linux/fs/mount.h

288 lines
8.5 KiB

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
fs: add immutable rootfs Currently pivot_root() doesn't work on the real rootfs because it cannot be unmounted. Userspace has to do a recursive removal of the initramfs contents manually before continuing the boot. Really all we want from the real rootfs is to serve as the parent mount for anything that is actually useful such as the tmpfs or ramfs for initramfs unpacking or the rootfs itself. There's no need for the real rootfs to actually be anything meaningful or useful. Add a immutable rootfs called "nullfs" that can be selected via the "nullfs_rootfs" kernel command line option. The kernel will mount a tmpfs/ramfs on top of it, unpack the initramfs and fire up userspace which mounts the rootfs and can then just do: chdir(rootfs); pivot_root(".", "."); umount2(".", MNT_DETACH); and be done with it. (Ofc, userspace can also choose to retain the initramfs contents by using something like pivot_root(".", "/initramfs") without unmounting it.) Technically this also means that the rootfs mount in unprivileged namespaces doesn't need to become MNT_LOCKED anymore as it's guaranteed that the immutable rootfs remains permanently empty so there cannot be anything revealed by unmounting the covering mount. In the future this will also allow us to create completely empty mount namespaces without risking to leak anything. systemd already handles this all correctly as it tries to pivot_root() first and falls back to MS_MOVE only when that fails. This goes back to various discussion in previous years and a LPC 2024 presentation about this very topic. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112-work-immutable-rootfs-v2-3-88dd1c34a204@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-01-12 16:47:10 +01:00
mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace. mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2 mount --make-rshared / for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem as some people have managed to hit this by accident. As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned. Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users as follows: > The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of > the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance > problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less > than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired. > > Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that > have been triggered and not yet expired. > > The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common > case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've > not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries. > > The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large > number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat > more active mounts. So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and malfunctioning programs. For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl. Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-09-28 00:27:17 -05:00
fs: don't let a migrating task hide its reference from do_umount() propagate_mount_busy() uses mnt_get_count() via do_refcount_check() to figure out whether a synchronous umount may proceed or not by summing the per-CPU mnt_count counter under mount_lock. The fastpath for mntget() and mntput() doesn't require that lock. A task that already holds a reference and takes another one on a cpu the loop has summed can get migrated and drops that reference again on another cpu. The loop might not have reached that cpu yet. That ends up undercounting. The original reference of the task is missed and umount() ends up succeeding with the file still open. The mount is destroyed later when the task mntput()s so it degrades to a lazy umount. That's basically the umount(2) variant of commit 9ea0a46ca2c3 ("fix mntput/mntput race") closed for the final mntput(). The same cpu-migration caused a UAF. Luckily this isn't a UAF. It's just a hidden reference pinning the mount but it's wrong nonetheless. Like the other race it's a narrow window but I can reproduce it reliably with some patching. The debug patch below prints the sum the loop computed next to an immediate re-sum of the same counters. It reports who drops the last reference to that mount later: --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> #include <linux/pidfs.h> #include <linux/nstree.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> #include "pnode.h" #include "internal.h" @@ -263,17 +265,48 @@ #endif } +static u32 mnt_get_count_delay_ms; +static int mnt_get_count_debug_id; + +static int __init mnt_get_count_debug_init(void) +{ + debugfs_create_u32("mnt_get_count_delay_ms", 0600, NULL, + &mnt_get_count_delay_ms); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(mnt_get_count_debug_init); + /* * vfsmount lock must be held for write */ int mnt_get_count(struct mount *mnt) { #ifdef CONFIG_SMP - int count = 0; + static int seen[NR_CPUS]; + bool slow = mnt_get_count_delay_ms && + !(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT); + int count = 0, again = 0; int cpu; for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - count += per_cpu_ptr(mnt->mnt_pcp, cpu)->mnt_count; + seen[cpu] = per_cpu_ptr(mnt->mnt_pcp, cpu)->mnt_count; + count += seen[cpu]; + if (slow) + mdelay(mnt_get_count_delay_ms); + } + if (slow) { + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + int now; + + now = per_cpu_ptr(mnt->mnt_pcp, cpu)->mnt_count; + again += now; + pr_err("mount %d: cpu%d read %d, now %d\n", + mnt->mnt_id, cpu, seen[cpu], now); + } + mnt_get_count_debug_id = mnt->mnt_id; + pr_err("mount %d: sum %d, re-sum %d, %ps\n", + mnt->mnt_id, count, again, + __builtin_return_address(0)); } return count; @@ -1350,6 +1383,9 @@ smp_mb(); mnt_add_count(mnt, -1); count = mnt_get_count(mnt); + if (count == 0 && mnt->mnt_id == mnt_get_count_debug_id) + pr_err("mount %d: last put by %s (%d)\n", mnt->mnt_id, + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); if (count != 0) { WARN_ON(count < 0); rcu_read_unlock(); A task holds open a directory fd on a tmpfs. A synchronous rumount() of the tmpfs sums up. Concurrently a task calls fchdir() on that fd on CPU 0 and fchdir()s back to / on CPU 3. This will cause a path_get() and a path_put() with a migration in between without mount_lock held. Adding a delay per CPU makes the count loop miss the get in a cpu it already visited but count the put in one it hasn't. The reproducer, run as root with debugfs mounted: /* * gcc -static -o umount-torn umount-torn.c */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sched.