linux/io_uring/cancel.c

664 lines
16 KiB

2022-06-18 10:00:50 -06:00
io_uring: add support for futex wake and wait Add support for FUTEX_WAKE/WAIT primitives. IORING_OP_FUTEX_WAKE is mix of FUTEX_WAKE and FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET, as it does support passing in a bitset. Similary, IORING_OP_FUTEX_WAIT is a mix of FUTEX_WAIT and FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET. For both of them, they are using the futex2 interface. FUTEX_WAKE is straight forward, as those can always be done directly from the io_uring submission without needing async handling. For FUTEX_WAIT, things are a bit more complicated. If the futex isn't ready, then we rely on a callback via futex_queue->wake() when someone wakes up the futex. From that calback, we queue up task_work with the original task, which will post a CQE and wake it, if necessary. Cancelations are supported, both from the application point-of-view, but also to be able to cancel pending waits if the ring exits before all events have occurred. The return value of futex_unqueue() is used to gate who wins the potential race between cancelation and futex wakeups. Whomever gets a 'ret == 1' return from that claims ownership of the io_uring futex request. This is just the barebones wait/wake support. PI or REQUEUE support is not added at this point, unclear if we might look into that later. Likewise, explicit timeouts are not supported either. It is expected that users that need timeouts would do so via the usual io_uring mechanism to do that using linked timeouts. The SQE format is as follows: `addr` Address of futex `fd` futex2(2) FUTEX2_* flags `futex_flags` io_uring specific command flags. None valid now. `addr2` Value of futex `addr3` Mask to wake/wait Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2023-06-08 11:57:40 -06:00
io_uring: add support for futex wake and wait Add support for FUTEX_WAKE/WAIT primitives. IORING_OP_FUTEX_WAKE is mix of FUTEX_WAKE and FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET, as it does support passing in a bitset. Similary, IORING_OP_FUTEX_WAIT is a mix of FUTEX_WAIT and FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET. For both of them, they are using the futex2 interface. FUTEX_WAKE is straight forward, as those can always be done directly from the io_uring submission without needing async handling. For FUTEX_WAIT, things are a bit more complicated. If the futex isn't ready, then we rely on a callback via futex_queue->wake() when someone wakes up the futex. From that calback, we queue up task_work with the original task, which will post a CQE and wake it, if necessary. Cancelations are supported, both from the application point-of-view, but also to be able to cancel pending waits if the ring exits before all events have occurred. The return value of futex_unqueue() is used to gate who wins the potential race between cancelation and futex wakeups. Whomever gets a 'ret == 1' return from that claims ownership of the io_uring futex request. This is just the barebones wait/wake support. PI or REQUEUE support is not added at this point, unclear if we might look into that later. Likewise, explicit timeouts are not supported either. It is expected that users that need timeouts would do so via the usual io_uring mechanism to do that using linked timeouts. The SQE format is as follows: `addr` Address of futex `fd` futex2(2) FUTEX2_* flags `futex_flags` io_uring specific command flags. None valid now. `addr2` Value of futex `addr3` Mask to wake/wait Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2023-06-08 11:57:40 -06:00
io_uring/tctx: add separate lock for list of tctx's in ctx ctx->tcxt_list holds the tasks using this ring, and it's currently protected by the normal ctx->uring_lock. However, this can cause a circular locking issue, as reported by syzbot, where cancelations off exec end up needing to remove an entry from this list: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.9999/12287 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88805851c0a8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 proc_pid_attr_write+0x547/0x630 fs/proc/base.c:2837 vfs_write+0x27e/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read_internal include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:53 [inline] percpu_down_read_freezable include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:83 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs/super.h:19 [inline] sb_start_write+0x4d/0x1c0 include/linux/fs/super.h:125 mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:499 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4529 [inline] path_openat+0xadd/0x3dd0 fs/namei.c:4784 do_filp_open+0x1fa/0x410 fs/namei.c:4814 io_openat2+0x3e0/0x5c0 io_uring/openclose.c:143 __io_issue_sqe+0x181/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1792 io_issue_sqe+0x165/0x1060 io_uring/io_uring.c:1815 io_queue_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2042 [inline] io_submit_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2320 [inline] io_submit_sqes+0xbf4/0x2140 io_uring/io_uring.c:2434 __do_sys_io_uring_enter io_uring/io_uring.c:3280 [inline] __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x2e0/0x2b60 io_uring/io_uring.c:3219 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctx->uring_lock --> sb_writers#3 --> &sig->cred_guard_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(sb_writers#3); lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(&ctx->uring_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz.0.9999/12287: #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12287 Comm: syz.0.9999 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff3a8b8f749 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff3a9a97038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 RCX: 00007ff3a8b8f749 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000200000000400 RBP: 00007ff3a8c13f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ff3a8de6038 R14: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 R15: 00007ff3a8f0fa28 </TASK> Add a separate lock just for the tctx_list, tctx_lock. This can nest under ->uring_lock, where necessary, and be used separately for list manipulation. For the cancelation off exec side, this removes the need to grab ->uring_lock, hence fixing the circular locking dependency. Reported-by: syzbot+b0e3b77ffaa8a4067ce5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2025-12-31 08:12:46 -07:00
