From 9d1afbf60ed53c5b051cd124153e0ae3078c8b93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxim Skokov Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 10:00:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] Bluetooth: RFCOMM: free the skb when the DLC has no owner rfcomm_recv_data() hands the skb to d->data_ready() and returns 0 without freeing it, so the callback owns the skb from that point on. The tty implementation frees it when the DLC has been detached from its device: static void rfcomm_dev_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner; if (!dev) { kfree_skb(skb); return; } The socket implementation returns without freeing it, and the skb is leaked. A connected DLC can have no owner: rfcomm_sock_destruct() clears d->owner, while the DLC itself stays on the session until it is closed. Data frames that arrive in that window still find d->state == BT_CONNECTED in rfcomm_recv_data() and are handed to the callback, one leaked skb each. The leak does not stop on its own either. The remote runs out of credits only once RFCOMM_RX_THROTTLED is set, and for a socket the only place that sets it is rfcomm_sk_data_ready() itself, below the return. rfcomm_process_dlcs() keeps granting credits, so the remote keeps sending and the leak keeps growing. Free the skb, as the tty side does. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Mikhail Gavrilov Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/CABXGCsPe5wykd8Aj-hm+SJ7SGQyb8yoGNnx3XDpPmBathj+EGg@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maxim Skokov Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Reviewed-by: Mikhail Gavrilov Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c index fb924d0e34ec..b26918dc9e9e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c @@ -48,8 +48,11 @@ static void rfcomm_sock_kill(struct sock *sk); static void rfcomm_sk_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sock *sk = d->owner; - if (!sk) + + if (!sk) { + kfree_skb(skb); return; + } atomic_add(skb->len, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc); skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb); From 816fb1590a4c8cf8d05cd076057616be02e276f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aldo Ariel Panzardo Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2026 18:21:45 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] Bluetooth: SCO: serialise sco_conn lifetime against sco_recv_scodata() sco_recv_scodata() upgrades the weak hcon->sco_data back-pointer to a strong reference under hdev->lock: hci_dev_lock(hdev); hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle); ... conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(hcon->sco_data); hci_dev_unlock(hdev); but the pointer is cleared from the other side without that lock. When the last sco_conn reference is dropped, sco_conn_free() ran conn->hcon->sco_data = NULL; with no hdev->lock held, so the RX path could read hcon->sco_data and call kref_get_unless_zero() on an sco_conn that was concurrently freed: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_hold_unless_zero+0xbe/0x160 Write of size 4 by task kworker/u17:0 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call Trace: sco_conn_hold_unless_zero+0xbe/0x160 sco_recv_scodata+0x13f/0x490 hci_rx_work+0x3af/0x730 kref_get_unless_zero() only guards against a zero refcount, not against the backing memory already being freed. Give hcon->sco_data an actual reference on the sco_conn it points to, so the object cannot be freed while the pointer is still installed, and only clear and drop it from sco_conn_del(), which runs under hdev->lock (its callers, sco_connect_cfm() and sco_disconn_cfm(), hold it). The reader in sco_recv_scodata() also takes hdev->lock, so the store and the read are now serialised: the RX path either observes NULL or a reference that is guaranteed to stay valid until it drops its own. sco_conn_add() no longer hands its kref_init() reference to the caller as the connection's only reference; that initial reference is the one owned by hcon->sco_data, and callers get their own via sco_conn_hold(). Because the sco_conn can now outlive the socket (the association keeps it alive until the link goes down), the hci_conn can no longer be dropped from sco_conn_free() without regressing socket close: closing a connected SCO socket must still tear the link down. Move hci_conn ownership to the socket instead: __sco_chan_add() takes an hci_conn reference and it is released from sco_chan_del() and sco_sock_destruct(), exactly once. The sco_conn no longer owns an hci_conn reference, so sco_conn_add() stops consuming one and sco_connect() drops the hci_connect_sco() reference on every path; sco_connect_cfm() no longer needs its hci_conn_hold() dance. Fixes: e6720779ae61 ("Bluetooth: SCO: Use kref to track lifetime of sco_conn") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Pauli Virtanen Signed-off-by: Aldo Ariel Panzardo Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/sco.