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #define KNOB "/sys/kernel/debug/mnt_get_count_delay_ms" #define MNT "/mnt/x" static int kmsg; static void pin(int cpu) { cpu_set_t s; CPU_ZERO(&s); CPU_SET(cpu, &s); sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(s), &s); } static void knob(const char *v) { int fd = open(KNOB, O_WRONLY); write(fd, v, strlen(v)); close(fd); } int main(void) { int last = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) - 1; int p[2], fd, ret; pid_t pid; char c; kmsg = open("/dev/kmsg", O_WRONLY); mkdir(MNT, 0755); mount("none", MNT, "tmpfs", 0, NULL); fd = open(MNT "/f", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0644); write(fd, "still here\n", 11); close(fd); pipe(p); pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { int dirfd = open(MNT, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY); int rootfd = open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY); struct stat st; char buf[16]; /* one get/put pair while the umount is summing */ usleep(150000); pin(0); fchdir(dirfd); /* mntget() */ dprintf(kmsg, "holder %d: get on cpu %d\n", getpid(), sched_getcpu()); pin(last); fchdir(rootfd); /* mntput() */ dprintf(kmsg, "holder %d: put on cpu %d\n", getpid(), sched_getcpu()); /* the umount has returned, is the fd still good? */ read(p[0], &c, 1); fd = openat(dirfd, "f", O_RDONLY); ret = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); dprintf(kmsg, "holder %d: fstat %d openat %d read %d\n", getpid(), fstat(dirfd, &st), fd, ret); _exit(0); } pin(1); knob("100"); ret = umount2(MNT, 0); knob("0"); if (ret) dprintf(kmsg, "umount: %s\n", strerror(errno)); else dprintf(kmsg, "umount: 0\n"); write(p[1], "x", 1); waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); return 0; } The log shows the busy check summing 2 and when read right after it reads 3. The loop read CPU 0 before the get landed there and CPU 3 after the put did. The umount succeeds while there's still someone with an fd. The mount is then dropped when the fd goes: [ 2.511944] holder 90: get on cpu 0 [ 2.512023] holder 90: put on cpu 3 [ 2.671388] mount 28: cpu0 read 1, now 2 [ 2.671398] mount 28: cpu1 read 2, now 2 [ 2.671401] mount 28: cpu2 read 0, now 0 [ 2.671404] mount 28: cpu3 read -1, now -1 [ 2.671407] mount 28: sum 2, re-sum 3, propagate_mount_busy [ 2.671773] umount: 0 [ 2.672963] holder 90: fstat 0 openat 8 read 11 [ 2.673663] mount 28: last put by umount-torn (90) Easy fix would be to order mntget() against the loop that sums up. But that's a full barrier and a flag test in mntget() afaict. No bueno... That would cost every path_get(). So learn from SRCU. Keep gets and puts in separate per-cpu counters and make mnt_get_count() sum all puts first and all gets second with a full barrier in between. A put is always after its own get (hopefully...) independent of the cpu the task is on. So a put the first pass counted must have its get visible to the second pass. Ergo, we can't undercount. This is the two pass sum srcu_readers_active_idx_check() does for srcu_locks and srcu_unlocks. mntget() keeps a single this_cpu_inc(). mntput() gains an smp_wmb() before its increment, a compiler barrier on x86 and a store fence on the weakly ordered architectures, since the two counters are two words and a put stored after a get could otherwise become visible before it. The counters are unsigned so the difference stays right after they wrap. The count can still come out high when a get is counted whose put the first pass did not see. We don't care. A task can only take a new reference if: (1) it holds one already (2) through __legitimize_mnt() which the seqcount orders against the write side So a get in this window means someone has a reference and -EBUSY is correct. The final mntput() is unchanged. Once ->mnt_ns is NULL every put takes the slow path under mount_lock and so no put is in flight while it counts. Here's an attempted proof for that crap: (i) A put never becomes visible before its get. Within one task the smp_wmb() in mntput_no_expire() orders every earlier store before the increment of the puts. Any task that migrated in between had its stores flushed by the scheduler. When that reference is handed to another task that's trivially true. (ii) The double count in mnt_get_count() is ordered via smp_mb(). That keeps every read of the puts counter before every read of the gets counter. (iii) We never undercount by (ii). (iv) There are no spurious counts/differences. A get is counted only if it happened and a put is left out only if it hasn't happened when the counter was read. With (iii) this means it's equivalent to the old count whenever nothing is taken or dropped during the loop. (v) do_umount() holds a reference and mount_lock hence. New references come from: (v.a) __legitimize_mnt() managed by the seqcount. Either it's smp_mb() made the get visible to the loop or it takes the lock and waits for the loop. By (iii) a mount with a additional references is refused. By (iv) refusing the umount just means that any additional reference existed, same as the old counter. (vi) mntput_no_expire_slowpath() runs with ->mnt_ns already NULL. Hence, every other put must take the slowpath as well and hangs on mount_lock. The grace period in namespace_unlock() will make every fast path do a put that still saw ->mnt_ns. No put is in flight during the loop. A get that is in flight comes from a task holding another reference. That must be included by the count or from __legitimize_mnt() as in (v). Ergo, zero means the last reference and non-zero means a reference is live. (vii) may_umount() uses propagate_mount_busy() as well and may_umount_tree() sums mnt_get_count() itself. With this patch the race is dead: [ 3.066786] mount 28: sum 3, re-sum 3, propagate_mount_busy [ 3.105867] umount: Device or resource busy [ 3.106047] holder 90: fstat 0 openat 8 read 11 Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260923-work-mount-fixes-v1-7-f424cf8d3242@kernel.org Fixes: b3e19d924b6e ("fs: scale mntget/mntput") Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-09-23 14:27:59 +02:00
