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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-27 08:55:01 +02:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:52 +03:00
lsm: move the program execution hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:06:51 -05:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering decisions are being made. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10 17:18:25 -07:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
[PATCH] move capable() to capability.h - Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h; - Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used (in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/, mm/, security/, & sound/; many more drivers/ to go) Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-11 12:17:46 -08:00
Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry. There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-05-22 12:50:34 -04:00
security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file. This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig. The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using. Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h (for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each instance for the presence of either and replace as needed. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-12-09 15:36:29 -05:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface. Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-02 10:38:15 -07:00
LSM: Split security.h The security.h header file serves two purposes, interfaces for users of the security modules and interfaces for security modules. Users of the security modules don't need to know about what's in the security_operations structure, so pull it out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.h Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:10:46 -07:00
security: trim security.h Trim security.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-02-13 03:58:52 +00:00
take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 17:11:23 -04:00
security: Fix nommu build. The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-07-02 14:34:11 +09:00
LSM: Enable multiple calls to security_add_hooks() for the same LSM The commit d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") extend security_add_hooks() with a new parameter to register the LSM name, which may be useful to make the list of currently loaded LSM available to userspace. However, there is no clean way for an LSM to split its hook declarations into multiple files, which may reduce the mess with all the included files (needed for LSM hook argument types) and make the source code easier to review and maintain. This change allows an LSM to register multiple times its hook while keeping a consistent list of LSM names as described in Documentation/security/LSM.txt . The list reflects the order in which checks are made. This patch only check for the last registered LSM. If an LSM register multiple times its hooks, interleaved with other LSM registrations (which should not happen), its name will still appear in the same order that the hooks are called, hence multiple times. To sum up, "capability,selinux,foo,foo" will be replaced with "capability,selinux,foo", however "capability,foo,selinux,foo" will remain as is. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-05-10 22:48:48 +02:00
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public evm.h header to evm_main.c. Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not executed for private inodes. Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:10 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
lsm: fix integer overflow in lsm_set_self_attr() syscall security_setselfattr() has an integer overflow bug that leads to out-of-bounds access when userspace provides bogus input: `lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx)` is checked against `lctx->len` (and, redundantly, also against `size`), but there are no checks on `lctx->ctx_len`. Therefore, userspace can provide an `lsm_ctx` with `->ctx_len` set to a value between `-sizeof(struct lsm_ctx)` and -1, and this bogus `->ctx_len` will then be passed to an LSM module as a buffer length, causing LSM modules to perform out-of-bounds accesses. The following reproducer will demonstrate this under ASAN (if AppArmor is loaded as an LSM): ``` struct lsm_ctx { uint64_t id; uint64_t flags; uint64_t len; uint64_t ctx_len; char ctx[]; }; int main(void) { size_t size = sizeof(struct lsm_ctx); struct lsm_ctx *ctx = malloc(size); ctx->id = 104/*LSM_ID_APPARMOR*/; ctx->flags = 0; ctx->len = size; ctx->ctx_len = -sizeof(struct lsm_ctx); syscall( 460/*__NR_lsm_set_self_attr*/, /*attr=*/ 100/*LSM_ATTR_CURRENT*/, /*ctx=*/ ctx, /*size=*/ size, /*flags=*/ 0 ); } ``` Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subj tweak, removed ref to ASAN splat that isn't included] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-14 17:05:38 +01:00
security: trim security.h Trim security.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-02-13 03:58:52 +00:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table. This will be used later for attribute reporting. Determine the number of possible security modules based on their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be known at build time. This allows data structures and tables to use the constant. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:47 -07:00
ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like 'integrity'). Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM, and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were hardcoded. Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(), which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm(). Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always executed to mark files as new, as before the move. A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod, inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub and kernel-internal tmpfs files. Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:08 +01:00
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public evm.h header to evm_main.c. Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not executed for private inodes. Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:10 +01:00
LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table. This will be used later for attribute reporting. Determine the number of possible security modules based on their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be known at build time. This allows data structures and tables to use the constant. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:47 -07:00
security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions. The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module is disabled. Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another. Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value. Sample AVC audit output from denials: avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd" lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp" lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-11-27 12:04:36 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions. The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module is disabled. Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another. Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value. Sample AVC audit output from denials: avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd" lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp" lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-11-27 12:04:36 -05:00
powerpc/pseries: block untrusted device tree changes when locked down The /proc/powerpc/ofdt interface allows the root user to freely alter the in-kernel device tree, enabling arbitrary physical address writes via drivers that could bind to malicious device nodes, thus making it possible to disable lockdown. Historically this interface has been used on the pseries platform to facilitate the runtime addition and removal of processor, memory, and device resources (aka Dynamic Logical Partitioning or DLPAR). Years ago, the processor and memory use cases were migrated to designs that happen to be lockdown-friendly: device tree updates are communicated directly to the kernel from firmware without passing through untrusted user space. I/O device DLPAR via the "drmgr" command in powerpc-utils remains the sole legitimate user of /proc/powerpc/ofdt, but it is already broken in lockdown since it uses /dev/mem to allocate argument buffers for the rtas syscall. So only illegitimate uses of the interface should see a behavior change when running on a locked down kernel. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM) Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-2-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
2022-09-26 08:16:42 -05:00
security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions. The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module is disabled. Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another. Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value. Sample AVC audit output from denials: avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd" lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp" lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-11-27 12:04:36 -05:00
bpf: Add lockdown check for probe_write_user helper Back then, commit 96ae52279594 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") added the bpf_probe_write_user() helper in order to allow to override user space memory. Its original goal was to have a facility to "debug, divert, and manipulate execution of semi-cooperative processes" under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Write to kernel was explicitly disallowed since it would otherwise tamper with its integrity. One use case was shown in cf9b1199de27 ("samples/bpf: Add test/example of using bpf_probe_write_user bpf helper") where the program DNATs traffic at the time of connect(2) syscall, meaning, it rewrites the arguments to a syscall while they're still in userspace, and before the syscall has a chance to copy the argument into kernel space. These days we have better mechanisms in BPF for achieving the same (e.g. for load-balancers), but without having to write to userspace memory. Of course the bpf_probe_write_user() helper can also be used to abuse many other things for both good or bad purpose. Outside of BPF, there is a similar mechanism for ptrace(2) such as PTRACE_PEEK{TEXT,DATA} and PTRACE_POKE{TEXT,DATA}, but would likely require some more effort. Commit 96ae52279594 explicitly dedicated the helper for experimentation purpose only. Thus, move the helper's availability behind a newly added LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER lockdown knob so that the helper is disabled under the "integrity" mode. More fine-grained control can be implemented also from LSM side with this change. Fixes: 96ae52279594 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
2021-08-09 12:43:17 +02:00
lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is triggered. Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism (although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking any action. For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen. CVE: CVE-2022-21499 Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-23 19:11:02 +01:00
powerpc/rtas: block error injection when locked down The error injection facility on pseries VMs allows corruption of arbitrary guest memory, potentially enabling a sufficiently privileged user to disable lockdown or perform other modifications of the running kernel via the rtas syscall. Block the PAPR error injection facility from being opened or called when locked down. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM) Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-3-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
2022-09-26 08:16:43 -05:00
security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions. The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module is disabled. Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another. Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value. Sample AVC audit output from denials: avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd" lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp" lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-11-27 12:04:36 -05:00
bpf: Add _kernel suffix to internal lockdown_bpf_read Rename LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ into LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL so we have naming more consistent with a LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER option that we are adding. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
2021-08-09 21:45:32 +02:00
lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is triggered. Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism (although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking any action. For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen. CVE: CVE-2022-21499 Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-23 19:11:02 +01:00
security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions. The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module is disabled. Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another. Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value. Sample AVC audit output from denials: avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd" lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp" lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-11-27 12:04:36 -05:00
xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa() or dumpall sa. Enable lockdown, confidentiality mode, at boot or at run time. e.g. when enabled: cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown none integrity [confidentiality] ip xfrm state src 172.16.1.200 dst 172.16.1.100 proto esp spi 0x00000002 reqid 2 mode tunnel replay-window 0 aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 96 note: the aead secret is redacted. Redacting secret is also a FIPS 140-2 requirement. v1->v2 - add size checks before memset calls v2->v3 - replace spaces with tabs for consistency v3->v4 - use kernel lockdown instead of a /proc setting v4->v5 - remove kconfig option Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2020-11-17 17:47:23 +01:00
security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions. The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module is disabled. Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another. Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value. Sample AVC audit output from denials: avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd" lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp" lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=lockdown permissive=0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-11-27 12:04:36 -05:00
selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it: The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until the system is rebooted. The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0" boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not allow for easy modification of the kernel command line. Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the "__ro_after_init" feature. It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening, which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level. From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state. If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot. It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written. Finally, in the several years where we have been working on deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel command line) resolved the issue without problem. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-17 12:43:07 -04:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it: The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until the system is rebooted. The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0" boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not allow for easy modification of the kernel command line. Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the "__ro_after_init" feature. It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening, which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level. From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state. If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot. It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written. Finally, in the several years where we have been working on deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel command line) resolved the issue without problem. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-17 12:43:07 -04:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux and SMACK to do so. Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-06 18:09:10 +02:00
LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new "lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-19 17:30:09 -07:00
LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming enable/disable infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 13:11:41 -07:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:27:46 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 19:57:06 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering decisions are being made. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10 17:18:25 -07:00
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-13 23:17:50 -07:00
LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Until now, any LSM without an enable storage variable was considered enabled. This inverts the logic and sets defaults to true only if the LSM gets added to the ordered initialization list. (And an exception continues for the major LSMs until they are integrated into the ordered initialization in a later patch.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:42:57 -07:00
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-13 23:17:50 -07:00
LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Until now, any LSM without an enable storage variable was considered enabled. This inverts the logic and sets defaults to true only if the LSM gets added to the ordered initialization list. (And an exception continues for the major LSMs until they are integrated into the ordered initialization in a later patch.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:42:57 -07:00
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-13 23:17:50 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Until now, any LSM without an enable storage variable was considered enabled. This inverts the logic and sets defaults to true only if the LSM gets added to the ordered initialization list. (And an exception continues for the major LSMs until they are integrated into the ordered initialization in a later patch.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:42:57 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Until now, any LSM without an enable storage variable was considered enabled. This inverts the logic and sets defaults to true only if the LSM gets added to the ordered initialization list. (And an exception continues for the major LSMs until they are integrated into the ordered initialization in a later patch.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:42:57 -07:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-13 23:17:50 -07:00
LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 19:57:06 -07:00
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-13 23:17:50 -07:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
landlock: Support file truncation Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation. This flag hooks into the path_truncate, file_truncate and file_alloc_security LSM hooks and covers file truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as well as creat(). This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document the flag. In security/security.c, allocate security blobs at pointer-aligned offsets. This fixes the problem where one LSM's security blob can shift another LSM's security blob to an unaligned address (reported by Nathan Chancellor). The following operations are restricted: open(2): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC). Notable special cases: * open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux * open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it creates a new file. truncate(2) (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right. ftruncate(2) (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right when it was previously opened. File descriptors acquired by other means than open(2) (e.g. memfd_create(2)) continue to support truncation with ftruncate(2). Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2022-10-18 20:22:09 +02:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 17:41:15 +02:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-06-10 09:57:35 +02:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Since we already have to do a pass through the LSMs to figure out if exclusive LSMs should be disabled after the first one is seen as enabled, this splits the logic up a bit more cleanly. Now we do a full "prepare" pass through the LSMs (which also allows for later use by the blob-sharing code), before starting the LSM initialization pass. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-10 15:45:22 -07:00
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-13 23:17:50 -07:00
LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Since we already have to do a pass through the LSMs to figure out if exclusive LSMs should be disabled after the first one is seen as enabled, this splits the logic up a bit more cleanly. Now we do a full "prepare" pass through the LSMs (which also allows for later use by the blob-sharing code), before starting the LSM initialization pass. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-10 15:45:22 -07:00
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-13 23:17:50 -07:00
LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 19:57:06 -07:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 19:57:06 -07:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Since we already have to do a pass through the LSMs to figure out if exclusive LSMs should be disabled after the first one is seen as enabled, this splits the logic up a bit more cleanly. Now we do a full "prepare" pass through the LSMs (which also allows for later use by the blob-sharing code), before starting the LSM initialization pass. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-10 15:45:22 -07:00
LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 19:57:06 -07:00
LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-13 23:17:50 -07:00
LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table. This will be used later for attribute reporting. Determine the number of possible security modules based on their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be known at build time. This allows data structures and tables to use the constant. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:47 -07:00
LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:27:46 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization This provides a place for ordered LSMs to be initialized, separate from the "major" LSMs. This is mainly a copy/paste from major_lsm_init() to ordered_lsm_init(), but it will change drastically in later patches. What is not obvious in the patch is that this change moves the integrity LSM from major_lsm_init() into ordered_lsm_init(), since it is not marked with the LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR. As it is the only LSM in the "ordered" list, there is no reordering yet created. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 16:16:55 -07:00
LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:27:46 -07:00
LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order In preparation for distinguishing the "capability" LSM from other LSMs, it must be ordered first. This introduces LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE for the general LSMs and LSM_ORDER_FIRST for capability. In the future LSM_ORDER_LAST for could be added for anything that must run last (e.g. Landlock may use this). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-19 17:48:21 -07:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order In preparation for distinguishing the "capability" LSM from other LSMs, it must be ordered first. This introduces LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE for the general LSMs and LSM_ORDER_FIRST for capability. In the future LSM_ORDER_LAST for could be added for anything that must run last (e.g. Landlock may use this). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-19 17:48:21 -07:00
LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable For what are marked as the Legacy Major LSMs, make them effectively exclusive when selected on the "security=" boot parameter, to handle the future case of when a previously major LSMs become non-exclusive (e.g. when TOMOYO starts blob-sharing). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 13:32:15 -07:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable For what are marked as the Legacy Major LSMs, make them effectively exclusive when selected on the "security=" boot parameter, to handle the future case of when a previously major LSMs become non-exclusive (e.g. when TOMOYO starts blob-sharing). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 13:32:15 -07:00
LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming enable/disable infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 13:11:41 -07:00
LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:27:46 -07:00
security: Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST and set it for the integrity LSM Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs needing to be last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command line or configuration. Also, set this order for the 'integrity' LSM. While not enforced, this is the only LSM expected to use it. Similarly to LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put at the end of the LSM list, if selected in the kernel configuration. Setting one of these orders alone, does not cause the LSMs to be selected and compiled built-in in the kernel. Finally, for LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE LSMs, set the found variable to true if an LSM is found, regardless of its order. In this way, the kernel would not wrongly report that the LSM is not built-in in the kernel if its order is LSM_ORDER_LAST. Fixes: 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-10 09:53:59 +01:00
LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:27:46 -07:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization This provides a place for ordered LSMs to be initialized, separate from the "major" LSMs. This is mainly a copy/paste from major_lsm_init() to ordered_lsm_init(), but it will change drastically in later patches. What is not obvious in the patch is that this change moves the integrity LSM from major_lsm_init() into ordered_lsm_init(), since it is not marked with the LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR. As it is the only LSM in the "ordered" list, there is no reordering yet created. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 16:16:55 -07:00
LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization This removes CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in favor of the explicit ordering offered by CONFIG_LSM and adds all the exclusive LSMs to the ordered LSM initialization. The old meaning of CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY is now captured by which exclusive LSM is listed first in the LSM order. All LSMs not added to the ordered list are explicitly disabled. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-11-19 18:04:32 -08:00
security: Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST and set it for the integrity LSM Introduce LSM_ORDER_LAST, to satisfy the requirement of LSMs needing to be last, e.g. the 'integrity' LSM, without changing the kernel command line or configuration. Also, set this order for the 'integrity' LSM. While not enforced, this is the only LSM expected to use it. Similarly to LSM_ORDER_FIRST, LSMs with LSM_ORDER_LAST are always enabled and put at the end of the LSM list, if selected in the kernel configuration. Setting one of these orders alone, does not cause the LSMs to be selected and compiled built-in in the kernel. Finally, for LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE LSMs, set the found variable to true if an LSM is found, regardless of its order. In this way, the kernel would not wrongly report that the LSM is not built-in in the kernel if its order is LSM_ORDER_LAST. Fixes: 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-10 09:53:59 +01:00
LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization This removes CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in favor of the explicit ordering offered by CONFIG_LSM and adds all the exclusive LSMs to the ordered LSM initialization. The old meaning of CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY is now captured by which exclusive LSM is listed first in the LSM order. All LSMs not added to the ordered list are explicitly disabled. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-11-19 18:04:32 -08:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization This removes CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in favor of the explicit ordering offered by CONFIG_LSM and adds all the exclusive LSMs to the ordered LSM initialization. The old meaning of CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY is now captured by which exclusive LSM is listed first in the LSM order. All LSMs not added to the ordered list are explicitly disabled. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-11-19 18:04:32 -08:00
LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-09 14:27:46 -07:00
LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization This provides a place for ordered LSMs to be initialized, separate from the "major" LSMs. This is mainly a copy/paste from major_lsm_init() to ordered_lsm_init(), but it will change drastically in later patches. What is not obvious in the patch is that this change moves the integrity LSM from major_lsm_init() into ordered_lsm_init(), since it is not marked with the LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR. As it is the only LSM in the "ordered" list, there is no reordering yet created. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 16:16:55 -07:00
LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions. Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 19:15:59 +09:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified To avoid potential confusion, explicitly ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is used on the command line, and report that it is happening. Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-12 10:23:18 -08:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified To avoid potential confusion, explicitly ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is used on the command line, and report that it is happening. Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-12 10:23:18 -08:00
LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new "lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-19 17:30:09 -07:00
LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified To avoid potential confusion, explicitly ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is used on the command line, and report that it is happening. Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-02-12 10:23:18 -08:00
LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new "lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-19 17:30:09 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Since we already have to do a pass through the LSMs to figure out if exclusive LSMs should be disabled after the first one is seen as enabled, this splits the logic up a bit more cleanly. Now we do a full "prepare" pass through the LSMs (which also allows for later use by the blob-sharing code), before starting the LSM initialization pass. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-10 15:45:22 -07:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 17:41:15 +02:00
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-06-10 09:57:35 +02:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:29 -07:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions. Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 19:15:59 +09:00
LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Since we already have to do a pass through the LSMs to figure out if exclusive LSMs should be disabled after the first one is seen as enabled, this splits the logic up a bit more cleanly. Now we do a full "prepare" pass through the LSMs (which also allows for later use by the blob-sharing code), before starting the LSM initialization pass. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-10-10 15:45:22 -07:00
LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls, and major LSMs continue to initialize separately. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-09-19 16:58:31 -07:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
security: don't treat structure as an array of struct hlist_head The initialization of "security_hook_heads" is done by casting it to another structure pointer type, and treating it as an array of "struct hlist_head" objects. This requires an exception be made in "randstruct", because otherwise it will emit an error, reducing the effectiveness of the hardening technique. Instead of using a cast, initialize the individual struct hlist_head elements in security_hook_heads explicitly. This removes the need for the cast and randstruct exception. Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220407175930.471870-1-morbo@google.com
2022-04-07 10:59:30 -07:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
LSM: Initialize security_hook_heads upon registration. "struct security_hook_heads" is an array of "struct list_head" where elements can be initialized just before registration. There is no need to waste 350+ lines for initialization. Let's initialize "struct security_hook_heads" just before registration. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-22 19:46:19 +09:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization For a while now, the LSM core has said it was "initializED", rather than "initializING". This adjust the report to be more accurate (i.e. before this was reported before any LSMs had been initialized.) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10 17:18:17 -07:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot Enhance the details reported by "lsm.debug" in several ways: - report contents of "security=" - report contents of "CONFIG_LSM" - report contents of "lsm=" - report any early LSM details - whitespace-align the output of similar phases for easier visual parsing - change "disabled" to more accurate "skipped" - explain what "skipped" and "ignored" mean in a parenthetical Upgrade the "security= is ignored" warning from pr_info to pr_warn, and include full arguments list to make the cause even more clear. Replace static "Security Framework initializing" pr_info with specific list of the resulting order of enabled LSMs. For example, if the kernel is built with: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN=y CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux, smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" Booting without options will show: LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf landlock: Up and running. Yama: becoming mindful. LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) SELinux: Initializing. LSM support for eBPF active Boot with "lsm.debug" will show: LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: exclusive disabled: apparmor LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf LSM: cred blob size = 32 LSM: file blob size = 16 LSM: inode blob size = 72 LSM: ipc blob size = 8 LSM: msg_msg blob size = 4 LSM: superblock blob size = 80 LSM: task blob size = 8 LSM: initializing capability LSM: initializing landlock landlock: Up and running. LSM: initializing yama Yama: becoming mindful. LSM: initializing loadpin LoadPin: ready to pin (currently not enforcing) LSM: initializing safesetid LSM: initializing integrity LSM: initializing selinux SELinux: Initializing. LSM: initializing bpf LSM support for eBPF active And some examples of how the lsm.debug ordering report changes... With "lsm.debug security=selinux": LSM: legacy security=selinux LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm= *unspecified* LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: security=selinux disabled: apparmor (only one legacy major LSM) LSM: builtin ordered: landlock (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: lockdown (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: yama (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: safesetid (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: builtin ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: builtin ignored: smack (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ignored: tomoyo (not built into kernel) LSM: builtin ordered: apparmor (disabled) LSM: builtin ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,landlock,yama,loadpin, safesetid,integrity,selinux,bpf With "lsm.debug lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,crabability,bpf, loadpin,loadpin": LSM: legacy security= *unspecified* LSM: CONFIG_LSM=landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity, selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf LSM: boot arg lsm=integrity,selinux,loadpin,capability,bpf,loadpin, loadpin LSM: early started: lockdown (enabled) LSM: first ordered: capability (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: integrity (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: selinux (enabled) LSM: cmdline ordered: loadpin (enabled) LSM: cmdline ignored: crabability (not built into kernel) LSM: cmdline ordered: bpf (enabled) LSM: cmdline skipped: apparmor (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: yama (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: safesetid (not in requested order) LSM: cmdline skipped: landlock (not in requested order) LSM: exclusive chosen: selinux LSM: initializing lsm=lockdown,capability,integrity,selinux,loadpin,bpf Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: line wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-11-01 17:05:29 -07:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization This provides a place for ordered LSMs to be initialized, separate from the "major" LSMs. This is mainly a copy/paste from major_lsm_init() to ordered_lsm_init(), but it will change drastically in later patches. What is not obvious in the patch is that this change moves the integrity LSM from major_lsm_init() into ordered_lsm_init(), since it is not marked with the LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR. As it is the only LSM in the "ordered" list, there is no reordering yet created. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 16:16:55 -07:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux and SMACK to do so. Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-06 18:09:10 +02:00
LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming enable/disable infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 13:11:41 -07:00
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux and SMACK to do so. Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-06 18:09:10 +02:00
LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming enable/disable infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 13:11:41 -07:00
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux and SMACK to do so. Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-06 18:09:10 +02:00
LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming enable/disable infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-09-19 13:11:41 -07:00
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux and SMACK to do so. Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-06 18:09:10 +02:00
LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new "lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-19 17:30:09 -07:00
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering decisions are being made. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-10 17:18:25 -07:00
LSM: Enable multiple calls to security_add_hooks() for the same LSM The commit d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") extend security_add_hooks() with a new parameter to register the LSM name, which may be useful to make the list of currently loaded LSM available to userspace. However, there is no clean way for an LSM to split its hook declarations into multiple files, which may reduce the mess with all the included files (needed for LSM hook argument types) and make the source code easier to review and maintain. This change allows an LSM to register multiple times its hook while keeping a consistent list of LSM names as described in Documentation/security/LSM.txt . The list reflects the order in which checks are made. This patch only check for the last registered LSM. If an LSM register multiple times its hooks, interleaved with other LSM registrations (which should not happen), its name will still appear in the same order that the hooks are called, hence multiple times. To sum up, "capability,selinux,foo,foo" will be replaced with "capability,selinux,foo", however "capability,foo,selinux,foo" will remain as is. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-05-10 22:48:48 +02:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append() lsm_append() should return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed. Fixes: d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-17 10:36:04 -07:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
LSM: Enable multiple calls to security_add_hooks() for the same LSM The commit d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") extend security_add_hooks() with a new parameter to register the LSM name, which may be useful to make the list of currently loaded LSM available to userspace. However, there is no clean way for an LSM to split its hook declarations into multiple files, which may reduce the mess with all the included files (needed for LSM hook argument types) and make the source code easier to review and maintain. This change allows an LSM to register multiple times its hook while keeping a consistent list of LSM names as described in Documentation/security/LSM.txt . The list reflects the order in which checks are made. This patch only check for the last registered LSM. If an LSM register multiple times its hooks, interleaved with other LSM registrations (which should not happen), its name will still appear in the same order that the hooks are called, hence multiple times. To sum up, "capability,selinux,foo,foo" will be replaced with "capability,selinux,foo", however "capability,foo,selinux,foo" will remain as is. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-05-10 22:48:48 +02:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
LSM: Identify modules by more than name Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to security_add_hooks(). The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to include it's LSMID in the lsm_id. The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel. This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs. LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:46 -07:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
LSM: Identify modules by more than name Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to security_add_hooks(). The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to include it's LSMID in the lsm_id. The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel. This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs. LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:46 -07:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table. This will be used later for attribute reporting. Determine the number of possible security modules based on their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be known at build time. This allows data structures and tables to use the constant. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:47 -07:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
LSM: Identify modules by more than name Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to security_add_hooks(). The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to include it's LSMID in the lsm_id. The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel. This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs. LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:46 -07:00
security: convert security hooks to use hlist This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down the size of the struct by about half. In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-03-29 01:28:23 +00:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
LSM: Identify modules by more than name Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to security_add_hooks(). The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to include it's LSMID in the lsm_id. The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel. This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs. LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:46 -07:00
security: Support early LSMs The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:37 -07:00
LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-18 17:09:05 -08:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity, switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename the functions accordingly. Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-14 15:20:14 +03:00
selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification system Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:53 +03:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions. Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 19:15:59 +09:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions. Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 19:15:59 +09:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions. Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 19:15:59 +09:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
LSM: Make some functions static Fixes the following sparse warnings: security/security.c:533:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_task_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? security/security.c:554:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_ipc_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? security/security.c:575:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_msg_msg_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? Fixes: f4ad8f2c4076 ("LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security") Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-16 05:44:32 +00:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
LSM: Make some functions static Fixes the following sparse warnings: security/security.c:533:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_task_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? security/security.c:554:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_ipc_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? security/security.c:575:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_msg_msg_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? Fixes: f4ad8f2c4076 ("LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security") Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-16 05:44:32 +00:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
LSM: Make some functions static Fixes the following sparse warnings: security/security.c:533:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_task_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? security/security.c:554:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_ipc_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? security/security.c:575:5: warning: symbol 'lsm_msg_msg_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static? Fixes: f4ad8f2c4076 ("LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security") Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-16 05:44:32 +00:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions. Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 19:15:59 +09:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions. Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 19:15:59 +09:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions. Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-18 19:15:59 +09:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 17:41:15 +02:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 14:44:00 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: handle the NULL buffer case in lsm_fill_user_ctx() Passing a NULL buffer into the lsm_get_self_attr() syscall is a valid way to quickly determine the minimum size of the buffer needed to for the syscall to return all of the LSM attributes to the caller. Unfortunately we/I broke that behavior in commit d7cf3412a9f6 ("lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()") such that it returned an error to the caller; this patch restores the original desired behavior of using the NULL buffer as a quick way to correctly size the attribute buffer. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d7cf3412a9f6 ("lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()") Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-13 21:37:48 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 14:44:00 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr() and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes") Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io> [PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-14 11:31:26 -04:00
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 14:44:00 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 14:44:00 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx() Using the size of a void pointer is much cleaner than BITS_PER_LONG / 8. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-11-01 17:39:44 -04:00
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 14:44:00 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: handle the NULL buffer case in lsm_fill_user_ctx() Passing a NULL buffer into the lsm_get_self_attr() syscall is a valid way to quickly determine the minimum size of the buffer needed to for the syscall to return all of the LSM attributes to the caller. Unfortunately we/I broke that behavior in commit d7cf3412a9f6 ("lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()") such that it returned an error to the caller; this patch restores the original desired behavior of using the NULL buffer as a quick way to correctly size the attribute buffer. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d7cf3412a9f6 ("lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()") Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-13 21:37:48 -04:00
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 14:44:00 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 14:44:00 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper. The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to an alignment that matches the word length of the machine (BITS_PER_LONG / 8). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 14:44:00 -04:00
LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a LSM_ATTR value if one is available. Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including the trailing attribute value. Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:52 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables Building with W=1 shows many unused const variable warnings. These can be silenced, as we're well aware of their being potentially unused: ./include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h:36:18: error: 'ptrace_access_check_default' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=] 36 | LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_access_check, struct task_struct *child, | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ security/security.c:706:32: note: in definition of macro 'LSM_RET_DEFAULT' 706 | #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) | ^~~~ security/security.c:711:9: note: in expansion of macro 'DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int' 711 | DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ./include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h:36:1: note: in expansion of macro 'LSM_HOOK' 36 | LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_access_check, struct task_struct *child, | ^~~~~~~~ Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202110131608.zms53FPR-lkp@intel.com/ Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-10-13 10:28:48 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: convert security hooks to use hlist This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down the size of the struct by about half. In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-03-29 01:28:23 +00:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: convert security hooks to use hlist This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down the size of the struct by about half. In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-03-29 01:28:23 +00:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the binder hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 16:39:08 -05:00
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-10-12 09:56:13 -07:00
Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-21 10:54:10 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-21 10:54:10 -05:00
lsm: move the binder hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 16:39:08 -05:00
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-10-12 09:56:13 -07:00
Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-21 10:54:10 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-21 10:54:10 -05:00
lsm: move the binder hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 16:39:08 -05:00
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-10-12 09:56:13 -07:00
Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-21 10:54:10 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-21 10:54:10 -05:00
