linux/fs/cifs/connect.c

4196 lines
106 KiB

include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 17:04:11 +09:00
cifs: don't allow cifs_reconnect to exit with NULL socket pointer It's possible for the following set of events to happen: cifsd calls cifs_reconnect which reconnects the socket. A userspace process then calls cifs_negotiate_protocol to handle the NEGOTIATE and gets a reply. But, while processing the reply, cifsd calls cifs_reconnect again. Eventually the GlobalMid_Lock is dropped and the reply from the earlier NEGOTIATE completes and the tcpStatus is set to CifsGood. cifs_reconnect then goes through and closes the socket and sets the pointer to zero, but because the status is now CifsGood, the new socket is not created and cifs_reconnect exits with the socket pointer set to NULL. Fix this by only setting the tcpStatus to CifsGood if the tcpStatus is CifsNeedNegotiate, and by making sure that generic_ip_connect is always called at least once in cifs_reconnect. Note that this is not a perfect fix for this issue. It's still possible that the NEGOTIATE reply is handled after the socket has been closed and reconnected. In that case, the socket state will look correct but it no NEGOTIATE was performed on it be for the wrong socket. In that situation though the server should just shut down the socket on the next attempted send, rather than causing the oops that occurs today. Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # .38.x: fd88ce9: [CIFS] cifs: clarify the meaning of tcpStatus == CifsGood Reported-and-Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-10 16:14:57 -04:00
cifs: don't allow cifs_reconnect to exit with NULL socket pointer It's possible for the following set of events to happen: cifsd calls cifs_reconnect which reconnects the socket. A userspace process then calls cifs_negotiate_protocol to handle the NEGOTIATE and gets a reply. But, while processing the reply, cifsd calls cifs_reconnect again. Eventually the GlobalMid_Lock is dropped and the reply from the earlier NEGOTIATE completes and the tcpStatus is set to CifsGood. cifs_reconnect then goes through and closes the socket and sets the pointer to zero, but because the status is now CifsGood, the new socket is not created and cifs_reconnect exits with the socket pointer set to NULL. Fix this by only setting the tcpStatus to CifsGood if the tcpStatus is CifsNeedNegotiate, and by making sure that generic_ip_connect is always called at least once in cifs_reconnect. Note that this is not a perfect fix for this issue. It's still possible that the NEGOTIATE reply is handled after the socket has been closed and reconnected. In that case, the socket state will look correct but it no NEGOTIATE was performed on it be for the wrong socket. In that situation though the server should just shut down the socket on the next attempted send, rather than causing the oops that occurs today. Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # .38.x: fd88ce9: [CIFS] cifs: clarify the meaning of tcpStatus == CifsGood Reported-and-Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-10 16:14:57 -04:00
Elminate sparse __CHECK_ENDIAN__ warnings on port conversion Ports are __be16 not unsigned short int Eliminates the remaining fixable endian warnings: ~/cifs-2.6$ make modules C=1 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ CHECK fs/cifs/connect.c fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin6_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2394:22: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-03-13 18:55:55 +00:00
Make CIFS mount work in a container. Teach cifs about network namespaces, so mounting uses adresses/routing visible from the container rather than from init context. A container is a chroot on steroids that changes more than just the root filesystem the new processes see. One thing containers can isolate is "network namespaces", meaning each container can have its own set of ethernet interfaces, each with its own own IP address and routing to the outside world. And if you open a socket in _userspace_ from processes within such a container, this works fine. But sockets opened from within the kernel still use a single global networking context in a lot of places, meaning the new socket's address and routing are correct for PID 1 on the host, but are _not_ what userspace processes in the container get to use. So when you mount a network filesystem from