wifi: libertas: fix RX OOB access from device-controlled pkt_ptr

lbs_process_rxed_packet() computes the packet header pointer as
skb->data + rxpd->pkt_ptr, where pkt_ptr is a 32-bit value supplied
by the device, and never checks it against the packet length. The
only validation (skb->len < ETH_HLEN + 8 + sizeof(struct rxpd))
bounds the total length, not pkt_ptr.

A bogus device can report an arbitrary pkt_ptr:

- the memcmp() against the RFC1042 header reads 6 bytes at
  pkt_ptr + 14, potentially past the skb buffer
- if the compared bytes happen to match, the EthernetII header
  reconstruction writes 12 bytes at pkt_ptr + 8;
- hdrchop derived from pkt_ptr is later passed to skb_pull().

Validate pkt_ptr before using it: it must leave room for a full
struct rxpackethdr within the received frame. It is not expected
to affect the driver behavior in most cases, only invalid pkt_ptr
packets being dropped.

Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen <flynnnchen@tencent.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/f22d4f23e5e54b1debd6038b3b75119f97920a73@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tianchu Chen 2026-09-24 10:19:43 +00:00 • committed by Johannes Berg
commit 076e00b142