lsm: move the binder hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 16:39:08 -05:00
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-10-12 09:56:13 -07:00
lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file() SELinux registers the implementation for the "binder_transfer_file" hook. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the parameter "file" is not changing. Mark the "file" parameter of LSM hook security_binder_transfer_file() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: subject line whitespace fix] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-08-12 20:31:08 +05:00
Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-21 10:54:10 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-01-21 10:54:10 -05:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have a retval convention. Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor. [ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-05-07 19:26:19 +10:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to change its own flags in a different way at the same time. __capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried. This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two: (1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process. current is the parent. (2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only, and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child. In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail. This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV. Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have been changed to calls to capable(). Of the places that were using __capable(): (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a process. All of these now use has_capability(). (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above, these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used. (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable(). (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been switched and capable() is used instead. (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating. (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process, whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged. I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-14 11:37:28 +01:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to change its own flags in a different way at the same time. __capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried. This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two: (1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process. current is the parent. (2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only, and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child. In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail. This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV. Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have been changed to calls to capable(). Of the places that were using __capable(): (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a process. All of these now use has_capability(). (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above, these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used. (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable(). (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been switched and capable() is used instead. (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating. (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process, whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged. I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-08-14 11:37:28 +01:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget() Three LSMs register the implementations for the "capget" hook: AppArmor, SELinux, and the normal capability code. Looking at the function implementations we may observe that the first parameter "target" is not changing. Mark the first argument "target" of LSM hook security_capget() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. cap_capget() LSM hook declaration exceeds the 80 characters per line limit. Split the function declaration to multiple lines to decrease the line length. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> [PM: align the cap_capget() declaration, spelling fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-08-07 11:59:29 +05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-07 16:10:53 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
lsm: constify 'sb' parameter in security_quotactl() SELinux registers the implementation for the "quotactl" hook. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the parameter "sb" is not changing. Mark the "sb" parameter of LSM hook security_quotactl() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-08-23 11:44:41 +05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failure The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code which used the new option was built even though the variable in question didn't exist. The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization better to eliminate the hook altogether. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-11-15 18:36:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Introduce security_settime64() security_settime() uses a timespec, which is not year 2038 safe on 32bit systems. Thus this patch introduces the security_settime64() function with timespec64 type. We also convert the cap_settime() helper function to use the 64bit types. This patch then moves security_settime() to the header file as an inline helper function so that existing users can be iteratively converted. None of the existing hooks is using the timespec argument and therefor the patch is not making any functional changes. Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>, Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org> [jstultz: Reworded commit message] Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2016-04-08 14:02:11 +08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: convert security hooks to use hlist This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down the size of the struct by about half. In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-03-29 01:28:23 +00:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the program execution hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:06:51 -05:00
exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations: apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds. Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and return immediately if it is true. The function cap_bprm_set_creds ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely. Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook that is called exactly once for the entire of exec. Modify the bits of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds behind. Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved to security_bprm_creds_for_exec. Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and to reflect this change. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-03-22 15:46:24 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations: apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds. Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and return immediately if it is true. The function cap_bprm_set_creds ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely. Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook that is called exactly once for the entire of exec. Modify the bits of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds behind. Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved to security_bprm_creds_for_exec. Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and to reflect this change. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-03-22 15:46:24 -05:00
lsm: move the program execution hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:06:51 -05:00
lsm: constify 'file' parameter in security_bprm_creds_from_file() The 'bprm_creds_from_file' hook has implementation registered in commoncap. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the 'file' parameter is not changing. Mark the 'file' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_creds_from_file() as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-08-23 12:17:29 +05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the program execution hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:06:51 -05:00
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:24 +11:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the program execution hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:06:51 -05:00
lsm: constify 'bprm' parameter in security_bprm_committing_creds() The 'bprm_committing_creds' hook has implementations registered in SELinux and Apparmor. Looking at the function implementations we observe that the 'bprm' parameter is not changing. Mark the 'bprm' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_committing_creds() as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-08-23 12:47:56 +05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the program execution hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:06:51 -05:00
lsm: constify 'bprm' parameter in security_bprm_committed_creds() Three LSMs register the implementations for the 'bprm_committed_creds()' hook: AppArmor, SELinux and tomoyo. Looking at the function implementations we may observe that the 'bprm' parameter is not changing. Mark the 'bprm' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_committed_creds() as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: minor merge fuzzing due to other constification patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-08-23 13:16:40 +05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called, leading to failure to match existing superblocks. This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when fscache is enabled: NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1) Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount creation. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5 Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.") Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode") Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Message-Id: <20230808-master-v9-1-e0ecde888221@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-08-08 07:34:20 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called, leading to failure to match existing superblocks. This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when fscache is enabled: NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1) Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount creation. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5 Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.") Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode") Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Message-Id: <20230808-master-v9-1-e0ecde888221@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-08-08 07:34:20 -04:00
lsm: move the fs_context hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:33:31 -05:00
introduce cloning of fs_context new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for doing the same to LSM parts. [needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-23 16:02:47 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
introduce cloning of fs_context new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for doing the same to LSM parts. [needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-23 16:02:47 -05:00
lsm: move the fs_context hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:33:31 -05:00
LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param The usual LSM hook "bail on fail" scheme doesn't work for cases where a security module may return an error code indicating that it does not recognize an input. In this particular case Smack sees a mount option that it recognizes, and returns 0. A call to a BPF hook follows, which returns -ENOPARAM, which confuses the caller because Smack has processed its data. The SELinux hook incorrectly returns 1 on success. There was a time when this was correct, however the current expectation is that it return 0 on success. This is repaired. Reported-by: syzbot+d1e3b1d92d25abf97943@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-01-27 04:51:00 +00:00
vfs: Add LSM hooks for the new mount API Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code. This includes: (1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security record attached to a filesystem context. (2) A hook to snoop source specifications. There may be multiple of these if the filesystem supports it. They will to be local files/devices if fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly remote server specifications, if false. (3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form. If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option being passed to the filesystem. Note that 'val' may include commas and binary data with the fsopen patch. (4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up. (5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created superblock. (6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint. These are intended to replace: security_sb_copy_data security_sb_kern_mount security_sb_mount security_sb_set_mnt_opts security_sb_clone_mnt_opts security_sb_parse_opts_str [AV -- some of the methods being replaced are already gone, some of the methods are not added for the lack of need] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-11-01 23:07:24 +00:00
LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param The usual LSM hook "bail on fail" scheme doesn't work for cases where a security module may return an error code indicating that it does not recognize an input. In this particular case Smack sees a mount option that it recognizes, and returns 0. A call to a BPF hook follows, which returns -ENOPARAM, which confuses the caller because Smack has processed its data. The SELinux hook incorrectly returns 1 on success. There was a time when this was correct, however the current expectation is that it return 0 on success. This is repaired. Reported-by: syzbot+d1e3b1d92d25abf97943@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-01-27 04:51:00 +00:00
vfs: Add LSM hooks for the new mount API Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code. This includes: (1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security record attached to a filesystem context. (2) A hook to snoop source specifications. There may be multiple of these if the filesystem supports it. They will to be local files/devices if fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly remote server specifications, if false. (3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form. If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option being passed to the filesystem. Note that 'val' may include commas and binary data with the fsopen patch. (4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up. (5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created superblock. (6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint. These are intended to replace: security_sb_copy_data security_sb_kern_mount security_sb_mount security_sb_set_mnt_opts security_sb_clone_mnt_opts security_sb_parse_opts_str [AV -- some of the methods being replaced are already gone, some of the methods are not added for the lack of need] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-11-01 23:07:24 +00:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 17:41:15 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 17:41:15 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook The sb_delete security hook is called when shutting down a superblock, which may be useful to release kernel objects tied to the superblock's lifetime (e.g. inodes). This new hook is needed by Landlock to release (ephemerally) tagged struct inodes. This comes from the unprivileged nature of Landlock described in the next commit. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-7-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 17:41:16 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-04-22 17:41:15 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-13 13:41:47 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-13 13:41:47 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-13 13:41:47 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-13 13:41:47 -05:00
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 16:09:14 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 16:09:14 -05:00
new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(), security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata(). Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-11-17 12:09:18 -05:00
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 16:09:14 -05:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount with new options and determines if new options confict with an existing mount or not. A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount. Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> [PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-26 22:37:55 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount with new options and determines if new options confict with an existing mount or not. A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount. Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> [PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-26 22:37:55 -05:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
LSM: lift extracting and parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_remount() This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior to actual mount/reconfiguration actions. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-01 23:06:57 -05:00
LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-13 13:41:47 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 16:09:14 -05:00
btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use 1) keeping a copy in btrfs_fs_info is completely pointless - we never use it for anything. Getting rid of that allows for simpler calling conventions for setup_security_options() (caller is responsible for freeing mnt_opts in all cases). 2) on remount we want to use ->sb_remount(), not ->sb_set_mnt_opts(), same as we would if not for FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. Behaviours *are* close (in fact, selinux sb_set_mnt_opts() ought to punt to sb_remount() in "already initialized" case), but let's handle that uniformly. And the only reason why the original btrfs changes didn't go for security_sb_remount() in btrfs_remount() case is that it hadn't been exported. Let's export it for a while - it'll be going away soon anyway. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-10 17:19:21 -05:00
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-03-03 16:09:14 -05:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
lsm: constify 'sb' parameter in security_sb_kern_mount() The "sb_kern_mount" hook has implementation registered in SELinux. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the "sb" parameter is not changing. Mark the "sb" parameter of LSM hook security_sb_kern_mount() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: minor merge fuzzing due to other constification patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-08-23 14:01:28 +05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mounts This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own security_sb_show_options() function. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-04 09:47:13 +10:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM/SELinux: show LSM mount options in /proc/mounts This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own security_sb_show_options() function. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-04 09:47:13 +10:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
constify security_sb_mount() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 14:52:53 -04:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 13:00:35 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 13:00:35 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 13:00:35 -05:00
LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount options. This includes a new string parsing function exported from the LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security data blob. This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be handled by the loaded LSM. Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK when dealing with binary mount data. If the binary mount data is less than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an illegal page fault and boom. Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code since they were broken by past NFS changes. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-05 10:31:54 -05:00
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 13:00:35 -05:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the second context= option is ignored. For instance: # mount server:/export /mnt/test1 # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 # ls -dZ /mnt/test1 drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1 # ls -dZ /mnt/test2 drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2 When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock, it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this case cannot take effect. This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the admin why the second mount failed. Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts, then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways. For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the server: # mount server:/ /mnt/test1 # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified ...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch. The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already present with the wrong context. OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work, because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons: # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/ -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one. Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2013-04-01 08:14:24 -04:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 13:00:35 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 13:00:35 -05:00
LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount options. This includes a new string parsing function exported from the LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security data blob. This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be handled by the loaded LSM. Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK when dealing with binary mount data. If the binary mount data is less than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an illegal page fault and boom. Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code since they were broken by past NFS changes. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-03-05 10:31:54 -05:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around Add a move_mount() system call that will move a mount from one place to another and, in the next commit, allow to attach an unattached mount tree. The new system call looks like the following: int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_path, int to_dfd, const char *to_path, unsigned int flags); Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-11-05 17:40:30 +00:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around Add a move_mount() system call that will move a mount from one place to another and, in the next commit, allow to attach an unattached mount tree. The new system call looks like the following: int move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_path, int to_dfd, const char *to_path, unsigned int flags); Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-11-05 17:40:30 +00:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify, or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant more power to an application in the form of permission events. While notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking. Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock. Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch all files accessed within a given mount or superblock. In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify, fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available, particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not use any of them. This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in its coverage. Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized. The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm (descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission: watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through fanotify. The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled object existed representing the mount. The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read events on a file. Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event. This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege. Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-08-12 11:20:00 -04:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify, or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant more power to an application in the form of permission events. While notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking. Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock. Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch all files accessed within a given mount or superblock. In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify, fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available, particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not use any of them. This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in its coverage. Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized. The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm (descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission: watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through fanotify. The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled object existed representing the mount. The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read events on a file. Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event. This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege. Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-08-12 11:20:00 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify, or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant more power to an application in the form of permission events. While notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking. Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock. Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch all files accessed within a given mount or superblock. In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify, fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available, particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not use any of them. This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in its coverage. Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized. The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm (descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission: watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through fanotify. The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled object existed representing the mount. The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read events on a file. Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event. This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege. Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-08-12 11:20:00 -04:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:29 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:29 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry. There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-05-22 12:50:34 -04:00