io_uring/tctx: add separate lock for list of tctx's in ctx ctx->tcxt_list holds the tasks using this ring, and it's currently protected by the normal ctx->uring_lock. However, this can cause a circular locking issue, as reported by syzbot, where cancelations off exec end up needing to remove an entry from this list: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.9999/12287 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88805851c0a8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 proc_pid_attr_write+0x547/0x630 fs/proc/base.c:2837 vfs_write+0x27e/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read_internal include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:53 [inline] percpu_down_read_freezable include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:83 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs/super.h:19 [inline] sb_start_write+0x4d/0x1c0 include/linux/fs/super.h:125 mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:499 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4529 [inline] path_openat+0xadd/0x3dd0 fs/namei.c:4784 do_filp_open+0x1fa/0x410 fs/namei.c:4814 io_openat2+0x3e0/0x5c0 io_uring/openclose.c:143 __io_issue_sqe+0x181/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1792 io_issue_sqe+0x165/0x1060 io_uring/io_uring.c:1815 io_queue_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2042 [inline] io_submit_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2320 [inline] io_submit_sqes+0xbf4/0x2140 io_uring/io_uring.c:2434 __do_sys_io_uring_enter io_uring/io_uring.c:3280 [inline] __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x2e0/0x2b60 io_uring/io_uring.c:3219 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctx->uring_lock --> sb_writers#3 --> &sig->cred_guard_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(sb_writers#3); lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(&ctx->uring_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz.0.9999/12287: #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12287 Comm: syz.0.9999 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff3a8b8f749 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff3a9a97038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 RCX: 00007ff3a8b8f749 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000200000000400 RBP: 00007ff3a8c13f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ff3a8de6038 R14: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 R15: 00007ff3a8f0fa28 </TASK> Add a separate lock just for the tctx_list, tctx_lock. This can nest under ->uring_lock, where necessary, and be used separately for list manipulation. For the cancelation off exec side, this removes the need to grab ->uring_lock, hence fixing the circular locking dependency. Reported-by: syzbot+b0e3b77ffaa8a4067ce5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2025-12-31 08:12:46 -07:00
io_uring/tctx: add separate lock for list of tctx's in ctx ctx->tcxt_list holds the tasks using this ring, and it's currently protected by the normal ctx->uring_lock. However, this can cause a circular locking issue, as reported by syzbot, where cancelations off exec end up needing to remove an entry from this list: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.9999/12287 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88805851c0a8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 proc_pid_attr_write+0x547/0x630 fs/proc/base.c:2837 vfs_write+0x27e/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read_internal include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:53 [inline] percpu_down_read_freezable include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:83 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs/super.h:19 [inline] sb_start_write+0x4d/0x1c0 include/linux/fs/super.h:125 mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:499 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4529 [inline] path_openat+0xadd/0x3dd0 fs/namei.c:4784 do_filp_open+0x1fa/0x410 fs/namei.c:4814 io_openat2+0x3e0/0x5c0 io_uring/openclose.c:143 __io_issue_sqe+0x181/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1792 io_issue_sqe+0x165/0x1060 io_uring/io_uring.c:1815 io_queue_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2042 [inline] io_submit_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2320 [inline] io_submit_sqes+0xbf4/0x2140 io_uring/io_uring.c:2434 __do_sys_io_uring_enter io_uring/io_uring.c:3280 [inline] __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x2e0/0x2b60 io_uring/io_uring.c:3219 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctx->uring_lock --> sb_writers#3 --> &sig->cred_guard_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(sb_writers#3); lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(&ctx->uring_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz.0.9999/12287: #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12287 Comm: syz.0.9999 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff3a8b8f749 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff3a9a97038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 RCX: 00007ff3a8b8f749 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000200000000400 RBP: 00007ff3a8c13f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ff3a8de6038 R14: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 R15: 00007ff3a8f0fa28 </TASK> Add a separate lock just for the tctx_list, tctx_lock. This can nest under ->uring_lock, where necessary, and be used separately for list manipulation. For the cancelation off exec side, this removes the need to grab ->uring_lock, hence fixing the circular locking dependency. Reported-by: syzbot+b0e3b77ffaa8a4067ce5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2025-12-31 08:12:46 -07:00
2022-06-18 10:00:50 -06:00
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2022-06-18 10:00:50 -06:00
