scsi: qla2xxx: Validate BSG request_len before reading vendor_cmd[]

The FC BSG transport allocates job->request via memdup_user() using the
exact user-supplied request_len. For FC_BSG_HST_VENDOR,
fc_bsg_host_dispatch() only guarantees request_len covers msgcode and
vendor_id; it does not account for the vendor_cmd[] flexible array.

qla2xxx then reads the command selector vendor_cmd[0] and, in several
sub-handlers, vendor_cmd[1]/[2] or structures overlaid on the vendor
command area without verifying request_len. A caller holding
CAP_SYS_RAWIO can submit a short request whose vendor_id matches the
host, triggering out-of-bounds heap reads (KASAN-detectable, and able to
mis-select a command or panic).

Add a central guard in qla2x00_process_vendor_specific() so the selector
is always in bounds, restrict the early vendor_cmd[0] read in
qla24xx_bsg_request() to sufficiently long vendor messages, and add
request_len checks to the sub-handlers that read further:
qla24xx_proc_fcp_prio_cfg_cmd(), qla2x00_process_loopback(),
qla84xx_reset(), qla84xx_updatefw(), qla2x00_read_optrom(),
qla2x00_update_optrom(), qlafx00_mgmt_cmd() and
qla28xx_validate_flash_image().

Fixes: 01e0e15c8b ("scsi: don't use fc_bsg_job::request and fc_bsg_job::reply directly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-dev@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730155838.2119230-31-njavali@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Nilesh Javali 2026-07-30 21:28:35 +05:30 • committed by Martin K. Petersen (Oracle)
commit 4cf38dd946