From 60763c2f834dbeb6c30064f845109358e775e64b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 15:40:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference Fix a '/dev/kmsg' reference which got replaced with '/proc/kmsg' (which is not accessible to regular users). Fixes: a03ef333fbd6 ("Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Acked-by: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet Message-ID: <20260819134039.286793-1-johan@kernel.org> --- Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst index 9dd8011dde82..3ec35682d479 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document. The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g. -kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to +kernel logs via ``/dev/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to these