namespace: rework connected mounts UMOUNT_CONNECTED as implemented allows for the creation of reference count cycles. Here's a simple example mkdir /x; mkfifo /ready /go unshare -m sh -c 'mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /x truncate -s 8M /x/img; mkfs.ext4 -q /x/img dev=$(losetup -f --show /x/img) mkdir /x/mp; mount $dev /x/mp echo $dev > /ready; read r < /go' & read dev < /ready rmdir /x echo > /go wait losetup -d $dev losetup -a Take a directory /x on the host, create a new mount namespace, mount a tmpfs on /x, use a file on that tmpfs as the backing file for a loop device, mount that loop device on that tmpfs. Now rmdir /x on the host. This will lazily unmount the mount on top of /x in the container with UMOUNT_CONNECTED. Once the namespace exits nothing references the mount anymore. Now the tmpfs is pinned by the backing file of the loop device and the loop mount is owned by the tmpfs superblock. Fun fact, such cycles can be formed by at least the following subsystems and I have added reproducers for all of them: (1) a loop mount P from an image on a tmpfs next to it, so that P's death shows as the loop device giving up its backing file (2) autofs with a FIFO on P as its pipe, zram with a device node on P as its writeback device, both on a minix image since vfat has neither (3) ecryptfs with its lower directory on P, under a passphrase token added to the session keyring (4) binfmt_misc in a new user namespace with an 'F' interpreter on P (5) a fuse server that answers FUSE_INIT with passthrough on and registers a file on P as a backing file (6) zloop with its zone files in a directory on P (7) a mass storage gadget on the dummy UDC with its LUN file on P, mounted from the SCSI disk the gadget shows up as (8) md with a RAID1 of one loop device and its bitmap file on P, which skips while SET_BITMAP_FILE has no way to succeed (9) rmdir of P's mountpoint from the parent, then the child exits, then the device must be free and LOOP_CLR_FD must release the file The underlying mechanism is UMOUNT_CONNECTED (MNT_LOCKED falls into the same class). With UMOUNT_CONNECTED an unmounted mount stays attached to its parent. This is used to protect revealing the underlying mount and is a non-negotiable security mechanism. So now the parent owns that mount and is put on the parent's final mntput(). That moves it to mnt_stuck_children and ultimately it's cleaned up by cleanup_mnt(). The fact that ownership of the child mount gets transferred to the parent turns every reference from a child's superblock back to one of its ancestors into a cycle. Don't keep the child attached at all. What the parent needs is that a lookup at the child's mountpoint keeps finding some mount, not the child itself and it's not a guarantee we have given really. When an unmounted mount would have stayed attached to its unmounted parent disconnect it like every other unmounted mount and leave a marker behind. A lookup on the parent that misses the mount hash and hits a marker finds knullfs. Either a file or a directory. Nothing leads from a marker to any other mount. The marker is owned by the parent and dropped by the parent's final mntput() or by __detach_mounts() when the mountpoint is deleted from under it. It is allocated together with the mount. With that every unmounted mount is a root and holds only its own reference which namespace_unlock() drops. No unmounted mount owns another one. A superblock that pins an ancestor can't form a cycle. It has a visible change. Mounts left connected (rmdir etc.) used to stay traversable through the parent for as long as something held the parent. Now it is detached with the umount. It lives as long as something references it but it isn't reachable through the parent anymore and ".." inside it leads nowhere which is the same as for every other lazily unmounted mount. Link: https://gist.github.com/mvo5/63ef46482349f3b1c3957d463a0c9c6f Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002-work-mount-cover-v1-2-232a8f52b43c@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-10-02 16:14:28 +02:00
namespace: rework connected mounts UMOUNT_CONNECTED as implemented allows for the creation of reference count cycles. Here's a simple example mkdir /x; mkfifo /ready /go unshare -m sh -c 'mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /x truncate -s 8M /x/img; mkfs.ext4 -q /x/img dev=$(losetup -f --show /x/img) mkdir /x/mp; mount $dev /x/mp echo $dev > /ready; read r < /go' & read dev < /ready rmdir /x echo > /go wait losetup -d $dev losetup -a Take a directory /x on the host, create a new mount namespace, mount a tmpfs on /x, use a file on that tmpfs as the backing file for a loop device, mount that loop device on that tmpfs. Now rmdir /x on the host. This will lazily unmount the mount on top of /x in the container with UMOUNT_CONNECTED. Once the namespace exits nothing references the mount anymore. Now the tmpfs is pinned by the backing file of the loop device and the loop mount is owned by the tmpfs superblock. Fun fact, such cycles can be formed by at least the following subsystems and I have added reproducers for all of them: (1) a loop mount P from an image on a tmpfs next to it, so that P's death shows as the loop device giving up its backing file (2) autofs with a FIFO on P as its pipe, zram with a device node on P as its writeback device, both on a minix image since vfat has neither (3) ecryptfs with its lower directory on P, under a passphrase token added to the session keyring (4) binfmt_misc in a new user namespace with an 'F' interpreter on P (5) a fuse server that answers FUSE_INIT with passthrough on and registers a file on P as a backing file (6) zloop with its zone files in a directory on P (7) a mass storage gadget on the dummy UDC with its LUN file on P, mounted from the SCSI disk the gadget shows up as (8) md with a RAID1 of one loop device and its bitmap file on P, which skips while SET_BITMAP_FILE has no way to succeed (9) rmdir of P's mountpoint from the parent, then the child exits, then the device must be free and LOOP_CLR_FD must release the file The underlying mechanism is UMOUNT_CONNECTED (MNT_LOCKED falls into the same class). With UMOUNT_CONNECTED an unmounted mount stays attached to its parent. This is used to protect revealing the underlying mount and is a non-negotiable security mechanism. So now the parent owns that mount and is put on the parent's final mntput(). That moves it to mnt_stuck_children and ultimately it's cleaned up by cleanup_mnt(). The fact that ownership of the child mount gets transferred to the parent turns every reference from a child's superblock back to one of its ancestors into a cycle. Don't keep the child attached at all. What the parent needs is that a lookup at the child's mountpoint keeps finding some mount, not the child itself and it's not a guarantee we have given really. When an unmounted