io_uring: add IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN Allow deferring async tasks until the user calls io_uring_enter(2) with the IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS flag. Enable this mode with a flag at io_uring_setup time. This functionality requires that the later io_uring_enter will be called from the same submission task, and therefore restrict this flag to work only when IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER is also set. Being able to hand pick when tasks are run prevents the problem where there is current work to be done, however task work runs anyway. For example, a common workload would obtain a batch of CQEs, and process each one. Interrupting this to additional taskwork would add latency but not gain anything. If instead task work is deferred to just before more CQEs are obtained then no additional latency is added. The way this is implemented is by trying to keep task work local to a io_ring_ctx, rather than to the submission task. This is required, as the application will want to wake up only a single io_ring_ctx at a time to process work, and so the lists of work have to be kept separate. This has some other benefits like not having to check the task continually in handle_tw_list (and potentially unlocking/locking those), and reducing locks in the submit & process completions path. There are networking cases where using this option can reduce request latency by 50%. For example a contrived example using [1] where the client sends 2k data and receives the same data back while doing some system calls (to trigger task work) shows this reduction. The reason ends up being that if sending responses is delayed by processing task work, then the client side sits idle. Whereas reordering the sends first means that the client runs it's workload in parallel with the local task work. [1]: Using https://github.com/DylanZA/netbench/tree/defer_run Client: ./netbench --client_only 1 --control_port 10000 --host <host> --tx "epoll --threads 16 --per_thread 1 --size 2048 --resp 2048 --workload 1000" Server: ./netbench --server_only 1 --control_port 10000 --rx "io_uring --defer_taskrun 0 --workload 100" --rx "io_uring --defer_taskrun 1 --workload 100" Signed-off-by: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220830125013.570060-5-dylany@fb.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2022-08-30 05:50:10 -07:00
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io_uring/tctx: add separate lock for list of tctx's in ctx ctx->tcxt_list holds the tasks using this ring, and it's currently protected by the normal ctx->uring_lock. However, this can cause a circular locking issue, as reported by syzbot, where cancelations off exec end up needing to remove an entry from this list: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.9999/12287 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88805851c0a8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 proc_pid_attr_write+0x547/0x630 fs/proc/base.c:2837 vfs_write+0x27e/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read_internal include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:53 [inline] percpu_down_read_freezable include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:83 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs/super.h:19 [inline] sb_start_write+0x4d/0x1c0 include/linux/fs/super.h:125 mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:499 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4529 [inline] path_openat+0xadd/0x3dd0 fs/namei.c:4784 do_filp_open+0x1fa/0x410 fs/namei.c:4814 io_openat2+0x3e0/0x5c0 io_uring/openclose.c:143 __io_issue_sqe+0x181/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1792 io_issue_sqe+0x165/0x1060 io_uring/io_uring.c:1815 io_queue_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2042 [inline] io_submit_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2320 [inline] io_submit_sqes+0xbf4/0x2140 io_uring/io_uring.c:2434 __do_sys_io_uring_enter io_uring/io_uring.c:3280 [inline] __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x2e0/0x2b60 io_uring/io_uring.c:3219 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctx->uring_lock --> sb_writers#3 --> &sig->cred_guard_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(sb_writers#3); lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(&ctx->uring_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz.0.9999/12287: #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12287 Comm: syz.0.9999 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff3a8b8f749 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff3a9a97038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 RCX: 00007ff3a8b8f749 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000200000000400 RBP: 00007ff3a8c13f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ff3a8de6038 R14: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 R15: 00007ff3a8f0fa28 </TASK> Add a separate lock just for the tctx_list, tctx_lock. This can nest under ->uring_lock, where necessary, and be used separately for list manipulation. For the cancelation off exec side, this removes the need to grab ->uring_lock, hence fixing the circular locking dependency. Reported-by: syzbot+b0e3b77ffaa8a4067ce5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2025-12-31 08:12:46 -07:00
