linux/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt

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38 KiB

documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec_load For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set. With this change, it is still possible to load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack of image) can't be altered. The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect" enforcement is hard. Without a verified boot, along with verified modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation. In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios: 1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based verification of kexec images. 2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images. 3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it. 4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all. 1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has landed. 4 is the state of things now. The gap between 2 and 4 is too large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2 and 1 are not possible for a system. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-23 15:55:59 -08:00
kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict sysctl. The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers, specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl. If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user (intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG (currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's. If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects "(nil)". [akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning] Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-12 16:59:41 -08:00
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
kernel: add panic_on_warn There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-10 15:45:50 -08:00
rcu: sysctl: Panic on RCU Stall It is not always easy to determine the cause of an RCU stall just by analysing the RCU stall messages, mainly when the problem is caused by the indirect starvation of rcu threads. For example, when preempt_rcu is not awakened due to the starvation of a timer softirq. We have been hard coding panic() in the RCU stall functions for some time while testing the kernel-rt. But this is not possible in some scenarios, like when supporting customers. This patch implements the sysctl kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall. If set to 1, the system will panic() when an RCU stall takes place, enabling the capture of a vmcore. The vmcore provides a way to analyze all kernel/tasks states, helping out to point to the culprit and the solution for the stall. The kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall sysctl is disabled by default. Changes from v1: - Fixed a typo in the git log - The if(sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall) panic() is in a static function - Fixed the CONFIG_TINY_RCU compilation issue - The var sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall is now __read_mostly Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Tested-by: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-02 13:51:41 -03:00
perf core: Allow setting up max frame stack depth via sysctl The default remains 127, which is good for most cases, and not even hit most of the time, but then for some cases, as reported by Brendan, 1024+ deep frames are appearing on the radar for things like groovy, ruby. And in some workloads putting a _lower_ cap on this may make sense. One that is per event still needs to be put in place tho. The new file is: # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack 127 Chaging it: # echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack 256 But as soon as there is some event using callchains we get: # echo 512 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack -bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy # Because we only allocate the callchain percpu data structures when there is a user, which allows for changing the max easily, its just a matter of having no callchain users at that point. Reported-and-Tested-by: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160426002928.GB16708@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-04-21 12:28:50 -03:00
perf core: Separate accounting of contexts and real addresses in a stack trace The perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr value includes all the entries in the ip_callchain->ip[] array, real addresses and PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc}, while what the user expects is that what is in the kernel.perf_event_max_stack sysctl or in the upcoming per event perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob be honoured in terms of IP addresses in the stack trace. So allocate a bunch of extra entries for contexts, and do the accounting via perf_callchain_entry_ctx struct members. A new sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack is also introduced for investigating possible bugs in the callchain implementation by some arch. Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-3b4wnqk340c4sg4gwkfdi9yk@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-05-12 13:06:21 -03:00
ipc: introduce shm_rmid_forced sysctl Add support for the shm_rmid_forced sysctl. If set to 1, all shared memory objects in current ipc namespace will be automatically forced to use IPC_RMID. The POSIX way of handling shmem allows one to create shm objects and call shmdt(), leaving shm object associated with no process, thus consuming memory not counted via rlimits. With shm_rmid_forced=1 the shared memory object is counted at least for one process, so OOM killer may effectively kill the fat process holding the shared memory. It obviously breaks POSIX - some programs relying on the feature would stop working. So set shm_rmid_forced=1 only if you're sure nobody uses "orphaned" memory. Use shm_rmid_forced=0 by default for compatability reasons. The feature was previously impemented in -ow as a configure option. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix documentation, per Randy] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: readability/conventionality tweaks] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix shm_rmid_forced/shm_forced_rmid confusion, use standard comment layout] Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-26 16:08:48 -07:00
