License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
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2007-07-09 11:56:42 -07:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 11:10:44 -07:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 11:10:44 -07:00
|
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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|
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 11:10:44 -07:00
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2007-05-18 15:11:01 +10:00
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2008-03-30 16:36:09 +08:00
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2022-07-25 11:36:34 -07:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-08-21 21:08:13 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2008-08-05 14:13:08 +08:00
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2014-07-04 22:15:08 +08:00
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2016-10-04 19:34:30 -03:00
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2008-08-05 14:13:08 +08:00
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2019-03-20 11:41:03 +01:00
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2008-08-05 14:13:08 +08:00
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2010-09-03 19:17:49 +08:00
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2008-08-05 14:13:08 +08:00
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2022-07-08 14:33:13 +02:00
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2006-08-21 21:08:13 +10:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2006-08-21 21:08:13 +10:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2007-08-30 15:36:14 +08:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2007-08-30 15:36:14 +08:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2023-06-15 18:28:48 +08:00
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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2006-08-22 00:07:53 +10:00
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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2006-08-22 00:07:53 +10:00
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2023-10-03 11:31:55 +08:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2006-08-22 00:07:53 +10:00
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2006-08-19 22:24:23 +10:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2006-08-19 22:24:23 +10:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2008-08-14 22:15:52 +10:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2008-08-14 22:15:52 +10:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2015-06-03 14:49:31 +08:00
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2015-06-16 10:30:55 -07:00
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2016-06-22 17:49:13 +01:00
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2016-10-21 13:19:47 +01:00
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2018-01-05 08:26:47 -08:00
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2016-10-21 13:19:47 +01:00
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2006-09-21 11:31:44 +10:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2006-09-21 11:31:44 +10:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2023-06-13 16:49:24 +08:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2015-06-16 10:31:06 -07:00
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2023-06-15 18:28:48 +08:00
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2023-06-13 16:49:24 +08:00
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2016-06-22 17:49:13 +01:00
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2023-06-13 16:49:24 +08:00
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2008-12-10 23:29:44 +11:00
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2011-09-27 07:23:50 +02:00
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2011-11-01 12:12:43 +11:00
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2011-09-27 07:23:50 +02:00
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2011-11-09 01:29:20 -05:00
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2011-09-27 07:23:50 +02:00
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2010-08-06 09:40:28 +08:00
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2010-08-06 10:34:00 +08:00
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2010-06-03 20:53:43 +10:00
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2010-08-06 09:40:28 +08:00
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2010-06-03 20:53:43 +10:00
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2019-01-31 23:51:44 -08:00
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2020-11-02 14:48:15 +01:00
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2019-01-31 23:51:44 -08:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2015-08-13 17:28:58 +08:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2015-08-13 17:28:58 +08:00
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2015-08-17 20:39:40 +08:00
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2015-08-13 17:28:58 +08:00
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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2015-08-13 17:28:58 +08:00
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2010-01-07 15:57:19 +11:00
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2012-10-02 11:16:49 -07:00
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2010-01-07 15:57:19 +11:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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2008-05-14 21:23:00 +08:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2015-08-04 21:23:14 +08:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2020-11-20 12:04:32 +01:00
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2008-07-31 17:08:25 +08:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2016-11-22 20:08:25 +08:00
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2012-06-18 14:06:58 +03:00
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2016-01-26 20:25:39 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2019-04-11 18:51:18 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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2019-04-11 18:51:18 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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2019-04-11 18:51:18 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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2019-04-11 18:51:18 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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2019-04-11 18:51:18 +03:00
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crypto: dh - implement ffdheXYZ(dh) templates
Current work on NVME in-band authentication support ([1]) needs to invoke
DH with the FFDHE safe-prime group parameters specified in RFC 7919.