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/sco.c b/net/bluetooth/sco.c index 3d4362a09df4..f4a20d7b5f9c 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/sco.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/sco.c @@ -84,12 +84,14 @@ static void sco_conn_free(struct kref *ref) if (conn->sk) sco_pi(conn->sk)->conn = NULL; - if (conn->hcon) { - conn->hcon->sco_data = NULL; - hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon); - } + /* hcon->sco_data is cleared and the association's reference on the + * sco_conn is dropped in sco_conn_del() under hdev->lock, and the + * hci_conn is now owned by the socket (held in __sco_chan_add() and + * dropped in sco_chan_del()/sco_sock_destruct()), so there is nothing + * left to release towards hcon here. + */ - /* Ensure no more work items will run since hci_conn has been dropped */ + /* Ensure no more work items will run before the connection is freed */ disable_delayed_work_sync(&conn->timeout_work); kfree(conn); @@ -188,25 +190,19 @@ static void sco_sock_clear_timer(struct sock *sk) } /* ---- SCO connections ---- */ -/* Consumes a reference on @hcon, which the returned sco_conn owns until it is - * freed. On failure (NULL return) the reference is left for the caller to drop. +/* Returns a new reference the caller must drop with sco_conn_put(). The + * hcon->sco_data association holds its own reference on the sco_conn for the + * connection's lifetime; it is dropped in sco_conn_del() under hdev->lock. + * @hcon is not consumed: the hci_conn reference is taken and owned by the + * socket in __sco_chan_add(). */ static struct sco_conn *sco_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon) { struct sco_conn *conn = hcon->sco_data; conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(conn); - if (conn) { - if (!conn->hcon) { - sco_conn_lock(conn); - conn->hcon = hcon; - sco_conn_unlock(conn); - } else { - /* conn already owns a reference on hcon */ - hci_conn_drop(hcon); - } + if (conn) return conn; - } conn = kzalloc_obj(struct sco_conn); if (!conn) @@ -227,7 +223,10 @@ static struct sco_conn *sco_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon) BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p", hcon, conn); - return conn; + /* kref_init() above set the association reference owned by + * hcon->sco_data; hand the caller its own reference. + */ + return sco_conn_hold(conn); } /* Delete channel. @@ -242,6 +241,19 @@ static void sco_chan_del(struct sock *sk, int err) BT_DBG("sk %p, conn %p, err %d", sk, conn, err); if (conn) { + struct hci_conn *hcon; + + sco_conn_lock(conn); + hcon = conn->hcon; + sco_conn_unlock(conn); + + /* Drop the socket's hci_conn reference BEFORE clearing + * conn->sk, so sco_conn_del() on another CPU cannot free + * the hci_conn while we still hold a pointer to it. + */ + if (hcon) + hci_conn_drop(hcon); + sco_conn_lock(conn); conn->sk = NULL; sco_conn_unlock(conn); @@ -266,6 +278,13 @@ static void sco_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err) BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p, err %d", hcon, conn, err); + /* Detach from the hci_conn and drop the association's reference. + * The caller holds hdev->lock, which serialises this against the + * read of hcon->sco_data in sco_recv_scodata(). + */ + hcon->sco_data = NULL; + sco_conn_put(conn); + sco_conn_lock(conn); sk = sco_sock_hold(conn); sco_conn_unlock(conn); @@ -290,6 +309,11 @@ static void __sco_chan_add(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sock *sk, sco_pi(sk)->conn = sco_conn_hold(conn); conn->sk = sk; + /* The socket owns an hci_conn reference for as long as it stays + * attached; it is dropped in sco_chan_del()/sco_sock_destruct(). + */ + hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon); + if (parent) bt_accept_enqueue(parent, sk, true); } @@ -371,6 +395,7 @@ static int sco_connect(struct sock *sk) if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN && sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND) { release_sock(sk); sco_conn_put(conn); + hci_conn_drop(hcon); err = -EBADFD; goto unlock; } @@ -379,9 +404,13 @@ static int sco_connect(struct sock *sk) sco_conn_put(conn); if (err) { release_sock(sk); + hci_conn_drop(hcon); goto unlock; } + /* __sco_chan_add() took its own hci_conn reference; drop ours. */ + hci_conn_drop(hcon); + /* Update source addr of the socket */ bacpy(&sco_pi(sk)->src, &hcon->src); @@ -495,9 +524,25 @@ static struct sock *sco_get_sock_listen(bdaddr_t *src) static void sco_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) { + struct sco_conn *conn = sco_pi(sk)->conn; + BT_DBG("sk %p", sk); - sco_conn_put(sco_pi(sk)->conn); + /* If the channel was not already torn down via sco_chan_del(), drop + * the socket's own references here. + */ + if (conn) { + struct hci_conn *hcon; + + sco_conn_lock(conn); + hcon = conn->hcon; + sco_conn_unlock(conn); + + if (hcon) + hci_conn_drop(hcon); + sco_pi(sk)->conn = NULL; + sco_conn_put(conn); + } skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue); skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue); @@ -1511,12 +1556,10 @@ static void sco_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 status) if (!status) { struct sco_conn *conn; - conn = sco_conn_add(hci_conn_hold(hcon)); + conn = sco_conn_add(hcon); if (conn) { sco_conn_ready(conn); sco_conn_put(conn); - } else { - hci_conn_drop(hcon); } } else sco_conn_del(hcon, bt_to_errno(status)); From baa53af641c9e3644e717b8dfd1b95a55a0c111b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ravindra Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2026 12:26:41 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: fix TX descriptor bounds check btintel_pcie_prepare_tx() uses tfd_index to access the TFD and data buffer arrays before the index is advanced modulo txq->count. An index equal to txq->count is one past the end of both arrays, so reject it in the bounds check. Fixes: 6e65a09f9275 ("Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: Add *setup* function to download firmware") Signed-off-by: Ravindra Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c index f333b01f7465..d525269be501 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static int btintel_pcie_send_sync(struct btintel_pcie_data *data, tfd_index = data->ia.tr_hia[BTINTEL_PCIE_TXQ_NUM]; - if (tfd_index > txq->count) + if (tfd_index >= txq->count) return -ERANGE; if (skb->len > BTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE - BTINTEL_PCIE_HCI_TYPE_LEN) { From ac022970e9fb0a5f7e7d1f6c8e104c1ed924dd1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikhail Gavrilov Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2026 17:22:26 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] Bluetooth: RFCOMM: connect the session socket without rfcomm_mutex An RFCOMM connect() issued while a BR/EDR link is being authenticated makes lockdep report a circular dependency, and the reported cycle is a real AB/BA between rfcomm_mutex and hdev->lock. rfcomm_security_cfm() is called from the HCI event path, which already holds hdev->lock: hci_rx_work() hci_event_packet() hci_cc_read_enc_key_size() [hdev->lock] hci_encrypt_cfm() [hci_cb_list_lock] rfcomm_security_cfm() [rfcomm_mutex] while an RFCOMM connect() from userspace takes the same two locks the other way round: rfcomm_sock_connect() rfcomm_dlc_open() [rfcomm_mutex] __rfcomm_dlc_open() rfcomm_session_create() kernel_connect() l2cap_sock_connect() l2cap_chan_connect() [hdev->lock] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected kworker/u131:1/1128 is trying to acquire lock: rfcomm_mutex, at: rfcomm_security_cfm+0x31/0x3e0 [rfcomm] but task is already holding lock: hci_cb_list_lock, at: hci_cc_read_enc_key_size+0x1d2/0xcc0 Chain exists of: rfcomm_mutex --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock hci_auth_complete_evt() and hci_encrypt_change_evt() reach the callback the same way. Both orders have to be seen in the same boot, which is why a BR/EDR connection alone is not enough to show it: a session set up by the remote side is created by rfcomm_accept_connection() in krfcommd, which calls kernel_accept() and never takes hdev->lock under rfcomm_mutex. Connecting a device that authenticates and encrypts the link and then calling connect() on an RFCOMM socket towards any address - the connect does not have to succeed, the order is recorded before the page timeout - reports it every time. Only the session socket has to be connected with the lock held, and it does not: nothing else can see the socket before it is put on the session list. So connect it first and take rfcomm_mutex afterwards, which removes the rfcomm_mutex -> hdev->lock order for good, rather than keeping the HCI event path out of rfcomm_mutex. rfcomm_session_create() becomes rfcomm_session_connect(), which returns the connected socket without touching the session list, and rfcomm_dlc_open() adds the session once it holds the lock again. If another opener added a session for the same pair while this socket was connecting, that session is used and this socket is dropped. __rfcomm_dlc_open() now takes the session it should