x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS

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Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB.  While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

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Josh Poimboeuf 2022-06-14 23:16:15 +02:00 • committed by Borislav Petkov

parent bea7e31a5c

commit 9756bba284

3 changed files with 62 additions and 9 deletions

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2

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

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63

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

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6

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S

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