linux/net/dccp/input.c

738 lines
22 KiB

include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 17:04:11 +09:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Honour and make use of shutdown option set by user This extends the DCCP socket API by honouring any shutdown(2) option set by the user. The behaviour is, as much as possible, made consistent with the API for TCP's shutdown. This patch exploits the information provided by the user via the socket API to reduce processing costs: * if the read end is closed (SHUT_RD), it is not necessary to deliver to input CCID; * if the write end is closed (SHUT_WR), the same idea applies, but with a difference - as long as the TX queue has not been drained, we need to receive feedback to keep congestion-control rates up to date. Hence SHUT_WR is honoured only after the last packet (under congestion control) has been sent; * although SHUT_RDWR seems nonsensical, it is nevertheless supported in the same manner as for TCP (and agrees with test for SHUTDOWN_MASK in dccp_poll() in net/dccp/proto.c). Furthermore, most of the code already honours the sk_shutdown flags (dccp_recvmsg() for instance sets the read length to 0 if SHUT_RD had been called); CCID handling is now added to this by the present patch. There will also no longer be any delivery when the socket is in the final stages, i.e. when one of dccp_close(), dccp_fin(), or dccp_done() has been called - which is fine since at that stage the connection is its final stages. Motivation and background are on http://www.erg.abdn.ac.uk/users/gerrit/dccp/notes/shutdown A FIXME has been added to notify the other end if SHUT_RD has been set (RFC 4340, 11.7). Note: There is a comment in inet_shutdown() in net/ipv4/af_inet.c which asks to "make sure the socket is a TCP socket". This should probably be extended to mean `TCP or DCCP socket' (the code is also used by UDP and raw sockets). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Ian McDonald <ian.mcdonald@jandi.co.nz> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-21 09:56:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Honour and make use of shutdown option set by user This extends the DCCP socket API by honouring any shutdown(2) option set by the user. The behaviour is, as much as possible, made consistent with the API for TCP's shutdown. This patch exploits the information provided by the user via the socket API to reduce processing costs: * if the read end is closed (SHUT_RD), it is not necessary to deliver to input CCID; * if the write end is closed (SHUT_WR), the same idea applies, but with a difference - as long as the TX queue has not been drained, we need to receive feedback to keep congestion-control rates up to date. Hence SHUT_WR is honoured only after the last packet (under congestion control) has been sent; * although SHUT_RDWR seems nonsensical, it is nevertheless supported in the same manner as for TCP (and agrees with test for SHUTDOWN_MASK in dccp_poll() in net/dccp/proto.c). Furthermore, most of the code already honours the sk_shutdown flags (dccp_recvmsg() for instance sets the read length to 0 if SHUT_RD had been called); CCID handling is now added to this by the present patch. There will also no longer be any delivery when the socket is in the final stages, i.e. when one of dccp_close(), dccp_fin(), or dccp_done() has been called - which is fine since at that stage the connection is its final stages. Motivation and background are on http://www.erg.abdn.ac.uk/users/gerrit/dccp/notes/shutdown A FIXME has been added to notify the other end if SHUT_RD has been set (RFC 4340, 11.7). Note: There is a comment in inet_shutdown() in net/ipv4/af_inet.c which asks to "make sure the socket is a TCP socket". This should probably be extended to mean `TCP or DCCP socket' (the code is also used by UDP and raw sockets). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Ian McDonald <ian.mcdonald@jandi.co.nz> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-21 09:56:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Honour and make use of shutdown option set by user This extends the DCCP socket API by honouring any shutdown(2) option set by the user. The behaviour is, as much as possible, made consistent with the API for TCP's shutdown. This patch exploits the information provided by the user via the socket API to reduce processing costs: * if the read end is closed (SHUT_RD), it is not necessary to deliver to input CCID; * if the write end is closed (SHUT_WR), the same idea applies, but with a difference - as long as the TX queue has not been drained, we need to receive feedback to keep congestion-control rates up to date. Hence SHUT_WR is honoured only after the last packet (under congestion control) has been sent; * although SHUT_RDWR seems nonsensical, it is nevertheless supported in the same manner as for TCP (and agrees with test for SHUTDOWN_MASK in dccp_poll() in net/dccp/proto.c). Furthermore, most of the code already honours the sk_shutdown flags (dccp_recvmsg() for instance sets the read length to 0 if SHUT_RD had been called); CCID handling is now added to this by the present patch. There will also no longer be any delivery when the socket is in the final stages, i.e. when one of dccp_close(), dccp_fin(), or dccp_done() has been called - which is fine since at that stage the connection is its final stages. Motivation and background are on http://www.erg.abdn.ac.uk/users/gerrit/dccp/notes/shutdown A FIXME has been added to notify the other end if SHUT_RD has been set (RFC 4340, 11.7). Note: There is a comment in inet_shutdown() in net/ipv4/af_inet.c which asks to "make sure the socket is a TCP socket". This should probably be extended to mean `TCP or DCCP socket' (the code is also used by UDP and raw sockets). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Ian McDonald <ian.mcdonald@jandi.co.nz> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-21 09:56:48 -02:00
