x86: use cmov for user address masking

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[ Upstream commit 91309a7082 ]

This was a suggestion by David Laight, and while I was slightly worried
that some micro-architecture would predict cmov like a conditional
branch, there is little reason to actually believe any core would be
that broken.

Intel documents that their existing cores treat CMOVcc as a data
dependency that will constrain speculation in their "Speculative
Execution Side Channel Mitigations" whitepaper:

  "Other instructions such as CMOVcc, AND, ADC, SBB and SETcc can also
   be used to prevent bounds check bypass by constraining speculative
   execution on current family 6 processors (Intel® Core™, Intel® Atom™,
   Intel® Xeon® and Intel® Xeon Phi™ processors)"

and while that leaves the future uarch issues open, that's certainly
true of our traditional SBB usage too.

Any core that predicts CMOV will be unusable for various crypto
algorithms that need data-independent timing stability, so let's just
treat CMOV as the safe choice that simplifies the address masking by
avoiding an extra instruction and doesn't need a temporary register.

Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Link: https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/336996-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.pdf
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: 284922f4c5 ("x86: uaccess: don't use runtime-const rewriting in modules")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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Linus Torvalds 2024-12-10 10:25:04 -08:00 • committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

parent 07640d34a7

commit 141a3e658b

2 changed files with 8 additions and 9 deletions

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12

arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h

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arch/x86/lib/getuser.S

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