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Makefile.kcsan
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kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) is a dynamic data-race detector for kernel space. KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based data-race detector. See the included Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst for more details. This patch adds basic infrastructure, but does not yet enable KCSAN for any architecture. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
2019-11-14 19:02:54 +01:00
kcsan: Avoid inserting __tsan_func_entry/exit if possible To avoid inserting __tsan_func_{entry,exit}, add option if supported by compiler. Currently only Clang can be told to not emit calls to these functions. It is safe to not emit these, since KCSAN does not rely on them. Note that, if we disable __tsan_func_{entry,exit}(), we need to disable tail-call optimization in sanitized compilation units, as otherwise we may skip frames in the stack trace; in particular when the tail called function is one of the KCSAN's runtime functions, and a report is generated, we might miss the function where the actual access occurred. Since __tsan_func_{entry,exit}() insertion effectively disabled tail-call optimization, there should be no observable change. This was caught and confirmed with kcsan-test & UNWINDER_ORC. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521142047.169334-3-elver@google.com
2020-05-21 16:20:38 +02:00
kcsan: Re-add GCC as a supported compiler GCC version 11 recently implemented all requirements to correctly support KCSAN: 1. Correct no_sanitize-attribute inlining behaviour: https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=4089df8ef4a63126b0774c39b6638845244c20d2 2. --param=tsan-distinguish-volatile https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=ab2789ec507a94f1a75a6534bca51c7b39037ce0 3. --param=tsan-instrument-func-entry-exit https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=06712fc68dc9843d9af7c7ac10047f49d305ad76 Therefore, we can re-enable GCC for KCSAN, and document the new compiler requirements. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Martin Liska <mliska@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
2020-06-18 11:31:16 +02:00
kcsan: Avoid inserting __tsan_func_entry/exit if possible To avoid inserting __tsan_func_{entry,exit}, add option if supported by compiler. Currently only Clang can be told to not emit calls to these functions. It is safe to not emit these, since KCSAN does not rely on them. Note that, if we disable __tsan_func_{entry,exit}(), we need to disable tail-call optimization in sanitized compilation units, as otherwise we may skip frames in the stack trace; in particular when the tail called function is one of the KCSAN's runtime functions, and a report is generated, we might miss the function where the actual access occurred. Since __tsan_func_{entry,exit}() insertion effectively disabled tail-call optimization, there should be no observable change. This was caught and confirmed with kcsan-test & UNWINDER_ORC. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521142047.169334-3-elver@google.com
2020-05-21 16:20:38 +02:00
kcsan: Support distinguishing volatile accesses In the kernel, the "volatile" keyword is used in various concurrent contexts, whether in low-level synchronization primitives or for legacy reasons. If supported by the compiler, it will be assumed that aligned volatile accesses up to sizeof(long long) (matching compiletime_assert_rwonce_type()) are atomic. Recent versions of Clang [1] (GCC tentative [2]) can instrument volatile accesses differently. Add the option (required) to enable the instrumentation, and provide the necessary runtime functions. None of the updated compilers are widely available yet (Clang 11 will be the first release to support the feature). [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/5a2c31116f412c3b6888be361137efd705e05814 [2] https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-patches/2020-April/544452.html This change allows removing of any explicit checks in primitives such as READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE(). [ bp: Massage commit message a bit. ] Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521142047.169334-4-elver@google.com
2020-05-21 16:20:39 +02:00
kbuild: move CFLAGS_{KASAN,UBSAN,KCSAN} exports to relevant Makefiles Move CFLAGS_KASAN*, CFLAGS_UBSAN, CFLAGS_KCSAN to Makefile.kasan, Makefile.ubsan, Makefile.kcsan, respectively. This commit also avoids the same -fsanitize=* flags being added to CFLAGS_UBSAN multiple times. Prior to this commit, the ubsan flags were appended by the '+=' operator, without any initialization. Some build targets such as 'make bindeb-pkg' recurses to the top Makefile, and ended up with adding the same flags to CFLAGS_UBSAN twice. Clear CFLAGS_UBSAN with ':=' to make it a simply expanded variable. This is better than a recursively expanded variable, which evaluates $(call cc-option, ...) multiple times before Kbuild starts descending to subdirectories. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
2020-09-10 22:44:29 +09:00
kcsan: Support distinguishing volatile accesses In the kernel, the "volatile" keyword is used in various concurrent contexts, whether in low-level synchronization primitives or for legacy reasons. If supported by the compiler, it will be assumed that aligned volatile accesses up to sizeof(long long) (matching compiletime_assert_rwonce_type()) are atomic. Recent versions of Clang [1] (GCC tentative [2]) can instrument volatile accesses differently. Add the option (required) to enable the instrumentation, and provide the necessary runtime functions. None of the updated compilers are widely available yet (Clang 11 will be the first release to support the feature). [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/5a2c31116f412c3b6888be361137efd705e05814 [2] https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-patches/2020-April/544452.html This change allows removing of any explicit checks in primitives such as READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE(). [ bp: Massage commit message a bit. ] Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521142047.169334-4-elver@google.com
2020-05-21 16:20:39 +02:00
kcsan: Support compounded read-write instrumentation Add support for compounded read-write instrumentation if supported by the compiler. Adds the necessary instrumentation functions, and a new type which is used to generate a more descriptive report. Furthermore, such compounded memory access instrumentation is excluded from the "assume aligned writes up to word size are atomic" rule, because we cannot assume that the compiler emits code that is atomic for compound ops. LLVM/Clang added support for the feature in: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/785d41a261d136b64ab6c15c5d35f2adc5ad53e3 The new instrumentation is emitted for sets of memory accesses in the same basic block to the same address with at least one read appearing before a write. These typically result from compound operations such as ++, --, +=, -=, |=, &=, etc. but also equivalent forms such as "var = var + 1". Where the compiler determines that it is equivalent to emit a call to a single __tsan_read_write instead of separate __tsan_read and __tsan_write, we can then benefit from improved performance and better reporting for such access patterns. The new reports now show that the ops are both reads and writes, for example: read-write to 0xffffffff90548a38 of 8 bytes by task 143 on cpu 3: test_kernel_rmw_array+0x45/0xa0 access_thread+0x71/0xb0 kthread+0x21e/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 read-write to 0xffffffff90548a38 of 8 bytes by task 144 on cpu 2: test_kernel_rmw_array+0x45/0xa0 access_thread+0x71/0xb0 kthread+0x21e/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
2020-07-24 09:00:01 +02:00
kcsan: Support distinguishing volatile accesses In the kernel, the "volatile" keyword is used in various concurrent contexts, whether in low-level synchronization primitives or for legacy reasons. If supported by the compiler, it will be assumed that aligned volatile accesses up to sizeof(long long) (matching compiletime_assert_rwonce_type()) are atomic. Recent versions of Clang [1] (GCC tentative [2]) can instrument volatile accesses differently. Add the option (required) to enable the instrumentation, and provide the necessary runtime functions. None of the updated compilers are widely available yet (Clang 11 will be the first release to support the feature). [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/5a2c31116f412c3b6888be361137efd705e05814 [2] https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-patches/2020-April/544452.html This change allows removing of any explicit checks in primitives such as READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE(). [ bp: Massage commit message a bit. ] Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521142047.169334-4-elver@google.com
2020-05-21 16:20:39 +02:00