumping This patch adds support for filtering based on time since last used. When we are dumping a large number of actions it is useful to have the option of filtering based on when the action was last used to reduce the amount of data crossing to user space. With this patch the user space app sets the TCA_ROOT_TIME_DELTA attribute with the value in milliseconds with "time of interest since now". The kernel converts this to jiffies and does the filtering comparison matching entries that have seen activity since then and returns them to user space. Old kernels and old tc continue to work in legacy mode since they dont specify this attribute. Some example (we have 400 actions bound to 400 filters); at installation time. Using updated when tc setting the time of interest to 120 seconds earlier (we see 400 actions): prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000| grep index | wc -l 400 go get some coffee and wait for > 120 seconds and try again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000 | grep index | wc -l 0 Lets see a filter bound to one of these actions: .... filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2 success 1) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 1 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1145 sec used 802 sec Action statistics: Sent 84 bytes 1 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 .... that coffee took long, no? It was good. Now lets ping -c 1 127.0.0.2, then run the actions again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120 | grep index | wc -l 1 More details please: prompt$ hackedtc -s actions ls action gact since 120000 action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1270 sec used 30 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 And the filter? filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 4 success 2) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 2 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1324 sec used 84 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:52 -04:00
net sched actions: add time filter for action dumping This patch adds support for filtering based on time since last used. When we are dumping a large number of actions it is useful to have the option of filtering based on when the action was last used to reduce the amount of data crossing to user space. With this patch the user space app sets the TCA_ROOT_TIME_DELTA attribute with the value in milliseconds with "time of interest since now". The kernel converts this to jiffies and does the filtering comparison matching entries that have seen activity since then and returns them to user space. Old kernels and old tc continue to work in legacy mode since they dont specify this attribute. Some example (we have 400 actions bound to 400 filters); at installation time. Using updated when tc setting the time of interest to 120 seconds earlier (we see 400 actions): prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000| grep index | wc -l 400 go get some coffee and wait for > 120 seconds and try again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120000 | grep index | wc -l 0 Lets see a filter bound to one of these actions: .... filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 2 success 1) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 1 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1145 sec used 802 sec Action statistics: Sent 84 bytes 1 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 .... that coffee took long, no? It was good. Now lets ping -c 1 127.0.0.2, then run the actions again: prompt$ hackedtc actions ls action gact since 120 | grep index | wc -l 1 More details please: prompt$ hackedtc -s actions ls action gact since 120000 action order 0: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1270 sec used 30 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 And the filter? filter pref 10 u32 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800: ht divisor 1 filter pref 10 u32 fh 800::800 order 2048 key ht 800 bkt 0 flowid 1:10 (rule hit 4 success 2) match 7f000002/ffffffff at 12 (success 2 ) action order 1: gact action pass random type none pass val 0 index 23 ref 2 bind 1 installed 1324 sec used 84 sec Action statistics: Sent 168 bytes 2 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0) backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:52 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00
net sched actions: dump more than TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO actions per batch When you dump hundreds of thousands of actions, getting only 32 per dump batch even when the socket buffer and memory allocations allow is inefficient. With this change, the user will get as many as possibly fitting within the given constraints available to the kernel. The top level action TLV space is extended. An attribute TCA_ROOT_FLAGS is used to carry flags; flag TCA_FLAG_LARGE_DUMP_ON is set by the user indicating the user is capable of processing these large dumps. Older user space which doesnt set this flag doesnt get the large (than 32) batches. The kernel uses the TCA_ROOT_COUNT attribute to tell the user how many actions are put in a single batch. As such user space app knows how long to iterate (independent of the type of action being dumped) instead of hardcoded maximum of 32 thus maintaining backward compat. Some results dumping 1.5M actions below: first an unpatched tc which doesnt understand these features... prompt$ time -p tc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 1388.43 user 2.07 sys 1386.79 Now lets see a patched tc which sets the correct flags when requesting a dump: prompt$ time -p updatedtc actions ls action gact | grep index | wc -l 1500000 real 178.13 user 2.02 sys 176.96 That is about 8x performance improvement for tc app which sets its receive buffer to about 32K. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-30 13:24:51 -04:00