use, and its state check runs after the lock is re-acquired, so a DLC that was opened or closed in the meantime is still handled. Over an existing ACL link the connection can complete before the session reaches the list, and the wakeup from the socket callback is then lost, so krfcommd is woken once the session is visible. Connecting without the lock opens a window in which the socket can be closed. The DLC is not on a session yet, so rfcomm_dlc_close() finds nothing to do and returns without touching it, and rfcomm_dlc_open() would then attach a DLC whose owner is gone. rfcomm_dlc_close() now marks such a DLC with RFCOMM_CLOSED, and rfcomm_dlc_open() checks the mark once it holds rfcomm_mutex again and drops the socket instead of attaching the DLC. The mark is cleared when an open starts, so a DLC that is reused is not affected. This covers both callers of rfcomm_dlc_open(), the socket and the tty layer. Fixes: 759c185d0bbd ("Bluetooth: RFCOMM: serialize security confirmation handling") Suggested-by: Pauli Virtanen Reported-by: Pauli Virtanen Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/5e76a95e934e451e7006db28827c2d64af5a88be.camel@iki.fi/ Reported-by: syzbot+74071deb72339c215b2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/6a92fadc.08e933ee.dbf97.008f.GAE@google.com/ Reported-by: Jiaming Zhang Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANypQFabseTuRiyz2pGkc_Qj0moGDnY7KEp1qdTOqkw6gAL3hw@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov Tested-by: syzbot+74071deb72339c215b2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- include/net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c | 134 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h b/include/net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h index 102c278e3584..9dc5fd4cb8c8 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ struct rfcomm_dlc { #define RFCOMM_AUTH_REJECT 7 #define RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP 8 #define RFCOMM_ENC_DROP 9 +#define RFCOMM_CLOSED 10 /* Scheduling flags and events */ #define RFCOMM_SCHED_WAKEUP 31 diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c index d91e2a6ee26c..54ec1136f87e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c @@ -62,10 +62,9 @@ static void rfcomm_make_uih(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 addr); static void rfcomm_process_connect(struct rfcomm_session *s); -static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_create(bdaddr_t *src, - bdaddr_t *dst, - u8 sec_level, - int *err); +static struct socket *rfcomm_session_connect(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, + u8 sec_level, int *err); +static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_add(struct socket *sock, int state); static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_get(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst); static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_del(struct rfcomm_session *s); @@ -365,28 +364,17 @@ static int rfcomm_check_channel(u8 channel) return channel < 1 || channel > 30; } -static int __rfcomm_dlc_open(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 channel) +static int __rfcomm_dlc_open(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, struct rfcomm_session *s, + u8 channel) { - struct rfcomm_session *s; - int err = 0; u8 dlci; - BT_DBG("dlc %p state %ld %pMR -> %pMR channel %d", - d, d->state, src, dst, channel); - - if (rfcomm_check_channel(channel)) - return -EINVAL; + BT_DBG("dlc %p state %ld session %p channel %d", + d, d->state, s, channel); if (d->state != BT_OPEN && d->state != BT_CLOSED) return 0; - s = rfcomm_session_get(src, dst); - if (!s) { - s = rfcomm_session_create(src, dst, d->sec_level, &err); - if (!s) - return err; - } - dlci = __dlci(__session_dir(s), channel); /* Check if DLCI already exists */ @@ -421,14 +409,84 @@ static int __rfcomm_dlc_open(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, int rfcomm_dlc_open(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 channel) { - int r; + struct rfcomm_session *s; + struct socket *sock; + int err; + + BT_DBG("dlc %p state %ld %pMR -> %pMR channel %d", + d, d->state, src, dst, channel); + + if (rfcomm_check_channel(channel)) + return -EINVAL; rfcomm_lock(); - r = __rfcomm_dlc_open(d, src, dst, channel); + clear_bit(RFCOMM_CLOSED, &d->flags); + + /* Do not page the remote device for a DLC that cannot be opened + * anyway. __rfcomm_dlc_open() looks at the state again once the + * lock has been re-acquired below. + */ + if (d->state != BT_OPEN && d->state != BT_CLOSED) { + rfcomm_unlock(); + return 0; + } + + s = rfcomm_session_get(src, dst); + if (s) { + err = __rfcomm_dlc_open(d, s, channel); + rfcomm_unlock(); + return