security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security() Right now security_dentry_init_security() only supports single security label and is used by SELinux only. There are two users of this hook, namely ceph and nfs. NFS does not care about xattr name. Ceph hardcodes the xattr name to security.selinux (XATTR_NAME_SELINUX). I am making changes to fuse/virtiofs to send security label to virtiofsd and I need to send xattr name as well. I also hardcoded the name of xattr to security.selinux. Stephen Smalley suggested that it probably is a good idea to modify security_dentry_init_security() to also return name of xattr so that we can avoid this hardcoding in the callers. This patch adds a new parameter "const char **xattr_name" to security_dentry_init_security() and LSM puts the name of xattr too if caller asked for it (xattr_name != NULL). Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: fixed typos in the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-10-12 09:23:07 -04:00
Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry. There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-05-22 12:50:34 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry. There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-05-22 12:50:34 -04:00
lsm: move the filesystem hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-07 17:44:01 -05:00
security, overlayfs: Provide hook to correctly label newly created files During a new file creation we need to make sure new file is created with the right label. New file is created in upper/ so effectively file should get label as if task had created file in upper/. We switched to mounter's creds for actual file creation. Also if there is a whiteout present, then file will be created in work/ dir first and then renamed in upper. In none of the cases file will be labeled as we want it to be. This patch introduces a new hook dentry_create_files_as(), which determines the label/context dentry will get if it had been created by task in upper and modify passed set of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new creds for file creation. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: fix whitespace issues found with checkpatch.pl] [PM: changes to use stat->mode in ovl_create_or_link()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-07-13 10:44:52 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security, overlayfs: Provide hook to correctly label newly created files During a new file creation we need to make sure new file is created with the right label. New file is created in upper/ so effectively file should get label as if task had created file in upper/. We switched to mounter's creds for actual file creation. Also if there is a whiteout present, then file will be created in work/ dir first and then renamed in upper. In none of the cases file will be labeled as we want it to be. This patch introduces a new hook dentry_create_files_as(), which determines the label/context dentry will get if it had been created by task in upper and modify passed set of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new creds for file creation. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: fix whitespace issues found with checkpatch.pl] [PM: changes to use stat->mode in ovl_create_or_link()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-07-13 10:44:52 -04:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-06-10 09:57:35 +02:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Fix ret values doc for security_inode_init_security() Commit 6bcdfd2cac55 ("security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook") unified the !initxattrs and initxattrs cases. By doing that, security_inode_init_security() cannot return -EOPNOTSUPP anymore, as it is always replaced with zero at the end of the function. Also, mentioning -ENOMEM as the only possible error is not correct. For example, evm_inode_init_security() could return -ENOKEY. Fix these issues in the documentation of security_inode_init_security(). Fixes: 6bcdfd2cac55 ("security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-26 09:39:05 +02:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callback This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-06 15:29:25 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-06-10 09:57:35 +02:00
security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callback This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-06 15:29:25 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return code security_inode_init_security previously returned -EOPNOTSUPP, for S_PRIVATE inodes, and relied on the callers to change it to 0. As the callers do not change the return code anymore, return 0, intead of -EOPNOTSUPP. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-08-15 10:13:18 -04:00
security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callback This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-06 15:29:25 -04:00
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-06-10 09:57:35 +02:00
evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache, and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()). Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata, obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata, the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA policy. Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time). Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files are marked as new. Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer(). Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in the common integrity layer. Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in security_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:11 +01:00
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-06-10 09:57:35 +02:00
security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callback This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-06 15:29:25 -04:00
evm: call evm_inode_init_security from security_inode_init_security Changelog v7: - moved the initialization call to security_inode_init_security, renaming evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security - increase size of xattr array for EVM xattr Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-15 21:19:10 -04:00
security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callback This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-06 15:29:25 -04:00
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-06-10 09:57:35 +02:00
security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callback This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-06 15:29:25 -04:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: add inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook This change adds a new LSM hook, inode_init_security_anon(), that will be used while creating secure anonymous inodes. The hook allows/denies its creation and assigns a security context to the inode. The new hook accepts an optional context_inode parameter that callers can use to provide additional contextual information to security modules for granting/denying permission to create an anon-inode of the same type. This context_inode's security_context can also be used to initialize the newly created anon-inode's security_context. Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-08 14:22:20 -08:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: add inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook This change adds a new LSM hook, inode_init_security_anon(), that will be used while creating secure anonymous inodes. The hook allows/denies its creation and assigns a security context to the inode. The new hook accepts an optional context_inode parameter that callers can use to provide additional contextual information to security modules for granting/denying permission to create an anon-inode of the same type. This context_inode's security_context can also be used to initialize the newly created anon-inode's security_context. Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-01-08 14:22:20 -08:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the path_post_mknod hook. IMA-appraisal requires all existing files in policy to have a file hash/signature stored in security.ima. An exception is made for empty files created by mknod, by tagging them as new files. LSMs could also take some action after files are created. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:02 +01:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
CacheFiles: Add calls to path-based security hooks Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-12-24 14:48:35 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir} Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 15:13:39 -04:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir} Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 15:13:39 -04:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
CacheFiles: Add calls to path-based security hooks Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-12-24 14:48:35 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify security_path_{mkdir,mknod,symlink} ... as well as unix_mknod() and may_o_create() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 15:21:09 -04:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify security_path_{link,rename} Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 15:27:45 -04:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify security_path_{link,rename} Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 15:27:45 -04:00
security: add flags to rename hooks Add flags to security_path_rename() and security_inode_rename() hooks. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 17:08:43 +02:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
vfs: add cross-rename If flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE then exchange source and destination files. There's no restriction on the type of the files; e.g. a directory can be exchanged with a symlink. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 17:08:43 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
CacheFiles: Add calls to path-based security hooks Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-12-24 14:48:35 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify security_path_truncate() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 14:22:01 -04:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:47 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify chmod_common/security_path_chmod Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 14:56:23 -04:00
LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:47 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:47 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:47 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify chown_common/security_path_chown Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 14:44:41 -04:00
LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:47 +09:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:47 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown() operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *", we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of notify_change(). These hooks are used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:47 +09:00
LSM: Add security_path_chroot(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations. This hook is used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:48 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
constify security_path_chroot() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-25 15:28:43 -04:00
LSM: Add security_path_chroot(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations. This hook is used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:48 +09:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Add security_path_chroot(). This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations. This hook is used by TOMOYO. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-04 21:49:48 +09:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-17 13:24:15 +09:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
2009-04-03 16:42:40 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook. As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security xattr. LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be canceled. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:03 +01:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
switch vfs_mkdir() and ->mkdir() to umode_t vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-07-26 01:41:39 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
2009-04-03 16:42:40 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
vfs: add cross-rename If flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE then exchange source and destination files. There's no restriction on the type of the files; e.g. a directory can be exchanged with a symlink. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 17:08:43 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
vfs: add cross-rename If flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE then exchange source and destination files. There's no restriction on the type of the files; e.g. a directory can be exchanged with a symlink. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 17:08:43 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware inode_follow_link now takes an inode and rcu flag as well as the dentry. inode is used in preference to d_backing_inode(dentry), particularly in RCU-walk mode. selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set. Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not actually drop the RCU read-lock. However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-23 13:37:39 +11:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware inode_follow_link now takes an inode and rcu flag as well as the dentry. inode is used in preference to d_backing_inode(dentry), particularly in RCU-walk mode. selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set. Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not actually drop the RCU read-lock. However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-23 13:37:39 +11:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
[PATCH] pass MAY_OPEN to vfs_permission() explicitly ... and get rid of the last "let's deduce mask from nameidata->flags" bit. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-17 09:37:02 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fs: port ->setattr() to pass mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:11 +01:00
security: pass down mount idmapping to setattr hook Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it should be. The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of bugs in various codepaths. We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers we need to use. Adapt the security_inode_setattr() helper to pass down the mount's idmapping to account for that change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-8-brauner@kernel.org Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-06-21 16:14:53 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
[patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_change The FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl() calls notify_change() to change the file mode before changing the inode attributes. Replace with explicit calls to security_inode_setattr(), fat_setattr() and fsnotify_change(). This is equivalent to the original. The reason it is needed, is that later in the series we move the immutable check into notify_change(). That would break the FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, as it needs to perform the mode change regardless of the immutability of the file. [Fix error if fat is built as a module. Thanks to OGAWA Hirofumi for noticing.] Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-07-01 15:01:28 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_setattr hook. At inode_setattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At inode_post_setattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified file attributes and other file metadata. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful file attribute change. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:30:58 +01:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
switch security_inode_getattr() to struct path * Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-08 19:28:30 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:23 +01:00
commoncap: handle idmapped mounts When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 14:19:29 +01:00
xattr: add missing consts to function arguments Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 00:59:41 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode. (Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.) Changelog: - Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled. - xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *' Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-03-09 14:38:26 -05:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public evm.h header to evm_main.c. Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not executed for private inodes. Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:10 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fs: port acl to mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:24 +01:00
security: add get, remove and set acl hook The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 17:17:07 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: add get, remove and set acl hook The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 17:17:07 +02:00
security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_set_acl hook. At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified POSIX ACL and other file metadata. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL change. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:04 +01:00
security: add get, remove and set acl hook The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 17:17:07 +02:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fs: port acl to mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:24 +01:00
security: add get, remove and set acl hook The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 17:17:07 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: add get, remove and set acl hook The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 17:17:07 +02:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fs: port acl to mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:24 +01:00
security: add get, remove and set acl hook The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 17:17:07 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: add get, remove and set acl hook The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 17:17:07 +02:00
security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_remove_acl hook. At inode_remove_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At inode_post_remove_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed POSIX ACL removed and other file metadata. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL removal. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:05 +01:00
security: add get, remove and set acl hook The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2022-09-22 17:17:07 +02:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
xattr: add missing consts to function arguments Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 00:59:41 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
xattr: add missing consts to function arguments Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 00:59:41 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:23 +01:00
commoncap: handle idmapped mounts When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 14:19:29 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode. (Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.) Changelog: - Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled. - xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *' Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-03-09 14:38:26 -05:00
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-03-17 22:26:22 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:23 +01:00
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public evm.h header to evm_main.c. Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not executed for private inodes. Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:10 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_removexattr hook. At inode_removexattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At inode_post_removexattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed xattr removed and other file metadata. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful xattr removal. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:30:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:36 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:36 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:23 +01:00
commoncap: handle idmapped mounts When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 14:19:29 +01:00
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:36 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:36 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-13 12:49:22 +01:00
commoncap: handle idmapped mounts When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 14:19:29 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
NFS: Extend NFS xattr handlers to accept the security namespace The existing NFSv4 xattr handlers do not accept xattr calls to the security namespace. This patch extends these handlers to accept xattrs from the security namespace in addition to the default NFSv4 ACL namespace. Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-05-22 12:50:45 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24 11:09:39 -05:00
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid) LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported SELinux interfaces. Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid secid exists. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 21:51:09 +02:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid) LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported SELinux interfaces. Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid secid exists. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 21:51:09 +02:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount. This hook can prepare a new set of creds which are suitable for new file creation during copy up. Caller will use new creds to create file and then revert back to old creds and release new creds. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: whitespace cleanup to appease checkpatch.pl] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-07-13 11:13:56 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount. This hook can prepare a new set of creds which are suitable for new file creation during copy up. Caller will use new creds to create file and then revert back to old creds and release new creds. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: whitespace cleanup to appease checkpatch.pl] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-07-13 11:13:56 -04:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return 0 if the security module wants the xattr to be copied up, 1 if the security module wants the xattr to be discarded on the copy, -EOPNOTSUPP if the security module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno upon an error. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: whitespace cleanup for checkpatch.pl] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-07-13 10:44:49 -04:00
security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up. The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail" call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out on other values. Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2020-06-22 00:21:35 +02:00
lsm: fix a number of misspellings A random collection of spelling fixes for source files in the LSM layer. Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-05-24 23:19:53 -04:00
security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up. The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail" call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out on other values. Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2020-06-22 00:21:35 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up. The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail" call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out on other values. Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2020-06-22 00:21:35 +02:00
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public evm.h header to evm_main.c. Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not executed for private inodes. Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:10 +01:00
security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return 0 if the security module wants the xattr to be copied up, 1 if the security module wants the xattr to be discarded on the copy, -EOPNOTSUPP if the security module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno upon an error. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: whitespace cleanup for checkpatch.pl] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-07-13 10:44:49 -04:00
lsm: move the kernfs hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:20:33 -05:00
LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an associated inode at the moment of creation). The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic for handling the creation of new nodes. This patch also adds helper functions to <linux/kernfs.h> for getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs them). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: more manual merge fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 15:57:16 +01:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an associated inode at the moment of creation). The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic for handling the creation of new nodes. This patch also adds helper functions to <linux/kernfs.h> for getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs them). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: more manual merge fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-02-22 15:57:16 +01:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Introduce file_release hook In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the file_release hook. IMA calculates at file close the new digest of the file content and writes it to security.ima, so that appraisal at next file access succeeds. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:01 +01:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