within in a container, the mount code in the CIFS driver uses the host's networking context and not the container's networking context, so it gets the wrong address, uses the wrong routing, and may even try to go out an interface that the container can't even access... Bad stuff. This patch copies the mount process's network context into the CIFS structure that stores the rest of the server information for that mount point, and changes the socket open code to use the saved network context instead of the global network context. I.E. "when you attempt to use these addresses, do so relative to THIS set of network interfaces and routing rules, not the old global context from back before we supported containers". The big long HOWTO sets up a test environment on the assumption you've never used ocntainers before. It basically says: 1) configure and build a new kernel that has container support 2) build a new root filesystem that includes the userspace container control package (LXC) 3) package/run them under KVM (so you don't have to mess up your host system in order to play with containers). 4) set up some containers under the KVM system 5) set up contradictory routing in the KVM system and the container so that the host and the container see different things for the same address 6) try to mount a CIFS share from both contexts so you can both force it to work and force it to fail. For a long drawn out test reproduction sequence, see: http://landley.livejournal.com/47024.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47205.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47476.html Signed-off-by: Rob Landley <rlandley@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-01-22 15:44:05 -06:00
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 14:25:08 -05:00
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 14:25:08 -05:00
Make CIFS mount work in a container. Teach cifs about network namespaces, so mounting uses adresses/routing visible from the container rather than from init context. A container is a chroot on steroids that changes more than just the root filesystem the new processes see. One thing containers can isolate is "network namespaces", meaning each container can have its own set of ethernet interfaces, each with its own own IP address and routing to the outside world. And if you open a socket in _userspace_ from processes within such a container, this works fine. But sockets opened from within the kernel still use a single global networking context in a lot of places, meaning the new socket's address and routing are correct for PID 1 on the host, but are _not_ what userspace processes in the container get to use. So when you mount a network filesystem from within in a container, the mount code in the CIFS driver uses the host's networking context and not the container's networking context, so it gets the wrong address, uses the wrong routing, and may even try to go out an interface that the container can't even access... Bad stuff. This patch copies the mount process's network context into the CIFS structure that stores the rest of the server information for that mount point, and changes the socket open code to use the saved network context instead of the global network context. I.E. "when you attempt to use these addresses, do so relative to THIS set of network interfaces and routing rules, not the old global context from back before we supported containers". The big long HOWTO sets up a test environment on the assumption you've never used ocntainers before. It basically says: 1) configure and build a new kernel that has container support 2) build a new root filesystem that includes the userspace container control package (LXC) 3) package/run them under KVM (so you don't have to mess up your host system in order to play with containers). 4) set up some containers under the KVM system 5) set up contradictory routing in the KVM system and the container so that the host and the container see different things for the same address 6) try to mount a CIFS share from both contexts so you can both force it to work and force it to fail. For a long drawn out test reproduction sequence, see: http://landley.livejournal.com/47024.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47205.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47476.html Signed-off-by: Rob Landley <rlandley@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-01-22 15:44:05 -06:00
NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-10-21 14:25:08 -05:00
Make CIFS mount work in a container. Teach cifs about network namespaces, so mounting uses adresses/routing visible from the container rather than from init context. A container is a chroot on steroids that changes more than just the root filesystem the new processes see. One thing containers can isolate is "network namespaces", meaning each container can have its own set of ethernet interfaces, each with its own own IP address and routing to the outside world. And if you open a socket in _userspace_ from processes within such a container, this works fine. But sockets opened from within the kernel still use a single global networking context in a lot of places, meaning the new socket's address and routing are correct for PID 1 on the host, but are _not_ what userspace processes in the container get to use. So when you mount a network filesystem from within in a container, the mount code in the CIFS driver uses the host's networking context and not the container's networking context, so it gets the wrong address, uses the wrong routing, and may even try to go out an interface that the container can't even access... Bad stuff. This patch copies the mount process's network context into the CIFS structure that stores the rest of the server information for that mount point, and changes the socket open code to use the saved network context instead of the global network context. I.E. "when you attempt to use these addresses, do so relative to THIS set of network interfaces and routing rules, not the old global context from back before we supported containers". The big long HOWTO sets up a test environment on the assumption you've never used ocntainers before. It basically says: 1) configure and build a new kernel that has container support 2) build a new root filesystem that includes the userspace container control package (LXC) 3) package/run them under KVM (so you don't have to mess up your host system in order to play with containers). 4) set up some containers under the KVM system 5) set up contradictory routing in the KVM system and the container so that the host and the container see different things for the same address 6) try to mount a CIFS share from both contexts so you can both force it to work and force it to fail. For a long drawn out test reproduction sequence, see: http://landley.livejournal.com/47024.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47205.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47476.html Signed-off-by: Rob Landley <rlandley@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-01-22 15:44:05 -06:00
[CIFS] Fixing to avoid invalid kfree() in cifs_get_tcp_session() trivial bug in fs/cifs/connect.c . The bug is caused by fail of extract_hostname() when mounting cifs file system. This is the situation when I noticed this bug. % sudo mount -t cifs //192.168.10.208 mountpoint -o options... Then my kernel says, [ 1461.807776] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1461.807781] kernel BUG at mm/slab.c:521! [ 1461.807784] invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP [ 1461.807790] last sysfs file: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:09:02.0/resource [ 1461.807793] CPU 0 [ 1461.807796] Modules linked in: nls_iso8859_1 usbhid sbp2 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd i2c_i801 ohci1394 ieee1394 psmouse serio_raw pcspkr sky2 usbcore evdev [ 1461.807816] Pid: 3446, comm: mount Tainted: G D 2.6.32-rc2-vanilla [ 1461.807820] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810b888e>] [<ffffffff810b888e>] kfree+0x63/0x156 [ 1461.807829] RSP: 0018:ffff8800b4f7fbb8 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 1461.807832] RAX: ffffea00033fff98 RBX: ffff8800afbae7e2 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1461.807836] RDX: ffffea0000000000 RSI: 000000000000005c RDI: ffffffffffffffea [ 1461.807839] RBP: ffff8800b4f7fbf8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1461.807842] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8800b4f7fbf8 R12: 00000000ffffffea [ 1461.807845] R13: ffff8800afb23000 R14: ffff8800b4f87bc0 R15: ffffffffffffffea [ 1461.807849] FS: 00007f52b6f187c0(0000) GS:ffff880007600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1461.807852] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1461.807855] CR2: 0000000000613000 CR3: 