tcp/dccp: block BH for SYN processing SYN processing really was meant to be handled from BH. When I got rid of BH blocking while processing socket backlog in commit 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog"), I forgot that a malicious user could transition to TCP_LISTEN from a state that allowed (SYN) packets to be parked in the socket backlog while socket is owned by the thread doing the listen() call. Sure enough syzkaller found this and reported the bug ;) ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.10.0+ #60 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. syz-executor0/5090 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2923 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xbcf/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 tcp_conn_request+0x25cc/0x3310 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6399 tcp_v4_conn_request+0x157/0x220 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1262 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x802/0x4130 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5889 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x56b/0x940 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1433 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e12/0x3210 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1711 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4ce/0xc40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1ce/0x710 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:492 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0xb1d/0x2110 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_rcv+0xd90/0x19c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ad1/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4179 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4217 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1d6/0x430 net/core/dev.c:4245 napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:4602 [inline] napi_gro_receive+0x4e6/0x680 net/core/dev.c:4636 e1000_receive_skb drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4033 [inline] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x5e0/0x1490 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4489 e1000_clean+0xb9a/0x2910 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3834 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5171 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5236 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x19e/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:658 [inline] do_IRQ+0x81/0x1a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:250 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x20 native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:53 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:98 [inline] default_idle+0x8f/0x410 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:271 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:262 default_idle_call+0x36/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:96 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline] do_idle+0x348/0x440 kernel/sched/idle.c:243 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:345 start_secondary+0x344/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:272 verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc irq event stamp: 1741 hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xf7/0x1a0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:191 hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa2/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 softirqs last enabled at (1738): [<ffffffff84d4deff>] __do_softirq+0x7cf/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:310 softirqs last disabled at (1571): [<ffffffff84d4b92c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor0/5090: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] sock_setsockopt+0x233/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:683 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 print_usage_bug+0x3ef/0x450 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2387 valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2400 [inline] mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2602 [inline] mark_lock+0xf30/0x1410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3065 mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2941 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x6dc/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 dccp_v6_conn_request+0xada/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:380 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1660 net/dccp/input.c:606 dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:896 [inline] __release_sock+0x127/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2052 release_sock+0xa5/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2539 sock_setsockopt+0x60f/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:1016 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1782 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x3a0 net/socket.c:1765 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x4458b9 RSP: 002b:00007fe8b26c2b58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00000000004458b9 RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00000000006e2110 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000208c3000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000708000 R13: 0000000020000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-01 08:39:49 -08:00
tcp/dccp: block BH for SYN processing SYN processing really was meant to be handled from BH. When I got rid of BH blocking while processing socket backlog in commit 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog"), I forgot that a malicious user could transition to TCP_LISTEN from a state that allowed (SYN) packets to be parked in the socket backlog while socket is owned by the thread doing the listen() call. Sure enough syzkaller found this and reported the bug ;) ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.10.0+ #60 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. syz-executor0/5090 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2923 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xbcf/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 tcp_conn_request+0x25cc/0x3310 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6399 tcp_v4_conn_request+0x157/0x220 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1262 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x802/0x4130 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5889 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x56b/0x940 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1433 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e12/0x3210 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1711 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4ce/0xc40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1ce/0x710 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:492 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0xb1d/0x2110 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_rcv+0xd90/0x19c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ad1/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4179 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4217 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1d6/0x430 net/core/dev.c:4245 napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:4602 [inline] napi_gro_receive+0x4e6/0x680 net/core/dev.c:4636 e1000_receive_skb drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4033 [inline] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x5e0/0x1490 