linux/fs/fuse/dev.c

2460 lines
56 KiB

fuse: {io-uring} Handle teardown of ring entries On teardown struct file_operations::uring_cmd requests need to be completed by calling io_uring_cmd_done(). Not completing all ring entries would result in busy io-uring tasks giving warning messages in intervals and unreleased struct file. Additionally the fuse connection and with that the ring can only get released when all io-uring commands are completed. Completion is done with ring entries that are a) in waiting state for new fuse requests - io_uring_cmd_done is needed b) already in userspace - io_uring_cmd_done through teardown is not needed, the request can just get released. If fuse server is still active and commits such a ring entry, fuse_uring_cmd() already checks if the connection is active and then complete the io-uring itself with -ENOTCONN. I.e. special handling is not needed. This scheme is basically represented by the ring entry state FRRS_WAIT and FRRS_USERSPACE. Entries in state: - FRRS_INIT: No action needed, do not contribute to ring->queue_refs yet - All other states: Are currently processed by other tasks, async teardown is needed and it has to wait for the two states above. It could be also solved without an async teardown task, but would require additional if conditions in hot code paths. Also in my personal opinion the code looks cleaner with async teardown. Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bschubert@ddn.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> # io_uring Reviewed-by: Luis Henriques <luis@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2025-01-20 02:29:04 +01:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
driver core: add devname module aliases to allow module on-demand auto-loading This adds: alias: devname:<name> to some common kernel modules, which will allow the on-demand loading of the kernel module when the device node is accessed. Ideally all these modules would be compiled-in, but distros seems too much in love with their modularization that we need to cover the common cases with this new facility. It will allow us to remove a bunch of pretty useless init scripts and modprobes from init scripts. The static device node aliases will be carried in the module itself. The program depmod will extract this information to a file in the module directory: $ cat /lib/modules/2.6.34-00650-g537b60d-dirty/modules.devname # Device nodes to trigger on-demand module loading. microcode cpu/microcode c10:184 fuse fuse c10:229 ppp_generic ppp c108:0 tun net/tun c10:200 dm_mod mapper/control c10:235 Udev will pick up the depmod created file on startup and create all the static device nodes which the kernel modules specify, so that these modules get automatically loaded when the device node is accessed: $ /sbin/udevd --debug ... static_dev_create_from_modules: mknod '/dev/cpu/microcode' c10:184 static_dev_create_from_modules: mknod '/dev/fuse' c10:229 static_dev_create_from_modules: mknod '/dev/ppp' c108:0 static_dev_create_from_modules: mknod '/dev/net/tun' c10:200 static_dev_create_from_modules: mknod '/dev/mapper/control' c10:235 udev_rules_apply_static_dev_perms: chmod '/dev/net/tun' 0666 udev_rules_apply_static_dev_perms: chmod '/dev/fuse' 0666 A few device nodes are switched to statically allocated numbers, to allow the static nodes to work. This might also useful for systems which still run a plain static /dev, which is completely unsafe to use with any dynamic minor numbers. Note: The devname aliases must be limited to the *common* and *single*instance* device nodes, like the misc devices, and never be used for conceptually limited systems like the loop devices, which should rather get fixed properly and get a control node for losetup to talk to, instead of creating a random number of device nodes in advance, regardless if they are ever used. This facility is to hide the mess distros are creating with too modualized kernels, and just to hide that these modules are not compiled-in, and not to paper-over broken concepts. Thanks! :) Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com> Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Tigran Aivazian <tigran@aivazian.fsnet.co.uk> Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Signed-Off-By: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2010-05-20 18:07:20 +02:00
fuse: give wakeup hints to the scheduler for synchronous requests When a synchronous FUSE request is sent, the in-kernel client queues it on fiq->pending and wakes the userspace daemon sleeping in fuse_dev_do_read()->wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(fiq->waitq, ...). The client then blocks in request_wait_answer() waiting for the reply, so the waker is about to go to sleep: this is exactly the pattern that WF_SYNC is meant to optimise. As Peter Zijlstra explained in the earlier discussion [1], WF_SYNC is a hint that the waker is about to sleep and the waker and wakee share data, so stacking the woken thread on the current CPU is beneficial for cache locality instead of searching for an idle one. Add a wake_up_sync() wrapper for task on the synchronous request path. Performance: On an Android big.LITTLE device where the FUSE daemon (MediaProvider) runs as a background service on the little cores while foreground applications run on the big cores, the synchronous wakeup hint lets the scheduler pull the daemon thread onto the big core that is issuing the request, where the request data is cache-hot. Measured by qixiaoyu [2] on a 2000-picture zip decompression to /sdcard: ------------------------------------------ | Default | patched | Improvement | ------------------------------------------ | 13.0 s | 7.0 s | 46% | ------------------------------------------ Server thread wall duration: 3583 ms -> 1276 ms Server runs on big core: 5% -> 79% The original 4K-file copy/compress/decompress workload [1] on the same kind of device showed a ~28% improvement (13.8s -> 9.9s). Note: Miklos reported [2] that on his test box he could not observe an actual migration from wake_up_interruptible_sync(); the benefit appears to be most visible on asymmetric topologies (big.LITTLE, where the daemon normally lives on a little core) and on workloads dominated by small synchronous requests. No regression was reported on the symmetric- SMP test setups tried. The earlier version of this change [1] added a `bool sync` argument to all three hooks of `struct fuse_iqueue_ops` and threaded it through virtio_fs as well. Miklos questioned the interface churn, and the patch has been stalled since. Re-work it so the exported interface is left alone. The hint is carried in a new FR_SYNC_WAKEUP bit of the existing `fuse_req->flags` bitfield (an `unsigned long`, so no layout change): - __fuse_request_send() sets the flag before fuse_send_one(). - fuse_dev_queue_req() consumes it with test_and_clear_bit() and forwards the result to fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(), which then picks wake_up_sync() or wake_up(). - The forget, interrupt and resend paths pass `false` explicitly, preserving their original wake_up() behaviour. Only /dev/fuse ever wakes fiq->waitq; virtio_fs and fuse_uring dispatch through their own transport and never call wake_up(), so threading `sync` through their ops would just add an unused argument. test_and_clear_bit() makes the flag a one-shot hint that cannot leak into a future requeue, and no extra cleanup is needed in fuse_request_end()/fuse_put_request(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1638780405-38026-1-git-send-email-quic_pragalla@quicinc.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221222093407.GA1141@mi-HP-ProDesk-680-G4-MT/ This work is based on "Pradeep P V K <quic_pragalla@quicinc.com>" and "Pavankumar Kondeti <quic_pkondeti@quicinc.com>" Assisted-by: TRAE:GLM-5.2 Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-07-31 15:01:02 +08:00
fuse: give wakeup hints to the scheduler for synchronous requests When a synchronous FUSE request is sent, the in-kernel client queues it on fiq->pending and wakes the userspace daemon sleeping in fuse_dev_do_read()->wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(fiq->waitq, ...). The client then blocks in request_wait_answer() waiting for the reply, so the waker is about to go to sleep: this is exactly the pattern that WF_SYNC is meant to optimise. As Peter Zijlstra explained in the earlier discussion [1], WF_SYNC is a hint that the waker is about to sleep and the waker and wakee share data, so stacking the woken thread on the current CPU is beneficial for cache locality instead of searching for an idle one. Add a wake_up_sync() wrapper for task on the synchronous request path. Performance: On an Android big.LITTLE device where the FUSE daemon (MediaProvider) runs as a background service on the little cores while foreground applications run on the big cores, the synchronous wakeup hint lets the scheduler pull the daemon thread onto the big core that is issuing the request, where the request data is cache-hot. Measured by qixiaoyu [2] on a 2000-picture zip decompression to /sdcard: ------------------------------------------ | Default | patched | Improvement | ------------------------------------------ | 13.0 s | 7.0 s | 46% | ------------------------------------------ Server thread wall duration: 3583 ms -> 1276 ms Server runs on big core: 5% -> 79% The original 4K-file copy/compress/decompress workload [1] on the same kind of device showed a ~28% improvement (13.8s -> 9.9s). Note: Miklos reported [2] that on his test box he could not observe an actual migration from wake_up_interruptible_sync(); the benefit appears to be most visible on asymmetric topologies (big.LITTLE, where the daemon normally lives on a little core) and on workloads dominated by small synchronous requests. No regression was reported on the symmetric- SMP test setups tried. The earlier version of this change [1] added a `bool sync` argument to all three hooks of `struct fuse_iqueue_ops` and threaded it through virtio_fs as well. Miklos questioned the interface churn, and the patch has been stalled since. Re-work it so the exported interface is left alone. The hint is carried in a new FR_SYNC_WAKEUP bit of the existing `fuse_req->flags` bitfield (an `unsigned long`, so no layout change): - __fuse_request_send() sets the flag before fuse_send_one(). - fuse_dev_queue_req() consumes it with test_and_clear_bit() and forwards the result to fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(), which then picks wake_up_sync() or wake_up(). - The forget, interrupt and resend paths pass `false` explicitly, preserving their original wake_up() behaviour. Only /dev/fuse ever wakes fiq->waitq; virtio_fs and fuse_uring dispatch through their own transport and never call wake_up(), so threading `sync` through their ops would just add an unused argument. test_and_clear_bit() makes the flag a one-shot hint that cannot leak into a future requeue, and no extra cleanup is needed in fuse_request_end()/fuse_put_request(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1638780405-38026-1-git-send-email-quic_pragalla@quicinc.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221222093407.GA1141@mi-HP-ProDesk-680-G4-MT/ This work is based on "Pradeep P V K <quic_pragalla@quicinc.com>" and "Pavankumar Kondeti <quic_pkondeti@quicinc.com>" Assisted-by: TRAE:GLM-5.2 Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-07-31 15:01:02 +08:00