kernel/watchdog.c: print traces for all cpus on lockup detection A 'softlockup' is defined as a bug that causes the kernel to loop in kernel mode for more than a predefined period to time, without giving other tasks a chance to run. Currently, upon detection of this condition by the per-cpu watchdog task, debug information (including a stack trace) is sent to the system log. On some occasions, we have observed that the "victim" rather than the actual "culprit" (i.e. the owner/holder of the contended resource) is reported to the user. Often this information has proven to be insufficient to assist debugging efforts. To avoid loss of useful debug information, for architectures which support NMI, this patch makes it possible to improve soft lockup reporting. This is accomplished by issuing an NMI to each cpu to obtain a stack trace. If NMI is not supported we just revert back to the old method. A sysctl and boot-time parameter is available to toggle this feature. [dzickus@redhat.com: add CONFIG_SMP in certain areas] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional CONFIG_SMP=n optimisations] [mq@suse.cz: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Moskyto Matejka <mq@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-23 13:22:05 -07:00
watchdog: enable the new user interface of the watchdog mechanism With the current user interface of the watchdog mechanism it is only possible to disable or enable both lockup detectors at the same time. This series introduces new kernel parameters and changes the semantics of some existing kernel parameters, so that the hard lockup detector and the soft lockup detector can be disabled or enabled individually. With this series applied, the user interface is as follows. - parameters in /proc/sys/kernel . soft_watchdog This is a new parameter to control and examine the run state of the soft lockup detector. . nmi_watchdog The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to control and examine the run state of the hard lockup detector. . watchdog This parameter is still available to control the run state of both lockup detectors at the same time. If this parameter is examined, it shows the logical OR of soft_watchdog and nmi_watchdog. . watchdog_thresh The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. - kernel command line parameters . nosoftlockup The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to disable the soft lockup detector at boot time. . nmi_watchdog=0 or nmi_watchdog=1 Disable or enable the hard lockup detector at boot time. The patch introduces '=1' as a new option. . nowatchdog The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. It is still available to disable both lockup detectors at boot time. Also, remove the proc_dowatchdog() function which is no longer needed. [dzickus@redhat.com: wrote changelog] [dzickus@redhat.com: update documentation for kernel params and sysctl] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position, begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the first: open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1 write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096 write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9 close(1) = 0 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe /bin/true Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would not append to the sysctl. The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools. This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to 1 enables the file position respecting behavior. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-06 14:37:19 -07:00
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
watchdog: enable the new user interface of the watchdog mechanism With the current user interface of the watchdog mechanism it is only possible to disable or enable both lockup detectors at the same time. This series introduces new kernel parameters and changes the semantics of some existing kernel parameters, so that the hard lockup detector and the soft lockup detector can be disabled or enabled individually. With this series applied, the user interface is as follows. - parameters in /proc/sys/kernel . soft_watchdog This is a new parameter to control and examine the run state of the soft lockup detector. . nmi_watchdog The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to control and examine the run state of the hard lockup detector. . watchdog This parameter is still available to control the run state of both lockup detectors at the same time. If this parameter is examined, it shows the logical OR of soft_watchdog and nmi_watchdog. . watchdog_thresh The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. - kernel command line parameters . nosoftlockup The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to disable the soft lockup detector at boot time. . nmi_watchdog=0 or nmi_watchdog=1 Disable or enable the hard lockup detector at boot time. The patch introduces '=1' as a new option. . nowatchdog The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. It is still available to disable both lockup detectors at boot time. Also, remove the proc_dowatchdog() function which is no longer needed. [dzickus@redhat.com: wrote changelog] [dzickus@redhat.com: update documentation for kernel params and sysctl] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