ovl: call secutiry hook in ovl_real_ioctl() Verify LSM permissions for underlying file, since vfs_ioctl() doesn't do it. [Stephen Rothwell] export security_file_ioctl Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-06-02 22:20:26 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*). However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits 32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file permissions. This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back - "/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */". This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed to support this hook. Reviewing the three places where we are currently using security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"") Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> [PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-12-19 10:09:09 +01:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*). However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits 32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file permissions. This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back - "/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */". This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed to support this hook. Reviewing the three places where we are currently using security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"") Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> [PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-12-19 10:09:09 +01:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 17:11:23 -04:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 17:11:23 -04:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 17:11:23 -04:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
fs: introduce f_op->mmap_capabilities for nommu mmap support Since "BDI: Provide backing device capability information [try #3]" the backing_dev_info structure also provides flags for the kind of mmap operation available in a nommu environment, which is entirely unrelated to it's original purpose. Introduce a new nommu-only file operation to provide this information to the nommu mmap code instead. Splitting this from the backing_dev_info structure allows to remove lots of backing_dev_info instance that aren't otherwise needed, and entirely gets rid of the concept of providing a backing_dev_info for a character device. It also removes the need for the mtd_inodefs filesystem. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
2015-01-14 10:42:32 +01:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs. Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs. Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems. Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and enforce that flag. Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the execute bit is cleared. The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects. This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs. Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-06-29 14:42:03 -05:00
take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 17:11:23 -04:00
fs: introduce f_op->mmap_capabilities for nommu mmap support Since "BDI: Provide backing device capability information [try #3]" the backing_dev_info structure also provides flags for the kind of mmap operation available in a nommu environment, which is entirely unrelated to it's original purpose. Introduce a new nommu-only file operation to provide this information to the nommu mmap code instead. Splitting this from the backing_dev_info structure allows to remove lots of backing_dev_info instance that aren't otherwise needed, and entirely gets rid of the concept of providing a backing_dev_info for a character device. It also removes the need for the mtd_inodefs filesystem. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
2015-01-14 10:42:32 +01:00
take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 17:11:23 -04:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 17:11:23 -04:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 19:58:30 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like 'integrity'). Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM, and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were hardcoded. Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(), which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm(). Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always executed to mark files as new, as before the move. A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod, inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub and kernel-internal tmpfs files. Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:08 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file() ... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 13:30:51 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file() ... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30 13:30:51 -04:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
lsm: fix typo in security_file_lock() comment header In the description of function definition security_file_lock(), the line "@cmd: fnctl command" has a typo where "fnctl" should be "fcntl". This patch fixes the typo. Signed-off-by: Pairman Guo <pairmanxlr@gmail.com> [PM: commit message cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-03 01:08:57 +08:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: make security_file_set_fowner, f_setown and __f_setown void return security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and __f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the callers. Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2014-08-22 11:27:32 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers This commit fixes several typos in comment headers in security/security.c where "Check is" should be "Check if". Signed-off-by: Pairman Guo <pairmanxlr@gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-17 21:35:04 +08:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security_file_open(): lose cred argument Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-07-10 13:25:29 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
fsnotify: new fsnotify hooks and events types for access decisions introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks to be in any way useful. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2009-12-17 21:24:34 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
fsnotify: new fsnotify hooks and events types for access decisions introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks to be in any way useful. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2009-12-17 21:24:34 -05:00
fsnotify: split fsnotify_perm() into two hooks We would like to make changes to the fsnotify access permission hook - add file range arguments and add the pre modify event. In preparation for these changes, split the fsnotify_perm() hook into fsnotify_open_perm() and fsnotify_file_perm(). This is needed for fanotify "pre content" events. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212094440.250945-4-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-12-12 11:44:38 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Introduce file_post_open hook In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS. Based on policy, IMA calculates the digest of the file content and extends the TPM with the digest, verifies the file's integrity based on the digest, and/or includes the file digest in the audit log. LSMs could similarly take action depending on the file content and the access mask requested with open(). The new hook returns a value and can cause the open to be aborted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:00 +01:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Introduce file_post_open hook In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS. Based on policy, IMA calculates the digest of the file content and extends the TPM with the digest, verifies the file's integrity based on the digest, and/or includes the file digest in the audit log. LSMs could similarly take action depending on the file content and the access mask requested with open(). The new hook returns a value and can cause the open to be aborted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:00 +01:00
lsm: move the file hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-10 13:23:09 -05:00
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted on an already-opened file. This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate() operations differently to truncate() operations. Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2022-10-18 20:22:06 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted on an already-opened file. This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate() operations differently to truncate() operations. Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2022-10-18 20:22:06 +02:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob. We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-24 20:46:33 +09:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob. We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-24 20:46:33 +09:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: create task_free security callback The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-12-21 12:17:03 -08:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Move management of the task_struct->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use is abstracted to avoid future conflict. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:19:37 -07:00
security: create task_free security callback The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-12-21 12:17:03 -08:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 09:14:21 +01:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 09:14:21 +01:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on free From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization that could result in this. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
2019-01-16 15:41:11 -08:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 12:02:49 -08:00
Infrastructure management of the cred security blob Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-12 09:30:56 -08:00
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 09:14:21 +01:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6] Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02 09:14:21 +01:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Add a cred_getsecid hook For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-01-08 13:36:19 -08:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of a task. This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of credentials. This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record: (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files). (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task creates. The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the LSM functions: (1) prepare_kernel_cred() Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared. (2) set_security_override() Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security context, assuming permission from the LSM policy. (3) set_security_override_from_ctx() As (2), but takes the security context as a string. (4) set_create_files_as() Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the same as that on a particular inode. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:28 +11:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of a task. This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of credentials. This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record: (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files). (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task creates. The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the LSM functions: (1) prepare_kernel_cred() Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared. (2) set_security_override() Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security context, assuming permission from the LSM policy. (3) set_security_override_from_ctx() As (2), but takes the security context as a string. (4) set_create_files_as() Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the same as that on a particular inode. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:28 +11:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of a task. This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of credentials. This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record: (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files). (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task creates. The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the LSM functions: (1) prepare_kernel_cred() Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared. (2) set_security_override() Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security context, assuming permission from the LSM policy. (3) set_security_override_from_ctx() As (2), but takes the security context as a string. (4) set_create_files_as() Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the same as that on a particular inode. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:28 +11:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of a task. This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of credentials. This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record: (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files). (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that a task creates. The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the LSM functions: (1) prepare_kernel_cred() Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared. (2) set_security_override() Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security context, assuming permission from the LSM policy. (3) set_security_override_from_ctx() As (2), but takes the security context as a string. (4) set_create_files_as() Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the same as that on a particular inode. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:28 +11:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers This commit fixes several typos in comment headers in security/security.c where "Check is" should be "Check if". Signed-off-by: Pairman Guo <pairmanxlr@gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-17 21:35:04 +08:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: report the module name to security_module_request For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request. Example output: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-11-03 16:35:32 +11:00
security: introducing security_request_module Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability to call request_module(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-13 09:44:57 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: introducing security_request_module Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability to call request_module(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-13 09:44:57 -04:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls. For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents, it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all existing LSMs to retain existing behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-02 10:38:23 -07:00
security: define kernel_read_file hook The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file into memory. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_read_file() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-01-30 22:23:26 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: define kernel_read_file hook The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file into memory. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_read_file() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-01-30 22:23:26 -05:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
vfs: define kernel_read_file_id enumeration To differentiate between the kernel_read_file() callers, this patch defines a new enumeration named kernel_read_file_id and includes the caller identifier as an argument. Subsequent patches define READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, READING_FIRMWARE, READING_MODULE, and READING_POLICY. Changelog v3: - Replace the IMA specific enumeration with a generic one. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-24 10:07:32 -05:00
vfs: define a generic function to read a file from the kernel For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux. These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just this though to load a file into a local buffer. There are minor but important checks differences on each. This patch set is the first attempt at resolving some of these differences. This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel with the corresponding security post-read hook and function. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu v3: - additional bounds checking - Luis v2: - To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-12-28 16:02:29 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
vfs: define a generic function to read a file from the kernel For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux. These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just this though to load a file into a local buffer. There are minor but important checks differences on each. This patch set is the first attempt at resolving some of these differences. This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel with the corresponding security post-read hook and function. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu v3: - additional bounds checking - Luis v2: - To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-12-28 16:02:29 -05:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-02 10:38:20 -07:00
security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data Differentiate between the kernel reading a file specified by userspace from the kernel loading a buffer containing data provided by userspace. This patch defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-13 14:05:56 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data Differentiate between the kernel reading a file specified by userspace from the kernel loading a buffer containing data provided by userspace. This patch defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-13 14:05:56 -04:00
security: export security_kernel_load_data function The firmware_loader can be built as a loadable module, which now fails when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, because a call to the security_kernel_load_data() function got added, and this is not exported to modules: ERROR: "security_kernel_load_data" [drivers/base/firmware_loader/firmware_class.ko] undefined! Add an EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() to make it available here. Fixes: 6e852651f28e ("firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-17 22:23:37 +02:00
security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data Differentiate between the kernel reading a file specified by userspace from the kernel loading a buffer containing data provided by userspace. This patch defines a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-13 14:05:56 -04:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-02 10:38:20 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-02 10:38:20 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls The SafeSetID LSM uses the security_task_fix_setuid hook to filter set*uid() syscalls according to its configured security policy. In preparation for adding analagous support in the LSM for set*gid() syscalls, we add the requisite hook here. Tested by putting print statements in the security_task_fix_setgid hook and seeing them get hit during kernel boot. Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
2020-06-09 10:22:13 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls The SafeSetID LSM uses the security_task_fix_setuid hook to filter set*uid() syscalls according to its configured security policy. In preparation for adding analagous support in the LSM for set*gid() syscalls, we add the requisite hook here. Tested by putting print statements in the security_task_fix_setgid hook and seeing them get hit during kernel boot. Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
2020-06-09 10:22:13 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls The SafeSetID LSM uses the security_task_fix_setuid hook to filter set*uid() syscalls according to its configured security policy. In preparation for adding analagous support in the LSM for set*gid() syscalls, we add the requisite hook here. Tested by putting print statements in the security_task_fix_setgid hook and seeing them get hit during kernel boot. Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
2020-06-09 10:22:13 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Add LSM hook to setgroups() syscall Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls. The SafeSetID LSM will use this new hook to ensure setgroups() calls are allowed by the installed security policy. Tested by putting print statement in security_task_fix_setgroups() hook and confirming that it gets hit when userspace does a setgroups() syscall. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
2022-06-08 20:57:11 +00:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Add LSM hook to setgroups() syscall Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls. The SafeSetID LSM will use this new hook to ensure setgroups() calls are allowed by the installed security policy. Tested by putting print statement in security_task_fix_setgroups() hook and confirming that it gets hit when userspace does a setgroups() syscall. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
2022-06-08 20:57:11 +00:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj() The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the current task and not an arbitrary task on the system. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-09-29 11:01:21 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj() The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the current task and not an arbitrary task on the system. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-09-29 11:01:21 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj() The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the current task and not an arbitrary task on the system. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-09-29 11:01:21 -04:00
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective credentials. This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook implementations and return the correct credentials. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-19 14:26:21 -05:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective credentials. This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook implementations and return the correct credentials. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-19 14:26:21 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2) with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context transitions. Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook. This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the resource limits of another process. Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission() function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource limits of the target process. The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the inline documentation for the hook to match the code. Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit (soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could only be used to obtain a process' own limits. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 07:57:00 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2) with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context transitions. Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook. This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the resource limits of another process. Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission() function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource limits of the target process. The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the inline documentation for the hook to match the code. Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit (soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could only be used to obtain a process' own limits. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 07:57:00 -05:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set rlimit of task other than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-26 18:41:16 +02:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler() All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable. This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is using it. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-15 04:21:18 +09:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying around in the kernel. The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in the kernel that embed struct siginfo. So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to 128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo. The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have the same field offsets. To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-09-25 11:27:20 +02:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: convert security hooks to use hlist This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down the size of the struct by about half. In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-03-29 01:28:23 +00:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the task hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-11 19:27:58 -05:00