Introduce a new CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS Kconfig option. If enabled, make
dh_generic register a couple of ffdheXYZ(dh) templates, one for each group:
ffdhe2048(dh), ffdhe3072(dh), ffdhe4096(dh), ffdhe6144(dh) and
ffdhe8192(dh). Their respective ->set_secret() expects a (serialized)
struct dh, just like the underlying "dh" implementation does, but with the
P and G values unset so that the safe-prime constants for the given group
can be filled in by the wrapping template.
Internally, a struct dh_safe_prime instance is being defined for each of
the ffdheXYZ(dh) templates as appropriate. In order to prepare for future
key generation, fill in the maximum security strength values as specified
by SP800-56Arev3 on the go, even though they're not needed at this point
yet.
Implement the respective ffdheXYZ(dh) crypto_template's ->create() by
simply forwarding any calls to the __dh_safe_prime_create() helper
introduced with the previous commit, passing the associated dh_safe_prime
in addition to the received ->create() arguments.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202152358.60116-1-hare@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-02-21 13:10:53 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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crypto: dh - implement ffdheXYZ(dh) templates
Current work on NVME in-band authentication support ([1]) needs to invoke
DH with the FFDHE safe-prime group parameters specified in RFC 7919.
Introduce a new CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS Kconfig option. If enabled, make
dh_generic register a couple of ffdheXYZ(dh) templates, one for each group:
ffdhe2048(dh), ffdhe3072(dh), ffdhe4096(dh), ffdhe6144(dh) and
ffdhe8192(dh). Their respective ->set_secret() expects a (serialized)
struct dh, just like the underlying "dh" implementation does, but with the
P and G values unset so that the safe-prime constants for the given group
can be filled in by the wrapping template.
Internally, a struct dh_safe_prime instance is being defined for each of
the ffdheXYZ(dh) templates as appropriate. In order to prepare for future
key generation, fill in the maximum security strength values as specified
by SP800-56Arev3 on the go, even though they're not needed at this point
yet.
Implement the respective ffdheXYZ(dh) crypto_template's ->create() by
simply forwarding any calls to the __dh_safe_prime_create() helper
introduced with the previous commit, passing the associated dh_safe_prime
in addition to the received ->create() arguments.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202152358.60116-1-hare@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-02-21 13:10:53 +01:00
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2022-02-21 13:10:55 +01:00
|
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|
|
crypto: dh - implement ffdheXYZ(dh) templates
Current work on NVME in-band authentication support ([1]) needs to invoke
DH with the FFDHE safe-prime group parameters specified in RFC 7919.
Introduce a new CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS Kconfig option. If enabled, make
dh_generic register a couple of ffdheXYZ(dh) templates, one for each group:
ffdhe2048(dh), ffdhe3072(dh), ffdhe4096(dh), ffdhe6144(dh) and
ffdhe8192(dh). Their respective ->set_secret() expects a (serialized)
struct dh, just like the underlying "dh" implementation does, but with the
P and G values unset so that the safe-prime constants for the given group
can be filled in by the wrapping template.
Internally, a struct dh_safe_prime instance is being defined for each of
the ffdheXYZ(dh) templates as appropriate. In order to prepare for future
key generation, fill in the maximum security strength values as specified
by SP800-56Arev3 on the go, even though they're not needed at this point
yet.
Implement the respective ffdheXYZ(dh) crypto_template's ->create() by
simply forwarding any calls to the __dh_safe_prime_create() helper
introduced with the previous commit, passing the associated dh_safe_prime
in addition to the received ->create() arguments.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202152358.60116-1-hare@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-02-21 13:10:53 +01:00
|
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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|
crypto: dh - implement ffdheXYZ(dh) templates
Current work on NVME in-band authentication support ([1]) needs to invoke
DH with the FFDHE safe-prime group parameters specified in RFC 7919.
Introduce a new CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS Kconfig option. If enabled, make
dh_generic register a couple of ffdheXYZ(dh) templates, one for each group:
ffdhe2048(dh), ffdhe3072(dh), ffdhe4096(dh), ffdhe6144(dh) and
ffdhe8192(dh). Their respective ->set_secret() expects a (serialized)
struct dh, just like the underlying "dh" implementation does, but with the
P and G values unset so that the safe-prime constants for the given group
can be filled in by the wrapping template.
