linux/net/wireless/util.c

3085 lines
75 KiB

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 17:04:11 +09:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-protection.docx Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-06-16 02:46:35 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-protection.docx Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-06-16 02:46:35 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix receiving A-MSDU frames on mesh interfaces The current mac80211 mesh A-MSDU receive path fails to parse A-MSDU packets on mesh interfaces, because it assumes that the Mesh Control field is always directly after the 802.11 header. 802.11-2020 9.3.2.2.2 Figure 9-70 shows that the Mesh Control field is actually part of the A-MSDU subframe header. This makes more sense, since it allows packets for multiple different destinations to be included in the same A-MSDU, as long as RA and TID are still the same. Another issue is the fact that the A-MSDU subframe length field was apparently accidentally defined as little-endian in the standard. In order to fix this, the mesh forwarding path needs happen at a different point in the receive path. ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr is changed to ignore the mesh control field and leave it in after the ethernet header. This also affects the source/dest MAC address fields, which now in the case of mesh point to the mesh SA/DA. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s is changed to deal with the endian difference and to add the Mesh Control length to the subframe length, since it's not covered by the MSDU length field. With these changes, the mac80211 will get the same packet structure for converted regular data packets and unpacked A-MSDU subframes. The mesh forwarding checks are now only performed after the A-MSDU decap. For locally received packets, the Mesh Control header is stripped away. For forwarded packets, a new 802.11 header gets added. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230213100855.34315-4-nbd@nbd.name [fix fortify build error] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-02-13 11:08:54 +01:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
cfg80211/nl80211: add a port authorized event Add an event that indicates that a connection is authorized (i.e. the 4 way handshake was performed by the driver). This event should be sent by the driver after sending a connect/roamed event. This is useful for networks that require 802.1X authentication. In cases that the driver supports 4 way handshake offload, but the 802.1X authentication is managed by user space, the driver needs to inform user space right after the 802.11 association was completed so user space can initialize its 802.1X state machine etc. However, it is also possible that the AP will choose to skip the 802.1X authentication (e.g. when PMKSA caching is used) and proceed with the 4 way handshake immediately. In this case the driver needs to inform user space that 802.1X authentication is no longer required (e.g. to prevent user space from disconnecting since it did not get any EAPOLs from the AP). This is also useful for roaming, in which case it is possible that the driver used the Fast Transition protocol so 802.1X is not required. Since there will now be a dedicated notification indicating that the connection is authorized, the authorized flag can be removed from the roamed event. Drivers can send the new port authorized event right after sending the roamed event to indicate the new AP is already authorized. This therefore reserves the old PORT_AUTHORIZED attribute. Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern <avraham.stern@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-09-29 14:21:49 +02:00
cfg80211/nl80211: add a port authorized event Add an event that indicates that a connection is authorized (i.e. the 4 way handshake was performed by the driver). This event should be sent by the driver after sending a connect/roamed event. This is useful for networks that require 802.1X authentication. In cases that the driver supports 4 way handshake offload, but the 802.1X authentication is managed by user space, the driver needs to inform user space right after the 802.11 association was completed so user space can initialize its 802.1X state machine etc. However, it is also possible that the AP will choose to skip the 802.1X authentication (e.g. when PMKSA caching is used) and proceed with the 4 way handshake immediately. In this case the driver needs to inform user space that 802.1X authentication is no longer required (e.g. to prevent user space from disconnecting since it did not get any EAPOLs from the AP). This is also useful for roaming, in which case it is possible that the driver used the Fast Transition protocol so 802.1X is not required. Since there will now be a dedicated notification indicating that the connection is authorized, the authorized flag can be removed from the roamed event. Drivers can send the new port authorized event right after sending the roamed event to indicate the new AP is already authorized. This therefore reserves the old PORT_AUTHORIZED attribute. Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern <avraham.stern@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-09-29 14:21:49 +02:00