00000000af8f9000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 1461.807858] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1461.807861] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1461.807865] Process mount (pid: 3446, threadinfo ffff8800b4f7e000, task ffff8800950e4380) [ 1461.807867] Stack: [ 1461.807869] 0000000000000202 0000000000000282 ffff8800b4f7fbf8 ffff8800afbae7e2 [ 1461.807876] <0> 00000000ffffffea ffff8800afb23000 ffff8800b4f87bc0 ffff8800b4f7fc28 [ 1461.807884] <0> ffff8800b4f7fcd8 ffffffff81159f6d ffffffff81147bc2 ffffffff816bfb48 [ 1461.807892] Call Trace: [ 1461.807899] [<ffffffff81159f6d>] cifs_get_tcp_session+0x440/0x44b [ 1461.807904] [<ffffffff81147bc2>] ? find_nls+0x1c/0xe9 [ 1461.807909] [<ffffffff8115b889>] cifs_mount+0x16bc/0x2167 [ 1461.807917] [<ffffffff814455bd>] ? _spin_unlock+0x30/0x4b [ 1461.807923] [<ffffffff81150da9>] cifs_get_sb+0xa5/0x1a8 [ 1461.807928] [<ffffffff810c1b94>] vfs_kern_mount+0x56/0xc9 [ 1461.807933] [<ffffffff810c1c64>] do_kern_mount+0x47/0xe7 [ 1461.807938] [<ffffffff810d8632>] do_mount+0x712/0x775 [ 1461.807943] [<ffffffff810d671f>] ? copy_mount_options+0xcf/0x132 [ 1461.807948] [<ffffffff810d8714>] sys_mount+0x7f/0xbf [ 1461.807953] [<ffffffff8144509a>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x35/0x67 [ 1461.807960] [<ffffffff81011cc2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 1461.807963] Code: 00 00 00 00 ea ff ff 48 c1 e8 0c 48 6b c0 68 48 01 d0 66 83 38 00 79 04 48 8b 40 10 66 83 38 00 79 04 48 8b 40 10 80 38 00 78 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 4c 8b 70 58 4c 89 ff 41 8b 76 4c e8 b8 49 fb ff e8 [ 1461.808022] RIP [<ffffffff810b888e>] kfree+0x63/0x156 [ 1461.808027] RSP <ffff8800b4f7fbb8> [ 1461.808031] ---[ end trace ffe26fcdc72c0ce4 ]--- The reason of this bug is that the error handling code of cifs_get_tcp_session() calls kfree() when corresponding kmalloc() failed. (The kmalloc() is called by extract_hostname().) Signed-off-by: Hitoshi Mitake <mitake@dcl.info.waseda.ac.jp> CC: Stable <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2009-10-06 18:31:29 +00:00
lockdep: annotate cifs in-kernel sockets Put CIFS sockets in their own class to avoid some lockdep warnings. CIFS sockets are not exposed to user-space, and so are not subject to the same deadlock scenarios. A similar change was made a couple of years ago for RPC sockets in commit ed07536ed6731775219c1df7fa26a7588753e693. This patch should prevent lockdep false-positives like this one: ======================================================= [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 2.6.18-98.el5.jtltest.38.bz456320.1debug #1 ------------------------------------------------------- test5/2483 is trying to acquire lock: (sk_lock-AF_INET){--..}, at: [<ffffffff800270d2>] tcp_sendmsg+0x1c/0xb2f but task is already holding lock: (&inode->i_alloc_sem){--..}, at: [<ffffffff8002e454>] notify_change+0xf5/0x2e0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&inode->i_alloc_sem){--..}: [<ffffffff800a817c>] __lock_acquire+0x9a9/0xadf [<ffffffff800a8a72>] lock_acquire+0x55/0x70 [<ffffffff8002e454>] notify_change+0xf5/0x2e0 [<ffffffff800a4e36>] down_write+0x3c/0x68 [<ffffffff8002e454>] notify_change+0xf5/0x2e0 [<ffffffff800e358d>] do_truncate+0x50/0x6b [<ffffffff8005197c>] get_write_access+0x40/0x46 [<ffffffff80012cf1>] may_open+0x1d3/0x22e [<ffffffff8001bc81>] open_namei+0x2c6/0x6dd [<ffffffff800289c6>] do_filp_open+0x1c/0x38 [<ffffffff800683ef>] _spin_unlock+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff800167a7>] get_unused_fd+0xf9/0x107 [<ffffffff8001a704>] do_sys_open+0x44/0xbe [<ffffffff80060116>] system_call+0x7e/0x83 [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff -> #2 (&sysfs_inode_imutex_key){--..}: [<ffffffff800a817c>] __lock_acquire+0x9a9/0xadf [<ffffffff8010f6df>] create_dir+0x26/0x1d7 [<ffffffff800a8a72>] lock_acquire+0x55/0x70 [<ffffffff8010f6df>] create_dir+0x26/0x1d7 [<ffffffff800671c0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x104/0x29c [<ffffffff800a819d>] __lock_acquire+0x9ca/0xadf [<ffffffff8010f6df>] create_dir+0x26/0x1d7 [<ffffffff8010fc67>] sysfs_create_dir+0x58/0x76 [<ffffffff8015144c>] kobject_add+0xdb/0x198 [<ffffffff801be765>] class_device_add+0xb2/0x465 [<ffffffff8005a6ff>] kobject_get+0x12/0x17 [<ffffffff80225265>] register_netdevice+0x270/0x33e [<ffffffff8022538c>] register_netdev+0x59/0x67 [<ffffffff80464d40>] net_olddevs_init+0xb/0xac [<ffffffff80448a79>] init+0x1f9/0x2fc [<ffffffff80068885>] _spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x27 [<ffffffff80067f86>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x35/0x37 [<ffffffff80061079>] child_rip+0xa/0x11 [<ffffffff80068885>] _spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x27 [<ffffffff800606a8>] restore_args+0x0/0x30 [<ffffffff80179a59>] acpi_ds_init_one_object+0x0/0x80 [<ffffffff80448880>] init+0x0/0x2fc [<ffffffff8006106f>] child_rip+0x0/0x11 [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){--..