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4489 e1000_clean+0xb9a/0x2910 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3834 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5171 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5236 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x19e/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:658 [inline] do_IRQ+0x81/0x1a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:250 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x20 native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:53 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:98 [inline] default_idle+0x8f/0x410 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:271 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:262 default_idle_call+0x36/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:96 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline] do_idle+0x348/0x440 kernel/sched/idle.c:243 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:345 start_secondary+0x344/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:272 verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc irq event stamp: 1741 hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xf7/0x1a0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:191 hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa2/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 softirqs last enabled at (1738): [<ffffffff84d4deff>] __do_softirq+0x7cf/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:310 softirqs last disabled at (1571): [<ffffffff84d4b92c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor0/5090: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] sock_setsockopt+0x233/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:683 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 print_usage_bug+0x3ef/0x450 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2387 valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2400 [inline] mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2602 [inline] mark_lock+0xf30/0x1410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3065 mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2941 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x6dc/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 dccp_v6_conn_request+0xada/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:380 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1660 net/dccp/input.c:606 dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:896 [inline] __release_sock+0x127/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2052 release_sock+0xa5/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2539 sock_setsockopt+0x60f/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:1016 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1782 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x3a0 net/socket.c:1765 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x4458b9 RSP: 002b:00007fe8b26c2b58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00000000004458b9 RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00000000006e2110 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000208c3000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000708000 R13: 0000000020000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-01 08:39:49 -08:00
tcp/dccp: block BH for SYN processing SYN processing really was meant to be handled from BH. When I got rid of BH blocking while processing socket backlog in commit 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog"), I forgot that a malicious user could transition to TCP_LISTEN from a state that allowed (SYN) packets to be parked in the socket backlog while socket is owned by the thread doing the listen() call. Sure enough syzkaller found this and reported the bug ;) ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.10.0+ #60 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. syz-executor0/5090 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2923 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xbcf/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 tcp_conn_request+0x25cc/0x3310 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6399 tcp_v4_conn_request+0x157/0x220 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1262 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x802/0x4130 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5889 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x56b/0x940 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1433 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e12/0x3210 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1711 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4ce/0xc40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1ce/0x710 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:492 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0xb1d/0x2110 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_rcv+0xd90/0x19c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ad1/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4179 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4217 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1d6/0x430 net/core/dev.c:4245 napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:4602 [inline] napi_gro_receive+0x4e6/0x680 net/core/dev.c:4636 e1000_receive_skb drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4033 [inline] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x5e0/0x1490 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4489 e1000_clean+0xb9a/0x2910 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3834 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5171 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5236 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x19e/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:658 [inline] do_IRQ+0x81/0x1a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:250 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x20 native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:53 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:98 [inline] default_idle+0x8f/0x410 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:271 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:262 default_idle_call+0x36/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:96 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline] do_idle+0x348/0x440 kernel/sched/idle.c:243 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:345 start_secondary+0x344/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:272 verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc irq event stamp: 1741 hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xf7/0x1a0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:191 hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa2/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 softirqs last enabled at (1738): [<ffffffff84d4deff>] __do_softirq+0x7cf/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:310 softirqs last disabled at (1571): [<ffffffff84d4b92c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor0/5090: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] sock_setsockopt+0x233/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:683 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 print_usage_bug+0x3ef/0x450 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2387 valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2400 [inline] mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2602 [inline] mark_lock+0xf30/0x1410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3065 mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2941 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x6dc/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 dccp_v6_conn_request+0xada/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:380 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1660 net/dccp/input.c:606 dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:896 [inline] __release_sock+0x127/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2052 release_sock+0xa5/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2539 sock_setsockopt+0x60f/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:1016 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1782 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x3a0 net/socket.c:1765 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x4458b9 RSP: 002b:00007fe8b26c2b58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00000000004458b9 RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00000000006e2110 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000208c3000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000708000 R13: 0000000020000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-01 08:39:49 -08:00
tcp/dccp: block BH for SYN processing SYN processing really was meant to be handled from BH. When I got rid of BH blocking while processing socket backlog in commit 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog"), I forgot that a malicious user could transition to TCP_LISTEN from a state that allowed (SYN) packets to be parked in the socket backlog while socket is owned by the thread doing the listen() call. Sure enough syzkaller found this and reported the bug ;) ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.10.0+ #60 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. syz-executor0/5090 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2923 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xbcf/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 tcp_conn_request+0x25cc/0x3310 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6399 tcp_v4_conn_request+0x157/0x220 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1262 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x802/0x4130 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5889 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x56b/0x940 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1433 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e12/0x3210 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1711 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4ce/0xc40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1ce/0x710 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:492 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0xb1d/0x2110 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_rcv+0xd90/0x19c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ad1/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4179 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4217 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1d6/0x430 net/core/dev.c:4245 napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:4602 [inline] napi_gro_receive+0x4e6/0x680 net/core/dev.c:4636 e1000_receive_skb drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4033 [inline] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x5e0/0x1490 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4489 e1000_clean+0xb9a/0x2910 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3834 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5171 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5236 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x19e/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:658 [inline] do_IRQ+0x81/0x1a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:250 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x20 native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:53 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:98 [inline] default_idle+0x8f/0x410 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:271 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:262 default_idle_call+0x36/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:96 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline] do_idle+0x348/0x440 kernel/sched/idle.c:243 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:345 start_secondary+0x344/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:272 verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc irq event stamp: 1741 hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xf7/0x1a0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:191 hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa2/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 softirqs last enabled at (1738): [<ffffffff84d4deff>] __do_softirq+0x7cf/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:310 softirqs last disabled at (1571): [<ffffffff84d4b92c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor0/5090: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] sock_setsockopt+0x233/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:683 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 print_usage_bug+0x3ef/0x450 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2387 valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2400 [inline] mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2602 [inline] mark_lock+0xf30/0x1410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3065 mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2941 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x6dc/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 dccp_v6_conn_request+0xada/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:380 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1660 net/dccp/input.c:606 dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:896 [inline] __release_sock+0x127/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2052 release_sock+0xa5/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2539 sock_setsockopt+0x60f/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:1016 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1782 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x3a0 net/socket.c:1765 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x4458b9 RSP: 002b:00007fe8b26c2b58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00000000004458b9 RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00000000006e2110 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000208c3000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000708000 R13: 0000000020000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-01 08:39:49 -08:00