fuse: give wakeup hints to the scheduler for synchronous requests When a synchronous FUSE request is sent, the in-kernel client queues it on fiq->pending and wakes the userspace daemon sleeping in fuse_dev_do_read()->wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(fiq->waitq, ...). The client then blocks in request_wait_answer() waiting for the reply, so the waker is about to go to sleep: this is exactly the pattern that WF_SYNC is meant to optimise. As Peter Zijlstra explained in the earlier discussion [1], WF_SYNC is a hint that the waker is about to sleep and the waker and wakee share data, so stacking the woken thread on the current CPU is beneficial for cache locality instead of searching for an idle one. Add a wake_up_sync() wrapper for task on the synchronous request path. Performance: On an Android big.LITTLE device where the FUSE daemon (MediaProvider) runs as a background service on the little cores while foreground applications run on the big cores, the synchronous wakeup hint lets the scheduler pull the daemon thread onto the big core that is issuing the request, where the request data is cache-hot. Measured by qixiaoyu [2] on a 2000-picture zip decompression to /sdcard: ------------------------------------------ | Default | patched | Improvement | ------------------------------------------ | 13.0 s | 7.0 s | 46% | ------------------------------------------ Server thread wall duration: 3583 ms -> 1276 ms Server runs on big core: 5% -> 79% The original 4K-file copy/compress/decompress workload [1] on the same kind of device showed a ~28% improvement (13.8s -> 9.9s). Note: Miklos reported [2] that on his test box he could not observe an actual migration from wake_up_interruptible_sync(); the benefit appears to be most visible on asymmetric topologies (big.LITTLE, where the daemon normally lives on a little core) and on workloads dominated by small synchronous requests. No regression was reported on the symmetric- SMP test setups tried. The earlier version of this change [1] added a `bool sync` argument to all three hooks of `struct fuse_iqueue_ops` and threaded it through virtio_fs as well. Miklos questioned the interface churn, and the patch has been stalled since. Re-work it so the exported interface is left alone. The hint is carried in a new FR_SYNC_WAKEUP bit of the existing `fuse_req->flags` bitfield (an `unsigned long`, so no layout change): - __fuse_request_send() sets the flag before fuse_send_one(). - fuse_dev_queue_req() consumes it with test_and_clear_bit() and forwards the result to fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(), which then picks wake_up_sync() or wake_up(). - The forget, interrupt and resend paths pass `false` explicitly, preserving their original wake_up() behaviour. Only /dev/fuse ever wakes fiq->waitq; virtio_fs and fuse_uring dispatch through their own transport and never call wake_up(), so threading `sync` through their ops would just add an unused argument. test_and_clear_bit() makes the flag a one-shot hint that cannot leak into a future requeue, and no extra cleanup is needed in fuse_request_end()/fuse_put_request(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1638780405-38026-1-git-send-email-quic_pragalla@quicinc.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221222093407.GA1141@mi-HP-ProDesk-680-G4-MT/ This work is based on "Pradeep P V K <quic_pragalla@quicinc.com>" and "Pavankumar Kondeti <quic_pkondeti@quicinc.com>" Assisted-by: TRAE:GLM-5.2 Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-07-31 15:01:02 +08:00
fuse: give wakeup hints to the scheduler for synchronous requests When a synchronous FUSE request is sent, the in-kernel client queues it on fiq->pending and wakes the userspace daemon sleeping in fuse_dev_do_read()->wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(fiq->waitq, ...). The client then blocks in request_wait_answer() waiting for the reply, so the waker is about to go to sleep: this is exactly the pattern that WF_SYNC is meant to optimise. As Peter Zijlstra explained in the earlier discussion [1], WF_SYNC is a hint that the waker is about to sleep and the waker and wakee share data, so stacking the woken thread on the current CPU is beneficial for cache locality instead of searching for an idle one. Add a wake_up_sync() wrapper for task on the synchronous request path. Performance: On an Android big.LITTLE device where the FUSE daemon (MediaProvider) runs as a background service on the little cores while foreground applications run on the big cores, the synchronous wakeup hint lets the scheduler pull the daemon thread onto the big core that is issuing the request, where the request data is cache-hot. Measured by qixiaoyu [2] on a 2000-picture zip decompression to /sdcard: ------------------------------------------ | Default | patched | Improvement | ------------------------------------------ | 13.0 s | 7.0 s | 46% | ------------------------------------------ Server thread wall duration: 3583 ms -> 1276 ms Server runs on big core: 5% -> 79% The original 4K-file copy/compress/decompress workload [1] on the same kind of device showed a ~28% improvement (13.8s -> 9.9s). Note: Miklos reported [2] that on his test box he could not observe an actual migration from wake_up_interruptible_sync(); the benefit appears to be most visible on asymmetric topologies (big.LITTLE, where the daemon normally lives on a little core) and on workloads dominated by small synchronous requests. No regression was reported on the symmetric- SMP test setups tried. The earlier version of this change [1] added a `bool sync` argument to all three hooks of `struct fuse_iqueue_ops` and threaded it through virtio_fs as well. Miklos questioned the interface churn, and the patch has been stalled since. Re-work it so the exported interface is left alone. The hint is carried in a new FR_SYNC_WAKEUP bit of the existing `fuse_req->flags` bitfield (an `unsigned long`, so no layout change): - __fuse_request_send() sets the flag before fuse_send_one(). - fuse_dev_queue_req() consumes it with test_and_clear_bit() and forwards the result to fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(), which then picks wake_up_sync() or wake_up(). - The forget, interrupt and resend paths pass `false` explicitly, preserving their original wake_up() behaviour. Only /dev/fuse ever wakes fiq->waitq; virtio_fs and fuse_uring dispatch through their own transport and never call wake_up(), so threading `sync` through their ops would just add an unused argument. test_and_clear_bit() makes the flag a one-shot hint that cannot leak into a future requeue, and no extra cleanup is needed in fuse_request_end()/fuse_put_request(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1638780405-38026-1-git-send-email-quic_pragalla@quicinc.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221222093407.GA1141@mi-HP-ProDesk-680-G4-MT/ This work is based on "Pradeep P V K <quic_pragalla@quicinc.com>" and "Pavankumar Kondeti <quic_pkondeti@quicinc.com>" Assisted-by: TRAE:GLM-5.2 Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-07-31 15:01:02 +08:00
fuse: give wakeup hints to the scheduler for synchronous requests When a synchronous FUSE request is sent, the in-kernel client queues it on fiq->pending and wakes the userspace daemon sleeping in fuse_dev_do_read()->wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(fiq->waitq, ...). The client then blocks in request_wait_answer() waiting for the reply, so the waker is about to go to sleep: this is exactly the pattern that WF_SYNC is meant to optimise. As Peter Zijlstra explained in the earlier discussion [1], WF_SYNC is a hint that the waker is about to sleep and the waker and wakee share data, so stacking the woken thread on the current CPU is beneficial for cache locality instead of searching for an idle one. Add a wake_up_sync() wrapper for task on the synchronous request path. Performance: On an Android big.LITTLE device where the FUSE daemon (MediaProvider) runs as a background service on the little cores while foreground applications run on the big cores, the synchronous wakeup hint lets the scheduler pull the daemon thread onto the big core that is issuing the request, where the request data is cache-hot. Measured by qixiaoyu [2] on a 2000-picture zip decompression to /sdcard: ------------------------------------------ | Default | patched | Improvement | ------------------------------------------ | 13.0 s | 7.0 s | 46% | ------------------------------------------ Server thread wall duration: 3583 ms -> 1276 ms Server runs on big core: 5% -> 79% The original 4K-file copy/compress/decompress workload [1] on the same kind of device showed a ~28% improvement (13.8s -> 9.9s). Note: Miklos reported [2] that on his test box he could not observe an actual migration from wake_up_interruptible_sync(); the benefit appears to be most visible on asymmetric topologies (big.LITTLE, where the daemon normally lives on a little core) and on workloads dominated by small synchronous requests. No regression was reported on the symmetric- SMP test setups tried. The earlier version of this change [1] added a `bool sync` argument to all three hooks of `struct fuse_iqueue_ops` and threaded it through virtio_fs as well. Miklos questioned the interface churn, and the patch has been stalled since. Re-work it so the exported interface is left alone. The hint is carried in a new FR_SYNC_WAKEUP bit of the existing `fuse_req->flags` bitfield (an `unsigned long`, so no layout change): - __fuse_request_send() sets the flag before fuse_send_one(). - fuse_dev_queue_req() consumes it with test_and_clear_bit() and forwards the result to fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(), which then picks wake_up_sync() or wake_up(). - The forget, interrupt and resend paths pass `false` explicitly, preserving their original wake_up() behaviour. Only /dev/fuse ever wakes fiq->waitq; virtio_fs and fuse_uring dispatch through their own transport and never call wake_up(), so threading `sync` through their ops would just add an unused argument. test_and_clear_bit() makes the flag a one-shot hint that cannot leak into a future requeue, and no extra cleanup is needed in fuse_request_end()/fuse_put_request(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1638780405-38026-1-git-send-email-quic_pragalla@quicinc.