cfg80211: ignore netif running state when changing iftype It was possible for mac80211 to be coerced into an unexpected flow causing sdata union to become corrupted. Station pointer was put into sdata->u.vlan.sta memory location while it was really master AP's sdata->u.ap.next_beacon. This led to station entry being later freed as next_beacon before __sta_info_flush() in ieee80211_stop_ap() and a subsequent invalid pointer dereference crash. The problem was that ieee80211_ptr->use_4addr wasn't cleared on interface type changes. This could be reproduced with the following steps: # host A and host B have just booted; no # wpa_s/hostapd running; all vifs are down host A> iw wlan0 set type station host A> iw wlan0 set 4addr on host A> printf 'interface=wlan0\nssid=4addrcrash\nchannel=1\nwds_sta=1' > /tmp/hconf host A> hostapd -B /tmp/conf host B> iw wlan0 set 4addr on host B> ifconfig wlan0 up host B> iw wlan0 connect -w hostAssid host A> pkill hostapd # host A crashed: [ 127.928192] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000006c8 [ 127.929014] IP: [<ffffffff816f4f32>] __sta_info_flush+0xac/0x158 ... [ 127.934578] [<ffffffff8170789e>] ieee80211_stop_ap+0x139/0x26c [ 127.934578] [<ffffffff8100498f>] ? dump_trace+0x279/0x28a [ 127.934578] [<ffffffff816dc661>] __cfg80211_stop_ap+0x84/0x191 [ 127.934578] [<ffffffff816dc7ad>] cfg80211_stop_ap+0x3f/0x58 [ 127.934578] [<ffffffff816c5ad6>] nl80211_stop_ap+0x1b/0x1d [ 127.934578] [<ffffffff815e53f8>] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x259/0x2b5 Note: This isn't a revert of f8cdddb8d61d ("cfg80211: check iface combinations only when iface is running") as far as functionality is considered because b6a550156bc ("cfg80211/mac80211: move more combination checks to mac80211") moved the logic somewhere else already. Fixes: f8cdddb8d61d ("cfg80211: check iface combinations only when iface is running") Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-22 10:57:22 +02:00
wifi: cfg80211: Lock wiphy in cfg80211_get_station Wiphy should be locked before calling rdev_get_station() (see lockdep assert in ieee80211_get_station()). This fixes the following kernel NULL dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000050 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000003001000 [0000000000000050] pgd=0800000002dca003, p4d=0800000002dca003, pud=08000000028e9003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: netconsole dwc3_meson_g12a dwc3_of_simple dwc3 ip_gre gre ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath CPU: 0 PID: 1091 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 6.4.0-02144-g565f9a3a7911-dirty #705 Hardware name: RPT (r1) (DT) Workqueue: bat_events batadv_v_elp_throughput_metric_update pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : ath10k_sta_statistics+0x10/0x2dc [ath10k_core] lr : sta_set_sinfo+0xcc/0xbd4 sp : ffff000007b43ad0 x29: ffff000007b43ad0 x28: ffff0000071fa900 x27: ffff00000294ca98 x26: ffff000006830880 x25: ffff000006830880 x24: ffff00000294c000 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffff000007b43c90 x21: ffff800008898acc x20: ffff00000294c6e8 x19: ffff000007b43c90 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 445946354d552d78 x16: 62661f7200000000 x15: 57464f445946354d x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000000000e3 x12: d5f0acbcebea978e x11: 00000000000000e3 x10: 000000010048fe41 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff000007b43d90 x7 : 000000007a1e2125 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : ffff0000024e0900 x4 : ffff800000a0250c x3 : ffff000007b43c90 x2 : ffff00000294ca98 x1 : ffff000006831920 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: ath10k_sta_statistics+0x10/0x2dc [ath10k_core] sta_set_sinfo+0xcc/0xbd4 ieee80211_get_station+0x2c/0x44 cfg80211_get_station+0x80/0x154 batadv_v_elp_get_throughput+0x138/0x1fc batadv_v_elp_throughput_metric_update+0x1c/0xa4 process_one_work+0x1ec/0x414 worker_thread+0x70/0x46c kthread+0xdc/0xe0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: a9bb7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 f9411c40 (f9402814) This happens because STA has time to disconnect and reconnect before batadv_v_elp_throughput_metric_update() delayed work gets scheduled. In this situation, ath10k_sta_state() can be in the middle of resetting arsta data when the work queue get chance to be scheduled and ends up accessing it. Locking wiphy prevents that. Fixes: 7406353d43c8 ("cfg80211: implement cfg80211_get_station cfg80211 API") Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <repk@triplefau.lt> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Escande <nico.escande@gmail.com> Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> Link: https://msgid.link/983b24a6a176e0800c01aedcd74480d9b551cb13.1716046653.git.repk@triplefau.lt Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-05-21 21:47:26 +02:00