err; + } + rfcomm_unlock(); + + /* There is no session for this pair yet. kernel_connect() ends up in + * l2cap_chan_connect(), which takes hdev->lock, and the HCI event + * path takes rfcomm_mutex while holding hdev->lock, so the socket has + * to be connected with rfcomm_mutex released. + */ + sock = rfcomm_session_connect(src, dst, d->sec_level, &err); + if (!sock) + return err; + + rfcomm_lock(); + + /* The DLC may have been closed while the socket was connecting. It + * was not on a session, so rfcomm_dlc_close() could only mark it; + * attaching it now would leave it with no owner. + */ + if (test_bit(RFCOMM_CLOSED, &d->flags)) { + rfcomm_unlock(); + sock_release(sock); + return -ECONNRESET; + } + + /* Another opener may have added a session for the same pair in the + * meantime; that one is used and this socket is dropped. + */ + s = rfcomm_session_get(src, dst); + if (!s) { + s = rfcomm_session_add(sock, BT_BOUND); + if (s) { + s->initiator = 1; + sock = NULL; + } + } + + err = s ? __rfcomm_dlc_open(d, s, channel) : -ENOMEM; rfcomm_unlock(); - return r; + + if (sock) + sock_release(sock); + + /* Over an existing ACL link the connection can complete before the + * session reaches the list, and that wakeup is then lost, so let + * krfcommd look at the socket state now. + */ + rfcomm_schedule(); + + return err; } static void __rfcomm_dlc_disconn(struct rfcomm_dlc *d) @@ -508,8 +566,14 @@ int rfcomm_dlc_close(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, int err) rfcomm_lock(); s = d->session; - if (!s) + if (!s) { + /* Not on a session yet: rfcomm_dlc_open() may be connecting a + * socket for it with rfcomm_mutex released. Leave a mark so + * that it does not attach the DLC once it holds the lock again. + */ + set_bit(RFCOMM_CLOSED, &d->flags); goto no_session; + } /* after waiting on the mutex check the session still exists * then check the dlc still exists @@ -757,12 +821,12 @@ static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_close(struct rfcomm_session *s, return rfcomm_session_del(s); } -static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_create(bdaddr_t *src, - bdaddr_t *dst, - u8 sec_level, - int *err) +/* Creates the L2CAP socket a new session will run on and starts connecting + * it. Must be called with rfcomm_mutex released. + */ +static struct socket *rfcomm_session_connect(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst, + u8 sec_level, int *err) { - struct rfcomm_session *s = NULL; struct sockaddr_l2 addr; struct socket *sock; struct sock *sk; @@ -792,24 +856,16 @@ static struct rfcomm_session *rfcomm_session_create(bdaddr_t *src, l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_ERTM; release_sock(sk); - s = rfcomm_session_add(sock, BT_BOUND); - if (!s) { - *err = -ENOMEM; - goto failed; - } - - s->initiator = 1; - bacpy(&addr.l2_bdaddr, dst); addr.l2_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.l2_psm = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_PSM_RFCOMM); addr.l2_cid = 0; addr.l2_bdaddr_type = BDADDR_BREDR; *err = kernel_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_unsized *)&addr, sizeof(addr), O_NONBLOCK); - if (*err == 0 || *err == -EINPROGRESS) - return s; + if (*err && *err != -EINPROGRESS) + goto failed; - return rfcomm_session_del(s); + return sock; failed: sock_release(sock); From 1465494e8d07426fa41c0021530cccb2a1ac38fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sai Teja Aluvala Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2026 11:42:33 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: Add shared HW reset for clean start Reset shared Bluetooth hardware after mapping the BAR and before setting up MSI-X interrupts, so stale device state is cleared before IRQ handlers and interrupt masks are configured. Propagate reset errors so probe aborts rather than continuing when the reset fails. Fixes: c2b636b3f788 ("Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: Add support for PCIe transport") Signed-off-by: Sai Teja Aluvala Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c index d525269be501..0194badeeff3 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c @@ -1877,6 +1877,13 @@ static int btintel_pcie_config_pcie(struct pci_dev *pdev, if (IS_ERR(data->base_addr)) return PTR_ERR(data->base_addr); + /* Do shared hardware reset to ensure a clean start before + * configuring interrupts. + */ + err = btintel_pcie_reset_bt(data); + if (err) + return err; + err = btintel_pcie_setup_irq(data); if (err) return err; From 86ef0f58bdecdedb3a1240971c56d71b7e4ce3fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Iaroslav Voitovych Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 