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221222093407.GA1141@mi-HP-ProDesk-680-G4-MT/ This work is based on "Pradeep P V K <quic_pragalla@quicinc.com>" and "Pavankumar Kondeti <quic_pkondeti@quicinc.com>" Assisted-by: TRAE:GLM-5.2 Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-07-31 15:01:02 +08:00
fuse: give wakeup hints to the scheduler for synchronous requests When a synchronous FUSE request is sent, the in-kernel client queues it on fiq->pending and wakes the userspace daemon sleeping in fuse_dev_do_read()->wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(fiq->waitq, ...). The client then blocks in request_wait_answer() waiting for the reply, so the waker is about to go to sleep: this is exactly the pattern that WF_SYNC is meant to optimise. As Peter Zijlstra explained in the earlier discussion [1], WF_SYNC is a hint that the waker is about to sleep and the waker and wakee share data, so stacking the woken thread on the current CPU is beneficial for cache locality instead of searching for an idle one. Add a wake_up_sync() wrapper for task on the synchronous request path. Performance: On an Android big.LITTLE device where the FUSE daemon (MediaProvider) runs as a background service on the little cores while foreground applications run on the big cores, the synchronous wakeup hint lets the scheduler pull the daemon thread onto the big core that is issuing the request, where the request data is cache-hot. Measured by qixiaoyu [2] on a 2000-picture zip decompression to /sdcard: ------------------------------------------ | Default | patched | Improvement | ------------------------------------------ | 13.0 s | 7.0 s | 46% | ------------------------------------------ Server thread wall duration: 3583 ms -> 1276 ms Server runs on big core: 5% -> 79% The original 4K-file copy/compress/decompress workload [1] on the same kind of device showed a ~28% improvement (13.8s -> 9.9s). Note: Miklos reported [2] that on his test box he could not observe an actual migration from wake_up_interruptible_sync(); the benefit appears to be most visible on asymmetric topologies (big.LITTLE, where the daemon normally lives on a little core) and on workloads dominated by small synchronous requests. No regression was reported on the symmetric- SMP test setups tried. The earlier version of this change [1] added a `bool sync` argument to all three hooks of `struct fuse_iqueue_ops` and threaded it through virtio_fs as well. Miklos questioned the interface churn, and the patch has been stalled since. Re-work it so the exported interface is left alone. The hint is carried in a new FR_SYNC_WAKEUP bit of the existing `fuse_req->flags` bitfield (an `unsigned long`, so no layout change): - __fuse_request_send() sets the flag before fuse_send_one(). - fuse_dev_queue_req() consumes it with test_and_clear_bit() and forwards the result to fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(), which then picks wake_up_sync() or wake_up(). - The forget, interrupt and resend paths pass `false` explicitly, preserving their original wake_up() behaviour. Only /dev/fuse ever wakes fiq->waitq; virtio_fs and fuse_uring dispatch through their own transport and never call wake_up(), so threading `sync` through their ops would just add an unused argument. test_and_clear_bit() makes the flag a one-shot hint that cannot leak into a future requeue, and no extra cleanup is needed in fuse_request_end()/fuse_put_request(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1638780405-38026-1-git-send-email-quic_pragalla@quicinc.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221222093407.GA1141@mi-HP-ProDesk-680-G4-MT/ This work is based on "Pradeep P V K <quic_pragalla@quicinc.com>" and "Pavankumar Kondeti <quic_pkondeti@quicinc.com>" Assisted-by: TRAE:GLM-5.2 Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-07-31 15:01:02 +08:00
fuse: wake one waiter per freed slot when raising max_background fuse_get_req() parks background allocations on fch->blocked_waitq via wait_event_state_exclusive(), so each wakeup releases exactly one waiter. fuse_chan_max_background_set() clears fch->blocked when the new limit exceeds num_background, but the accompanying wake_up() releases a single waiter regardless of how many slots just became available. Raising max_background from 10 to 100 therefore admits one request instead of ninety. The remaining waiters are not permanently stranded — the "else if (!fch->blocked)" branch in fuse_request_end() wakes one more per completion — but that only helps while requests keep completing. Consider a fixed pool of threads doing readahead or async direct I/O with the quota exhausted: every thread is either in flight or parked, and each completion wakes one waiter while freeing one slot, a net change of zero. num_background oscillates around the old limit and the added quota is never taken up. Waking one waiter per freed slot also preserves submission order: once fch->blocked is clear, new callers of fuse_get_req() skip the waitqueue entirely, overtaking waiters that parked before the limit was raised. Use wake_up_nr() with the number of slots that just became available. Since the wakeup is guarded by !fch->blocked, num_background is strictly below max_background, so the count is at least 1 and never degenerates into wake_up_all(). Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-By: Horst Birthelmer <hbirthelmer@ddn.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-08-01 16:24:51 +08:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: give wakeup hints to the scheduler for synchronous requests When a synchronous FUSE request is sent, the in-kernel client queues it on fiq->pending and wakes the userspace daemon sleeping in fuse_dev_do_read()->wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(fiq->waitq, ...). The client then blocks in request_wait_answer() waiting for the reply, so the waker is about to go to sleep: this is exactly the pattern that WF_SYNC is meant to optimise. As Peter Zijlstra explained in the earlier discussion [1], WF_SYNC is a hint that the waker is about to sleep and the waker and wakee share data, so stacking the woken thread on the current CPU is beneficial for cache locality instead of searching for an idle one. Add a wake_up_sync() wrapper for task on the synchronous request path. Performance: On an Android big.LITTLE device where the FUSE daemon (MediaProvider) runs as a background service on the little cores while foreground applications run on the big cores, the synchronous wakeup hint lets the scheduler pull the daemon thread onto the big core that is issuing the request, where the request data is cache-hot. Measured by qixiaoyu [2] on a 2000-picture zip decompression to /sdcard: ------------------------------------------ | Default | patched | Improvement | ------------------------------------------ | 13.0 s | 7.0 s | 46% | ------------------------------------------ Server thread wall duration: 3583 ms -> 1276 ms Server runs on big core: 5% -> 79% The original 4K-file copy/compress/decompress workload [1] on the same kind of device showed a ~28% improvement (13.8s -> 9.9s). Note: Miklos reported [2] that on his test box he could not observe an actual migration from wake_up_interruptible_sync(); the benefit appears to be most visible on asymmetric topologies (big.LITTLE, where the daemon normally lives on a little core) and on workloads dominated by small synchronous requests. No regression was reported on the symmetric- SMP test setups tried. The earlier version of this change [1] added a `bool sync` argument to all three hooks of `struct fuse_iqueue_ops` and threaded it through virtio_fs as well. Miklos questioned the interface churn, and the patch has been stalled since. Re-work it so the exported interface is left alone. The hint is carried in a new FR_SYNC_WAKEUP bit of the existing `fuse_req->flags` bitfield (an `unsigned long`, so no layout change): - __fuse_request_send() sets the flag before fuse_send_one(). - fuse_dev_queue_req() consumes it with test_and_clear_bit() and forwards the result to fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(), which then picks wake_up_sync() or wake_up(). - The forget, interrupt and resend paths pass `false` explicitly, preserving their original wake_up() behaviour. Only /dev/fuse ever wakes fiq->waitq; virtio_fs and fuse_uring dispatch through their own transport and never call wake_up(), so threading `sync` through their ops would just add an unused argument. test_and_clear_bit() makes the flag a one-shot hint that cannot leak into a future requeue, and no extra cleanup is needed in fuse_request_end()/fuse_put_request(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1638780405-38026-1-git-send-email-quic_pragalla@quicinc.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221222093407.GA1141@mi-HP-ProDesk-680-G4-MT/ This work is based on "Pradeep P V K <quic_pragalla@quicinc.com>" and "Pavankumar Kondeti <quic_pkondeti@quicinc.com>" Assisted-by: TRAE:GLM-5.2 Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-07-31 15:01:02 +08:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