coredump: add %i/%I in core_pattern to report the tid of the crashed thread format_corename() can only pass the leader's pid to the core handler, but there is no simple way to figure out which thread originated the coredump. As Jan explains, this also means that there is no simple way to create the backtrace of the crashed process: As programs are mostly compiled with implicit gcc -fomit-frame-pointer one needs program's .eh_frame section (equivalently PT_GNU_EH_FRAME segment) or .debug_frame section. .debug_frame usually is present only in separate debug info files usually not even installed on the system. While .eh_frame is a part of the executable/library (and it is even always mapped for C++ exceptions unwinding) it no longer has to be present anywhere on the disk as the program could be upgraded in the meantime and the running instance has its executable file already unlinked from disk. One possibility is to echo 0x3f >/proc/*/coredump_filter and dump all the file-backed memory including the executable's .eh_frame section. But that can create huge core files, for example even due to mmapped data files. Other possibility would be to read .eh_frame from /proc/PID/mem at the core_pattern handler time of the core dump. For the backtrace one needs to read the register state first which can be done from core_pattern handler: ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, tid, 0, PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT) close(0); // close pipe fd to resume the sleeping dumper waitpid(); // should report EXIT PTRACE_GETREGS or other requests The remaining problem is how to get the 'tid' value of the crashed thread. It could be read from the first NT_PRSTATUS note of the core file but that makes the core_pattern handler complicated. Unfortunately %t is already used so this patch uses %i/%I. Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (https://github.com/abrt/abrt/wiki/overview) is experimenting with this. It is using the elfutils (https://fedorahosted.org/elfutils/) unwinder for generating the backtraces. Apart from not needing matching executables as mentioned above, another advantage is that we can get the backtrace without saving the core (which might be quite large) to disk. [mmilata@redhat.com: final paragraph of changelog] Signed-off-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Wielaard <mjw@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Milata <mmilata@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-13 15:53:35 -07:00
kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec_load For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set. With this change, it is still possible to load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack of image) can't be altered. The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect" enforcement is hard. Without a verified boot, along with verified modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation. In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios: 1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based verification of kexec images. 2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images. 3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it. 4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all. 1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has landed. 4 is the state of things now. The gap between 2 and 4 is too large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2 and 1 are not possible for a system. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-23 15:55:59 -08:00
kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict sysctl. The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers, specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl. If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user (intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG (currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's. If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects "(nil)". [akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning] Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-12 16:59:41 -08:00
vsprintf: check real user/group id for %pK Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time, but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be leaked. This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu 12.04: $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms 00000000 T startup_32 $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000' This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other setuid binaries may leak more information. Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process having CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids. If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses %pK then the pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user is unprivileged. Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also correct the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default. This is a only temporary solution to the issue. The correct solution is to do the permission check at open() time on files, and to replace %pK with a function which checks the open() time permission. %pK uses in printk should be removed since no sane permission check can be done, and instead protected by using dmesg_restrict. Signed-off-by: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-11-12 15:08:51 -08:00
vsprintf: check real user/group id for %pK Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time, but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be leaked. This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu 12.04: $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms 00000000 T startup_32 $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000' This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other setuid binaries may leak more information. Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process having CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids. If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses %pK then the pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user is unprivileged. Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also correct the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default. This is a only temporary solution to the issue. The correct solution is to do the permission check at open() time on files, and to replace %pK with a function which checks the open() time permission. %pK uses in printk should be removed since no sane permission check can be done, and instead protected by using dmesg_restrict. Signed-off-by: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-11-12 15:08:51 -08:00
kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users Add the %pK printk format specifier and the /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict sysctl. The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers, specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl. If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user (intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG (currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's. If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects "(nil)". [akpm@linux-foundation.org: check for IRQ context when !kptr_restrict, save an indent level, s/WARN/WARN_ONCE/] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixup] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix kernel/sysctl.c warning] Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-01-12 16:59:41 -08:00
kexec: add sysctl to disable kexec_load For general-purpose (i.e. distro) kernel builds it makes sense to build with CONFIG_KEXEC to allow end users to choose what kind of things they want to do with kexec. However, in the face of trying to lock down a system with such a kernel, there needs to be a way to disable kexec_load (much like module loading can be disabled). Without this, it is too easy for the root user to modify kernel memory even when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM and modules_disabled are set. With this change, it is still possible to load an image for use later, then disable kexec_load so the image (or lack of image) can't be altered. The intention is for using this in environments where "perfect" enforcement is hard. Without a verified boot, along with verified modules, and along with verified kexec, this is trying to give a system a better chance to defend itself (or at least grow the window of discoverability) against attack in the face of a privilege escalation. In my mind, I consider several boot scenarios: 1) Verified boot of read-only verified root fs loading fd-based verification of kexec images. 2) Secure boot of writable root fs loading signed kexec images. 3) Regular boot loading kexec (e.g. kcrash) image early and locking it. 4) Regular boot with no control of kexec image at all. 1 and 2 don't exist yet, but will soon once the verified kexec series has landed. 4 is the state of things now. The gap between 2 and 4 is too large, so this change creates scenario 3, a middle-ground above 4 when 2 and 1 are not possible for a system. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-23 15:55:59 -08:00
watchdog: enable the new user interface of the watchdog mechanism With the current user interface of the watchdog mechanism it is only possible to disable or enable both lockup detectors at the same time. This series introduces new kernel parameters and changes the semantics of some existing kernel parameters, so that the hard lockup detector and the soft lockup detector can be disabled or enabled individually. With this series applied, the user interface is as follows. - parameters in /proc/sys/kernel . soft_watchdog This is a new parameter to control and examine the run state of the soft lockup detector. . nmi_watchdog The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to control and examine the run state of the hard lockup detector. . watchdog This parameter is still available to control the run state of both lockup detectors at the same time. If this parameter is examined, it shows the logical OR of soft_watchdog and nmi_watchdog. . watchdog_thresh The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. - kernel command line parameters . nosoftlockup The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to disable the soft lockup detector at boot time. . nmi_watchdog=0 or nmi_watchdog=1 Disable or enable the hard lockup detector at boot time. The patch introduces '=1' as a new option. . nowatchdog The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. It is still available to disable both lockup detectors at boot time. Also, remove the proc_dowatchdog() function which is no longer needed. [dzickus@redhat.com: wrote changelog] [dzickus@redhat.com: update documentation for kernel params and sysctl] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
watchdog: enable the new user interface of the watchdog mechanism With the current user interface of the watchdog mechanism it is only possible to disable or enable both lockup detectors at the same time. This series introduces new kernel parameters and changes the semantics of some existing kernel parameters, so that the hard lockup detector and the soft lockup detector can be disabled or enabled individually. With this series applied, the user interface is as follows. - parameters in /proc/sys/kernel . soft_watchdog This is a new parameter to control and examine the run state of the soft lockup detector. . nmi_watchdog The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to control and examine the run state of the hard lockup detector. . watchdog This parameter is still available to control the run state of both lockup detectors at the same time. If this parameter is examined, it shows the logical OR of soft_watchdog and nmi_watchdog. . watchdog_thresh The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. - kernel command line parameters . nosoftlockup The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to disable the soft lockup detector at boot time. . nmi_watchdog=0 or nmi_watchdog=1 Disable or enable the hard lockup detector at boot time. The patch introduces '=1' as a new option. . nowatchdog The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. It is still available to disable both lockup detectors at boot time. Also, remove the proc_dowatchdog() function which is no longer needed. [dzickus@redhat.com: wrote changelog] [dzickus@redhat.com: update documentation for kernel params and sysctl] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