mount would have stayed attached to its unmounted parent disconnect it like every other unmounted mount and leave a marker behind. A lookup on the parent that misses the mount hash and hits a marker finds knullfs. Either a file or a directory. Nothing leads from a marker to any other mount. The marker is owned by the parent and dropped by the parent's final mntput() or by __detach_mounts() when the mountpoint is deleted from under it. It is allocated together with the mount. With that every unmounted mount is a root and holds only its own reference which namespace_unlock() drops. No unmounted mount owns another one. A superblock that pins an ancestor can't form a cycle. It has a visible change. Mounts left connected (rmdir etc.) used to stay traversable through the parent for as long as something held the parent. Now it is detached with the umount. It lives as long as something references it but it isn't reachable through the parent anymore and ".." inside it leads nowhere which is the same as for every other lazily unmounted mount. Link: https://gist.github.com/mvo5/63ef46482349f3b1c3957d463a0c9c6f Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002-work-mount-cover-v1-2-232a8f52b43c@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-10-02 16:14:28 +02:00
fs: kill MNT_ONRB Move mnt->mnt_node into the union with mnt->mnt_rcu and mnt->mnt_llist instead of keeping it with mnt->mnt_list. This allows us to use RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mnt->mnt_node) in umount_tree() as well as list_empty(&mnt->mnt_node). That in turn allows us to remove MNT_ONRB. This also fixes the bug reported in [1] where seemingly MNT_ONRB wasn't set in @mnt->mnt_flags even though the mount was present in the mount rbtree of the mount namespace. The root cause is the following race. When a btrfs subvolume is mounted a temporary mount is created: btrfs_get_tree_subvol() { mnt = fc_mount() // Register the newly allocated mount with sb->mounts: lock_mount_hash(); list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_mounts); unlock_mount_hash(); } and registered on sb->s_mounts. Later it is added to an anonymous mount namespace via mount_subvol(): -> mount_subvol() -> mount_subtree() -> alloc_mnt_ns() mnt_add_to_ns() vfs_path_lookup() put_mnt_ns() The mnt_add_to_ns() call raises MNT_ONRB in @mnt->mnt_flags. If someone concurrently does a ro remount: reconfigure_super() -> sb_prepare_remount_readonly() { list_for_each_entry(mnt, &sb->s_mounts, mnt_instance) { } all mounts registered in sb->s_mounts are visited and first MNT_WRITE_HOLD is raised, then MNT_READONLY is raised, and finally MNT_WRITE_HOLD is removed again. The flag modification for MNT_WRITE_HOLD/MNT_READONLY and MNT_ONRB race so MNT_ONRB might be lost. Fixes: 2eea9ce4310d ("mounts: keep list of mounts in an rbtree") Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # v6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241215-vfs-6-14-mount-work-v1-1-fd55922c4af8@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ec6784ed-8722-4695-980a-4400d4e7bd1a@gmx.com [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-12-15 21:17:05 +01:00
preparations to taking MNT_WRITE_HOLD out of ->mnt_flags We have an unpleasant wart in accessibility rules for struct mount. There are per-superblock lists of mounts, used by sb_prepare_remount_readonly() to check if any of those is currently claimed for write access and to block further attempts to get write access on those until we are done. As soon as it is attached to a filesystem, mount becomes reachable via that list. Only sb_prepare_remount_readonly() traverses it and it only accesses a few members of struct mount. Unfortunately, ->mnt_flags is one of those and it is modified - MNT_WRITE_HOLD set and then cleared. It is done under mount_lock, so from the locking rules POV everything's fine. However, it has easily overlooked implications - once mount has been attached to a filesystem, it has to be treated as globally visible. In particular, initializing ->mnt_flags *must* be done either prior to that point or under mount_lock. All other members are still private at that point. Life gets simpler if we move that bit (and that's *all* that can get touched by access via this list) out of ->mnt_flags. It's not even hard to do - currently the list is implemented as list_head one, anchored in super_block->s_mounts and linked via mount->mnt_instance. As the first step, switch it to hlist-like open-coded structure - address of the first mount in the set is stored in ->s_mounts and ->mnt_instance replaced with ->mnt_next_for_sb and ->mnt_pprev_for_sb - the former either NULL or pointing to the next mount in set, the latter - address of either ->s_mounts or ->mnt_next_for_sb in the previous element of the set. In the next commit we'll steal the LSB of ->mnt_pprev_for_sb as replacement for MNT_WRITE_HOLD. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2025-08-27 12:33:11 -04:00
fs: kill MNT_ONRB Move mnt->mnt_node into the union with mnt->mnt_rcu and mnt->mnt_llist instead of keeping it with mnt->mnt_list. This allows us to use RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mnt->mnt_node) in umount_tree() as well as list_empty(&mnt->mnt_node). That in turn allows us to remove MNT_ONRB. This also fixes the bug reported in [1] where seemingly MNT_ONRB wasn't set in @mnt->mnt_flags even though the mount was present in the mount rbtree of the mount namespace. The root cause is the following race. When a btrfs subvolume is mounted a temporary mount is created: btrfs_get_tree_subvol() { mnt = fc_mount() // Register the newly allocated mount with sb->mounts: lock_mount_hash(); list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_mounts); unlock_mount_hash(); } and registered on sb->s_mounts. Later it is added to an anonymous mount namespace via mount_subvol(): -> mount_subvol() -> mount_subtree() -> alloc_mnt_ns() mnt_add_to_ns() vfs_path_lookup() put_mnt_ns() The mnt_add_to_ns() call raises MNT_ONRB in @mnt->mnt_flags. If someone concurrently does a ro remount: reconfigure_super() -> sb_prepare_remount_readonly() { list_for_each_entry(mnt, &sb->s_mounts, mnt_instance) { } all mounts registered in sb->s_mounts are visited and first MNT_WRITE_HOLD is raised, then MNT_READONLY is raised, and finally MNT_WRITE_HOLD is removed again. The flag modification for MNT_WRITE_HOLD/MNT_READONLY and MNT_ONRB race so MNT_ONRB might be lost. Fixes: 2eea9ce4310d ("mounts: keep list of mounts in an rbtree") Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # v6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241215-vfs-6-14-mount-work-v1-1-fd55922c4af8@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ec6784ed-8722-4695-980a-4400d4e7bd1a@gmx.com [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-12-15 21:17:05 +01:00