mm: introduce memdesc_flags_t Patch series "Add and use memdesc_flags_t". At some point struct page will be separated from struct slab and struct folio. This is a step towards that by introducing a type for the 'flags' word of all three structures. This gives us a certain amount of type safety by establishing that some of these unsigned longs are different from other unsigned longs in that they contain things like node ID, section number and zone number in the upper bits. That lets us have functions that can be easily called by anyone who has a slab, folio or page (but not easily by anyone else) to get the node or zone. There's going to be some unusual merge problems with this as some odd bits of the kernel decide they want to print out the flags value or something similar by writing page->flags and now they'll need to write page->flags.f instead. That's most of the churn here. Maybe we should be removing these things from the debug output? This patch (of 11): Wrap the unsigned long flags in a typedef. In upcoming patches, this will provide a strong hint that you can't just pass a random unsigned long to functions which take this as an argument. [willy@infradead.org: s/flags/flags.f/ in several architectures] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aKMgPRLD-WnkPxYm@casper.infradead.org [nicola.vetrini@gmail.com: mips: fix compilation error] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+G9fYvkpmqGr6wjBNHY=dRp71PLCoi2341JxOudi60yqaeUdg@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250825214245.1838158-1-nicola.vetrini@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250805172307.1302730-1-willy@infradead.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250805172307.1302730-2-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2025-08-05 18:22:51 +01:00
mm: multi-gen LRU: groundwork Evictable pages are divided into multiple generations for each lruvec. The youngest generation number is stored in lrugen->max_seq for both anon and file types as they are aged on an equal footing. The oldest generation numbers are stored in lrugen->min_seq[] separately for anon and file types as clean file pages can be evicted regardless of swap constraints. These three variables are monotonically increasing. Generation numbers are truncated into order_base_2(MAX_NR_GENS+1) bits in order to fit into the gen counter in folio->flags. Each truncated generation number is an index to lrugen->lists[]. The sliding window technique is used to track at least MIN_NR_GENS and at most MAX_NR_GENS generations. The gen counter stores a value within [1, MAX_NR_GENS] while a page is on one of lrugen->lists[]. Otherwise it stores 0. There are two conceptually independent procedures: "the aging", which produces young generations, and "the eviction", which consumes old generations. They form a closed-loop system, i.e., "the page reclaim". Both procedures can be invoked from userspace for the purposes of working set estimation and proactive reclaim. These techniques are commonly used to optimize job scheduling (bin packing) in data centers [1][2]. To avoid confusion, the terms "hot" and "cold" will be applied to the multi-gen LRU, as a new convention; the terms "active" and "inactive" will be applied to the active/inactive LRU, as usual. The protection of hot pages and the selection of cold pages are based on page access channels and patterns. There are two access channels: one through page tables and the other through file descriptors. The protection of the former channel is by design stronger because: 1. The uncertainty in determining the access patterns of the former channel is higher due to the approximation of the accessed bit. 2. The cost of evicting the former channel is higher due to the TLB flushes required and the likelihood of encountering the dirty bit. 3. The penalty of underprotecting the former channel is higher because applications usually do not prepare themselves for major page faults like they do for blocked I/O. E.g., GUI applications commonly use dedicated I/O threads to avoid blocking rendering threads. There are also two access patterns: one with temporal locality and the other without. For the reasons listed above, the former channel is assumed to follow the former pattern unless VM_SEQ_READ or VM_RAND_READ is present; the latter channel is assumed to follow the latter pattern unless outlying refaults have been observed [3][4]. The next patch will address the "outlying refaults". Three macros, i.e., LRU_REFS_WIDTH, LRU_REFS_PGOFF and LRU_REFS_MASK, used later are added in this patch to make the entire patchset less diffy. A page is added to the youngest generation on faulting. The aging needs to check the accessed bit at least twice before handing this page over to the eviction. The first check takes care of the accessed bit set on the initial fault; the second check makes sure this page has not been used since then. This protocol, AKA second chance, requires a minimum of two generations, hence MIN_NR_GENS. [1] https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3297858.3304053 [2] https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3503222.3507731 [3] https://lwn.net/Articles/495543/ [4] https://lwn.net/Articles/815342/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220918080010.2920238-6-yuzhao@google.com Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Acked-by: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Acked-by: Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) <heftig@archlinux.org> Acked-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Acked-by: Steven Barrett <steven@liquorix.net> Acked-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Tested-by: Daniel Byrne <djbyrne@mtu.edu> Tested-by: Donald Carr <d@chaos-reins.com> Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com> Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <Hi-Angel@yandex.ru> Tested-by: Shuang Zhai <szhai2@cs.rochester.edu> Tested-by: Sofia Trinh <sofia.trinh@edi.works> Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michael Larabel <Michael@MichaelLarabel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-18 02:00:02 -06:00
fuse: revert back to __readahead_folio() for readahead In commit 3eab9d7bc2f4 ("fuse: convert readahead to use folios"), the logic was converted to using the new folio readahead code, which drops the reference on the folio once it is locked, using an inferred reference on the folio. Previously we held a reference on the folio for the entire duration of the readpages call. This is fine, however for the case for splice pipe responses where we will remove the old folio and splice in the new folio (see fuse_try_move_page()), we assume that there is a reference held on the folio for ap->folios, which is no longer the case. To fix this, revert back to __readahead_folio() which allows us to hold the reference on the folio for the duration of readpages until either we drop the reference ourselves in fuse_readpages_end() or the reference is dropped after it's replaced in the page cache in the splice case. This will fix the UAF bug that was reported. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/2f681f48-00f5-4e09-8431-2b3dbfaa881e@heusel.eu/ Fixes: 3eab9d7bc2f4 ("fuse: convert readahead to use folios") Reported-by: Christian Heusel <christian@heusel.eu> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/2f681f48-00f5-4e09-8431-2b3dbfaa881e@heusel.eu/ Closes: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/issues/110 Reported-by: Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/34feb867-09e2-46e4-aa31-d9660a806d1a@gmail.com/ Closes: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1236660 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.13 Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2025-02-11 13:47:50 -08:00
fuse: add zero-copy over io-uring Implement zero-copy in fuse io-uring to eliminate memory copies between the application, kernel, and server for read/write operations. The server can directly access client pages or page cache folios without copying data through an intermediary buffer. When a fuse request arrives, the kernel registers the relevant pages into a sparse slot in the server's io_uring registered buffer table. The server can then operate on these pages directly using io-uring fixed buffer operations (eg read_fixed/write_fixed) and the kernel unregisters these pages when the request completes. Non-page-backed args (eg op out headers) will go through the payload buffer as normal. The server can specify which open files should have their reads/writes go through zero-copy, by setting the FOPEN_IO_URING_ZERO_COPY flag when servicing opens. This requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN and bufpools. This is gated behind CAP_SYS_ADMIN because zero-copy allows the server direct access to the client's underlying pages, rather than operating on an intermediary buffer that the contents of the client's pages were copied into or on page cache folios. The request flow for the zero-copy direct-io write path (client writes data, server reads it) is as follows: ======================================================================= | Kernel | FUSE server | | | "write(fd, buf, 1MB)" | | | | >sys_write() | | >fuse_file_write_iter() | | >fuse_send_one() | | [req->args->in_pages = true] | | [folios hold client write data] | | | | >fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() | | >copy_header_to_ring(IN_OUT) | | [memcpy fuse_in_header] | | >copy_header_to_ring(OP) | | [memcpy write_in header] | | | | >fuse_uring_args_to_ring() | | >setup_fuse_copy_state() | | [skip_folio_copy = true] | | | | >fuse_uring_set_up_zero_copy() | | [folio_get for each client