}: [<ffffffff800a817c>] __lock_acquire+0x9a9/0xadf [<ffffffff8025acf8>] ip_mc_leave_group+0x23/0xb7 [<ffffffff800a8a72>] lock_acquire+0x55/0x70 [<ffffffff8025acf8>] ip_mc_leave_group+0x23/0xb7 [<ffffffff800671c0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x104/0x29c [<ffffffff8025acf8>] ip_mc_leave_group+0x23/0xb7 [<ffffffff802451b0>] do_ip_setsockopt+0x6d1/0x9bf [<ffffffff800a575e>] lock_release_holdtime+0x27/0x48 [<ffffffff800a575e>] lock_release_holdtime+0x27/0x48 [<ffffffff8006a85e>] do_page_fault+0x503/0x835 [<ffffffff8012cbf6>] socket_has_perm+0x5b/0x68 [<ffffffff80245556>] ip_setsockopt+0x22/0x78 [<ffffffff8021c973>] sys_setsockopt+0x91/0xb7 [<ffffffff800602a6>] tracesys+0xd5/0xdf [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){--..}: [<ffffffff800a5037>] print_stack_trace+0x59/0x68 [<ffffffff800a8092>] __lock_acquire+0x8bf/0xadf [<ffffffff800a8a72>] lock_acquire+0x55/0x70 [<ffffffff800270d2>] tcp_sendmsg+0x1c/0xb2f [<ffffffff80035466>] lock_sock+0xd4/0xe4 [<ffffffff80096e91>] _local_bh_enable+0xcb/0xe0 [<ffffffff800606a8>] restore_args+0x0/0x30 [<ffffffff800270d2>] tcp_sendmsg+0x1c/0xb2f [<ffffffff80057540>] sock_sendmsg+0xf3/0x110 [<ffffffff800a2bb6>] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x2e [<ffffffff800a10e4>] kernel_text_address+0x1a/0x26 [<ffffffff8006f4e2>] dump_trace+0x211/0x23a [<ffffffff800a6d3d>] find_usage_backwards+0x5f/0x88 [<ffffffff8840221a>] MD5Final+0xaf/0xc2 [cifs] [<ffffffff884032ec>] cifs_calculate_signature+0x55/0x69 [cifs] [<ffffffff8021d891>] kernel_sendmsg+0x35/0x47 [<ffffffff883ff38e>] smb_send+0xa3/0x151 [cifs] [<ffffffff883ff5de>] SendReceive+0x1a2/0x448 [cifs] [<ffffffff800a812f>] __lock_acquire+0x95c/0xadf [<ffffffff883e758a>] CIFSSMBSetEOF+0x20d/0x25b [cifs] [<ffffffff883fa430>] cifs_set_file_size+0x110/0x3b7 [cifs] [<ffffffff883faa89>] cifs_setattr+0x3b2/0x6f6 [cifs] [<ffffffff8002e454>] notify_change+0xf5/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8002e4a4>] notify_change+0x145/0x2e0 [<ffffffff800e358d>] do_truncate+0x50/0x6b [<ffffffff8005197c>] get_write_access+0x40/0x46 [<ffffffff80012cf1>] may_open+0x1d3/0x22e [<ffffffff8001bc81>] open_namei+0x2c6/0x6dd [<ffffffff800289c6>] do_filp_open+0x1c/0x38 [<ffffffff800683ef>] _spin_unlock+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff800167a7>] get_unused_fd+0xf9/0x107 [<ffffffff8001a704>] do_sys_open+0x44/0xbe [<ffffffff800602a6>] tracesys+0xd5/0xdf [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff other info that might help us debug this: 2 locks held by test5/2483: #0: (&inode->i_mutex){--..}, at: [<ffffffff800e3582>] do_truncate+0x45/0x6b #1: (&inode->i_alloc_sem){--..}, at: [<ffffffff8002e454>] notify_change+0xf5/0x2e0 stack backtrace: Call Trace: [<ffffffff800a6a7b>] print_circular_bug_tail+0x65/0x6e [<ffffffff800a5037>] print_stack_trace+0x59/0x68 [<ffffffff800a8092>] __lock_acquire+0x8bf/0xadf [<ffffffff800a8a72>] lock_acquire+0x55/0x70 [<ffffffff800270d2>] tcp_sendmsg+0x1c/0xb2f [<ffffffff80035466>] lock_sock+0xd4/0xe4 [<ffffffff80096e91>] _local_bh_enable+0xcb/0xe0 [<ffffffff800606a8>] restore_args+0x0/0x30 [<ffffffff800270d2>] tcp_sendmsg+0x1c/0xb2f [<ffffffff80057540>] sock_sendmsg+0xf3/0x110 [<ffffffff800a2bb6>] autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x2e [<ffffffff800a10e4>] kernel_text_address+0x1a/0x26 [<ffffffff8006f4e2>] dump_trace+0x211/0x23a [<ffffffff800a6d3d>] find_usage_backwards+0x5f/0x88 [<ffffffff8840221a>] :cifs:MD5Final+0xaf/0xc2 [<ffffffff884032ec>] :cifs:cifs_calculate_signature+0x55/0x69 [<ffffffff8021d891>] kernel_sendmsg+0x35/0x47 [<ffffffff883ff38e>] :cifs:smb_send+0xa3/0x151 [<ffffffff883ff5de>] :cifs:SendReceive+0x1a2/0x448 [<ffffffff800a812f>] __lock_acquire+0x95c/0xadf [<ffffffff883e758a>] :cifs:CIFSSMBSetEOF+0x20d/0x25b [<ffffffff883fa430>] :cifs:cifs_set_file_size+0x110/0x3b7 [<ffffffff883faa89>] :cifs:cifs_setattr+0x3b2/0x6f6 [<ffffffff8002e454>] notify_change+0xf5/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8002e4a4>] notify_change+0x145/0x2e0 [<ffffffff800e358d>] do_truncate+0x50/0x6b [<ffffffff8005197c>] get_write_access+0x40/0x46 [<ffffffff80012cf1>] may_open+0x1d3/0x22e [<ffffffff8001bc81>] open_namei+0x2c6/0x6dd [<ffffffff800289c6>] do_filp_open+0x1c/0x38 [<ffffffff800683ef>] _spin_unlock+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff800167a7>] get_unused_fd+0xf9/0x107 [<ffffffff8001a704>] do_sys_open+0x44/0xbe [<ffffffff800602a6>] tracesys+0xd5/0xdf Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2008-07-23 10:11:19 -04:00
