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linux/net/core/secure_seq.c

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treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed files Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which: - Have no license information of any form - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the initial scan/conversion to ignore the file These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-19 13:08:55 +01:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: switch net_secret key generation to net_get_random_once Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-10-19 21:48:59 +02:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: secure_seq: Fix warning when CONFIG_IPV6 and CONFIG_INET are not selected net_secret() is only used when CONFIG_IPV6 or CONFIG_INET are selected. Building a defconfig with both of these symbols unselected (Using the ARM at91sam9rl_defconfig, for example) leads to the following build warning: $ make at91sam9rl_defconfig # # configuration written to .config # $ make net/core/secure_seq.o scripts/kconfig/conf --silentoldconfig Kconfig CHK include/config/kernel.release CHK include/generated/uapi/linux/version.h CHK include/generated/utsrelease.h make[1]: `include/generated/mach-types.h' is up to date. CALL scripts/checksyscalls.sh CC net/core/secure_seq.o net/core/secure_seq.c:17:13: warning: 'net_secret_init' defined but not used [-Wunused-function] Fix this warning by protecting the definition of net_secret() with these symbols. Reported-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-10-05 17:56:59 -03:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
tcp: allow to turn tcp timestamp randomization off Eric says: "By looking at tcpdump, and TS val of xmit packets of multiple flows, we can deduct the relative qdisc delays (think of fq pacing). This should work even if we have one flow per remote peer." Having random per flow (or host) offsets doesn't allow that anymore so add a way to turn this off. Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-01 11:32:07 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: align static siphash keys siphash keys use 16 bytes. Define siphash_aligned_key_t macro so that we can make sure they are not crossing a cache line boundary. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-11-15 09:23:03 -08:00
net: net_secret should not depend on TCP A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket. Problem added in commit aebda156a570782 ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization") Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa. Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-09-24 06:19:57 -07:00
tcp: resalt the secret every 10 seconds In order to limit the ability for an observer to recognize the source ports sequence used to contact a set of destinations, we should periodically shuffle the secret. 10 seconds looks effective enough without causing particular issues. Cc: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-05-02 10:46:10 +02:00
net: always inline net_secret_init Currently net_secret_init does not get inlined, so we always have a call to net_secret_init even in the fast path. Let's specify net_secret_init as __always_inline so we have the nop in the fast-path without the call to net_secret_init and the unlikely path at the epilogue of the function. jump_labels handle the inlining correctly. Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-10-23 08:44:50 +02:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
net: secure_seq: Fix warning when CONFIG_IPV6 and CONFIG_INET are not selected net_secret() is only used when CONFIG_IPV6 or CONFIG_INET are selected. Building a defconfig with both of these symbols unselected (Using the ARM at91sam9rl_defconfig, for example) leads to the following build warning: $ make at91sam9rl_defconfig # # configuration written to .config # $ make net/core/secure_seq.o scripts/kconfig/conf --silentoldconfig Kconfig CHK include/config/kernel.release CHK include/generated/uapi/linux/version.h CHK include/generated/utsrelease.h make[1]: `include/generated/mach-types.h' is up to date. CALL scripts/checksyscalls.sh CC net/core/secure_seq.o net/core/secure_seq.c:17:13: warning: 'net_secret_init' defined but not used [-Wunused-function] Fix this warning by protecting the definition of net_secret() with these symbols. Reported-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-10-05 17:56:59 -03:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: Silence seq_scale() unused warning On a CONFIG_NET=y build net/core/secure_seq.c:22: warning: 'seq_scale' defined but not used Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-12-06 08:04:40 +00:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: use ktime_get_ns() and ktime_get_real_ns() helpers ktime_get_ns() replaces ktime_to_ns(ktime_get()) ktime_get_real_ns() replaces ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-22 18:32:09 -07:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: Silence seq_scale() unused warning On a CONFIG_NET=y build net/core/secure_seq.c:22: warning: 'seq_scale' defined but not used Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-12-06 08:04:40 +00:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) Instead of testing defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-12-10 09:48:31 +00:00
tcp: Namespaceify sysctl_tcp_timestamps Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-07 10:34:39 -07:00
secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1, which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr. Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets. Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme <yvan@vanrossomme.net> Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 19:42:37 +01:00
tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl knobs related to SYN option. While reading these knobs, they can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to their readers. - tcp_sack - tcp_window_scaling - tcp_timestamps Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-07-18 10:26:44 -07:00
secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1, which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr. Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets. Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme <yvan@vanrossomme.net> Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 19:42:37 +01:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1, which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr. Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets. Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme <yvan@vanrossomme.net> Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 19:42:37 +01:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1, which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr. Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets. Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme <yvan@vanrossomme.net> Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 19:42:37 +01:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
net: net_secret should not depend on TCP A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket. Problem added in commit aebda156a570782 ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization") Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa. Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-09-24 06:19:57 -07:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation SipHash replaced MD5 in secure_ipv{4,6}_port_ephemeral() via commit 7cd23e5300c1 ("secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5"), but the output remained truncated to 32-bit only. In order to exploit more bits from the hash, let's make the functions return the full 64-bit of siphash_3u32(). We also make sure the port offset calculation in __inet_hash_connect() remains done on 32-bit to avoid the need for div_u64_rem() and an extra cost on 32-bit systems. Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-05-02 10:46:08 +02:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
tcp: resalt the secret every 10 seconds In order to limit the ability for an observer to recognize the source ports sequence used to contact a set of destinations, we should periodically shuffle the secret. 10 seconds looks effective enough without causing particular issues. Cc: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-05-02 10:46:10 +02:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
tcp: resalt the secret every 10 seconds In order to limit the ability for an observer to recognize the source ports sequence used to contact a set of destinations, we should periodically shuffle the secret. 10 seconds looks effective enough without causing particular issues. Cc: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-05-02 10:46:10 +02:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: net_secret should not depend on TCP A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket. Problem added in commit aebda156a570782 ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization") Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa. Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-09-24 06:19:57 -07:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
netfilter: ipv6: add IPv6 NAT support Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2012-08-26 19:14:12 +02:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
tcp: Namespaceify sysctl_tcp_timestamps Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-07 10:34:39 -07:00
secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1, which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr. Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets. Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme <yvan@vanrossomme.net> Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 19:42:37 +01:00
tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl knobs related to SYN option. While reading these knobs, they can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to their readers. - tcp_sack - tcp_window_scaling - tcp_timestamps Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-07-18 10:26:44 -07:00
secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1, which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr. Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets. Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme <yvan@vanrossomme.net> Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 19:42:37 +01:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets Unfortunately too many devices (not under our control) use tcp_tw_recycle=1, which depends on timestamps being identical of the same saddr. Although tcp_tw_recycle got removed in net-next we can't make such end hosts disappear so downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets. Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reported-by: Yvan Vanrossomme <yvan@vanrossomme.net> Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-24 19:42:37 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
tcp: rename *_sequence_number() to *_seq_and_tsoff() The functions that are returning tcp sequence number also setup TS offset value, so rename them to better describe their purpose. No functional changes in this patch. Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-09 13:53:55 +03:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
tcp: randomize timestamps on syncookies Whole point of randomization was to hide server uptime, but an attacker can simply start a syn flood and TCP generates 'old style' timestamps, directly revealing server jiffies value. Also, TSval sent by the server to a particular remote address vary depending on syncookies being sent or not, potentially triggering PAWS drops for innocent clients. Lets implement proper randomization, including for SYNcookies. Also we do not need to export sysctl_tcp_timestamps, since it is not used from a module. In v2, I added Florian feedback and contribution, adding tsoff to tcp_get_cookie_sock(). v3 removed one unused variable in tcp_v4_connect() as Florian spotted. Fixes: 95a22caee396c ("tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-05 06:56:54 -07:00
net: net_secret should not depend on TCP A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket. Problem added in commit aebda156a570782 ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization") Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa. Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-09-24 06:19:57 -07:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