tcp/dccp: block BH for SYN processing SYN processing really was meant to be handled from BH. When I got rid of BH blocking while processing socket backlog in commit 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog"), I forgot that a malicious user could transition to TCP_LISTEN from a state that allowed (SYN) packets to be parked in the socket backlog while socket is owned by the thread doing the listen() call. Sure enough syzkaller found this and reported the bug ;) ================================= [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.10.0+ #60 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. syz-executor0/5090 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff83a6a370>] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2923 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xbcf/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 tcp_conn_request+0x25cc/0x3310 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6399 tcp_v4_conn_request+0x157/0x220 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1262 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x802/0x4130 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5889 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x56b/0x940 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1433 tcp_v4_rcv+0x2e12/0x3210 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1711 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4ce/0xc40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x1ce/0x710 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:492 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0xb1d/0x2110 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline] ip_rcv+0xd90/0x19c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:487 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ad1/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4179 __netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4217 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x1d6/0x430 net/core/dev.c:4245 napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:4602 [inline] napi_gro_receive+0x4e6/0x680 net/core/dev.c:4636 e1000_receive_skb drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4033 [inline] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x5e0/0x1490 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:4489 e1000_clean+0xb9a/0x2910 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3834 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5171 [inline] net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5236 __do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x19e/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:658 [inline] do_IRQ+0x81/0x1a0 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:250 ret_from_intr+0x0/0x20 native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:53 arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:98 [inline] default_idle+0x8f/0x410 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:271 arch_cpu_idle+0xa/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:262 default_idle_call+0x36/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:96 cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline] do_idle+0x348/0x440 kernel/sched/idle.c:243 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:345 start_secondary+0x344/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:272 verify_cpu+0x0/0xfc irq event stamp: 1741 hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (1741): [<ffffffff84d49d77>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xf7/0x1a0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:191 hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (1740): [<ffffffff84d4a732>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xa2/0x110 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 softirqs last enabled at (1738): [<ffffffff84d4deff>] __do_softirq+0x7cf/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:310 softirqs last disabled at (1571): [<ffffffff84d4b92c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&hashinfo->ehash_locks[i])->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor0/5090: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83406b43>] sock_setsockopt+0x233/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:683 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 print_usage_bug+0x3ef/0x450 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2387 valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2400 [inline] mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2602 [inline] mark_lock+0xf30/0x1410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3065 mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2941 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x6dc/0x3270 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 lock_acquire+0x241/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] inet_ehash_insert+0x240/0xad0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:407 reqsk_queue_hash_req net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:753 [inline] inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add+0x1b7/0x2a0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:764 dccp_v6_conn_request+0xada/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:380 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1660 net/dccp/input.c:606 dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:896 [inline] __release_sock+0x127/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2052 release_sock+0xa5/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2539 sock_setsockopt+0x60f/0x1e40 net/core/sock.c:1016 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1782 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x3a0 net/socket.c:1765 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x4458b9 RSP: 002b:00007fe8b26c2b58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00000000004458b9 RDX: 000000000000001a RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00000000006e2110 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000208c3000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000708000 R13: 0000000020000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 5413d1babe8f ("net: do not block BH while processing socket backlog") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-01 08:39:49 -08:00