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform some exploit. [1,2,3] While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched. Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in order of granularity: 1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl 2. Distro specific patch(es) 3. CONFIG_USER_NS To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and it is called before create_user_ns(): cred = prepare_creds() security_prepare_creds() call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ... if (cred) create_user_ns(cred) Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4] Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the hook returns any non-zero error code. This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack. Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome. Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an accompanying userns_create LSM hook. With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or administrators. This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials, otherwise an error is returned. Links: 1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492 2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636 3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918 4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/ Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-08-15 11:20:25 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform some exploit. [1,2,3] While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched. Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in order of granularity: 1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl 2. Distro specific patch(es) 3. CONFIG_USER_NS To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and it is called before create_user_ns(): cred = prepare_creds() security_prepare_creds() call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ... if (cred) create_user_ns(cred) Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4] Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the hook returns any non-zero error code. This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack. Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome. Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an accompanying userns_create LSM hook. With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or administrators. This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials, otherwise an error is returned. Links: 1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492 2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636 3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918 4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/ Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-08-15 11:20:25 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid) LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported SELinux interfaces. Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid secid exists. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 21:51:09 +02:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid) LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported SELinux interfaces. Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid secid exists. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 21:51:09 +02:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue. Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to ipc/msg.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:22:26 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue. Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to ipc/msg.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:22:26 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue. Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to ipc/msg.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:22:26 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue. Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to ipc/msg.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:22:26 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue. Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to ipc/msg.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:22:26 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
msg/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not msg_queue into the msg_queue security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue. Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to ipc/msg.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:22:26 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel.. Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:08:27 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel.. Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:08:27 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel.. Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:08:27 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
shm/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not shmid_kernel into the shm security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel.. Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 21:08:27 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array. Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array to become private to ipc/sem.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 20:52:43 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array. Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array to become private to ipc/sem.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 20:52:43 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-11-20 11:55:02 -08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array. Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array to become private to ipc/sem.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 20:52:43 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array. Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array to become private to ipc/sem.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 20:52:43 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the sysv hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 11:53:49 -05:00
sem/security: Pass kern_ipc_perm not sem_array into the sem security hooks All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array. Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array to become private to ipc/sem.c. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-22 20:52:43 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr() and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes") Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io> [PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-14 11:31:26 -04:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr() and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes") Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io> [PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-14 11:31:26 -04:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr() We should return -EINVAL if the user specifies LSM_FLAG_SINGLE without supplying a valid lsm_ctx struct buffer. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 12:42:38 -04:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr() We should return -EINVAL if the user specifies LSM_FLAG_SINGLE without supplying a valid lsm_ctx struct buffer. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 12:42:38 -04:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr() Zero out all of the size counters in the -E2BIG case (buffer too small) to help make the current code a bit more robust in the face of future code changes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 12:38:40 -04:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr() Zero out all of the size counters in the -E2BIG case (buffer too small) to help make the current code a bit more robust in the face of future code changes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-24 12:38:40 -04:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: use 32-bit compatible data types in LSM syscalls Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr() and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes") Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io> [PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-03-14 11:31:26 -04:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: fix integer overflow in lsm_set_self_attr() syscall security_setselfattr() has an integer overflow bug that leads to out-of-bounds access when userspace provides bogus input: `lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx)` is checked against `lctx->len` (and, redundantly, also against `size`), but there are no checks on `lctx->ctx_len`. Therefore, userspace can provide an `lsm_ctx` with `->ctx_len` set to a value between `-sizeof(struct lsm_ctx)` and -1, and this bogus `->ctx_len` will then be passed to an LSM module as a buffer length, causing LSM modules to perform out-of-bounds accesses. The following reproducer will demonstrate this under ASAN (if AppArmor is loaded as an LSM): ``` struct lsm_ctx { uint64_t id; uint64_t flags; uint64_t len; uint64_t ctx_len; char ctx[]; }; int main(void) { size_t size = sizeof(struct lsm_ctx); struct lsm_ctx *ctx = malloc(size); ctx->id = 104/*LSM_ID_APPARMOR*/; ctx->flags = 0; ctx->len = size; ctx->ctx_len = -sizeof(struct lsm_ctx); syscall( 460/*__NR_lsm_set_self_attr*/, /*attr=*/ 100/*LSM_ATTR_CURRENT*/, /*ctx=*/ ctx, /*size=*/ size, /*flags=*/ 0 ); } ``` Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subj tweak, removed ref to ASAN splat that isn't included] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-14 17:05:38 +01:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user() As suggested by the kernel test robot, memdup_user() is a better option than the combo of kmalloc()/copy_from_user(). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202310270805.2ArE52i5-lkp@intel.com/ Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-11-01 18:42:12 -04:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: fix integer overflow in lsm_set_self_attr() syscall security_setselfattr() has an integer overflow bug that leads to out-of-bounds access when userspace provides bogus input: `lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx)` is checked against `lctx->len` (and, redundantly, also against `size`), but there are no checks on `lctx->ctx_len`. Therefore, userspace can provide an `lsm_ctx` with `->ctx_len` set to a value between `-sizeof(struct lsm_ctx)` and -1, and this bogus `->ctx_len` will then be passed to an LSM module as a buffer length, causing LSM modules to perform out-of-bounds accesses. The following reproducer will demonstrate this under ASAN (if AppArmor is loaded as an LSM): ``` struct lsm_ctx { uint64_t id; uint64_t flags; uint64_t len; uint64_t ctx_len; char ctx[]; }; int main(void) { size_t size = sizeof(struct lsm_ctx); struct lsm_ctx *ctx = malloc(size); ctx->id = 104/*LSM_ID_APPARMOR*/; ctx->flags = 0; ctx->len = size; ctx->ctx_len = -sizeof(struct lsm_ctx); syscall( 460/*__NR_lsm_set_self_attr*/, /*attr=*/ 100/*LSM_ATTR_CURRENT*/, /*ctx=*/ ctx, /*size=*/ size, /*flags=*/ 0 ); } ``` Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subj tweak, removed ref to ASAN splat that isn't included] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-14 17:05:38 +01:00
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr. The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well. struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; }; Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:49 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr. The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:48 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr. The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:48 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
procfs: add smack subdir to attrs Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the security "context" of the process, but it will be different depending on the security module you're using. This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case may be) as before. The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. The original implementation is by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:16:59 -07:00
proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr. The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:48 -07:00
procfs: add smack subdir to attrs Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the security "context" of the process, but it will be different depending on the security module you're using. This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case may be) as before. The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. The original implementation is by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:16:59 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr. The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:48 -07:00
lsm: move the inode hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-08 16:31:55 -05:00
proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr. The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:48 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
procfs: add smack subdir to attrs Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the security "context" of the process, but it will be different depending on the security module you're using. This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case may be) as before. The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. The original implementation is by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:16:59 -07:00
proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr. The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement. Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-09-12 13:56:48 -07:00
procfs: add smack subdir to attrs Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module. The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the security "context" of the process, but it will be different depending on the security module you're using. This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case may be) as before. The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory. The original implementation is by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-21 17:16:59 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the netlink hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:06:59 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers This commit fixes several typos in comment headers in security/security.c where "Check is" should be "Check if". Signed-off-by: Pairman Guo <pairmanxlr@gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-17 21:35:04 +08:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model. The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-05-22 12:50:35 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model. The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
2013-05-22 12:50:35 -04:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdata Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 20:52:51 +01:00
security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux implementation for this hook. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-15 23:47:35 +00:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: add a secctx_to_secid() hook Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux implementation for this hook. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-01-15 23:47:35 +00:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached information becomes invalid. Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes invalid. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24 11:09:40 -05:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
lsm: fix a spelling mistake Fix a spelling mistake in the security_inode_notifysecctx() kdoc header block. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-10-04 16:08:09 -04:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-03 14:25:57 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-03 14:25:57 -04:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-03 14:25:57 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-03 14:25:57 -04:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-03 14:25:57 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-03 14:25:57 -04:00
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion Add a security hook that allows an LSM to rule on whether a notification message is allowed to be inserted into a particular watch queue. The hook is given the following information: (1) The credentials of the triggerer (which may be init_cred for a system notification, eg. a hardware error). (2) The credentials of the whoever set the watch. (3) The notification message. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-02-12 13:58:35 +00:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion Add a security hook that allows an LSM to rule on whether a notification message is allowed to be inserted into a particular watch queue. The hook is given the following information: (1) The credentials of the triggerer (which may be init_cred for a system notification, eg. a hardware error). (2) The credentials of the whoever set the watch. (3) The notification message. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-02-12 13:58:35 +00:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion Add a security hook that allows an LSM to rule on whether a notification message is allowed to be inserted into a particular watch queue. The hook is given the following information: (1) The credentials of the triggerer (which may be init_cred for a system notification, eg. a hardware error). (2) The credentials of the whoever set the watch. (3) The notification message. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-02-12 13:58:35 +00:00
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch Add security hooks that will allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch may be set. More than one hook is required as the watches watch different types of object. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-02-12 13:58:35 +00:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch Add security hooks that will allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch may be set. More than one hook is required as the watches watch different types of object. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-02-12 13:58:35 +00:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch Add security hooks that will allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch may be set. More than one hook is required as the watches watch different types of object. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-02-12 13:58:35 +00:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch Add security hooks that will allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch may be set. More than one hook is required as the watches watch different types of object. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-02-12 13:58:35 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the AF_UNIX hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:10:23 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the AF_UNIX hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:10:23 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: add hook for socketpair() Right now the LSM labels for socketpairs are always uninitialized, since there is no security hook for the socketpair() syscall. This patch adds the required hooks so LSMs can properly label socketpairs. This allows SO_PEERSEC to return useful information on those sockets. Note that the behavior of socketpair() can be emulated by creating a listener socket, connecting to it, and then discarding the initial listener socket. With this workaround, SO_PEERSEC would return the caller's security context. However, with socketpair(), the uninitialized context is returned unconditionally. This is unexpected and makes socketpair() less useful in situations where the security context is crucial to the application. With the new socketpair-hook this disparity can be solved by making socketpair() return the expected security context. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-04 16:28:19 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: add hook for socketpair() Right now the LSM labels for socketpairs are always uninitialized, since there is no security hook for the socketpair() syscall. This patch adds the required hooks so LSMs can properly label socketpairs. This allows SO_PEERSEC to return useful information on those sockets. Note that the behavior of socketpair() can be emulated by creating a listener socket, connecting to it, and then discarding the initial listener socket. With this workaround, SO_PEERSEC would return the caller's security context. However, with socketpair(), the uninitialized context is returned unconditionally. This is unexpected and makes socketpair() less useful in situations where the security context is crucial to the application. With the new socketpair-hook this disparity can be solved by making socketpair() return the expected security context. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-05-04 16:28:19 +02:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers This commit fixes several typos in comment headers in security/security.c where "Check is" should be "Check if". Signed-off-by: Pairman Guo <pairmanxlr@gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-17 21:35:04 +08:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt() with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook. There are several ways to protect against this, including careful code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and safely handle both user and kernel space buffers. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-10-10 12:31:21 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
bluetooth: Properly clone LSM attributes to newly created child connections The Bluetooth stack has internal connection handlers for all of the various Bluetooth protocols, and unfortunately, they are currently lacking the LSM hooks found in the core network stack's connection handlers. I say unfortunately, because this can cause problems for users who have have an LSM enabled and are using certain Bluetooth devices. See one problem report below: * http://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=741703 In order to keep things simple at this point in time, this patch fixes the problem by cloning the parent socket's LSM attributes to the newly created child socket. If we decide we need a more elaborate LSM marking mechanism for Bluetooth (I somewhat doubt this) we can always revisit this decision in the future. Reported-by: James M. Cape <jcape@ignore-your.tv> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-10-07 09:40:59 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: add comment block for security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook has no comment block. Add a comment block with a brief description of LSM hook and its function parameters. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: minor double-space fix] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-31 19:36:47 +05:00
security: Constify sk in the sk_getsecid hook. The sk_getsecid hook shouldn't need to modify its socket argument. Make it const so that callers of security_sk_classify_flow() can use a const struct sock *. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2023-07-11 15:06:08 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-09-27 22:38:26 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-09-27 22:38:26 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-09-27 22:38:26 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: add const qualifier to struct sock in various places A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const' qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the 'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function expects a 'struct sock *'. However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to security_inet_conn_request instead. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-11-30 16:36:29 +01:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-02-13 20:53:21 +00:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
secmark: make secmark object handling generic Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-13 16:24:41 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
secmark: make secmark object handling generic Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-13 16:24:41 -04:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
secmark: make secmark object handling generic Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-13 16:24:41 -04:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
secmark: make secmark object handling generic Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-13 16:24:41 -04:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
secmark: make secmark object handling generic Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-13 16:24:41 -04:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
secmark: make secmark object handling generic Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-13 16:24:41 -04:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-28 18:12:43 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-28 18:12:43 -04:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-28 18:12:43 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-28 18:12:43 -04:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-28 18:12:43 -04:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-28 18:12:43 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driver The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-28 18:12:43 -04:00
lsm: move the socket hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-12 15:15:29 -05:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2013-01-14 07:12:19 +00:00
lsm: move the SCTP hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 17:47:10 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-02-13 20:53:21 +00:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-02-13 20:53:21 +00:00
lsm: move the SCTP hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 17:47:10 -05:00
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-02-13 20:53:21 +00:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-02-13 20:53:21 +00:00
lsm: move the SCTP hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 17:47:10 -05:00
security: pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association, and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's. Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request() is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(). v1->v2: - fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed. - fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-11-02 08:02:47 -04:00
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-02-13 20:53:21 +00:00
security: pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association, and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's. Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request() is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(). v1->v2: - fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed. - fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-11-02 08:02:47 -04:00
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-02-13 20:53:21 +00:00
lsm: move the SCTP hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 17:47:10 -05:00
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace security_inet_conn_established() called in sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-02-12 18:59:21 +01:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace security_inet_conn_established() called in sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Based-on-patch-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-02-12 18:59:21 +01:00