fhandle: fix UAF due to unlocked ->mnt_ns read in may_decode_fh() may_decode_fh() accesses mount::mnt_ns without holding any locks; that means the mount can concurrently be unmounted, and the mnt_namespace can concurrently be freed after an RCU grace period. This race can happens as follows, assuming that the mount point was created by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE): thread 1 thread 2 RCU __do_sys_open_by_handle_at do_handle_open handle_to_path may_decode_fh is_mounted [mount::mnt_ns access] [mount::mnt_ns access] __do_sys_close fput_close_sync __fput dissolve_on_fput umount_tree class_namespace_excl_destructor namespace_unlock free_mnt_ns mnt_ns_tree_remove call_rcu(mnt_ns_release_rcu) mnt_ns_release_rcu mnt_ns_release kfree [mnt_namespace::user_ns access] **UAF** Fix it by taking rcu_read_lock() around the mount::mnt_ns access, like in __prepend_path(). Additionally, document the semantics of mount::mnt_ns, and use WRITE_ONCE() for writers that can race with lockless readers. This bug is unreachable unless one of the following is set: - CONFIG_PREEMPTION - CONFIG_RCU_STRICT_GRACE_PERIOD because it requires an RCU grace period to happen during a syscall without an explicit preemption. This doesn't seem to have interesting security impact; worst-case, it could leak the result of an integer comparison to userspace (from the level check in cap_capable()), cause an endless loop, or crash the kernel by dereferencing an invalid address. Fixes: 620c266f3949 ("fhandle: relax open_by_handle_at() permission checks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260603-vfs-fhandle-uaf-fix-v2-1-d05db76a5084@google.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-06-03 21:31:57 +02:00
namespace: rework connected mounts UMOUNT_CONNECTED as implemented allows for the creation of reference count cycles. Here's a simple example mkdir /x; mkfifo /ready /go unshare -m sh -c 'mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /x truncate -s 8M /x/img; mkfs.ext4 -q /x/img dev=$(losetup -f --show /x/img) mkdir /x/mp; mount $dev /x/mp echo $dev > /ready; read r < /go' & read dev < /ready rmdir /x echo > /go wait losetup -d $dev losetup -a Take a directory /x on the host, create a new mount namespace, mount a tmpfs on /x, use a file on that tmpfs as the backing file for a loop device, mount that loop device on that tmpfs. Now rmdir /x on the host. This will lazily unmount the mount on top of /x in the container with UMOUNT_CONNECTED. Once the namespace exits nothing references the mount anymore. Now the tmpfs is pinned by the backing file of the loop device and the loop mount is owned by the tmpfs superblock. Fun fact, such cycles can be formed by at least the following subsystems and I have added reproducers for all of them: (1) a loop mount P from an image on a tmpfs next to it, so that P's death shows as the loop device giving up its backing file (2) autofs with a FIFO on P as its pipe, zram with a device node on P as its writeback device, both on a minix image since vfat has neither (3) ecryptfs with its lower directory on P, under a passphrase token added to the session keyring (4) binfmt_misc in a new user namespace with an 'F' interpreter on P (5) a fuse server that answers FUSE_INIT with passthrough on and registers a file on P as a backing file (6) zloop with its zone files in a directory on P (7) a mass storage gadget on the dummy UDC with its LUN file on P, mounted from the SCSI disk the gadget shows up as (8) md with a RAID1 of one loop device and its bitmap file on P, which skips while SET_BITMAP_FILE has no way to succeed (9) rmdir of P's mountpoint from the parent, then the child exits, then the device must be free and LOOP_CLR_FD must release the file The underlying mechanism is UMOUNT_CONNECTED (MNT_LOCKED falls into the same class). With UMOUNT_CONNECTED an unmounted mount stays attached to its parent. This is used to protect revealing the underlying mount and is a non-negotiable security mechanism. So now the parent owns that mount and is put on the parent's final mntput(). That moves it to mnt_stuck_children and ultimately it's cleaned up by cleanup_mnt(). The fact that ownership of the child mount gets transferred to the parent turns every reference from a child's superblock back to one of its ancestors into a cycle. Don't keep the child attached at all. What the parent needs is that a lookup at the child's mountpoint keeps finding some mount, not the child itself and it's not a guarantee we have given really. When an unmounted mount would have stayed attached to its unmounted parent disconnect it like every other unmounted mount and leave a marker behind. A lookup on the parent that misses the mount hash and hits a marker finds knullfs. Either a file or a directory. Nothing leads from a marker to any other mount. The marker is owned by the parent and dropped by the parent's final mntput() or by __detach_mounts() when the mountpoint is deleted from under it. It is allocated together with the mount. With that every unmounted mount is a root and holds only its own reference which namespace_unlock() drops. No unmounted mount owns another one. A superblock that pins an ancestor can't form a cycle. It has a visible change. Mounts left connected (rmdir etc.) used to stay traversable through the parent for as long as something held the parent. Now it is detached with the umount. It lives as long as something references it but it isn't reachable through the parent anymore and ".." inside it leads nowhere which is the same as for every other lazily unmounted mount. Link: https://gist.github.com/mvo5/63ef46482349f3b1c3957d463a0c9c6f Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002-work-mount-cover-v1-2-232a8f52b43c@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-10-02 16:14:28 +02:00