Internally, a struct dh_safe_prime instance is being defined for each of
the ffdheXYZ(dh) templates as appropriate. In order to prepare for future
key generation, fill in the maximum security strength values as specified
by SP800-56Arev3 on the go, even though they're not needed at this point
yet.
Implement the respective ffdheXYZ(dh) crypto_template's ->create() by
simply forwarding any calls to the __dh_safe_prime_create() helper
introduced with the previous commit, passing the associated dh_safe_prime
in addition to the received ->create() arguments.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202152358.60116-1-hare@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-02-21 13:10:53 +01:00
|
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|
2019-04-11 18:51:19 +03:00
|
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2021-09-20 12:05:35 +02:00
|
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2019-04-11 18:51:19 +03:00
|
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2019-04-11 18:51:18 +03:00
|
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
|
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2019-04-11 18:51:19 +03:00
|
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2019-04-11 18:51:18 +03:00
|
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
|
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2019-04-11 18:51:18 +03:00
|
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2021-03-16 17:07:32 -04:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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2021-03-16 17:07:32 -04:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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2021-03-16 17:07:32 -04:00
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crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 18:51:20 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
|
|
|
|
crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 18:51:20 +03:00
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2019-04-24 04:32:40 +03:00
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crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 18:51:20 +03:00
|
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
|
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|
crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R
34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since
2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be
used in the IMA.
Summary of the changes:
* crypto/Kconfig:
- EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section.
* crypto/Makefile:
- ecrdsa objects are added.
* crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:
- Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs.
* include/linux/oid_registry.h:
- EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not
implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to
not change numbering and grouping).
* crypto/ecc.c:
- Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because
vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his
code from micro-ecc.
- Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed.
- New functions:
vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli;
vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for
a signature);
vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for
a public key);
vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for
increment/decrement);
mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds
up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature
verification) by the factor of 1.5-2;
vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point
multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes);
vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne
primes (used for the curves A);
vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of
Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B);
vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used
for the curve C);
vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower
(used when the modulus is subgroup order);
vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication;
ecc_point_add - add two points;
ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one
combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in
compare to two separate multiplications).
ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added.
- Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal
module reduction function depending on the prime value;
- All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should
not unaffected.
* crypto/ecc.h:
- Newly exported functions are documented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h
- Five curves are defined.
* crypto/ecrdsa.c:
- Signature verification is implemented.
* crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1:
- Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-11 18:51:20 +03:00
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2020-09-21 00:20:57 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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2022-03-13 21:11:01 -06:00
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2020-09-21 00:20:57 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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2020-09-21 00:20:57 +08:00
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2020-09-21 00:20:57 +08:00
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2019-11-08 13:22:34 +01:00
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2019-11-08 13:22:34 +01:00
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2019-11-08 13:22:34 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2007-11-10 20:08:25 +08:00
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2015-06-01 13:44:00 +02:00
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2018-05-11 14:12:49 +02:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2018-11-16 17:26:29 -08:00
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crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-16 17:26:31 -08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
|
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crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-16 17:26:31 -08:00
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2019-11-08 13:22:19 +01:00
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crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-16 17:26:31 -08:00
|
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2019-05-20 09:49:46 -07:00
|
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|
|
crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-16 17:26:31 -08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by
Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper:
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf)
See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview.
Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for
fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated
crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12
stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash
function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single
16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much
faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors
Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption,
and decryption about 5 times faster.
Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our
earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a
different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's
εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function
like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's;
consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC.
This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as
secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC,
Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256,
subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction
to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only
trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only
used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken".
Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any
plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice
versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing
the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports
arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16
bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing".
For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in
order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices.
Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks
on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial
security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is
also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses
AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and
needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis
making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this
patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with
XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher.
We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt,
where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes
such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile
devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries,
as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES
instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too
slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight"
block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as
not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial.