io_uring/tctx: add separate lock for list of tctx's in ctx ctx->tcxt_list holds the tasks using this ring, and it's currently protected by the normal ctx->uring_lock. However, this can cause a circular locking issue, as reported by syzbot, where cancelations off exec end up needing to remove an entry from this list: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.9999/12287 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88805851c0a8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 proc_pid_attr_write+0x547/0x630 fs/proc/base.c:2837 vfs_write+0x27e/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: percpu_down_read_internal include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:53 [inline] percpu_down_read_freezable include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:83 [inline] __sb_start_write include/linux/fs/super.h:19 [inline] sb_start_write+0x4d/0x1c0 include/linux/fs/super.h:125 mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:499 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4529 [inline] path_openat+0xadd/0x3dd0 fs/namei.c:4784 do_filp_open+0x1fa/0x410 fs/namei.c:4814 io_openat2+0x3e0/0x5c0 io_uring/openclose.c:143 __io_issue_sqe+0x181/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1792 io_issue_sqe+0x165/0x1060 io_uring/io_uring.c:1815 io_queue_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2042 [inline] io_submit_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2320 [inline] io_submit_sqes+0xbf4/0x2140 io_uring/io_uring.c:2434 __do_sys_io_uring_enter io_uring/io_uring.c:3280 [inline] __se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x2e0/0x2b60 io_uring/io_uring.c:3219 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctx->uring_lock --> sb_writers#3 --> &sig->cred_guard_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(sb_writers#3); lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); lock(&ctx->uring_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz.0.9999/12287: #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline] #0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12287 Comm: syz.0.9999 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776 io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179 io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646 io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline] begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131 load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline] exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline] bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753 do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859 do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline] __do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline] __se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline] __x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ff3a8b8f749 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ff3a9a97038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 RCX: 00007ff3a8b8f749 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000200000000400 RBP: 00007ff3a8c13f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ff3a8de6038 R14: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 R15: 00007ff3a8f0fa28 </TASK> Add a separate lock just for the tctx_list, tctx_lock. This can nest under ->uring_lock, where necessary, and be used separately for list manipulation. For the cancelation off exec side, this removes the need to grab ->uring_lock, hence fixing the circular locking dependency. Reported-by: syzbot+b0e3b77ffaa8a4067ce5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2025-12-31 08:12:46 -07:00
io_uring/cancel: don't spin on local work the task can't run io_uring_cancel_generic() refuses to sleep while any ring on the exiting task's tctx has local work pending. It assumes the task is that ring's submitter and that the next io_uring_try_cancel_requests() pass will run the work. This does not hold for a ring that was still IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED when the task got its tctx node from io_uring_create() or io_ringfd_register(). The submitter is set later by IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS, possibly from another task, and only the submitter may run local work on an IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN ring. To the exiting task the work stays pending forever, the loop never reaches schedule(), and the task trips the WARN_ON_ONCE() once and then spins in do_exit(). An unprivileged user can set this up at will by creating a disabled ring, having a child enable it and stop, posting to the ring with IORING_OP_MSG_RING and exiting with a request in flight that only the child can complete. The exiting thread burns a CPU until the child runs or dies, and with panic_on_warn set the WARN panics the kernel. Fix by skipping the sleep only when io_allowed_defer_tw_run() allows the task to run the work. This is reasonable since work it cannot run cannot complete any of its requests either, so nothing is lost by sleeping. Drop the WARN_ON_ONCE() since handing a disabled ring to another thread is a supported scenario, not a bug state. Fixes: 360cd42c4e95 ("io_uring: optimise io_req_local_work_add") Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008191602.45101-1-cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2026-10-08 15:16:02 -04:00
io_uring/cancel: don't spin on local work the task can't run io_uring_cancel_generic() refuses to sleep while any ring on the exiting task's tctx has local work pending. It assumes the task is that ring's submitter and that the next io_uring_try_cancel_requests() pass will run the work. This does not hold for a ring that was still IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED when the task got its tctx node from io_uring_create() or io_ringfd_register(). The submitter is set later by IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS, possibly from another task, and only the submitter may run local work on an IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN ring. To the exiting task the work stays pending forever, the loop never reaches schedule(), and the task trips the WARN_ON_ONCE() once and then spins in do_exit(). An unprivileged user can set this up at will by creating a disabled ring, having a child enable it and stop, posting to the ring with IORING_OP_MSG_RING and exiting with a request in flight that only the child can complete. The exiting thread burns a CPU until the child runs or dies, and with panic_on_warn set the WARN panics the kernel. Fix by skipping the sleep only when io_allowed_defer_tw_run() allows the task to run the work. This is reasonable since work it cannot run cannot complete any of its requests either, so nothing is lost by sleeping. Drop the WARN_ON_ONCE() since handing a disabled ring to another thread is a supported scenario, not a bug state. Fixes: 360cd42c4e95 ("io_uring: optimise io_req_local_work_add") Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008191602.45101-1-cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2026-10-08 15:16:02 -04:00