namespace: rework connected mounts UMOUNT_CONNECTED as implemented allows for the creation of reference count cycles. Here's a simple example mkdir /x; mkfifo /ready /go unshare -m sh -c 'mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /x truncate -s 8M /x/img; mkfs.ext4 -q /x/img dev=$(losetup -f --show /x/img) mkdir /x/mp; mount $dev /x/mp echo $dev > /ready; read r < /go' & read dev < /ready rmdir /x echo > /go wait losetup -d $dev losetup -a Take a directory /x on the host, create a new mount namespace, mount a tmpfs on /x, use a file on that tmpfs as the backing file for a loop device, mount that loop device on that tmpfs. Now rmdir /x on the host. This will lazily unmount the mount on top of /x in the container with UMOUNT_CONNECTED. Once the namespace exits nothing references the mount anymore. Now the tmpfs is pinned by the backing file of the loop device and the loop mount is owned by the tmpfs superblock. Fun fact, such cycles can be formed by at least the following subsystems and I have added reproducers for all of them: (1) a loop mount P from an image on a tmpfs next to it, so that P's death shows as the loop device giving up its backing file (2) autofs with a FIFO on P as its pipe, zram with a device node on P as its writeback device, both on a minix image since vfat has neither (3) ecryptfs with its lower directory on P, under a passphrase token added to the session keyring (4) binfmt_misc in a new user namespace with an 'F' interpreter on P (5) a fuse server that answers FUSE_INIT with passthrough on and registers a file on P as a backing file (6) zloop with its zone files in a directory on P (7) a mass storage gadget on the dummy UDC with its LUN file on P, mounted from the SCSI disk the gadget shows up as (8) md with a RAID1 of one loop device and its bitmap file on P, which skips while SET_BITMAP_FILE has no way to succeed (9) rmdir of P's mountpoint from the parent, then the child exits, then the device must be free and LOOP_CLR_FD must release the file The underlying mechanism is UMOUNT_CONNECTED (MNT_LOCKED falls into the same class). With UMOUNT_CONNECTED an unmounted mount stays attached to its parent. This is used to protect revealing the underlying mount and is a non-negotiable security mechanism. So now the parent owns that mount and is put on the parent's final mntput(). That moves it to mnt_stuck_children and ultimately it's cleaned up by cleanup_mnt(). The fact that ownership of the child mount gets transferred to the parent turns every reference from a child's superblock back to one of its ancestors into a cycle. Don't keep the child attached at all. What the parent needs is that a lookup at the child's mountpoint keeps finding some mount, not the child itself and it's not a guarantee we have given really. When an unmounted mount would have stayed attached to its unmounted parent disconnect it like every other unmounted mount and leave a marker behind. A lookup on the parent that misses the mount hash and hits a marker finds knullfs. Either a file or a directory. Nothing leads from a marker to any other mount. The marker is owned by the parent and dropped by the parent's final mntput() or by __detach_mounts() when the mountpoint is deleted from under it. It is allocated together with the mount. With that every unmounted mount is a root and holds only its own reference which namespace_unlock() drops. No unmounted mount owns another one. A superblock that pins an ancestor can't form a cycle. It has a visible change. Mounts left connected (rmdir etc.) used to stay traversable through the parent for as long as something held the parent. Now it is detached with the umount. It lives as long as something references it but it isn't reachable through the parent anymore and ".." inside it leads nowhere which is the same as for every other lazily unmounted mount. Link: https://gist.github.com/mvo5/63ef46482349f3b1c3957d463a0c9c6f Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261002-work-mount-cover-v1-2-232a8f52b43c@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-10-02 16:14:28 +02:00
RCU'd vfsmounts * RCU-delayed freeing of vfsmounts * vfsmount_lock replaced with a seqlock (mount_lock) * sequence number from mount_lock is stored in nameidata->m_seq and used when we exit RCU mode * new vfsmount flag - MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT. Set by umount_tree() when its caller knows that vfsmount will have no surviving references. * synchronize_rcu() done between unlocking namespace_sem in namespace_unlock() and doing pending mntput(). * new helper: legitimize_mnt(mnt, seq). Checks the mount_lock sequence number against seq, then grabs reference to mnt. Then it rechecks mount_lock again to close the race and either returns success or drops the reference it has acquired. The subtle point is that in case of MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT we can simply decrement the refcount and sod off - aforementioned synchronize_rcu() makes sure that final mntput() won't come until we leave RCU mode. We need that, since we don't want to end up with some lazy pathwalk racing with umount() and stealing the final mntput() from it - caller of umount() may expect it to return only once the fs is shut down and we don't want to break that. In other cases (i.e. with MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT absent) we have to do full-blown mntput() in case of mount_lock sequence number mismatch happening just as we'd grabbed the reference, but in those cases we won't be stealing the final mntput() from anything that would care. * mntput_no_expire() doesn't lock anything on the fast path now. Incidentally, SMP and UP cases are handled the same way - no ifdefs there. * normal pathname resolution does *not* do any writes to mount_lock. It does, of course, bump the refcounts of vfsmount and dentry in the very end, but that's it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-09-29 22:06:07 -04:00
RCU'd vfsmounts * RCU-delayed freeing of vfsmounts * vfsmount_lock replaced with a seqlock (mount_lock) * sequence number from mount_lock is stored in nameidata->m_seq and used when we exit RCU mode * new vfsmount flag - MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT. Set by umount_tree() when its caller knows that vfsmount will have no surviving references. * synchronize_rcu() done between unlocking namespace_sem in namespace_unlock() and doing pending mntput(). * new helper: legitimize_mnt(mnt, seq). Checks the mount_lock sequence number against seq, then grabs reference to mnt. Then it rechecks mount_lock again to close the race and either returns success or drops the reference it has acquired. The subtle point is that in case of MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT we can simply decrement the refcount and sod off - aforementioned synchronize_rcu() makes sure that final mntput() won't come until we leave RCU mode. We need that, since we don't want to end up with some lazy pathwalk racing with umount() and stealing the final mntput() from it - caller of umount() may expect it to return only once the fs is shut down and we don't want to break that. In other cases (i.e. with MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT absent) we have to do full-blown mntput() in case of mount_lock sequence number mismatch happening just as we'd grabbed the reference, but in those cases we won't be stealing the final mntput() from anything that would care. * mntput_no_expire() doesn't lock anything on the fast path now. Incidentally, SMP and UP cases are handled the same way - no ifdefs there. * normal pathname resolution does *not* do any writes to mount_lock. It does, of course, bump the refcounts of vfsmount and dentry in the very end, but that's it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-09-29 22:06:07 -04:00