The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to
use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each
time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline
attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't
guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling.
Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a
"tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest
possible security model for length-preserving encryption.
Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the
ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems
runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data
journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance.
Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-16 17:26:31 -08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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crypto: hctr2 - Add HCTR2 support
Add support for HCTR2 as a template. HCTR2 is a length-preserving
encryption mode that is efficient on processors with instructions to
accelerate AES and carryless multiplication, e.g. x86 processors with
AES-NI and CLMUL, and ARM processors with the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions.
As a length-preserving encryption mode, HCTR2 is suitable for
applications such as storage encryption where ciphertext expansion is
not possible, and thus authenticated encryption cannot be used.
Currently, such applications usually use XTS, or in some cases Adiantum.
XTS has the disadvantage that it is a narrow-block mode: a bitflip will
only change 16 bytes in the resulting ciphertext or plaintext. This
reveals more information to an attacker than necessary.
HCTR2 is a wide-block mode, so it provides a stronger security property:
a bitflip will change the entire message. HCTR2 is somewhat similar to
Adiantum, which is also a wide-block mode. However, HCTR2 is designed
to take advantage of existing crypto instructions, while Adiantum
targets devices without such hardware support. Adiantum is also
designed with longer messages in mind, while HCTR2 is designed to be
efficient even on short messages.
HCTR2 requires POLYVAL and XCTR as components. More information on
HCTR2 can be found here: "Length-preserving encryption with HCTR2":
https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1441.pdf
Signed-off-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-05-20 18:14:55 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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crypto: hctr2 - Add HCTR2 support
Add support for HCTR2 as a template. HCTR2 is a length-preserving
encryption mode that is efficient on processors with instructions to
accelerate AES and carryless multiplication, e.g. x86 processors with
AES-NI and CLMUL, and ARM processors with the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions.
As a length-preserving encryption mode, HCTR2 is suitable for
applications such as storage encryption where ciphertext expansion is
not possible, and thus authenticated encryption cannot be used.
Currently, such applications usually use XTS, or in some cases Adiantum.
XTS has the disadvantage that it is a narrow-block mode: a bitflip will
only change 16 bytes in the resulting ciphertext or plaintext. This
reveals more information to an attacker than necessary.
HCTR2 is a wide-block mode, so it provides a stronger security property:
a bitflip will change the entire message. HCTR2 is somewhat similar to
Adiantum, which is also a wide-block mode. However, HCTR2 is designed
to take advantage of existing crypto instructions, while Adiantum
targets devices without such hardware support. Adiantum is also
designed with longer messages in mind, while HCTR2 is designed to be
efficient even on short messages.
HCTR2 requires POLYVAL and XCTR as components. More information on
HCTR2 can be found here: "Length-preserving encryption with HCTR2":
https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1441.pdf
Signed-off-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-05-20 18:14:55 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2019-08-19 17:17:33 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2019-08-19 17:17:33 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2019-08-19 17:17:33 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2019-08-19 17:17:33 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2013-04-08 10:48:44 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2013-04-08 10:48:44 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2008-03-24 21:26:16 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2008-03-24 21:26:16 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2009-09-02 20:05:22 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2009-09-02 20:05:22 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2023-10-03 11:31:55 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2007-12-12 20:25:13 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2007-12-12 20:25:13 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2013-01-10 18:54:59 +04:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2013-01-10 18:54:59 +04:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2009-08-06 15:32:38 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2009-08-06 15:32:38 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-11-03 20:22:57 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-05-20 18:14:54 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-05-20 18:14:54 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2007-04-16 20:49:20 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2007-04-16 20:49:20 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-12-16 12:13:14 +11:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2006-12-16 12:13:14 +11:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-11-08 09:18:51 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-05-09 21:30:27 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-05-09 21:30:27 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2006-06-20 20:37:23 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2006-06-20 20:59:16 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2006-06-20 20:59:16 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2016-06-17 10:30:35 +05:30
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2016-06-17 10:30:35 +05:30
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2022-03-13 21:11:01 -06:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2017-08-21 13:51:28 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2017-08-21 13:51:28 +03:00
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2023-06-13 17:13:35 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2023-06-13 17:13:35 +08:00
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2018-11-07 00:00:01 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2018-11-07 00:00:01 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2023-06-13 17:13:35 +08:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:47 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 16:37:40 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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|
crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES cipher
Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is due to
the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and the fact that
8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of cachelines on any
architecture, resulting in an exploitable correlation between the key
and the processing time for known plaintexts.