sched/numa: Set the scan rate proportional to the memory usage of the task being scanned The NUMA PTE scan rate is controlled with a combination of the numa_balancing_scan_period_min, numa_balancing_scan_period_max and numa_balancing_scan_size. This scan rate is independent of the size of the task and as an aside it is further complicated by the fact that numa_balancing_scan_size controls how many pages are marked pte_numa and not how much virtual memory is scanned. In combination, it is almost impossible to meaningfully tune the min and max scan periods and reasoning about performance is complex when the time to complete a full scan is is partially a function of the tasks memory size. This patch alters the semantic of the min and max tunables to be about tuning the length time it takes to complete a scan of a tasks occupied virtual address space. Conceptually this is a lot easier to understand. There is a "sanity" check to ensure the scan rate is never extremely fast based on the amount of virtual memory that should be scanned in a second. The default of 2.5G seems arbitrary but it is to have the maximum scan rate after the patch roughly match the maximum scan rate before the patch was applied. On a similar note, numa_scan_period is in milliseconds and not jiffies. Properly placed pages slow the scanning rate but adding 10 jiffies to numa_scan_period means that the rate scanning slows depends on HZ which is confusing. Get rid of the jiffies_to_msec conversion and treat it as ms. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381141781-10992-18-git-send-email-mgorman@suse.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-10-07 11:28:55 +01:00
sched/numa: Set the scan rate proportional to the memory usage of the task being scanned The NUMA PTE scan rate is controlled with a combination of the numa_balancing_scan_period_min, numa_balancing_scan_period_max and numa_balancing_scan_size. This scan rate is independent of the size of the task and as an aside it is further complicated by the fact that numa_balancing_scan_size controls how many pages are marked pte_numa and not how much virtual memory is scanned. In combination, it is almost impossible to meaningfully tune the min and max scan periods and reasoning about performance is complex when the time to complete a full scan is is partially a function of the tasks memory size. This patch alters the semantic of the min and max tunables to be about tuning the length time it takes to complete a scan of a tasks occupied virtual address space. Conceptually this is a lot easier to understand. There is a "sanity" check to ensure the scan rate is never extremely fast based on the amount of virtual memory that should be scanned in a second. The default of 2.5G seems arbitrary but it is to have the maximum scan rate after the patch roughly match the maximum scan rate before the patch was applied. On a similar note, numa_scan_period is in milliseconds and not jiffies. Properly placed pages slow the scanning rate but adding 10 jiffies to numa_scan_period means that the rate scanning slows depends on HZ which is confusing. Get rid of the jiffies_to_msec conversion and treat it as ms. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381141781-10992-18-git-send-email-mgorman@suse.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-10-07 11:28:55 +01:00
kernel: add panic_on_warn There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash dump from a system. Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to the user. A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a panic. This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote debugging. This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the warn_slowpath_common() path. The function will still print out the location of the warning. An example of the panic_on_warn output: The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s location. After that the panic() output is displayed. WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]() Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W OE 3.17.0+ #57 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013 0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190 0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df Call Trace: [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58 [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module] [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210 [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110 [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30 [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180 [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0 [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Successfully tested by me. hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either functionally or security-wise. Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-10 15:45:50 -08:00
rcu: sysctl: Panic on RCU Stall It is not always easy to determine the cause of an RCU stall just by analysing the RCU stall messages, mainly when the problem is caused by the indirect starvation of rcu threads. For example, when preempt_rcu is not awakened due to the starvation of a timer softirq. We have been hard coding panic() in the RCU stall functions for some time while testing the kernel-rt. But this is not possible in some scenarios, like when supporting customers. This patch implements the sysctl kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall. If set to 1, the system will panic() when an RCU stall takes place, enabling the capture of a vmcore. The vmcore provides a way to analyze all kernel/tasks states, helping out to point to the culprit and the solution for the stall. The kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall sysctl is disabled by default. Changes from v1: - Fixed a typo in the git log - The if(sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall) panic() is in a static function - Fixed the CONFIG_TINY_RCU compilation issue - The var sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall is now __read_mostly Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Tested-by: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-06-02 13:51:41 -03:00