2013-10-04 19:15:13 -07:00
2013-10-04 19:15:13 -07:00
fs: kill MNT_ONRB Move mnt->mnt_node into the union with mnt->mnt_rcu and mnt->mnt_llist instead of keeping it with mnt->mnt_list. This allows us to use RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mnt->mnt_node) in umount_tree() as well as list_empty(&mnt->mnt_node). That in turn allows us to remove MNT_ONRB. This also fixes the bug reported in [1] where seemingly MNT_ONRB wasn't set in @mnt->mnt_flags even though the mount was present in the mount rbtree of the mount namespace. The root cause is the following race. When a btrfs subvolume is mounted a temporary mount is created: btrfs_get_tree_subvol() { mnt = fc_mount() // Register the newly allocated mount with sb->mounts: lock_mount_hash(); list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_mounts); unlock_mount_hash(); } and registered on sb->s_mounts. Later it is added to an anonymous mount namespace via mount_subvol(): -> mount_subvol() -> mount_subtree() -> alloc_mnt_ns() mnt_add_to_ns() vfs_path_lookup() put_mnt_ns() The mnt_add_to_ns() call raises MNT_ONRB in @mnt->mnt_flags. If someone concurrently does a ro remount: reconfigure_super() -> sb_prepare_remount_readonly() { list_for_each_entry(mnt, &sb->s_mounts, mnt_instance) { } all mounts registered in sb->s_mounts are visited and first MNT_WRITE_HOLD is raised, then MNT_READONLY is raised, and finally MNT_WRITE_HOLD is removed again. The flag modification for MNT_WRITE_HOLD/MNT_READONLY and MNT_ONRB race so MNT_ONRB might be lost. Fixes: 2eea9ce4310d ("mounts: keep list of mounts in an rbtree") Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # v6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241215-vfs-6-14-mount-work-v1-1-fd55922c4af8@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ec6784ed-8722-4695-980a-4400d4e7bd1a@gmx.com [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-12-15 21:17:05 +01:00
fs: kill MNT_ONRB Move mnt->mnt_node into the union with mnt->mnt_rcu and mnt->mnt_llist instead of keeping it with mnt->mnt_list. This allows us to use RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mnt->mnt_node) in umount_tree() as well as list_empty(&mnt->mnt_node). That in turn allows us to remove MNT_ONRB. This also fixes the bug reported in [1] where seemingly MNT_ONRB wasn't set in @mnt->mnt_flags even though the mount was present in the mount rbtree of the mount namespace. The root cause is the following race. When a btrfs subvolume is mounted a temporary mount is created: btrfs_get_tree_subvol() { mnt = fc_mount() // Register the newly allocated mount with sb->mounts: lock_mount_hash(); list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_mounts); unlock_mount_hash(); } and registered on sb->s_mounts. Later it is added to an anonymous mount namespace via mount_subvol(): -> mount_subvol() -> mount_subtree() -> alloc_mnt_ns() mnt_add_to_ns() vfs_path_lookup() put_mnt_ns() The mnt_add_to_ns() call raises MNT_ONRB in @mnt->mnt_flags. If someone concurrently does a ro remount: reconfigure_super() -> sb_prepare_remount_readonly() { list_for_each_entry(mnt, &sb->s_mounts, mnt_instance) { } all mounts registered in sb->s_mounts are visited and first MNT_WRITE_HOLD is raised, then MNT_READONLY is raised, and finally MNT_WRITE_HOLD is removed again. The flag modification for MNT_WRITE_HOLD/MNT_READONLY and MNT_ONRB race so MNT_ONRB might be lost. Fixes: 2eea9ce4310d ("mounts: keep list of mounts in an rbtree") Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # v6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241215-vfs-6-14-mount-work-v1-1-fd55922c4af8@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ec6784ed-8722-4695-980a-4400d4e7bd1a@gmx.com [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-12-15 21:17:05 +01:00
fs: kill MNT_ONRB Move mnt->mnt_node into the union with mnt->mnt_rcu and mnt->mnt_llist instead of keeping it with mnt->mnt_list. This allows us to use RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mnt->mnt_node) in umount_tree() as well as list_empty(&mnt->mnt_node). That in turn allows us to remove MNT_ONRB. This also fixes the bug reported in [1] where seemingly MNT_ONRB wasn't set in @mnt->mnt_flags even though the mount was present in the mount rbtree of the mount namespace. The root cause is the following race. When a btrfs subvolume is mounted a temporary mount is created: btrfs_get_tree_subvol() { mnt = fc_mount() // Register the newly allocated mount with sb->mounts: lock_mount_hash(); list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_mounts); unlock_mount_hash(); } and registered on sb->s_mounts. Later it is added to an anonymous mount namespace via mount_subvol(): -> mount_subvol() -> mount_subtree() -> alloc_mnt_ns() mnt_add_to_ns() vfs_path_lookup() put_mnt_ns() The mnt_add_to_ns() call raises MNT_ONRB in @mnt->mnt_flags. If someone concurrently does a ro remount: reconfigure_super() -> sb_prepare_remount_readonly() { list_for_each_entry(mnt, &sb->s_mounts, mnt_instance) { } all mounts registered in sb->s_mounts are visited and first MNT_WRITE_HOLD is raised, then MNT_READONLY is raised, and finally MNT_WRITE_HOLD is removed again. The flag modification for MNT_WRITE_HOLD/MNT_READONLY and MNT_ONRB race so MNT_ONRB might be lost. Fixes: 2eea9ce4310d ("mounts: keep list of mounts in an rbtree") Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # v6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241215-vfs-6-14-mount-work-v1-1-fd55922c4af8@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ec6784ed-8722-4695-980a-4400d4e7bd1a@gmx.com [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-12-15 21:17:05 +01:00