security, lsm: Introduce security_mptcp_add_subflow() MPTCP can create subflows in kernel context, and later indirectly expose them to user-space, via the owning MPTCP socket. As discussed in the reported link, the above causes unexpected failures for server, MPTCP-enabled applications. Let's introduce a new LSM hook to allow the security module to relabel the subflow according to the owning user-space process, via the MPTCP socket owning the subflow. Note that the new hook requires both the MPTCP socket and the new subflow. This could allow future extensions, e.g. explicitly validating the MPTCP <-> subflow linkage. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/CAHC9VhTNh-YwiyTds=P1e3rixEDqbRTFj22bpya=+qJqfcaMfg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-04-20 19:17:13 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security, lsm: Introduce security_mptcp_add_subflow() MPTCP can create subflows in kernel context, and later indirectly expose them to user-space, via the owning MPTCP socket. As discussed in the reported link, the above causes unexpected failures for server, MPTCP-enabled applications. Let's introduce a new LSM hook to allow the security module to relabel the subflow according to the owning user-space process, via the MPTCP socket owning the subflow. Note that the new hook requires both the MPTCP socket and the new subflow. This could allow future extensions, e.g. explicitly validating the MPTCP <-> subflow linkage. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/CAHC9VhTNh-YwiyTds=P1e3rixEDqbRTFj22bpya=+qJqfcaMfg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-04-20 19:17:13 +02:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:52 +03:00
lsm: move the Infiniband hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:07:41 -05:00
lsm: fix a number of misspellings A random collection of spelling fixes for source files in the LSM layer. Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-05-24 23:19:53 -04:00
lsm: move the Infiniband hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:07:41 -05:00
IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:52 +03:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:52 +03:00
lsm: move the Infiniband hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:07:41 -05:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a MAD agent. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys and sending and receiving SMPs. When sending or receiving a MAD check that the agent has permission to access the PKey for the Subnet Prefix of the port. During MAD and snoop agent registration for SMI QPs check that the calling process has permission to access the manage the subnet and register a callback with the LSM to be notified of policy changes. When notificaiton of a policy change occurs recheck permission and set a flag indicating sending and receiving SMPs is allowed. When sending and receiving MADs check that the agent has access to the SMI if it's on an SMI QP. Because security policy can change it's possible permission was allowed when creating the agent, but no longer is. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: remove the LSM hook init code] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:54 +03:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a MAD agent. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys and sending and receiving SMPs. When sending or receiving a MAD check that the agent has permission to access the PKey for the Subnet Prefix of the port. During MAD and snoop agent registration for SMI QPs check that the calling process has permission to access the manage the subnet and register a callback with the LSM to be notified of policy changes. When notificaiton of a policy change occurs recheck permission and set a flag indicating sending and receiving SMPs is allowed. When sending and receiving MADs check that the agent has access to the SMI if it's on an SMI QP. Because security policy can change it's possible permission was allowed when creating the agent, but no longer is. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: remove the LSM hook init code] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:54 +03:00
lsm: move the Infiniband hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:07:41 -05:00
IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:52 +03:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:52 +03:00
lsm: move the Infiniband hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:07:41 -05:00
IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-19 15:48:52 +03:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callers security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-03-07 12:44:19 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
LSM: Make the Labeled IPsec hooks more stack friendly The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs on the stack to work around the LSM API. This patch attempts to fix that problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security" pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-04-12 19:07:52 -07:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
LSM: Make the Labeled IPsec hooks more stack friendly The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs on the stack to work around the LSM API. This patch attempts to fix that problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security" pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-04-12 19:07:52 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
LSM: Make the Labeled IPsec hooks more stack friendly The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs on the stack to work around the LSM API. This patch attempts to fix that problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security" pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-04-12 19:07:52 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
lsm: split the xfrm_state_alloc_security() hook implementation The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel: * xfrm_state_alloc * xfrm_state_alloc_acquire Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux code; no other LSMs are affected. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2013-07-23 17:38:38 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
selinux: delete selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() useless argument seliunx_xfrm_policy_lookup() is hooks of security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). The dir argument is uselss in security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). So remove the dir argument from selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). Signed-off-by: Zhongjun Tan <tanzhongjun@yulong.com> [PM: reformat the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-04-09 13:48:41 +08:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
lsm: fix doc warnings in the LSM hook comments Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 12:31:03 -05:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
xfrm: Mark flowi arg to security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() const. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-02-22 18:13:15 -08:00
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-09-27 22:38:26 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-29 01:43:50 +01:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: convert security hooks to use hlist This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down the size of the struct by about half. In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-03-29 01:28:23 +00:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-09-27 22:38:26 -04:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the xfrm hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 18:14:01 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-09-27 22:38:26 -04:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm: styling fixes to security/security.c As we were already making massive changes to security/security.c by moving all of the function header comments above the function definitions, let's take the opportunity to fix various style crimes. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 21:33:20 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the key hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 21:46:31 -05:00
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the key hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 21:46:31 -05:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the key hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 21:46:31 -05:00
keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum. The enum is also given some extra values to represent special circumstances, such as: (1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter being unset. (2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag). (3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN. (4) An override due to an instantiation token being present. (5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission() calls. The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations. [Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available permits. However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle of the notifications patchset.] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
2020-05-12 15:16:29 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
lsm: move the key hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 21:46:31 -05:00
lsm: fix a badly named parameter in security_get_getsecurity() There is no good reason for why the "_buffer" parameter needs an underscore, get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 13:28:18 -05:00
lsm: move the key hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 21:46:31 -05:00
lsm: fix a badly named parameter in security_get_getsecurity() There is no good reason for why the "_buffer" parameter needs an underscore, get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 13:28:18 -05:00
lsm: move the key hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-15 21:46:31 -05:00
lsm: fix a badly named parameter in security_get_getsecurity() There is no good reason for why the "_buffer" parameter needs an underscore, get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 13:28:18 -05:00
keys: add keyctl function to get a security label Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key. The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt: (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context attached to a key in the buffer provided. Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy will take place. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is in force then an empty string will be returned. A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be successful. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 01:01:26 -07:00
lsm: fix a badly named parameter in security_get_getsecurity() There is no good reason for why the "_buffer" parameter needs an underscore, get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-03-08 13:28:18 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
keys: add keyctl function to get a security label Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key. The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt: (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context attached to a key in the buffer provided. Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy will take place. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is in force then an empty string will be returned. A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be successful. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 01:01:26 -07:00
security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the key_post_create_or_update hook. Depending on policy, IMA measures the key content after creation or update, so that remote verifiers are aware of the operation. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful key creation or update. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-02-15 11:31:06 +01:00
keys: add keyctl function to get a security label Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key. The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt: (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context attached to a key in the buffer provided. Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy will take place. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is in force then an empty string will be returned. A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be successful. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 01:01:26 -07:00
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-16 23:31:32 -07:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
lsm: move the audit hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:00:01 -05:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
lsm: move the audit hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:00:01 -05:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
lsm: move the audit hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:00:01 -05:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
LSM: Introduce security hook calling Macros Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:29 -07:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
lsm: move the audit hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:00:01 -05:00
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack). The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be accessed by audit accessor functions. It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used. Remove it. Please see the github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: fixed the referenced commit title] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-31 11:52:11 -05:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules by adding the following new LSM hooks: audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule) audit_rule_known(krule) audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx) audit_rule_free(rule) Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
2008-03-01 22:00:05 +02:00
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-05-02 15:11:42 -07:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free LSM hooks Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs. Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which seems to be a sweet spot. But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the outcome. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:07 -08:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free LSM hooks Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs. Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which seems to be a sweet spot. But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the outcome. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:07 -08:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free LSM hooks Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs. Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which seems to be a sweet spot. But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the outcome. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:07 -08:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm/stable-6.9 PR 20240312 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmXwt3cUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXObOhAAqldn1nbYS/t1D/k/9ZN/PtSQetK4 S58D8+gB59Sg0daWFaRhCwwShIbXS/6XzhqaVb3iAPptJs0YDFMbWLAW2d+dd69K /7C8diguHbuJdEnCJtFYQIVinavaYVRlyoQcO8uwTz8uvTgXPOhr2P9NcOApJXcR xqttuADVo/9Zn0O9/+GUPCH0ROL0SMnuUjwdVP3bpPHj9zEk8F1/A6chzTeSLJru Y4+cRrN/r0JTkvRqPdnF9LSvxK7mtAEaHkKGeLQbw0O5pv3r3w0EWMJvq+uonGU2 WX0eR5VMfevkFMUdw8FKOTa+OZ0HJ2KKIb4sB4wDMgeGyov7Z6SxgvFeQiSyD3aB QnyfLDzeEuPfousxUd45dUDnsWNnSgFF+JAdi0LSzm5hMuLeQDozTsFmh0orQcX1 L5A6VtAbSPP0ffl+tuPi48q3P3LlSjMP0B8W20NXFYhXukKXCgXVMr/dEvpwpu1m o1glviGIXeLQQSnX3lMWb7Ds2igmCtXPrqkdu2vpRhMp0od6n4R4jH73Aj5MeSQn n3sP73dg5sAaMjtI2NOisMeFUp09MMlOumCCM+AIplPXremm1kwgKRTIp0rKsLW9 VoQPXa43LQc3hAgPrpGuE+4yBfaBUq7Z8I37IFER/2y4K8b9YkduW4kDh7OdRz+d iQ4Nnu2lR/+CCH0= =0mTM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs, complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM. However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen. - Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a default return value, despite a default value being specified when the LSM hook was defined. This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently, hence this work). - Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create() The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's use it. - Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in the LSM hook comment blocks. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits) cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create() lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers integrity: Remove LSM ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Move to LSM infrastructure ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure ima: Move to LSM infrastructure integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook security: Introduce file_release hook security: Introduce file_post_open hook security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM ...
2024-03-12 20:03:34 -07:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much information as we can basically provide. The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF verification step. bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and signatures. Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one *even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their relative ordering. Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it should not be an issue anymore. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:06 -08:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much information as we can basically provide. The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF verification step. bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and signatures. Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one *even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their relative ordering. Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it should not be an issue anymore. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:06 -08:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much information as we can basically provide. The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF verification step. bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and signatures. Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one *even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their relative ordering. Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it should not be an issue anymore. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:06 -08:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm/stable-6.9 PR 20240312 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmXwt3cUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXObOhAAqldn1nbYS/t1D/k/9ZN/PtSQetK4 S58D8+gB59Sg0daWFaRhCwwShIbXS/6XzhqaVb3iAPptJs0YDFMbWLAW2d+dd69K /7C8diguHbuJdEnCJtFYQIVinavaYVRlyoQcO8uwTz8uvTgXPOhr2P9NcOApJXcR xqttuADVo/9Zn0O9/+GUPCH0ROL0SMnuUjwdVP3bpPHj9zEk8F1/A6chzTeSLJru Y4+cRrN/r0JTkvRqPdnF9LSvxK7mtAEaHkKGeLQbw0O5pv3r3w0EWMJvq+uonGU2 WX0eR5VMfevkFMUdw8FKOTa+OZ0HJ2KKIb4sB4wDMgeGyov7Z6SxgvFeQiSyD3aB QnyfLDzeEuPfousxUd45dUDnsWNnSgFF+JAdi0LSzm5hMuLeQDozTsFmh0orQcX1 L5A6VtAbSPP0ffl+tuPi48q3P3LlSjMP0B8W20NXFYhXukKXCgXVMr/dEvpwpu1m o1glviGIXeLQQSnX3lMWb7Ds2igmCtXPrqkdu2vpRhMp0od6n4R4jH73Aj5MeSQn n3sP73dg5sAaMjtI2NOisMeFUp09MMlOumCCM+AIplPXremm1kwgKRTIp0rKsLW9 VoQPXa43LQc3hAgPrpGuE+4yBfaBUq7Z8I37IFER/2y4K8b9YkduW4kDh7OdRz+d iQ4Nnu2lR/+CCH0= =0mTM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs, complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM. However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen. - Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a default return value, despite a default value being specified when the LSM hook was defined. This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently, hence this work). - Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create() The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's use it. - Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in the LSM hook comment blocks. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits) cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create() lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers integrity: Remove LSM ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Move to LSM infrastructure ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure ima: Move to LSM infrastructure integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook security: Introduce file_release hook security: Introduce file_post_open hook security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM ...
2024-03-12 20:03:34 -07:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token. This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog. Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable() LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability, respectively. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:08 -08:00
lsm/stable-6.9 PR 20240312 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmXwt3cUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXObOhAAqldn1nbYS/t1D/k/9ZN/PtSQetK4 S58D8+gB59Sg0daWFaRhCwwShIbXS/6XzhqaVb3iAPptJs0YDFMbWLAW2d+dd69K /7C8diguHbuJdEnCJtFYQIVinavaYVRlyoQcO8uwTz8uvTgXPOhr2P9NcOApJXcR xqttuADVo/9Zn0O9/+GUPCH0ROL0SMnuUjwdVP3bpPHj9zEk8F1/A6chzTeSLJru Y4+cRrN/r0JTkvRqPdnF9LSvxK7mtAEaHkKGeLQbw0O5pv3r3w0EWMJvq+uonGU2 WX0eR5VMfevkFMUdw8FKOTa+OZ0HJ2KKIb4sB4wDMgeGyov7Z6SxgvFeQiSyD3aB QnyfLDzeEuPfousxUd45dUDnsWNnSgFF+JAdi0LSzm5hMuLeQDozTsFmh0orQcX1 L5A6VtAbSPP0ffl+tuPi48q3P3LlSjMP0B8W20NXFYhXukKXCgXVMr/dEvpwpu1m o1glviGIXeLQQSnX3lMWb7Ds2igmCtXPrqkdu2vpRhMp0od6n4R4jH73Aj5MeSQn n3sP73dg5sAaMjtI2NOisMeFUp09MMlOumCCM+AIplPXremm1kwgKRTIp0rKsLW9 VoQPXa43LQc3hAgPrpGuE+4yBfaBUq7Z8I37IFER/2y4K8b9YkduW4kDh7OdRz+d iQ4Nnu2lR/+CCH0= =0mTM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs, complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM. However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen. - Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a default return value, despite a default value being specified when the LSM hook was defined. This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently, hence this work). - Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create() The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's use it. - Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in the LSM hook comment blocks. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits) cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create() lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers integrity: Remove LSM ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Move to LSM infrastructure ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure ima: Move to LSM infrastructure integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook security: Introduce file_release hook security: Introduce file_post_open hook security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM ...
2024-03-12 20:03:34 -07:00
bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token. This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog. Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable() LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability, respectively. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:08 -08:00
lsm/stable-6.9 PR 20240312 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmXwt3cUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXObOhAAqldn1nbYS/t1D/k/9ZN/PtSQetK4 S58D8+gB59Sg0daWFaRhCwwShIbXS/6XzhqaVb3iAPptJs0YDFMbWLAW2d+dd69K /7C8diguHbuJdEnCJtFYQIVinavaYVRlyoQcO8uwTz8uvTgXPOhr2P9NcOApJXcR xqttuADVo/9Zn0O9/+GUPCH0ROL0SMnuUjwdVP3bpPHj9zEk8F1/A6chzTeSLJru Y4+cRrN/r0JTkvRqPdnF9LSvxK7mtAEaHkKGeLQbw0O5pv3r3w0EWMJvq+uonGU2 WX0eR5VMfevkFMUdw8FKOTa+OZ0HJ2KKIb4sB4wDMgeGyov7Z6SxgvFeQiSyD3aB QnyfLDzeEuPfousxUd45dUDnsWNnSgFF+JAdi0LSzm5hMuLeQDozTsFmh0orQcX1 L5A6VtAbSPP0ffl+tuPi48q3P3LlSjMP0B8W20NXFYhXukKXCgXVMr/dEvpwpu1m o1glviGIXeLQQSnX3lMWb7Ds2igmCtXPrqkdu2vpRhMp0od6n4R4jH73Aj5MeSQn n3sP73dg5sAaMjtI2NOisMeFUp09MMlOumCCM+AIplPXremm1kwgKRTIp0rKsLW9 VoQPXa43LQc3hAgPrpGuE+4yBfaBUq7Z8I37IFER/2y4K8b9YkduW4kDh7OdRz+d iQ4Nnu2lR/+CCH0= =0mTM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs, complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM. However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen. - Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a default return value, despite a default value being specified when the LSM hook was defined. This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently, hence this work). - Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create() The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's use it. - Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in the LSM hook comment blocks. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits) cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create() lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers integrity: Remove LSM ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Move to LSM infrastructure ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure ima: Move to LSM infrastructure integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook security: Introduce file_release hook security: Introduce file_post_open hook security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM ...
2024-03-12 20:03:34 -07:00
bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token. This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog. Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable() LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability, respectively. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:08 -08:00
lsm/stable-6.9 PR 20240312 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmXwt3cUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXObOhAAqldn1nbYS/t1D/k/9ZN/PtSQetK4 S58D8+gB59Sg0daWFaRhCwwShIbXS/6XzhqaVb3iAPptJs0YDFMbWLAW2d+dd69K /7C8diguHbuJdEnCJtFYQIVinavaYVRlyoQcO8uwTz8uvTgXPOhr2P9NcOApJXcR xqttuADVo/9Zn0O9/+GUPCH0ROL0SMnuUjwdVP3bpPHj9zEk8F1/A6chzTeSLJru Y4+cRrN/r0JTkvRqPdnF9LSvxK7mtAEaHkKGeLQbw0O5pv3r3w0EWMJvq+uonGU2 WX0eR5VMfevkFMUdw8FKOTa+OZ0HJ2KKIb4sB4wDMgeGyov7Z6SxgvFeQiSyD3aB QnyfLDzeEuPfousxUd45dUDnsWNnSgFF+JAdi0LSzm5hMuLeQDozTsFmh0orQcX1 L5A6VtAbSPP0ffl+tuPi48q3P3LlSjMP0B8W20NXFYhXukKXCgXVMr/dEvpwpu1m o1glviGIXeLQQSnX3lMWb7Ds2igmCtXPrqkdu2vpRhMp0od6n4R4jH73Aj5MeSQn n3sP73dg5sAaMjtI2NOisMeFUp09MMlOumCCM+AIplPXremm1kwgKRTIp0rKsLW9 VoQPXa43LQc3hAgPrpGuE+4yBfaBUq7Z8I37IFER/2y4K8b9YkduW4kDh7OdRz+d iQ4Nnu2lR/+CCH0= =0mTM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs, complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM. However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen. - Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a default return value, despite a default value being specified when the LSM hook was defined. This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently, hence this work). - Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create() The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's use it. - Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in the LSM hook comment blocks. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits) cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create() lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers integrity: Remove LSM ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM evm: Move to LSM infrastructure ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure ima: Move to LSM infrastructure integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook security: Introduce file_release hook security: Introduce file_post_open hook security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM ...
