diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 64fa42175a15..0c2cd0897b9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -526,4 +526,5 @@
 #define X86_BUG_RFDS			X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* "rfds" CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */
 #define X86_BUG_BHI			X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* "bhi" CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */
 #define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET	   	X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_ITS			X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 61e991507353..ac25f9eb5912 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -209,6 +209,14 @@
 						 * VERW clears CPU Register
 						 * File.
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO			BIT_ULL(62) /*
+						     * Not susceptible to
+						     * Indirect Target Selection.
+						     * This bit is not set by
+						     * HW, but is synthesized by
+						     * VMMs for guests to know
+						     * their affected status.
+						     */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
 #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index e85f1ec11c17..63dc8fb15eda 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1228,6 +1228,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define GDS		BIT(6)
 /* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */
 #define RFDS		BIT(7)
+/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
+#define ITS		BIT(8)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
@@ -1239,22 +1241,25 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_BROADWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_BROADWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_BROADWELL,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x5),	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xb),	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xc),	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_COMETLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_COMETLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS | ITS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
@@ -1318,6 +1323,32 @@ static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
 	return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
 }
 
+static bool __init vulnerable_to_its(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
+{
+	/* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */
+	if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO)
+		return false;
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+		return false;
+
+	/* None of the affected CPUs have BHI_CTRL */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a VMM did not expose ITS_NO, assume that a guest could
+	 * be running on a vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such
+	 * hardware.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return true;
+
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1450,6 +1481,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
 
+	if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 7a5367b14518..f378d479fea3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1623,7 +1623,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_rdpmc);
 	 ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \
 	 ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \
 	 ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO | \
-	 ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO)
+	 ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO | ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO)
 
 static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 {
@@ -1657,6 +1657,8 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 		data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
 		data |= ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO;
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_ITS))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
 		/*