fhandle: relax open_by_handle_at() permission checks A current limitation of open_by_handle_at() is that it's currently not possible to use it from within containers at all because we require CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH in the initial namespace. That's unfortunate because there are scenarios where using open_by_handle_at() from within containers. Two examples: (1) cgroupfs allows to encode cgroups to file handles and reopen them with open_by_handle_at(). (2) Fanotify allows placing filesystem watches they currently aren't usable in containers because the returned file handles cannot be used. Here's a proposal for relaxing the permission check for open_by_handle_at(). (1) Opening file handles when the caller has privileges over the filesystem (1.1) The caller has an unobstructed view of the filesystem. (1.2) The caller has permissions to follow a path to the file handle. This doesn't address the problem of opening a file handle when only a portion of a filesystem is exposed as is common in containers by e.g., bind-mounting a subtree. The proposal to solve this use-case is: (2) Opening file handles when the caller has privileges over a subtree (2.1) The caller is able to reach the file from the provided mount fd. (2.2) The caller has permissions to construct an unobstructed path to the file handle. (2.3) The caller has permissions to follow a path to the file handle. The relaxed permission checks are currently restricted to directory file handles which are what both cgroupfs and fanotify need. Handling disconnected non-directory file handles would lead to a potentially non-deterministic api. If a disconnected non-directory file handle is provided we may fail to decode a valid path that we could use for permission checking. That in itself isn't a problem as we would just return EACCES in that case. However, confusion may arise if a non-disconnected dentry ends up in the cache later and those opening the file handle would suddenly succeed. * It's potentially possible to use timing information (side-channel) to infer whether a given inode exists. I don't think that's particularly problematic. Thanks to Jann for bringing this to my attention. * An unrelated note (IOW, these are thoughts that apply to open_by_handle_at() generically and are unrelated to the changes here): Jann pointed out that we should verify whether deleted files could potentially be reopened through open_by_handle_at(). I don't think that's possible though. Another potential thing to check is whether open_by_handle_at() could be abused to open internal stuff like memfds or gpu stuff. I don't think so but I haven't had the time to completely verify this. This dates back to discussions Amir and I had quite some time ago and thanks to him for providing a lot of details around the export code and related patches! Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240524-vfs-open_by_handle_at-v1-1-3d4b7d22736b@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-05-24 12:19:39 +02:00
nsfs: iterate through mount namespaces It is already possible to list mounts in other mount namespaces and to retrieve namespace file descriptors without having to go through procfs by deriving them from pidfds. Augment these abilities by adding the ability to retrieve information about a mount namespace via NS_MNT_GET_INFO. This will return the mount namespace id and the number of mounts currently in the mount namespace. The number of mounts can be used to size the buffer that needs to be used for listmount() and is in general useful without having to actually iterate through all the mounts. The structure is extensible. And add the ability to iterate through all mount namespaces over which the caller holds privilege returning the file descriptor for the next or previous mount namespace. To retrieve a mount namespace the caller must be privileged wrt to it's owning user namespace. This means that PID 1 on the host can list all mounts in all mount namespaces or that a container can list all mounts of its nested containers. Optionally pass a structure for NS_MNT_GET_INFO with NS_MNT_GET_{PREV,NEXT} to retrieve information about the mount namespace in one go. Both ioctls can be implemented for other namespace types easily. Together with recent api additions this means one can iterate through all mounts in all mount namespaces without ever touching procfs. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719-work-mount-namespace-v1-5-834113cab0d2@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-07-19 13:41:52 +02:00
namespace: queue a mount only once for mount notifications mnt_notify_add() puts a mount on notify_list. It doesn't check whether the mount is on the list already. That's fine as long as every mount is queued at most once per namespace_sem hold. It isn't. propagate_umount() moves a surviving overmount off a stack of mounts that are going away and queues it as moved. shrink_submounts() and mark_mounts_for_expiry() call umount_tree() for several mounts under a single namespace_sem hold. So the second umount_tree() can take down exactly the mount the first one reparented, reparent it once more and so end up queueing it a second time. The second list_add_tail() cuts the mounts queued in between out of the list while the head still points at the last of them. notify_mnt_list() then only visits that one mount and the others are freed after the grace period with notify_list still pointing at them. Every later mount operation on the host walks freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881003d57e0 by task notify_dq/162 __list_add_valid_or_report+0x15c/0x1a0 mnt_add_to_ns+0x322/0x890 attach_recursive_mnt.isra.0+0xf2a/0x1a00 path_mount+0x139c/0x1d40 This needs a mount with MNT_SHRINKABLE to bind from. That's what finish_automount() creates (submounts of NFS, AFS and CIFS and the tracefs mount below debugfs). Bind mounts inherit the flag. A mount namespace with a FAN_MARK_MNTNS mark does the rest and root in a user namespace can have both. Initialize to_notify in alloc_vfsmnt() and leave a mount alone that is queued already. mnt_notify() looks at the state the mount has when the list is drained so a single entry per mount is enough. The move event for a mount that is unmounted under the same hold is lost. That's fine. The detach is what matters. Fixes: bf630c401641 ("vfs: add notifications for mount attach and detach") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15+ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260930-work-mount-fixes-3-v1-1-be34c83956ae@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
2026-09-30 15:31:53 +02:00