For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents a
security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically time
invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or by using
SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups.
For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too much
performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by switching
to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table data (the actual
S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start of each block to
eliminate data dependent latencies.
This code encrypts at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the
ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this
hardware). Decryption is substantially slower.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-02-02 16:37:40 +00:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-11-03 20:22:57 +01:00
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2011-09-02 01:45:07 +03:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2011-09-02 01:45:07 +03:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2012-11-13 11:43:14 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2012-11-13 11:43:14 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-11-03 20:22:57 +01:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-09-01 17:42:46 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2015-06-01 13:43:56 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2015-06-01 13:43:56 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support
Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-16 17:26:20 -08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support
Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-16 17:26:22 -08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-07-04 09:42:48 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-07-04 09:42:48 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-07-04 09:42:48 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-03-13 21:11:01 -06:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2018-03-06 09:44:42 +00:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:46 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:46 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:46 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2006-10-22 14:49:17 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:46 -05:00
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2006-10-22 14:49:17 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:46 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:46 -05:00
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2006-10-22 14:49:17 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:46 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:46 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2016-10-21 13:19:53 +01:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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[CRYPTO] aead: Add authenc
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-08-30 16:24:15 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2008-04-05 21:04:48 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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|
[CRYPTO] aead: Add authenc
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-08-30 16:24:15 +08:00
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2007-12-07 16:53:23 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2007-12-07 16:53:23 +08:00
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2016-10-21 13:19:49 +01:00
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2007-12-07 16:53:23 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2007-12-07 16:53:23 +08:00
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2012-07-19 09:42:41 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2015-05-07 13:49:15 -04:00
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2016-10-21 13:19:52 +01:00
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2015-05-07 13:49:15 -04:00
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2012-07-19 09:42:41 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2013-07-08 16:01:51 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2013-07-08 16:01:51 -07:00
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2016-10-21 13:19:50 +01:00
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2013-07-08 16:01:51 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2013-07-08 16:01:51 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2013-07-08 16:01:51 -07:00
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2016-10-21 13:19:51 +01:00
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2013-07-08 16:01:51 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2012-07-19 09:42:41 -05:00
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2018-03-30 12:14:53 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2018-03-30 12:14:53 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2018-03-30 12:14:53 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2008-08-14 22:15:52 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2008-08-14 22:15:52 +10:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2008-08-14 22:15:52 +10:00
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2014-07-04 22:15:08 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2014-07-04 22:15:08 +08:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2015-06-03 14:49:31 +08:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2021-06-30 12:32:52 +02:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2015-06-11 08:55:10 +08:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2020-04-24 13:40:47 +00:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2014-07-04 22:15:08 +08:00
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2015-06-03 14:49:31 +08:00
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2014-07-04 22:15:08 +08:00
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2015-05-25 15:10:20 +02:00
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2014-07-04 22:15:08 +08:00
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2014-05-31 17:22:31 +02:00
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2015-05-25 15:10:20 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2016-01-26 14:47:10 +01:00
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crypto: jitter - replace LFSR with SHA3-256
Using the kernel crypto API, the SHA3-256 algorithm is used as
conditioning element to replace the LFSR in the Jitter RNG. All other
parts of the Jitter RNG are unchanged.
The application and use of the SHA-3 conditioning operation is identical
to the user space Jitter RNG 3.4.0 by applying the following concept:
- the Jitter RNG initializes a SHA-3 state which acts as the "entropy
pool" when the Jitter RNG is allocated.