2024-03-12 20:03:34 -07:00
bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token. This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog. Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable() LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability, respectively. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:08 -08:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free LSM hooks Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs. Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which seems to be a sweet spot. But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the outcome. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:07 -08:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much information as we can basically provide. The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF verification step. bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and signatures. Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one *even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their relative ordering. Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it should not be an issue anymore. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:06 -08:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much information as we can basically provide. The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF verification step. bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and signatures. Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one *even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their relative ordering. Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it should not be an issue anymore. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:06 -08:00
lsm: move the bpf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:13:40 -05:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much information as we can basically provide. The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF verification step. bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and signatures. Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one *even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their relative ordering. Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it should not be an issue anymore. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:06 -08:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
bpf,lsm: Refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much information as we can basically provide. The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF verification step. bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and signatures. Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one *even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their relative ordering. Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it should not be an issue anymore. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:06 -08:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token. This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog. Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable() LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability, respectively. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-23 18:21:08 -08:00
security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps. The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and how the cmd should be checked. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-18 13:00:24 -07:00
security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:38 -07:00
lsm: move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:34:14 -05:00
security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:38 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-19 17:17:38 -07:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: move the perf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:22:36 -05:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: move the perf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:22:36 -05:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: move the perf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:22:36 -05:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: move the perf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:22:36 -05:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: move the perf hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:22:36 -05:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
2019-10-14 13:03:08 -04:00
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring A full expalantion of io_uring is beyond the scope of this commit description, but in summary it is an asynchronous I/O mechanism which allows for I/O requests and the resulting data to be queued in memory mapped "rings" which are shared between the kernel and userspace. Optionally, io_uring offers the ability for applications to spawn kernel threads to dequeue I/O requests from the ring and submit the requests in the kernel, helping to minimize the syscall overhead. Rings are accessed in userspace by memory mapping a file descriptor provided by the io_uring_setup(2), and can be shared between applications as one might do with any open file descriptor. Finally, process credentials can be registered with a given ring and any process with access to that ring can submit I/O requests using any of the registered credentials. While the io_uring functionality is widely recognized as offering a vastly improved, and high performing asynchronous I/O mechanism, its ability to allow processes to submit I/O requests with credentials other than its own presents a challenge to LSMs. When a process creates a new io_uring ring the ring's credentials are inhertied from the calling process; if this ring is shared with another process operating with different credentials there is the potential to bypass the LSMs security policy. Similarly, registering credentials with a given ring allows any process with access to that ring to submit I/O requests with those credentials. In an effort to allow LSMs to apply security policy to io_uring I/O operations, this patch adds two new LSM hooks. These hooks, in conjunction with the LSM anonymous inode support previously submitted, allow an LSM to apply access control policy to the sharing of io_uring rings as well as any io_uring credential changes requested by a process. The new LSM hooks are described below: * int security_uring_override_creds(cred) Controls if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to override it's credentials with @cred. In cases where the current task is a user application, the current credentials will be those of the user application. In cases where the current task is a kernel thread servicing io_uring requests the current credentials will be those of the io_uring ring (inherited from the process that created the ring). * int security_uring_sqpoll(void) Controls if the current task is allowed to create an io_uring polling thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). Without a SQPOLL thread in the kernel processes must submit I/O requests via io_uring_enter(2) which allows us to compare any requested credential changes against the application making the request. With a SQPOLL thread, we can no longer compare requested credential changes against the application making the request, the comparison is made against the ring's credentials. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-01 19:56:49 -05:00
lsm: move the io_uring hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:28:31 -05:00
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring A full expalantion of io_uring is beyond the scope of this commit description, but in summary it is an asynchronous I/O mechanism which allows for I/O requests and the resulting data to be queued in memory mapped "rings" which are shared between the kernel and userspace. Optionally, io_uring offers the ability for applications to spawn kernel threads to dequeue I/O requests from the ring and submit the requests in the kernel, helping to minimize the syscall overhead. Rings are accessed in userspace by memory mapping a file descriptor provided by the io_uring_setup(2), and can be shared between applications as one might do with any open file descriptor. Finally, process credentials can be registered with a given ring and any process with access to that ring can submit I/O requests using any of the registered credentials. While the io_uring functionality is widely recognized as offering a vastly improved, and high performing asynchronous I/O mechanism, its ability to allow processes to submit I/O requests with credentials other than its own presents a challenge to LSMs. When a process creates a new io_uring ring the ring's credentials are inhertied from the calling process; if this ring is shared with another process operating with different credentials there is the potential to bypass the LSMs security policy. Similarly, registering credentials with a given ring allows any process with access to that ring to submit I/O requests with those credentials. In an effort to allow LSMs to apply security policy to io_uring I/O operations, this patch adds two new LSM hooks. These hooks, in conjunction with the LSM anonymous inode support previously submitted, allow an LSM to apply access control policy to the sharing of io_uring rings as well as any io_uring credential changes requested by a process. The new LSM hooks are described below: * int security_uring_override_creds(cred) Controls if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to override it's credentials with @cred. In cases where the current task is a user application, the current credentials will be those of the user application. In cases where the current task is a kernel thread servicing io_uring requests the current credentials will be those of the io_uring ring (inherited from the process that created the ring). * int security_uring_sqpoll(void) Controls if the current task is allowed to create an io_uring polling thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). Without a SQPOLL thread in the kernel processes must submit I/O requests via io_uring_enter(2) which allows us to compare any requested credential changes against the application making the request. With a SQPOLL thread, we can no longer compare requested credential changes against the application making the request, the comparison is made against the ring's credentials. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-01 19:56:49 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring A full expalantion of io_uring is beyond the scope of this commit description, but in summary it is an asynchronous I/O mechanism which allows for I/O requests and the resulting data to be queued in memory mapped "rings" which are shared between the kernel and userspace. Optionally, io_uring offers the ability for applications to spawn kernel threads to dequeue I/O requests from the ring and submit the requests in the kernel, helping to minimize the syscall overhead. Rings are accessed in userspace by memory mapping a file descriptor provided by the io_uring_setup(2), and can be shared between applications as one might do with any open file descriptor. Finally, process credentials can be registered with a given ring and any process with access to that ring can submit I/O requests using any of the registered credentials. While the io_uring functionality is widely recognized as offering a vastly improved, and high performing asynchronous I/O mechanism, its ability to allow processes to submit I/O requests with credentials other than its own presents a challenge to LSMs. When a process creates a new io_uring ring the ring's credentials are inhertied from the calling process; if this ring is shared with another process operating with different credentials there is the potential to bypass the LSMs security policy. Similarly, registering credentials with a given ring allows any process with access to that ring to submit I/O requests with those credentials. In an effort to allow LSMs to apply security policy to io_uring I/O operations, this patch adds two new LSM hooks. These hooks, in conjunction with the LSM anonymous inode support previously submitted, allow an LSM to apply access control policy to the sharing of io_uring rings as well as any io_uring credential changes requested by a process. The new LSM hooks are described below: * int security_uring_override_creds(cred) Controls if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to override it's credentials with @cred. In cases where the current task is a user application, the current credentials will be those of the user application. In cases where the current task is a kernel thread servicing io_uring requests the current credentials will be those of the io_uring ring (inherited from the process that created the ring). * int security_uring_sqpoll(void) Controls if the current task is allowed to create an io_uring polling thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). Without a SQPOLL thread in the kernel processes must submit I/O requests via io_uring_enter(2) which allows us to compare any requested credential changes against the application making the request. With a SQPOLL thread, we can no longer compare requested credential changes against the application making the request, the comparison is made against the ring's credentials. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-01 19:56:49 -05:00
lsm: move the io_uring hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:28:31 -05:00
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring A full expalantion of io_uring is beyond the scope of this commit description, but in summary it is an asynchronous I/O mechanism which allows for I/O requests and the resulting data to be queued in memory mapped "rings" which are shared between the kernel and userspace. Optionally, io_uring offers the ability for applications to spawn kernel threads to dequeue I/O requests from the ring and submit the requests in the kernel, helping to minimize the syscall overhead. Rings are accessed in userspace by memory mapping a file descriptor provided by the io_uring_setup(2), and can be shared between applications as one might do with any open file descriptor. Finally, process credentials can be registered with a given ring and any process with access to that ring can submit I/O requests using any of the registered credentials. While the io_uring functionality is widely recognized as offering a vastly improved, and high performing asynchronous I/O mechanism, its ability to allow processes to submit I/O requests with credentials other than its own presents a challenge to LSMs. When a process creates a new io_uring ring the ring's credentials are inhertied from the calling process; if this ring is shared with another process operating with different credentials there is the potential to bypass the LSMs security policy. Similarly, registering credentials with a given ring allows any process with access to that ring to submit I/O requests with those credentials. In an effort to allow LSMs to apply security policy to io_uring I/O operations, this patch adds two new LSM hooks. These hooks, in conjunction with the LSM anonymous inode support previously submitted, allow an LSM to apply access control policy to the sharing of io_uring rings as well as any io_uring credential changes requested by a process. The new LSM hooks are described below: * int security_uring_override_creds(cred) Controls if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to override it's credentials with @cred. In cases where the current task is a user application, the current credentials will be those of the user application. In cases where the current task is a kernel thread servicing io_uring requests the current credentials will be those of the io_uring ring (inherited from the process that created the ring). * int security_uring_sqpoll(void) Controls if the current task is allowed to create an io_uring polling thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). Without a SQPOLL thread in the kernel processes must submit I/O requests via io_uring_enter(2) which allows us to compare any requested credential changes against the application making the request. With a SQPOLL thread, we can no longer compare requested credential changes against the application making the request, the comparison is made against the ring's credentials. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-01 19:56:49 -05:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring A full expalantion of io_uring is beyond the scope of this commit description, but in summary it is an asynchronous I/O mechanism which allows for I/O requests and the resulting data to be queued in memory mapped "rings" which are shared between the kernel and userspace. Optionally, io_uring offers the ability for applications to spawn kernel threads to dequeue I/O requests from the ring and submit the requests in the kernel, helping to minimize the syscall overhead. Rings are accessed in userspace by memory mapping a file descriptor provided by the io_uring_setup(2), and can be shared between applications as one might do with any open file descriptor. Finally, process credentials can be registered with a given ring and any process with access to that ring can submit I/O requests using any of the registered credentials. While the io_uring functionality is widely recognized as offering a vastly improved, and high performing asynchronous I/O mechanism, its ability to allow processes to submit I/O requests with credentials other than its own presents a challenge to LSMs. When a process creates a new io_uring ring the ring's credentials are inhertied from the calling process; if this ring is shared with another process operating with different credentials there is the potential to bypass the LSMs security policy. Similarly, registering credentials with a given ring allows any process with access to that ring to submit I/O requests with those credentials. In an effort to allow LSMs to apply security policy to io_uring I/O operations, this patch adds two new LSM hooks. These hooks, in conjunction with the LSM anonymous inode support previously submitted, allow an LSM to apply access control policy to the sharing of io_uring rings as well as any io_uring credential changes requested by a process. The new LSM hooks are described below: * int security_uring_override_creds(cred) Controls if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to override it's credentials with @cred. In cases where the current task is a user application, the current credentials will be those of the user application. In cases where the current task is a kernel thread servicing io_uring requests the current credentials will be those of the io_uring ring (inherited from the process that created the ring). * int security_uring_sqpoll(void) Controls if the current task is allowed to create an io_uring polling thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). Without a SQPOLL thread in the kernel processes must submit I/O requests via io_uring_enter(2) which allows us to compare any requested credential changes against the application making the request. With a SQPOLL thread, we can no longer compare requested credential changes against the application making the request, the comparison is made against the ring's credentials. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-01 19:56:49 -05:00
lsm: move the io_uring hook comments to security/security.c This patch relocates the LSM hook function comments to the function definitions, in keeping with the current kernel conventions. This should make the hook descriptions more easily discoverable and easier to maintain. While formatting changes have been done to better fit the kernel-doc style, content changes have been kept to a minimum and limited to text which was obviously incorrect and/or outdated. It is expected the future patches will improve the quality of the function header comments. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-02-16 17:28:31 -05:00
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details. This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file operation. [0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd") Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-07-15 12:16:22 -07:00
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook() Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...) as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro, also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...). After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still a net simplification. There should be no functional change resulting from this patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-01-30 13:56:59 +01:00
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details. This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file operation. [0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd") Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-07-15 12:16:22 -07:00
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring A full expalantion of io_uring is beyond the scope of this commit description, but in summary it is an asynchronous I/O mechanism which allows for I/O requests and the resulting data to be queued in memory mapped "rings" which are shared between the kernel and userspace. Optionally, io_uring offers the ability for applications to spawn kernel threads to dequeue I/O requests from the ring and submit the requests in the kernel, helping to minimize the syscall overhead. Rings are accessed in userspace by memory mapping a file descriptor provided by the io_uring_setup(2), and can be shared between applications as one might do with any open file descriptor. Finally, process credentials can be registered with a given ring and any process with access to that ring can submit I/O requests using any of the registered credentials. While the io_uring functionality is widely recognized as offering a vastly improved, and high performing asynchronous I/O mechanism, its ability to allow processes to submit I/O requests with credentials other than its own presents a challenge to LSMs. When a process creates a new io_uring ring the ring's credentials are inhertied from the calling process; if this ring is shared with another process operating with different credentials there is the potential to bypass the LSMs security policy. Similarly, registering credentials with a given ring allows any process with access to that ring to submit I/O requests with those credentials. In an effort to allow LSMs to apply security policy to io_uring I/O operations, this patch adds two new LSM hooks. These hooks, in conjunction with the LSM anonymous inode support previously submitted, allow an LSM to apply access control policy to the sharing of io_uring rings as well as any io_uring credential changes requested by a process. The new LSM hooks are described below: * int security_uring_override_creds(cred) Controls if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to override it's credentials with @cred. In cases where the current task is a user application, the current credentials will be those of the user application. In cases where the current task is a kernel thread servicing io_uring requests the current credentials will be those of the io_uring ring (inherited from the process that created the ring). * int security_uring_sqpoll(void) Controls if the current task is allowed to create an io_uring polling thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). Without a SQPOLL thread in the kernel processes must submit I/O requests via io_uring_enter(2) which allows us to compare any requested credential changes against the application making the request. With a SQPOLL thread, we can no longer compare requested credential changes against the application making the request, the comparison is made against the ring's credentials. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-02-01 19:56:49 -05:00