Elminate sparse __CHECK_ENDIAN__ warnings on port conversion Ports are __be16 not unsigned short int Eliminates the remaining fixable endian warnings: ~/cifs-2.6$ make modules C=1 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ CHECK fs/cifs/connect.c fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin6_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2394:22: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-03-13 18:55:55 +00:00
Make CIFS mount work in a container. Teach cifs about network namespaces, so mounting uses adresses/routing visible from the container rather than from init context. A container is a chroot on steroids that changes more than just the root filesystem the new processes see. One thing containers can isolate is "network namespaces", meaning each container can have its own set of ethernet interfaces, each with its own own IP address and routing to the outside world. And if you open a socket in _userspace_ from processes within such a container, this works fine. But sockets opened from within the kernel still use a single global networking context in a lot of places, meaning the new socket's address and routing are correct for PID 1 on the host, but are _not_ what userspace processes in the container get to use. So when you mount a network filesystem from within in a container, the mount code in the CIFS driver uses the host's networking context and not the container's networking context, so it gets the wrong address, uses the wrong routing, and may even try to go out an interface that the container can't even access... Bad stuff. This patch copies the mount process's network context into the CIFS structure that stores the rest of the server information for that mount point, and changes the socket open code to use the saved network context instead of the global network context. I.E. "when you attempt to use these addresses, do so relative to THIS set of network interfaces and routing rules, not the old global context from back before we supported containers". The big long HOWTO sets up a test environment on the assumption you've never used ocntainers before. It basically says: 1) configure and build a new kernel that has container support 2) build a new root filesystem that includes the userspace container control package (LXC) 3) package/run them under KVM (so you don't have to mess up your host system in order to play with containers). 4) set up some containers under the KVM system 5) set up contradictory routing in the KVM system and the container so that the host and the container see different things for the same address 6) try to mount a CIFS share from both contexts so you can both force it to work and force it to fail. For a long drawn out test reproduction sequence, see: http://landley.livejournal.com/47024.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47205.html http://landley.livejournal.com/47476.html Signed-off-by: Rob Landley <rlandley@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-01-22 15:44:05 -06:00
cifs: set socket send and receive timeouts before attempting connect Benjamin S. reported that he was unable to suspend his machine while it had a cifs share mounted. The freezer caused this to spew when he tried it: -----------------------[snip]------------------ PM: Syncing filesystems ... done. Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.01 seconds) done. Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... Freezing of tasks failed after 20.01 seconds (1 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0): cifsd S ffff880127f7b1b0 0 1821 2 0x00800000 ffff880127f7b1b0 0000000000000046 ffff88005fe008a8 ffff8800ffffffff ffff880127cee6b0 0000000000011100 ffff880127737fd8 0000000000004000 ffff880127737fd8 0000000000011100 ffff880127f7b1b0 ffff880127736010 Call Trace: [<ffffffff811e85dd>] ? sk_reset_timer+0xf/0x19 [<ffffffff8122cf3f>] ? tcp_connect+0x43c/0x445 [<ffffffff8123374e>] ? tcp_v4_connect+0x40d/0x47f [<ffffffff8126ce41>] ? schedule_timeout+0x21/0x1ad [<ffffffff8126e358>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x9/0x1f [<ffffffff811e81c7>] ? release_sock+0x19/0xef [<ffffffff8123e8be>] ? inet_stream_connect+0x14c/0x24a [<ffffffff8104485b>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x2a [<ffffffffa02ccfe2>] ? ipv4_connect+0x39c/0x3b5 [cifs] [<ffffffffa02cd7b7>] ? cifs_reconnect+0x1fc/0x28a [cifs] [<ffffffffa02cdbdc>] ? cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x397/0xb9f [cifs] [<ffffffff81076afc>] ? perf_event_exit_task+0xb9/0x1bf [<ffffffffa02cd845>] ? cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x0/0xb9f [cifs] [<ffffffffa02cd845>] ? cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x0/0xb9f [cifs] [<ffffffff810444a1>] ? kthread+0x7a/0x82 [<ffffffff81002d14>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff81044427>] ? kthread+0x0/0x82 [<ffffffff81002d10>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x0/0x10 Restarting tasks ... done. -----------------------[snip]------------------ We do attempt to perform a try_to_freeze in cifs_reconnect, but the connection attempt itself seems to be taking longer than 20s to time out. The connect timeout is governed by the socket send and receive timeouts, so we can shorten that period by setting those timeouts before attempting the connect instead of after. Adam Williamson tested the patch and said that it seems to have fixed suspending on his laptop when a cifs share is mounted. Reported-by: Benjamin S <da_joind@gmx.net> Tested-by: Adam Williamson <awilliam@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-21 07:18:26 -04:00
Elminate sparse __CHECK_ENDIAN__ warnings on port conversion Ports are __be16 not unsigned short int Eliminates the remaining fixable endian warnings: ~/cifs-2.6$ make modules C=1 M=fs/cifs CF=-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ CHECK fs/cifs/connect.c fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2408:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: expected unsigned short *sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2410:23: got restricted __be16 *<noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2416:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: expected unsigned short [unsigned] [short] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2423:24: got restricted __be16 [usertype] <noident> fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2326:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin6_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: expected unsigned short [unsigned] sport fs/cifs/connect.c:2330:23: got restricted __be16 [usertype] sin_port fs/cifs/connect.c:2394:22: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-03-13 18:55:55 +00:00
cifs: don't allow cifs_reconnect to exit with NULL socket pointer It's possible for the following set of events to happen: cifsd calls cifs_reconnect which reconnects the socket. A userspace process then calls cifs_negotiate_protocol to handle the NEGOTIATE and gets a reply. But, while processing the reply, cifsd calls cifs_reconnect again. Eventually the GlobalMid_Lock is dropped and the reply from the earlier NEGOTIATE completes and the tcpStatus is set to CifsGood. cifs_reconnect then goes through and closes the socket and sets the pointer to zero, but because the status is now CifsGood, the new socket is not created and cifs_reconnect exits with the socket pointer set to NULL. Fix this by only setting the tcpStatus to CifsGood if the tcpStatus is CifsNeedNegotiate, and by making sure that generic_ip_connect is always called at least once in cifs_reconnect. Note that this is not a perfect fix for this issue. It's still possible that the NEGOTIATE reply is handled after the socket has been closed and reconnected. In that case, the socket state will look correct but it no NEGOTIATE was performed on it be for the wrong socket. In that situation though the server should just shut down the socket on the next attempted send, rather than causing the oops that occurs today. Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # .38.x: fd88ce9: [CIFS] cifs: clarify the meaning of tcpStatus == CifsGood Reported-and-Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-10 16:14:57 -04:00