- When a new time delta is obtained, it is inserted into the "entropy
pool" with a SHA-3 update operation. Note, this operation in most of
the cases is a simple memcpy() onto the SHA-3 stack.
- To cause a true SHA-3 operation for each time delta operation, a
second SHA-3 operation is performed hashing Jitter RNG status
information. The final message digest is also inserted into the
"entropy pool" with a SHA-3 update operation. Yet, this data is not
considered to provide any entropy, but it shall stir the entropy pool.
- To generate a random number, a SHA-3 final operation is performed to
calculate a message digest followed by an immediate SHA-3 init to
re-initialize the "entropy pool". The obtained message digest is one
block of the Jitter RNG that is returned to the caller.
Mathematically speaking, the random number generated by the Jitter RNG
is:
aux_t = SHA-3(Jitter RNG state data)
Jitter RNG block = SHA-3(time_i || aux_i || time_(i-1) || aux_(i-1) ||
... || time_(i-255) || aux_(i-255))
when assuming that the OSR = 1, i.e. the default value.
This operation implies that the Jitter RNG has an output-blocksize of
256 bits instead of the 64 bits of the LFSR-based Jitter RNG that is
replaced with this patch.
The patch also replaces the varying number of invocations of the
conditioning function with one fixed number of invocations. The use
of the conditioning function consistent with the userspace Jitter RNG
library version 3.4.0.
The code is tested with a system that exhibited the least amount of
entropy generated by the Jitter RNG: the SiFive Unmatched RISC-V
system. The measured entropy rate is well above the heuristically
implied entropy value of 1 bit of entropy per time delta. On all other
tested systems, the measured entropy rate is even higher by orders
of magnitude. The measurement was performed using updated tooling
provided with the user space Jitter RNG library test framework.
The performance of the Jitter RNG with this patch is about en par
with the performance of the Jitter RNG without the patch.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-04-21 08:08:04 +02:00
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2015-05-25 15:10:20 +02:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2024-02-17 08:55:13 -08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2024-02-17 08:55:13 -08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:51 -05:00
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2024-02-17 08:55:13 -08:00
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2015-05-25 15:10:20 +02:00
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2023-11-06 18:00:08 +08:00
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2023-09-21 13:48:33 +02:00
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2023-09-21 13:48:59 +02:00
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2023-04-21 08:08:23 +02:00
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2023-11-06 18:00:08 +08:00
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2021-11-19 07:55:58 +01:00
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2022-01-18 16:31:29 +11:00
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2021-12-21 20:31:42 +01:00
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2021-11-19 07:55:58 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2010-10-19 21:12:39 +08:00
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2010-10-19 21:23:00 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2010-11-29 22:56:03 +08:00
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2010-10-19 21:23:00 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2010-10-19 21:23:00 +08:00
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2010-10-19 21:31:55 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2010-11-29 22:56:03 +08:00
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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2010-10-19 21:31:55 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2010-10-19 21:31:55 +08:00
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2014-12-25 23:00:39 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2014-12-25 23:00:39 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2014-12-25 23:00:39 +01:00
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2020-09-18 16:42:16 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2020-09-18 16:42:16 +01:00
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2015-05-28 11:30:35 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2015-05-28 11:30:35 +08:00
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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2017-07-30 14:32:58 +02:00
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2015-05-28 11:30:35 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
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2015-05-28 11:30:35 +08:00
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|
crypto: arc4 - mark ecb(arc4) skcipher as obsolete
Cryptographic algorithms may have a lifespan that is significantly
shorter than Linux's, and so we need to start phasing out algorithms
that are known to be broken, and are no longer fit for general use.
RC4 (or arc4) is a good example here: there are a few areas where its
use is still somewhat acceptable, e.g., for interoperability with legacy
wifi hardware that can only use WEP or TKIP data encryption, but that
should not imply that, for instance, use of RC4 based EAP-TLS by the WPA
supplicant for negotiating TKIP keys is equally acceptable, or that RC4
should remain available as a general purpose cryptographic transform for
all in-kernel and user space clients.