perf core: Allow setting up max frame stack depth via sysctl The default remains 127, which is good for most cases, and not even hit most of the time, but then for some cases, as reported by Brendan, 1024+ deep frames are appearing on the radar for things like groovy, ruby. And in some workloads putting a _lower_ cap on this may make sense. One that is per event still needs to be put in place tho. The new file is: # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack 127 Chaging it: # echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack 256 But as soon as there is some event using callchains we get: # echo 512 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack -bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy # Because we only allocate the callchain percpu data structures when there is a user, which allows for changing the max easily, its just a matter of having no callchain users at that point. Reported-and-Tested-by: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160426002928.GB16708@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-04-21 12:28:50 -03:00
perf core: Separate accounting of contexts and real addresses in a stack trace The perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr value includes all the entries in the ip_callchain->ip[] array, real addresses and PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc}, while what the user expects is that what is in the kernel.perf_event_max_stack sysctl or in the upcoming per event perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob be honoured in terms of IP addresses in the stack trace. So allocate a bunch of extra entries for contexts, and do the accounting via perf_callchain_entry_ctx struct members. A new sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack is also introduced for investigating possible bugs in the callchain implementation by some arch. Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-3b4wnqk340c4sg4gwkfdi9yk@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-05-12 13:06:21 -03:00
printk: add kernel parameter to control writes to /dev/kmsg Add a "printk.devkmsg" kernel command line parameter which controls how userspace writes into /dev/kmsg. It has three options: * ratelimit - ratelimit logging from userspace. * on - unlimited logging from userspace * off - logging from userspace gets ignored The default setting is to ratelimit the messages written to it. This changes the kernel default setting of "on" to "ratelimit" and we do that because we want to keep userspace spamming /dev/kmsg to sane levels. This is especially moot when a small kernel log buffer wraps around and messages get lost. So the ratelimiting setting should be a sane setting where kernel messages should have a bit higher chance of survival from all the spamming. It additionally does not limit logging to /dev/kmsg while the system is booting if we haven't disabled it on the command line. Furthermore, we can control the logging from a lower priority sysctl interface - kernel.printk_devkmsg. That interface will succeed only if printk.devkmsg *hasn't* been supplied on the command line. If it has, then printk.devkmsg is a one-time setting which remains for the duration of the system lifetime. This "locking" of the setting is to prevent userspace from changing the logging on us through sysctl(2). This patch is based on previous patches from Linus and Steven. [bp@suse.de: fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160719072344.GC25563@nazgul.tnic Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160716061745.15795-3-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Franck Bui <fbui@suse.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-02 14:04:07 -07:00
sched/debug: Make schedstats a runtime tunable that is disabled by default schedstats is very useful during debugging and performance tuning but it incurs overhead to calculate the stats. As such, even though it can be disabled at build time, it is often enabled as the information is useful. This patch adds a kernel command-line and sysctl tunable to enable or disable schedstats on demand (when it's built in). It is disabled by default as someone who knows they need it can also learn to enable it when necessary. The benefits are dependent on how scheduler-intensive the workload is. If it is then the patch reduces the number of cycles spent calculating the stats with a small benefit from reducing the cache footprint of the scheduler. These measurements were taken from a 48-core 2-socket machine with Xeon(R) E5-2670 v3 cpus although they were also tested on a single socket machine 8-core machine with Intel i7-3770 processors. netperf-tcp 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Hmean 64 560.45 ( 0.00%) 575.98 ( 2.77%) Hmean 128 766.66 ( 0.00%) 795.79 ( 3.80%) Hmean 256 950.51 ( 0.00%) 981.50 ( 3.26%) Hmean 1024 1433.25 ( 0.00%) 1466.51 ( 2.32%) Hmean 2048 2810.54 ( 0.00%) 2879.75 ( 2.46%) Hmean 3312 4618.18 ( 0.00%) 4682.09 ( 1.38%) Hmean 4096 5306.42 ( 0.00%) 5346.39 ( 0.75%) Hmean 8192 10581.44 ( 0.00%) 10698.15 ( 1.10%) Hmean 16384 18857.70 ( 0.00%) 18937.61 ( 0.42%) Small gains here, UDP_STREAM showed nothing intresting and neither did the TCP_RR tests. The gains on the 8-core machine were very similar. tbench4 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Hmean mb/sec-1 500.85 ( 0.00%) 522.43 ( 4.31%) Hmean mb/sec-2 984.66 ( 0.00%) 1018.19 ( 3.41%) Hmean mb/sec-4 1827.91 ( 0.00%) 1847.78 ( 1.09%) Hmean mb/sec-8 3561.36 ( 0.00%) 3611.28 ( 1.40%) Hmean mb/sec-16 5824.52 ( 0.00%) 5929.03 ( 1.79%) Hmean mb/sec-32 10943.10 ( 0.00%) 10802.83 ( -1.28%) Hmean mb/sec-64 15950.81 ( 0.00%) 16211.31 ( 1.63%) Hmean mb/sec-128 15302.17 ( 0.00%) 15445.11 ( 0.93%) Hmean mb/sec-256 14866.18 ( 0.00%) 15088.73 ( 1.50%) Hmean mb/sec-512 15223.31 ( 0.00%) 15373.69 ( 0.99%) Hmean mb/sec-1024 14574.25 ( 0.00%) 14598.02 ( 0.16%) Hmean mb/sec-2048 13569.02 ( 0.00%) 13733.86 ( 1.21%) Hmean mb/sec-3072 12865.98 ( 0.00%) 13209.23 ( 2.67%) Small gains of 2-4% at low thread counts and otherwise flat. The gains on the 8-core machine were slightly different tbench4 on 8-core i7-3770 single socket machine Hmean mb/sec-1 442.59 ( 0.00%) 448.73 ( 1.39%) Hmean mb/sec-2 796.68 ( 