dccp: fix oops on Reset after close This fixes a bug in the order of dccp_rcv_state_process() that still permitted reception even after closing the socket. A Reset after close thus causes a NULL pointer dereference by not preventing operations on an already torn-down socket. dccp_v4_do_rcv() | | state other than OPEN v dccp_rcv_state_process() | | DCCP_PKT_RESET v dccp_rcv_reset() | v dccp_time_wait() WARNING: at net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:141 __inet_twsk_hashdance+0x48/0x128() Modules linked in: arc4 ecb carl9170 rt2870sta(C) mac80211 r8712u(C) crc_ccitt ah [<c0038850>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xec) from [<c0055364>] (warn_slowpath_common) [<c0055364>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x4c/0x64) from [<c0055398>] (warn_slowpath_n) [<c0055398>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x1c/0x24) from [<c02b72d0>] (__inet_twsk_hashd) [<c02b72d0>] (__inet_twsk_hashdance+0x48/0x128) from [<c031caa0>] (dccp_time_wai) [<c031caa0>] (dccp_time_wait+0x40/0xc8) from [<c031c15c>] (dccp_rcv_state_proces) [<c031c15c>] (dccp_rcv_state_process+0x120/0x538) from [<c032609c>] (dccp_v4_do_) [<c032609c>] (dccp_v4_do_rcv+0x11c/0x14c) from [<c0286594>] (release_sock+0xac/0) [<c0286594>] (release_sock+0xac/0x110) from [<c031fd34>] (dccp_close+0x28c/0x380) [<c031fd34>] (dccp_close+0x28c/0x380) from [<c02d9a78>] (inet_release+0x64/0x70) The fix is by testing the socket state first. Receiving a packet in Closed state now also produces the required "No connection" Reset reply of RFC 4340, 8.3.1. Reported-and-tested-by: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-01 23:02:07 -08:00
dccp: Clean up slow-path input processing This patch rearranges the order of statements of the slow-path input processing (i.e. any other state than OPEN), to resolve the following issues. 1. Dependencies: the order of statements now better matches RFC 4340, 8.5, i.e. step 7 is before step 9 (previously 9 was before 7), and parsing options in step 8 (which can consume resources) now comes after step 7. 2. Bug-fix: in state CLOSED, there should not be any sequence number checking or option processing. This is why the test for CLOSED has been moved after the test for LISTEN. 3. As before sequence number checks are omitted if in state LISTEN/REQUEST, due to the note underneath the table in RFC 4340, 7.5.3. 4. Packets are now passed on to Ack Vector / CCID processing only after - step 7 (receive unexpected packets), - step 9 (receive Reset), - step 13 (receive CloseReq), - step 14 (receive Close) and only if the state is PARTOPEN. This simplifies CCID processing: - in LISTEN/CLOSED the CCIDs are non-existent; - in RESPOND/REQUEST the CCIDs have not yet been negotiated; - in CLOSEREQ and active-CLOSING the node has already closed this socket; - in passive-CLOSING the client is waiting for its Reset. In the last case, RFC 4340, 8.3 leaves it open to ignore further incoming data, which is the approach taken here. As a result of (3), CCID processing is now indeed confined to OPEN/PARTOPEN states, i.e. congestion control is performed only on the flow of data packets. This avoids pathological cases of doing congestion control on those messages which set up and terminate the connection. I have done a few checks to see if this creates a problem in other parts of the code. This seems not to be the case; even if there were one, it would be better to fix it than to perform congestion control on Close/Request/Response messages. Similarly for Ack Vectors (as they depend on the negotiated CCID). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
2008-09-04 07:30:19 +02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00
[DCCP]: Integrate state transitions for passive-close This adds the necessary state transitions for the two forms of passive-close * PASSIVE_CLOSE - which is entered when a host receives a Close; * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ - which is entered when a client receives a CloseReq. Here is a detailed account of what the patch does in each state. 1) Receiving CloseReq The pseudo-code in 8.5 says: Step 13: Process CloseReq If P.type == CloseReq and S.state < CLOSEREQ, Generate Close S.state := CLOSING Set CLOSING timer. This means we need to address what to do in CLOSED, LISTEN, REQUEST, RESPOND, PARTOPEN, and OPEN. * CLOSED: silently ignore - it may be a late or duplicate CloseReq; * LISTEN/RESPOND: will not appear, since Step 7 is performed first (we know we are the client); * REQUEST: perform Step 13 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ so that the application has a chance to process unread data. When already in PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ, no second CloseReq is enqueued. In any other state, the CloseReq is ignored. I think that this offers some robustness against rare and pathological cases: e.g. a simultaneous close where the client sends a Close and the server a CloseReq. The client will then be retransmitting its Close until it gets the Reset, so ignoring the CloseReq while in state CLOSING is sane. 2) Receiving Close The code below from 8.5 is unconditional. Step 14: Process Close If P.type == Close, Generate Reset(Closed) Tear down connection Drop packet and return Thus we need to consider all states: * CLOSED: silently ignore, since this can happen when a retransmitted or late Close arrives; * LISTEN: dccp_rcv_state_process() will generate a Reset ("No Connection"); * REQUEST: perform Step 14 directly (no need to enqueue packet); * RESPOND: dccp_check_req() will generate a Reset ("Packet Error") -- left it at that; * OPEN/PARTOPEN: enter PASSIVE_CLOSE so that application has a chance to process unread data; * CLOSEREQ: server performed active-close -- perform Step 14; * CLOSING: simultaneous-close: use a tie-breaker to avoid message ping-pong (see comment); * PASSIVE_CLOSEREQ: ignore - the peer has a bug (sending first a CloseReq and now a Close); * TIMEWAIT: packet is ignored. Note that the condition of receiving a packet in state CLOSED here is different from the condition "there is no socket for such a connection": the socket still exists, but its state indicates it is unusable. Last, dccp_finish_passive_close sets either DCCP_CLOSED or DCCP_CLOSING = TCP_CLOSING, so that sk_stream_wait_close() will wait for the final Reset (which will trigger CLOSING => CLOSED). Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-11-28 11:59:48 -02:00