folio] | | [build bio_vec array from folios] | | >io_buffer_register_bvec() | | [register pages at ent->zero_copy_index] | | [ent->zero_copied = true] | | | | >fuse_copy_args() | | [skip_folio_copy => return 0 | | for page arg, skip data copy] | | | | >copy_header_to_ring(RING_ENT) | | [memcpy ent_in_out] | | >io_uring_cmd_done() | | | | | [CQE received] | | | | [issue io_uring READ at | | ent->zero_copy_index] | | [reads directly from | |client's pages (ZERO_COPY)] | | | | [write data to backing | | store] | | [submit COMMIT AND FETCH] | | | >fuse_uring_commit_fetch() | | >fuse_uring_commit() | | >fuse_uring_copy_from_ring() | | >fuse_uring_req_end() | | >io_buffer_unregister(ent->zero_copy_index) | | [unregister pages from index] | | >fuse_zero_copy_release() | | [folio_put for each folio] | | [ent->zero_copied = false] | | >fuse_request_end() | | [wake up client] | The zero-copy read path is analogous. Some requests may have both page-backed args and non-page-backed args. For these requests, the page-backed args are zero-copied while the non-page-backed args are copied to the buffer selected from the buffer pool: zero-copy: pages registered via io_buffer_register_bvec() non-page-backed: copied to payload buffer via fuse_copy_args() For a request whose payload is zero-copied, the registration/unregistration path looks like: register: fuse_uring_set_up_zero_copy() folio_get() for each folio io_buffer_register_bvec(ent->zero_copy_index) unregister: fuse_uring_req_end() io_buffer_unregister(ent->zero_copy_index) -> fuse_zero_copy_release() callback folio_put() for each folio Please note that on abort for in-flight zero-copied requests that have been sent to userspace, the registered bvec slot remains occupied and its folios remain pinned until the io-uring ring is destroyed, at which point io-uring unregisters all buffers and the fuse_zero_copy_release() callback drops the folio references. Unregistering at teardown would require operating on the ring context directly, whose validity is hard to ascertain; this is deemed not worth the complexity for the abort race, since everything is freed when the ring is torn down. The throughput improvement from zero-copy depends on how much of the per-request latency is spent on data copying vs backing I/O. The gain comes from eliminating the payload-buffer memcpy, but accessing the zero-copied pages requires the server to issue the read/write as an IORING_OP_READ/WRITE_FIXED operation. The benefit is largest when the mempcy is a meaningful fraction of per-request latency while backing i/o is still noticable enough that the extra io-uring op's overhead doesn't dominate. Benchmarked with passthrough_hp (--nopassthrough, q_depth=8) on a 2-socket Intel Xeon Gold 6138 (40 cores / 80 threads), using fio (sync engine, bs=1M, O_DIRECT, numjobs=2, 30s run + 10s ramp, 3 runs) where direct-I/O throughput is against a RAM-backed (tmpfs) source (backing I/O is not the bottleneck): baseline registered-buf zero-copy (zc vs base) direct read ~5.1 GB/s ~5.4 GB/s ~8.9 GB/s (+75%) direct write ~3.4 GB/s ~4.8 GB/s ~5.1 GB/s (+50%) Reads end up higher than writes because the backing store reads faster than it writes (the baseline shows the same read>write gap, and the raw device does too). On a device-bound NVMe (~2 GB/s reads) the read gain shrinks to ~10-16% (and no measurable gains for writes), as backing I/O rather than the eliminated copy dominates latency. The benefit overall scales with how much of the per-request latency is the data copy versus backing I/O. Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-08-14 11:59:45 -07:00
fuse: add zero-copy over io-uring Implement zero-copy in fuse io-uring to eliminate memory copies between the application, kernel, and server for read/write operations. The server can directly access client pages or page cache folios without copying data through an intermediary buffer. When a fuse request arrives, the kernel registers the relevant pages into a sparse slot in the server's io_uring registered buffer table. The server can then operate on these pages directly using io-uring fixed buffer operations (eg read_fixed/write_fixed) and the kernel unregisters these pages when the request completes. Non-page-backed args (eg op out headers) will go through the payload buffer as normal. The server can specify which open files should have their reads/writes go through zero-copy, by setting the FOPEN_IO_URING_ZERO_COPY flag when servicing opens. This requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN and bufpools. This is gated behind CAP_SYS_ADMIN because zero-copy allows the server direct access to the client's underlying pages, rather than operating on an intermediary buffer that the contents of the client's pages were copied into or on page cache folios. The request flow for the zero-copy direct-io write path (client writes data, server reads it) is as follows: ======================================================================= | Kernel | FUSE server | | | "write(fd, buf, 1MB)" | | | | >sys_write() | | >fuse_file_write_iter() | | >fuse_send_one() | | [req->args->in_pages = true] | | [folios hold client write data] | | | | >fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() | | >copy_header_to_ring(IN_OUT) | | [memcpy fuse_in_header] | | >copy_header_to_ring(OP) | | [memcpy write_in header] | | | | >fuse_uring_args_to_ring() | | >setup_fuse_copy_state() | | [skip_folio_copy = true] | | | | >fuse_uring_set_up_zero_copy() | | [folio_get for each client folio] | | [build bio_vec array from folios] | | >io_buffer_register_bvec() | | [register pages at ent->zero_copy_index] | | [ent->zero_copied = true] | | | | >fuse_copy_args() | | [skip_folio_copy => return 0 | | for page arg, skip data copy] | | | | >copy_header_to_ring(RING_ENT) | | [memcpy ent_in_out] | | >io_uring_cmd_done() | | | | | [CQE received] | | | | [issue io_uring READ at | | ent->zero_copy_index] | | [reads directly from | |client's pages (ZERO_COPY)] | | | | [write data to backing | | store] | | [submit COMMIT AND FETCH] | | | >fuse_uring_commit_fetch() | | >fuse_uring_commit() | | >fuse_uring_copy_from_ring() | | >fuse_uring_req_end() | | >io_buffer_unregister(ent->zero_copy_index) | | [unregister pages from index] | | >fuse_zero_copy_release() | | [folio_put for each folio] | | [ent->zero_copied = false] | | >fuse_request_end() | | [wake up client] | The zero-copy read path is analogous. Some requests may have both page-backed args and non-page-backed args. For these requests, the page-backed args are zero-copied while the non-page-backed args are copied to the buffer selected from the buffer pool: zero-copy: pages registered via io_buffer_register_bvec() non-page-backed: copied to payload buffer via fuse_copy_args() For a request whose payload is zero-copied, the registration/unregistration path looks like: register: fuse_uring_set_up_zero_copy() folio_get() for each folio io_buffer_register_bvec(ent->zero_copy_index) unregister: fuse_uring_req_end() io_buffer_unregister(ent->zero_copy_index) -> fuse_zero_copy_release() callback folio_put() for each folio Please note that on abort for in-flight zero-copied requests that have been sent to userspace, the registered bvec slot remains occupied and its folios remain pinned until the io-uring ring is destroyed, at which point io-uring unregisters all buffers and the fuse_zero_copy_release() callback drops the folio references. Unregistering at teardown would require operating on the ring context directly, whose validity is hard to ascertain; this is deemed not worth the complexity for the abort race, since everything is freed when the ring is torn down. The throughput improvement from zero-copy depends on how much of the per-request latency is spent on data copying vs backing I/O. The gain comes from eliminating the payload-buffer memcpy, but accessing the zero-copied pages requires the server to issue the read/write as an IORING_OP_READ/WRITE_FIXED operation. The benefit is largest when the mempcy is a meaningful fraction of per-request latency while backing i/o is still noticable enough that the extra io-uring op's overhead doesn't dominate. Benchmarked with passthrough_hp (--nopassthrough, q_depth=8) on a 2-socket Intel Xeon Gold 6138 (40 cores / 80 threads), using fio (sync engine, bs=1M, O_DIRECT, numjobs=2, 30s run + 10s ramp, 3 runs) where direct-I/O throughput is against a RAM-backed (tmpfs) source (backing I/O is not the bottleneck): baseline registered-buf zero-copy (zc vs base) direct read ~5.1 GB/s ~5.4 GB/s ~8.9 GB/s (+75%) direct write ~3.4 GB/s ~4.8 GB/s ~5.1 GB/s (+50%) Reads end up higher than writes because the backing store reads faster than it writes (the baseline shows the same read>write gap, and the raw device does too). On a device-bound NVMe (~2 GB/s reads) the read gain shrinks to ~10-16% (and no measurable gains for writes), as backing I/O rather than the eliminated copy dominates latency. The benefit overall scales with how much of the per-request latency is the data copy versus backing I/O. Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-08-14 11:59:45 -07:00