Now that all in-kernel users that need to retain support have moved to
the arc4 library interface, and the known users of ecb(arc4) via the
socket API (iwd [0] and libell [1][2]) have been updated to switch to a
local implementation, we can take the next step, and mark the ecb(arc4)
skcipher as obsolete, and only provide it if the socket API is enabled in
the first place, as well as provide the option to disable all algorithms
that have been marked as obsolete.
[0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git/commit/?id=1db8a85a60c64523
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=53482ce421b727c2
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=7f6a137809d42f6b
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-08-31 18:16:49 +03:00
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|
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|
2022-08-20 13:41:49 -05:00
|
|
|
|
crypto: arc4 - mark ecb(arc4) skcipher as obsolete
Cryptographic algorithms may have a lifespan that is significantly
shorter than Linux's, and so we need to start phasing out algorithms
that are known to be broken, and are no longer fit for general use.
RC4 (or arc4) is a good example here: there are a few areas where its
use is still somewhat acceptable, e.g., for interoperability with legacy
wifi hardware that can only use WEP or TKIP data encryption, but that
should not imply that, for instance, use of RC4 based EAP-TLS by the WPA
supplicant for negotiating TKIP keys is equally acceptable, or that RC4
should remain available as a general purpose cryptographic transform for
all in-kernel and user space clients.
Now that all in-kernel users that need to retain support have moved to
the arc4 library interface, and the known users of ecb(arc4) via the
socket API (iwd [0] and libell [1][2]) have been updated to switch to a
local implementation, we can take the next step, and mark the ecb(arc4)
skcipher as obsolete, and only provide it if the socket API is enabled in
the first place, as well as provide the option to disable all algorithms
that have been marked as obsolete.
[0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/wireless/iwd.git/commit/?id=1db8a85a60c64523
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=53482ce421b727c2
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/ell/ell.git/commit/?id=7f6a137809d42f6b
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-08-31 18:16:49 +03:00
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2024-03-13 09:49:37 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:44 -05:00
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2013-05-06 15:40:01 +03:00
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- Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in
linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any negative
reports (or any positive ones, come to that).
- Also the Maple Tree from Liam R. Howlett. An overlapping range-based
tree for vmas. It it apparently slight more efficient in its own right,
but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock contention.
Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.
Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
(https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com).
This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately timed
vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.
- Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down to
the single bit level.
KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.
- Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
memory into THPs.
- Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to support
file/shmem-backed pages.
- userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen
- zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov
- cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and memory-failure
- Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.
- memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
memory consumption.
- memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.
- memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.
- Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions
- Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(
- migration enhancements from Peter Xu
- migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying
- Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
drivers, etc.
- vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.
- NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.
- xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging activity.
- THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.
- more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.
- KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.
- DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.
- DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.
- hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.
- Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.
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Merge tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in
linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any
negative reports (or any positive ones, come to that).
- Also the Maple Tree from Liam Howlett. An overlapping range-based
tree for vmas. It it apparently slightly more efficient in its own
right, but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock
contention.
Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.
Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
at [1]. This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately
timed vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.
- Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down
to the single bit level.
KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.
- Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
memory into THPs.
- Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to
support file/shmem-backed pages.
- userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen
- zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov
- cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and
memory-failure
- Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.
- memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
memory consumption.
- memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.
- memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.
- Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions
- Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(
- migration enhancements from Peter Xu
- migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying
- Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
drivers, etc.
- vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.
- NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.
- xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging
activity.
- THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.
- more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.
- KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.
- DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.
- DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.
- hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.
- Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com [1]
* tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (555 commits)
hugetlb: allocate vma lock for all sharable vmas
hugetlb: take hugetlb vma_lock when clearing vma_lock->vma pointer
hugetlb: fix vma lock handling during split vma and range unmapping
mglru: mm/vmscan.c: fix imprecise comments
mm/mglru: don't sync disk for each aging cycle
mm: memcontrol: drop dead CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP config symbol
mm: memcontrol: use do_memsw_account() in a few more places
mm: memcontrol: deprecate swapaccounting=0 mode
mm: memcontrol: don't allocate cgroup swap arrays when memcg is disabled
mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value
mm/hugetlb: add available_huge_pages() func
mm: remove unused inline functions from include/linux/mm_inline.h
selftests/vm: add selftest for MADV_COLLAPSE of uffd-minor memory
selftests/vm: add file/shmem MADV_COLLAPSE selftest for cleared pmd
selftests/vm: add thp collapse shmem testing
selftests/vm: add thp collapse file and tmpfs testing
selftests/vm: modularize thp collapse memory operations
selftests/vm: dedup THP helpers
mm/khugepaged: add tracepoint to hpage_collapse_scan_file()
mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to MADV_COLLAPSE
...
2022-10-10 17:53:04 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:41 -05:00
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2023-05-01 17:19:43 +08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:35 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:36 -05:00
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2024-01-21 16:19:14 -08:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:37 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:38 -05:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:39 -05:00
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- Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in
linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any negative
reports (or any positive ones, come to that).
- Also the Maple Tree from Liam R. Howlett. An overlapping range-based
tree for vmas. It it apparently slight more efficient in its own right,
but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock contention.
Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.
Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
(https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com).
This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately timed
vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.
- Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down to
the single bit level.
KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.
- Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
memory into THPs.
- Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to support
file/shmem-backed pages.
- userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen
- zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov
- cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and memory-failure
- Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.
- memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
memory consumption.
- memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.
- memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.
- Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions
- Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(
- migration enhancements from Peter Xu
- migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying
- Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
drivers, etc.
- vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.
- NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.
- xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging activity.
- THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.
- more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.
- KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.
- DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.
- DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.
- hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.
- Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.
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=xfWx
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Merge tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in
linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any
negative reports (or any positive ones, come to that).
- Also the Maple Tree from Liam Howlett. An overlapping range-based
tree for vmas. It it apparently slightly more efficient in its own
right, but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock
contention.
Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.
Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
at [1]. This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately
timed vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.
- Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down
to the single bit level.
KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.
- Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
memory into THPs.
- Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to
support file/shmem-backed pages.
- userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen
- zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov
- cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and
memory-failure
- Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.
- memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
memory consumption.
- memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.
- memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.
- Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions
- Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(
- migration enhancements from Peter Xu
- migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying
- Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
drivers, etc.
- vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.
- NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.
- xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging
activity.
- THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.
- more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.
- KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.
- DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.
- DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.
- hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.
- Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com [1]
* tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (555 commits)
hugetlb: allocate vma lock for all sharable vmas
hugetlb: take hugetlb vma_lock when clearing vma_lock->vma pointer
hugetlb: fix vma lock handling during split vma and range unmapping
mglru: mm/vmscan.c: fix imprecise comments
mm/mglru: don't sync disk for each aging cycle
mm: memcontrol: drop dead CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP config symbol
mm: memcontrol: use do_memsw_account() in a few more places
mm: memcontrol: deprecate swapaccounting=0 mode
mm: memcontrol: don't allocate cgroup swap arrays when memcg is disabled
mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value
mm/hugetlb: add available_huge_pages() func
mm: remove unused inline functions from include/linux/mm_inline.h
selftests/vm: add selftest for MADV_COLLAPSE of uffd-minor memory
selftests/vm: add file/shmem MADV_COLLAPSE selftest for cleared pmd
selftests/vm: add thp collapse shmem testing
selftests/vm: add thp collapse file and tmpfs testing
selftests/vm: modularize thp collapse memory operations
selftests/vm: dedup THP helpers
mm/khugepaged: add tracepoint to hpage_collapse_scan_file()
mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to MADV_COLLAPSE
...
2022-10-10 17:53:04 -07:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:35 -05:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2018-12-11 20:01:04 +09:00
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2006-08-21 21:08:13 +10:00
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