0.00%) 794.39 ( -0.29%) Hmean mb/sec-4 1322.52 ( 0.00%) 1343.66 ( 1.60%) Hmean mb/sec-8 2611.65 ( 0.00%) 2694.86 ( 3.19%) Hmean mb/sec-16 2537.07 ( 0.00%) 2609.34 ( 2.85%) Hmean mb/sec-32 2506.02 ( 0.00%) 2578.18 ( 2.88%) Hmean mb/sec-64 2511.06 ( 0.00%) 2569.16 ( 2.31%) Hmean mb/sec-128 2313.38 ( 0.00%) 2395.50 ( 3.55%) Hmean mb/sec-256 2110.04 ( 0.00%) 2177.45 ( 3.19%) Hmean mb/sec-512 2072.51 ( 0.00%) 2053.97 ( -0.89%) In constract, this shows a relatively steady 2-3% gain at higher thread counts. Due to the nature of the patch and the type of workload, it's not a surprise that the result will depend on the CPU used. hackbench-pipes 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Amean 1 0.0637 ( 0.00%) 0.0660 ( -3.59%) Amean 4 0.1229 ( 0.00%) 0.1181 ( 3.84%) Amean 7 0.1921 ( 0.00%) 0.1911 ( 0.52%) Amean 12 0.3117 ( 0.00%) 0.2923 ( 6.23%) Amean 21 0.4050 ( 0.00%) 0.3899 ( 3.74%) Amean 30 0.4586 ( 0.00%) 0.4433 ( 3.33%) Amean 48 0.5910 ( 0.00%) 0.5694 ( 3.65%) Amean 79 0.8663 ( 0.00%) 0.8626 ( 0.43%) Amean 110 1.1543 ( 0.00%) 1.1517 ( 0.22%) Amean 141 1.4457 ( 0.00%) 1.4290 ( 1.16%) Amean 172 1.7090 ( 0.00%) 1.6924 ( 0.97%) Amean 192 1.9126 ( 0.00%) 1.9089 ( 0.19%) Some small gains and losses and while the variance data is not included, it's close to the noise. The UMA machine did not show anything particularly different pipetest 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v2r2 Min Time 4.13 ( 0.00%) 3.99 ( 3.39%) 1st-qrtle Time 4.38 ( 0.00%) 4.27 ( 2.51%) 2nd-qrtle Time 4.46 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.57%) 3rd-qrtle Time 4.56 ( 0.00%) 4.51 ( 1.10%) Max-90% Time 4.67 ( 0.00%) 4.60 ( 1.50%) Max-93% Time 4.71 ( 0.00%) 4.65 ( 1.27%) Max-95% Time 4.74 ( 0.00%) 4.71 ( 0.63%) Max-99% Time 4.88 ( 0.00%) 4.79 ( 1.84%) Max Time 4.93 ( 0.00%) 4.83 ( 2.03%) Mean Time 4.48 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.91%) Best99%Mean Time 4.47 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.91%) Best95%Mean Time 4.46 ( 0.00%) 4.38 ( 1.93%) Best90%Mean Time 4.45 ( 0.00%) 4.36 ( 1.98%) Best50%Mean Time 4.36 ( 0.00%) 4.25 ( 2.49%) Best10%Mean Time 4.23 ( 0.00%) 4.10 ( 3.13%) Best5%Mean Time 4.19 ( 0.00%) 4.06 ( 3.20%) Best1%Mean Time 4.13 ( 0.00%) 4.00 ( 3.39%) Small improvement and similar gains were seen on the UMA machine. The gain is small but it stands to reason that doing less work in the scheduler is a good thing. The downside is that the lack of schedstats and tracepoints may be surprising to experts doing performance analysis until they find the existence of the schedstats= parameter or schedstats sysctl. It will be automatically activated for latencytop and sleep profiling to alleviate the problem. For tracepoints, there is a simple warning as it's not safe to activate schedstats in the context when it's known the tracepoint may be wanted but is unavailable. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454663316-22048-1-git-send-email-mgorman@techsingularity.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-05 09:08:36 +00:00
ipc: introduce shm_rmid_forced sysctl Add support for the shm_rmid_forced sysctl. If set to 1, all shared memory objects in current ipc namespace will be automatically forced to use IPC_RMID. The POSIX way of handling shmem allows one to create shm objects and call shmdt(), leaving shm object associated with no process, thus consuming memory not counted via rlimits. With shm_rmid_forced=1 the shared memory object is counted at least for one process, so OOM killer may effectively kill the fat process holding the shared memory. It obviously breaks POSIX - some programs relying on the feature would stop working. So set shm_rmid_forced=1 only if you're sure nobody uses "orphaned" memory. Use shm_rmid_forced=0 by default for compatability reasons. The feature was previously impemented in -ow as a configure option. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix documentation, per Randy] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: readability/conventionality tweaks] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix shm_rmid_forced/shm_forced_rmid confusion, use standard comment layout] Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-07-26 16:08:48 -07:00
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position, begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the first: open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1 write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096 write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9 close(1) = 0 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe /bin/true Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would not append to the sysctl. The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools. This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to 1 enables the file position respecting behavior. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-06 14:37:19 -07:00
sysctl: allow for strict write position handling When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position, begins writing the string from the start. This means the contents of the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the first: open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY) = 1 write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096 write(1, "/bin/true", 9) = 9 close(1) = 0 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe /bin/true Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the contents of the second write. Similarly, multiple short writes would not append to the sysctl. The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or dangerous situations. For example, "as long as the input starts with a trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools. This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done when reading from non-zero file positions). For now, the default (0) is to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy behavior. Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to 1 enables the file position respecting behavior. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-06 14:37:19 -07:00