infiniband: i40iw, nes: don't use wall time for TCP sequence numbers The nes infiniband driver uses current_kernel_time() to get a nanosecond granunarity timestamp to initialize its tcp sequence counters. This is one of only a few remaining users of that deprecated function, so we should try to get rid of it. Aside from using a deprecated API, there are several problems I see here: - Using a CLOCK_REALTIME based time source makes it predictable in case the time base is synchronized. - Using a coarse timestamp means it only gets updated once per jiffie, making it even more predictable in order to avoid having to access the hardware clock source - The upper 2 bits are always zero because the nanoseconds are at most 999999999. For the Linux TCP implementation, we use secure_tcp_seq(), which appears to be appropriate here as well, and solves all the above problems. i40iw uses a variant of the same code, so I do that same thing there for ipv4. Unlike nes, i40e also supports ipv6, which needs to call secure_tcpv6_seq instead. Acked-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-07-09 10:34:43 +02:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation SipHash replaced MD5 in secure_ipv{4,6}_port_ephemeral() via commit 7cd23e5300c1 ("secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5"), but the output remained truncated to 32-bit only. In order to exploit more bits from the hash, let's make the functions return the full 64-bit of siphash_3u32(). We also make sure the port offset calculation in __inet_hash_connect() remains done on 32-bit to avoid the need for div_u64_rem() and an extra cost on 32-bit systems. Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-05-02 10:46:08 +02:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: net_secret should not depend on TCP A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket. Problem added in commit aebda156a570782 ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization") Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa. Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-09-24 06:19:57 -07:00
tcp: resalt the secret every 10 seconds In order to limit the ability for an observer to recognize the source ports sequence used to contact a set of destinations, we should periodically shuffle the secret. 10 seconds looks effective enough without causing particular issues. Cc: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il> Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-05-02 10:46:10 +02:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net:core: use IS_ENABLED Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FOO) instead of defined(CONFIG_FOO) || defined (CONFIG_FOO_MODULE) Signed-off-by: Igor Maravić <igorm@etf.rs> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-12-12 02:58:22 +00:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: net_secret should not depend on TCP A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket. Problem added in commit aebda156a570782 ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization") Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa. Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-09-24 06:19:57 -07:00
secure_seq: fix sparse errors Fixes following warnings : net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types) net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28: expected unsigned int const [unsigned] [usertype] a net/core/secure_seq.c:125:28: got restricted __be32 [usertype] saddr net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different base types) net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35: expected unsigned int const [unsigned] [usertype] b net/core/secure_seq.c:125:35: got restricted __be32 [usertype] daddr net/core/secure_seq.c:125:43: warning: cast from restricted __be16 net/core/secure_seq.c:125:61: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer Fixes: 7cd23e5300c1 ("secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-11 18:10:37 -08:00
net: use ktime_get_ns() and ktime_get_real_ns() helpers ktime_get_ns() replaces ktime_to_ns(ktime_get()) ktime_get_real_ns() replaces ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-22 18:32:09 -07:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) Instead of testing defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-12-10 09:48:31 +00:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00
net: net_secret should not depend on TCP A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket. Problem added in commit aebda156a570782 ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization") Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa. Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@strressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-09-24 06:19:57 -07:00
secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5 This gives a clear speed and security improvement. Siphash is both faster and is more solid crypto than the aging MD5. Rather than manually filling MD5 buffers, for IPv6, we simply create a layout by a simple anonymous struct, for which gcc generates rather efficient code. For IPv4, we pass the values directly to the short input convenience functions. 64-bit x86_64: [ 1.683628] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 99563527 [ 1.717350] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 92890502 [ 1.741968] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67825362 [ 1.762048] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 67485526 32-bit x86: [ 1.600012] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 103227892 [ 1.634219] secure_tcp_sequence_number_md5# cycles: 94732544 [ 1.669102] secure_tcpv6_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 96299384 [ 1.700165] secure_tcp_sequence_number_siphash# cycles: 86015473 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-08 13:54:02 +01:00
net: use ktime_get_ns() and ktime_get_real_ns() helpers ktime_get_ns() replaces ktime_to_ns(ktime_get()) ktime_get_real_ns() replaces ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-08-22 18:32:09 -07:00
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5. Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-03 20:50:44 -07:00