fuse: add zero-copy over io-uring Implement zero-copy in fuse io-uring to eliminate memory copies between the application, kernel, and server for read/write operations. The server can directly access client pages or page cache folios without copying data through an intermediary buffer. When a fuse request arrives, the kernel registers the relevant pages into a sparse slot in the server's io_uring registered buffer table. The server can then operate on these pages directly using io-uring fixed buffer operations (eg read_fixed/write_fixed) and the kernel unregisters these pages when the request completes. Non-page-backed args (eg op out headers) will go through the payload buffer as normal. The server can specify which open files should have their reads/writes go through zero-copy, by setting the FOPEN_IO_URING_ZERO_COPY flag when servicing opens. This requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN and bufpools. This is gated behind CAP_SYS_ADMIN because zero-copy allows the server direct access to the client's underlying pages, rather than operating on an intermediary buffer that the contents of the client's pages were copied into or on page cache folios. The request flow for the zero-copy direct-io write path (client writes data, server reads it) is as follows: ======================================================================= | Kernel | FUSE server | | | "write(fd, buf, 1MB)" | | | | >sys_write() | | >fuse_file_write_iter() | | >fuse_send_one() | | [req->args->in_pages = true] | | [folios hold client write data] | | | | >fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() | | >copy_header_to_ring(IN_OUT) | | [memcpy fuse_in_header] | | >copy_header_to_ring(OP) | | [memcpy write_in header] | | | | >fuse_uring_args_to_ring() | | >setup_fuse_copy_state() | | [skip_folio_copy = true] | | | | >fuse_uring_set_up_zero_copy() | | [folio_get for each client folio] | | [build bio_vec array from folios] | | >io_buffer_register_bvec() | | [register pages at ent->zero_copy_index] | | [ent->zero_copied = true] | | | | >fuse_copy_args() | | [skip_folio_copy => return 0 | | for page arg, skip data copy] | | | | >copy_header_to_ring(RING_ENT) | | [memcpy ent_in_out] | | >io_uring_cmd_done() | | | | | [CQE received] | | | | [issue io_uring READ at | | ent->zero_copy_index] | | [reads directly from | |client's pages (ZERO_COPY)] | | | | [write data to backing | | store] | | [submit COMMIT AND FETCH] | | | >fuse_uring_commit_fetch() | | >fuse_uring_commit() | | >fuse_uring_copy_from_ring() | | >fuse_uring_req_end() | | >io_buffer_unregister(ent->zero_copy_index) | | [unregister pages from index] | | >fuse_zero_copy_release() | | [folio_put for each folio] | | [ent->zero_copied = false] | | >fuse_request_end() | | [wake up client] | The zero-copy read path is analogous. Some requests may have both page-backed args and non-page-backed args. For these requests, the page-backed args are zero-copied while the non-page-backed args are copied to the buffer selected from the buffer pool: zero-copy: pages registered via io_buffer_register_bvec() non-page-backed: copied to payload buffer via fuse_copy_args() For a request whose payload is zero-copied, the registration/unregistration path looks like: register: fuse_uring_set_up_zero_copy() folio_get() for each folio io_buffer_register_bvec(ent->zero_copy_index) unregister: fuse_uring_req_end() io_buffer_unregister(ent->zero_copy_index) -> fuse_zero_copy_release() callback folio_put() for each folio Please note that on abort for in-flight zero-copied requests that have been sent to userspace, the registered bvec slot remains occupied and its folios remain pinned until the io-uring ring is destroyed, at which point io-uring unregisters all buffers and the fuse_zero_copy_release() callback drops the folio references. Unregistering at teardown would require operating on the ring context directly, whose validity is hard to ascertain; this is deemed not worth the complexity for the abort race, since everything is freed when the ring is torn down. The throughput improvement from zero-copy depends on how much of the per-request latency is spent on data copying vs backing I/O. The gain comes from eliminating the payload-buffer memcpy, but accessing the zero-copied pages requires the server to issue the read/write as an IORING_OP_READ/WRITE_FIXED operation. The benefit is largest when the mempcy is a meaningful fraction of per-request latency while backing i/o is still noticable enough that the extra io-uring op's overhead doesn't dominate. Benchmarked with passthrough_hp (--nopassthrough, q_depth=8) on a 2-socket Intel Xeon Gold 6138 (40 cores / 80 threads), using fio (sync engine, bs=1M, O_DIRECT, numjobs=2, 30s run + 10s ramp, 3 runs) where direct-I/O throughput is against a RAM-backed (tmpfs) source (backing I/O is not the bottleneck): baseline registered-buf zero-copy (zc vs base) direct read ~5.1 GB/s ~5.4 GB/s ~8.9 GB/s (+75%) direct write ~3.4 GB/s ~4.8 GB/s ~5.1 GB/s (+50%) Reads end up higher than writes because the backing store reads faster than it writes (the baseline shows the same read>write gap, and the raw device does too). On a device-bound NVMe (~2 GB/s reads) the read gain shrinks to ~10-16% (and no measurable gains for writes), as backing I/O rather than the eliminated copy dominates latency. The benefit overall scales with how much of the per-request latency is the data copy versus backing I/O. Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd@bsbernd.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-08-14 11:59:45 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: require /dev/fuse reads to have enough buffer capacity (take 2) [ This retries commit d4b13963f217 ("fuse: require /dev/fuse reads to have enough buffer capacity"), which was reverted. In this version we require only `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_write_in)` instead of 4K for FUSE request header room, because, contrary to libfuse and kernel client behaviour, GlusterFS actually provides only so much room for request header. ] A FUSE filesystem server queues /dev/fuse sys_read calls to get filesystem requests to handle. It does not know in advance what would be that request as it can be anything that client issues - LOOKUP, READ, WRITE, ... Many requests are short and retrieve data from the filesystem. However WRITE and NOTIFY_REPLY write data into filesystem. Before getting into operation phase, FUSE filesystem server and kernel client negotiate what should be the maximum write size the client will ever issue. After negotiation the contract in between server/client is that the filesystem server then should queue /dev/fuse sys_read calls with enough buffer capacity to receive any client request - WRITE in particular, while FUSE client should not, in particular, send WRITE requests with > negotiated max_write payload. FUSE client in kernel and libfuse historically reserve 4K for request header. However an existing filesystem server - GlusterFS - was found which reserves only 80 bytes for header room (= `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_write_in)`). Since `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_write_in)` == `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_read_in)` == `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_notify_retrieve_in)` is the absolute minimum any sane filesystem should be using for header room, the contract is that filesystem server should queue sys_reads with `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_write_in)` + max_write buffer. If the filesystem server does not follow this contract, what can happen is that fuse_dev_do_read will see that request size is > buffer size, and then it will return EIO to client who issued the request but won't indicate in any way that there is a problem to filesystem server. This can be hard to diagnose because for some requests, e.g. for NOTIFY_REPLY which mimics WRITE, there is no client thread that is waiting for request completion and that EIO goes nowhere, while on filesystem server side things look like the kernel is not replying back after successful NOTIFY_RETRIEVE request made by the server. We can make the problem easy to diagnose if we indicate via error return to filesystem server when it is violating the contract. This should not practically cause problems because if a filesystem server is using shorter buffer, writes to it were already very likely to cause EIO, and if the filesystem is read-only it should be too following FUSE_MIN_READ_BUFFER minimum buffer size. Please see [1] for context where the problem of stuck filesystem was hit for real (because kernel client was incorrectly sending more than max_write data with NOTIFY_REPLY; see also previous patch), how the situation was traced and for more involving patch that did not make it into the tree. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=155057023600853&w=2 Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com> Tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Cc: Jakob Unterwurzacher <jakobunt@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-07-08 17:03:31 +00:00
fuse: require /dev/fuse reads to have enough buffer capacity (take 2) [ This retries commit d4b13963f217 ("fuse: require /dev/fuse reads to have enough buffer capacity"), which was reverted. In this version we require only `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_write_in)` instead of 4K for FUSE request header room, because, contrary to libfuse and kernel client behaviour, GlusterFS actually provides only so much room for request header. ] A FUSE filesystem server queues /dev/fuse sys_read calls to get filesystem requests to handle. It does not know in advance what would be that request as it can be anything that client issues - LOOKUP, READ, WRITE, ... Many requests are short and retrieve data from the filesystem. However WRITE and NOTIFY_REPLY write data into filesystem. Before getting into operation phase, FUSE filesystem server and kernel client negotiate what should be the maximum write size the client will ever issue. After negotiation the contract in between server/client is that the filesystem server then should queue /dev/fuse sys_read calls with enough buffer capacity to receive any client request - WRITE in particular, while FUSE client should not, in particular, send WRITE requests with > negotiated max_write payload. FUSE client in kernel and libfuse historically reserve 4K for request header. However an existing filesystem server - GlusterFS - was found which reserves only 80 bytes for header room (= `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_write_in)`). Since `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_write_in)` == `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_read_in)` == `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_notify_retrieve_in)` is the absolute minimum any sane filesystem should be using for header room, the contract is that filesystem server should queue sys_reads with `sizeof(fuse_in_header) + sizeof(fuse_write_in)` + max_write buffer. If the filesystem server does not follow this contract, what can happen is that fuse_dev_do_read will see that request size is > buffer size, and then it will return EIO to client who issued the request but won't indicate in any way that there is a problem to filesystem server. This can be hard to diagnose because for some requests, e.g. for NOTIFY_REPLY which mimics WRITE, there is no client thread that is waiting for request completion and that EIO goes nowhere, while on filesystem server side things look like the kernel is not replying back after successful NOTIFY_RETRIEVE request made by the server. We can make the problem easy to diagnose if we indicate via error return to filesystem server when it is violating the contract. This should not practically cause problems because if a filesystem server is using shorter buffer, writes to it were already very likely to cause EIO, and if the filesystem is read-only it should be too following FUSE_MIN_READ_BUFFER minimum buffer size. Please see [1] for context where the problem of stuck filesystem was hit for real (because kernel client was incorrectly sending more than max_write data with NOTIFY_REPLY; see also previous patch), how the situation was traced and for more involving patch that did not make it into the tree. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=155057023600853&w=2 Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com> Tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Cc: Jakob Unterwurzacher <jakobunt@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-07-08 17:03:31 +00:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: allow server to run in different pid_ns Commit 0b6e9ea041e6 ("fuse: Add support for pid namespaces") broke Sandstorm.io development tools, which have been sending FUSE file descriptors across PID namespace boundaries since early 2014. The above patch added a check that prevented I/O on the fuse device file descriptor if the pid namespace of the reader/writer was different from the pid namespace of the mounter. With this change passing the device file descriptor to a different pid namespace simply doesn't work. The check was added because pids are transferred to/from the fuse userspace server in the namespace registered at mount time. To fix this regression, remove the checks and do the following: 1) the pid in the request header (the pid of the task that initiated the filesystem operation) is translated to the reader's pid namespace. If a mapping doesn't exist for this pid, then a zero pid is used. Note: even if a mapping would exist between the initiator task's pid namespace and the reader's pid namespace the pid will be zero if either mapping from initator's to mounter's namespace or mapping from mounter's to reader's namespace doesn't exist. 2) The lk.pid value in setlk/setlkw requests and getlk reply is left alone. Userspace should not interpret this value anyway. Also allow the setlk/setlkw operations if the pid of the task cannot be represented in the mounter's namespace (pid being zero in that case). Reported-by: Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Fixes: 0b6e9ea041e6 ("fuse: Add support for pid namespaces") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
2017-09-12 16:57:53 +02:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: explicitly set /dev/fuse file's private_data The misc subsystem (which is used for /dev/fuse) initializes private_data to point to the misc device when a driver has registered a custom open file operation, and initializes it to NULL when a custom open file operation has *not* been provided. This subtle quirk is confusing, to the point where kernel code registers *empty* file open operations to have private_data point to the misc device structure. And it leads to bugs, where the addition or removal of a custom open file operation surprisingly changes the initial contents of a file's private_data structure. So to simplify things in the misc subsystem, a patch [1] has been proposed to *always* set the private_data to point to the misc device, instead of only doing this when a custom open file operation has been registered. But before this patch can be applied we need to modify drivers that make the assumption that a misc device file's private_data is initialized to NULL because they didn't register a custom open file operation, so they don't rely on this assumption anymore. FUSE uses private_data to store the fuse_conn and errors out if this is not initialized to NULL at mount time. Hence, we now set a file's private_data to NULL explicitly, to be independent of whatever value the misc subsystem initializes it to by default. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/4/939 Reported-by: Giedrius Statkevicius <giedriuswork@gmail.com> Reported-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Van Braeckel <tomvanbraeckel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2015-01-12 05:22:16 +01:00
fuse: explicitly set /dev/fuse file's private_data The misc subsystem (which is used for /dev/fuse) initializes private_data to point to the misc device when a driver has registered a custom open file operation, and initializes it to NULL when a custom open file operation has *not* been provided. This subtle quirk is confusing, to the point where kernel code registers *empty* file open operations to have private_data point to the misc device structure. And it leads to bugs, where the addition or removal of a custom open file operation surprisingly changes the initial contents of a file's private_data structure. So to simplify things in the misc subsystem, a patch [1] has been proposed to *always* set the private_data to point to the misc device, instead of only doing this when a custom open file operation has been registered. But before this patch can be applied we need to modify drivers that make the assumption that a misc device file's private_data is initialized to NULL because they didn't register a custom open file operation, so they don't rely on this assumption anymore. FUSE uses private_data to store the fuse_conn and errors out if this is not initialized to NULL at mount time. Hence, we now set a file's private_data to NULL explicitly, to be independent of whatever value the misc subsystem initializes it to by default. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/4/939 Reported-by: Giedrius Statkevicius <giedriuswork@gmail.com> Reported-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Van Braeckel <tomvanbraeckel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2015-01-12 05:22:16 +01:00
fs/pipe: add simpler helpers for common cases The fix to atomically read the pipe head and tail state when not holding the pipe mutex has caused a number of headaches due to the size change of the involved types. It turns out that we don't have _that_ many places that access these fields directly and were affected, but we have more than we strictly should have, because our low-level helper functions have been designed to have intimate knowledge of how the pipes work. And as a result, that random noise of direct 'pipe->head' and 'pipe->tail' accesses makes it harder to pinpoint any actual potential problem spots remaining. For example, we didn't have a "is the pipe full" helper function, but instead had a "given these pipe buffer indexes and this pipe size, is the pipe full". That's because some low-level pipe code does actually want that much more complicated interface. But most other places literally just want a "is the pipe full" helper, and not having it meant that those places ended up being unnecessarily much too aware of this all. It would have been much better if only the very core pipe code that cared had been the one aware of this all. So let's fix it - better late than never. This just introduces the trivial wrappers for "is this pipe full or empty" and to get how many pipe buffers are used, so that instead of writing if (pipe_full(pipe->head, pipe->tail, pipe->max_usage)) the places that literally just want to know if a pipe is full can just say if (pipe_is_full(pipe)) instead. The existing trivial cases were converted with a 'sed' script. This cuts down on the places that access pipe->head and pipe->tail directly outside of the pipe code (and core splice code) quite a lot. The splice code in particular still revels in doing the direct low-level accesses, and the fuse fuse_dev_splice_write() code also seems a bit unnecessarily eager to go very low-level, but it's at least a bit better than it used to be. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2025-03-06 18:25:35 -10:00
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 15:29:47 +03:00
fuse: give wakeup hints to the scheduler for synchronous requests When a synchronous FUSE request is sent, the in-kernel client queues it on fiq->pending and wakes the userspace daemon sleeping in fuse_dev_do_read()->wait_event_interruptible_exclusive(fiq->waitq, ...). The client then blocks in request_wait_answer() waiting for the reply, so the waker is about to go to sleep: this is exactly the pattern that WF_SYNC is meant to optimise. As Peter Zijlstra explained in the earlier discussion [1], WF_SYNC is a hint that the waker is about to sleep and the waker and wakee share data, so stacking the woken thread on the current CPU is beneficial for cache locality instead of searching for an idle one. Add a wake_up_sync() wrapper for task on the synchronous request path. Performance: On an Android big.LITTLE device where the FUSE daemon (MediaProvider) runs as a background service on the little cores while foreground applications run on the big cores, the synchronous wakeup hint lets the scheduler pull the daemon thread onto the big core that is issuing the request, where the request data is cache-hot. Measured by qixiaoyu [2] on a 2000-picture zip decompression to /sdcard: ------------------------------------------ | Default | patched | Improvement | ------------------------------------------ | 13.0 s | 7.0 s | 46% | ------------------------------------------ Server thread wall duration: 3583 ms -> 1276 ms Server runs on big core: 5% -> 79% The original 4K-file copy/compress/decompress workload [1] on the same kind of device showed a ~28% improvement (13.8s -> 