kernel/watchdog.c: print traces for all cpus on lockup detection A 'softlockup' is defined as a bug that causes the kernel to loop in kernel mode for more than a predefined period to time, without giving other tasks a chance to run. Currently, upon detection of this condition by the per-cpu watchdog task, debug information (including a stack trace) is sent to the system log. On some occasions, we have observed that the "victim" rather than the actual "culprit" (i.e. the owner/holder of the contended resource) is reported to the user. Often this information has proven to be insufficient to assist debugging efforts. To avoid loss of useful debug information, for architectures which support NMI, this patch makes it possible to improve soft lockup reporting. This is accomplished by issuing an NMI to each cpu to obtain a stack trace. If NMI is not supported we just revert back to the old method. A sysctl and boot-time parameter is available to toggle this feature. [dzickus@redhat.com: add CONFIG_SMP in certain areas] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional CONFIG_SMP=n optimisations] [mq@suse.cz: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Moskyto Matejka <mq@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-23 13:22:05 -07:00
watchdog: enable the new user interface of the watchdog mechanism With the current user interface of the watchdog mechanism it is only possible to disable or enable both lockup detectors at the same time. This series introduces new kernel parameters and changes the semantics of some existing kernel parameters, so that the hard lockup detector and the soft lockup detector can be disabled or enabled individually. With this series applied, the user interface is as follows. - parameters in /proc/sys/kernel . soft_watchdog This is a new parameter to control and examine the run state of the soft lockup detector. . nmi_watchdog The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to control and examine the run state of the hard lockup detector. . watchdog This parameter is still available to control the run state of both lockup detectors at the same time. If this parameter is examined, it shows the logical OR of soft_watchdog and nmi_watchdog. . watchdog_thresh The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. - kernel command line parameters . nosoftlockup The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to disable the soft lockup detector at boot time. . nmi_watchdog=0 or nmi_watchdog=1 Disable or enable the hard lockup detector at boot time. The patch introduces '=1' as a new option. . nowatchdog The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. It is still available to disable both lockup detectors at boot time. Also, remove the proc_dowatchdog() function which is no longer needed. [dzickus@redhat.com: wrote changelog] [dzickus@redhat.com: update documentation for kernel params and sysctl] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature. This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y. Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules. With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module. Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt). Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2014-03-13 12:11:30 +10:30
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-02 16:57:20 -07:00
watchdog: enable the new user interface of the watchdog mechanism With the current user interface of the watchdog mechanism it is only possible to disable or enable both lockup detectors at the same time. This series introduces new kernel parameters and changes the semantics of some existing kernel parameters, so that the hard lockup detector and the soft lockup detector can be disabled or enabled individually. With this series applied, the user interface is as follows. - parameters in /proc/sys/kernel . soft_watchdog This is a new parameter to control and examine the run state of the soft lockup detector. . nmi_watchdog The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to control and examine the run state of the hard lockup detector. . watchdog This parameter is still available to control the run state of both lockup detectors at the same time. If this parameter is examined, it shows the logical OR of soft_watchdog and nmi_watchdog. . watchdog_thresh The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. - kernel command line parameters . nosoftlockup The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to disable the soft lockup detector at boot time. . nmi_watchdog=0 or nmi_watchdog=1 Disable or enable the hard lockup detector at boot time. The patch introduces '=1' as a new option. . nowatchdog The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. It is still available to disable both lockup detectors at boot time. Also, remove the proc_dowatchdog() function which is no longer needed. [dzickus@redhat.com: wrote changelog] [dzickus@redhat.com: update documentation for kernel params and sysctl] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-14 15:44:13 -07:00
watchdog: add watchdog_cpumask sysctl to assist nohz Change the default behavior of watchdog so it only runs on the housekeeping cores when nohz_full is enabled at build and boot time. Allow modifying the set of cores the watchdog is currently running on with a new kernel.watchdog_cpumask sysctl. In the current system, the watchdog subsystem runs a periodic timer that schedules the watchdog kthread to run. However, nohz_full cores are designed to allow userspace application code running on those cores to have 100% access to the CPU. So the watchdog system prevents the nohz_full application code from being able to run the way it wants to, thus the motivation to suppress the watchdog on nohz_full cores, which this patchset provides by default. However, if we disable the watchdog globally, then the housekeeping cores can't benefit from the watchdog functionality. So we allow disabling it only on some cores. See Documentation/lockup-watchdogs.txt for more information. [jhubbard@nvidia.com: fix a watchdog crash in some configurations] Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-24 16:55:45 -07:00