9.9s). Note: Miklos reported [2] that on his test box he could not observe an actual migration from wake_up_interruptible_sync(); the benefit appears to be most visible on asymmetric topologies (big.LITTLE, where the daemon normally lives on a little core) and on workloads dominated by small synchronous requests. No regression was reported on the symmetric- SMP test setups tried. The earlier version of this change [1] added a `bool sync` argument to all three hooks of `struct fuse_iqueue_ops` and threaded it through virtio_fs as well. Miklos questioned the interface churn, and the patch has been stalled since. Re-work it so the exported interface is left alone. The hint is carried in a new FR_SYNC_WAKEUP bit of the existing `fuse_req->flags` bitfield (an `unsigned long`, so no layout change): - __fuse_request_send() sets the flag before fuse_send_one(). - fuse_dev_queue_req() consumes it with test_and_clear_bit() and forwards the result to fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(), which then picks wake_up_sync() or wake_up(). - The forget, interrupt and resend paths pass `false` explicitly, preserving their original wake_up() behaviour. Only /dev/fuse ever wakes fiq->waitq; virtio_fs and fuse_uring dispatch through their own transport and never call wake_up(), so threading `sync` through their ops would just add an unused argument. test_and_clear_bit() makes the flag a one-shot hint that cannot leak into a future requeue, and no extra cleanup is needed in fuse_request_end()/fuse_put_request(). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1638780405-38026-1-git-send-email-quic_pragalla@quicinc.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221222093407.GA1141@mi-HP-ProDesk-680-G4-MT/ This work is based on "Pradeep P V K <quic_pragalla@quicinc.com>" and "Pavankumar Kondeti <quic_pkondeti@quicinc.com>" Assisted-by: TRAE:GLM-5.2 Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2026-07-31 15:01:02 +08:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
fuse: {io-uring} Handle teardown of ring entries On teardown struct file_operations::uring_cmd requests need to be completed by calling io_uring_cmd_done(). Not completing all ring entries would result in busy io-uring tasks giving warning messages in intervals and unreleased struct file. Additionally the fuse connection and with that the ring can only get released when all io-uring commands are completed. Completion is done with ring entries that are a) in waiting state for new fuse requests - io_uring_cmd_done is needed b) already in userspace - io_uring_cmd_done through teardown is not needed, the request can just get released. If fuse server is still active and commits such a ring entry, fuse_uring_cmd() already checks if the connection is active and then complete the io-uring itself with -ENOTCONN. I.e. special handling is not needed. This scheme is basically represented by the ring entry state FRRS_WAIT and FRRS_USERSPACE. Entries in state: - FRRS_INIT: No action needed, do not contribute to ring->queue_refs yet - All other states: Are currently processed by other tasks, async teardown is needed and it has to wait for the two states above. It could be also solved without an async teardown task, but would require additional if conditions in hot code paths. Also in my personal opinion the code looks cleaner with async teardown. Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bschubert@ddn.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> # io_uring Reviewed-by: Luis Henriques <luis@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2025-01-20 02:29:04 +01:00
fuse: {io-uring} Handle teardown of ring entries On teardown struct file_operations::uring_cmd requests need to be completed by calling io_uring_cmd_done(). Not completing all ring entries would result in busy io-uring tasks giving warning messages in intervals and unreleased struct file. Additionally the fuse connection and with that the ring can only get released when all io-uring commands are completed. Completion is done with ring entries that are a) in waiting state for new fuse requests - io_uring_cmd_done is needed b) already in userspace - io_uring_cmd_done through teardown is not needed, the request can just get released. If fuse server is still active and commits such a ring entry, fuse_uring_cmd() already checks if the connection is active and then complete the io-uring itself with -ENOTCONN. I.e. special handling is not needed. This scheme is basically represented by the ring entry state FRRS_WAIT and FRRS_USERSPACE. Entries in state: - FRRS_INIT: No action needed, do not contribute to ring->queue_refs yet - All other states: Are currently processed by other tasks, async teardown is needed and it has to wait for the two states above. It could be also solved without an async teardown task, but would require additional if conditions in hot code paths. Also in my personal opinion the code looks cleaner with async teardown. Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bschubert@ddn.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> # io_uring Reviewed-by: Luis Henriques <luis@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2025-01-20 02:29:04 +01:00
fuse: {io-uring} Handle teardown of ring entries On teardown struct file_operations::uring_cmd requests need to be completed by calling io_uring_cmd_done(). Not completing all ring entries would result in busy io-uring tasks giving warning messages in intervals and unreleased struct file. Additionally the fuse connection and with that the ring can only get released when all io-uring commands are completed. Completion is done with ring entries that are a) in waiting state for new fuse requests - io_uring_cmd_done is needed b) already in userspace - io_uring_cmd_done through teardown is not needed, the request can just get released. If fuse server is still active and commits such a ring entry, fuse_uring_cmd() already checks if the connection is active and then complete the io-uring itself with -ENOTCONN. I.e. special handling is not needed. This scheme is basically represented by the ring entry state FRRS_WAIT and FRRS_USERSPACE. Entries in state: - FRRS_INIT: No action needed, do not contribute to ring->queue_refs yet - All other states: Are currently processed by other tasks, async teardown is needed and it has to wait for the two states above. It could be also solved without an async teardown task, but would require additional if conditions in hot code paths. Also in my personal opinion the code looks cleaner with async teardown. Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bschubert@ddn.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> # io_uring Reviewed-by: Luis Henriques <luis@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2025-01-20 02:29:04 +01:00
fuse: explicitly set /dev/fuse file's private_data The misc subsystem (which is used for /dev/fuse) initializes private_data to point to the misc device when a driver has registered a custom open file operation, and initializes it to NULL when a custom open file operation has *not* been provided. This subtle quirk is confusing, to the point where kernel code registers *empty* file open operations to have private_data point to the misc device structure. And it leads to bugs, where the addition or removal of a custom open file operation surprisingly changes the initial contents of a file's private_data structure. So to simplify things in the misc subsystem, a patch [1] has been proposed to *always* set the private_data to point to the misc device, instead of only doing this when a custom open file operation has been registered. But before this patch can be applied we need to modify drivers that make the assumption that a misc device file's private_data is initialized to NULL because they didn't register a custom open file operation, so they don't rely on this assumption anymore. FUSE uses private_data to store the fuse_conn and errors out if this is not initialized to NULL at mount time. Hence, we now set a file's private_data to NULL explicitly, to be independent of whatever value the misc subsystem initializes it to by default. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/4/939 Reported-by: Giedrius Statkevicius <giedriuswork@gmail.com> Reported-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Van Braeckel <tomvanbraeckel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2015-01-12 05:22:16 +01:00
fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device Allow userspace filesystem implementation to use splice() to write to the fuse device. The semantics of using splice() are: 1) buffer the message header and data in a temporary pipe 2) with a *single* splice() call move the message from the temporary pipe to the fuse device The READ reply message has the most interesting use for this, since now the data from an arbitrary file descriptor (which could be a regular file, a block device or a socket) can be tranferred into the fuse device without having to go through a userspace buffer. It will also allow zero copy moving of pages. One caveat is that the protocol on the fuse device requires the length of the whole message to be written into the header. But the length of the data transferred into the temporary pipe may not be known in advance. The current library implementation works around this by using vmplice to write the header and modifying the header after splicing the data into the pipe (error handling omitted): struct fuse_out_header out; iov.iov_base = &out; iov.iov_len = sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); vmsplice(pip[1], &iov, 1, 0); len = splice(input_fd, input_offset, pip[1], NULL, len, 0); /* retrospectively modify the header: */ out.len = len + sizeof(struct fuse_out_header); splice(pip[0], NULL, fuse_chan_fd(req->ch), NULL, out.len, flags); This works since vmsplice only saves a pointer to the data, it does not copy the data itself. Since pipes are currently limited to 16 pages and messages need to be spliced atomically, the length of the data is limited to 15 pages (or 60kB for 4k pages). Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2010-05-25 15:06:06 +02:00