19:11:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix status of pending commands flushed on power off cmd_complete_rsp() receives a struct cmd_lookup and, for a pending command that has no cmd_complete callback, falls through to cmd_status_rsp(cmd, data). cmd_status_rsp() reads data as a u8 *, so the status sent comes from the first byte of match->sk's representation, not from match->mgmt_status. commit f53e1c9c726d ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible crash on mgmt_index_removed") changed the callers' data from &status to &match and updated the cmd_complete branch to match->mgmt_status, but left the fall-through passing data unchanged. In mgmt_index_removed() match->sk is NULL, so every such command is answered with status 0x00 (Success) instead of MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_INDEX. In __mgmt_power_off() it is NULL too, unless a Set Powered command was pending: then settings_rsp() has stored that command's socket in match->sk, and the byte sent comes from the socket pointer. Either way the status the caller set, MGMT_STATUS_NOT_POWERED (or MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_INDEX when the device is being unregistered), is lost. Pass the status the callers set. This was seen on a QCA9377 laptop: bluetoothd's Start Discovery, pending when the adapter was powered off, was answered with Command Status 0x00 and no parameters, and bluetoothd 5.72 crashed on the zero-length success. BlueZ master has since added the length check on that path ("adapter: Fix crash on short start discovery reply", BlueZ a734b06059cb), but userspace should still be told Not Powered, not Success. Tested on Ubuntu 7.0.0-31 with a virtual controller (hci_vhci): power off is held in HCI Write Scan Enable while a Start Discovery is submitted, and the flush answers it with status 0x00 before this change and 0x0f (Not Powered) after. Fixes: f53e1c9c726d ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible crash on mgmt_index_removed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Iaroslav Voitovych Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 41956cdde982..251a896babd5 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -1495,7 +1495,7 @@ static void cmd_complete_rsp(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data) return; } - cmd_status_rsp(cmd, data); + cmd_status_rsp(cmd, &match->mgmt_status); } static int generic_cmd_complete(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status) From 25016fe8c1ed0fccae107bd629089139ffbafe08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 15:44:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: use managed IRQ teardown The PCIe driver registers its MSI-X handlers with devm_request_threaded_irq(), but remove() uses free_irq() directly. The devres actions then retain registrations and attempt to release them again during device cleanup. Use devm_free_irq() for the remove path and for already registered vectors when a later setup request fails. This removes the managed resource at the same time as the IRQ is released and keeps MSI-X vector teardown ordered after IRQ ownership is gone. Fixes: c2b636b3f788 ("Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: Add support for PCIe transport") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c index 0194badeeff3..ac7193400769 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btintel_pcie.c @@ -1777,7 +1777,7 @@ static irqreturn_t btintel_pcie_irq_msix_handler(int irq, void *dev_id) static int btintel_pcie_setup_irq(struct btintel_pcie_data *data) { int err; - int num_irqs, i; + int num_irqs, i, j; for (i = 0; i < BTINTEL_PCIE_MSIX_VEC_MAX; i++) data->msix_entries[i].entry = i; @@ -1806,6 +1806,10 @@ static int btintel_pcie_setup_irq(struct btintel_pcie_data *data) KBUILD_MODNAME, msix_entry); if (err) { + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + devm_free_irq(&data->pdev->dev, + data->msix_entries[j].vector, + &data->msix_entries[j]); pci_free_irq_vectors(data->pdev); data->alloc_vecs = 0; return err; @@ -3145,7 +3149,7 @@ static void btintel_pcie_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) struct msix_entry *msix_entry; msix_entry = &data->msix_entries[i]; - free_irq(msix_entry->vector, msix_entry); + devm_free_irq(&pdev->dev, msix_entry->vector, msix_entry); } pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev); From 08e90633377f1b2567ab5ad6810b74c552246a07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Palla Raghunath Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2026 08:07:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Fix NULL tty_dev dereference in rfcomm_dev_shutdown syzbot hit a NULL pointer dereference in rfcomm_dev_shutdown() when an RFCOMM tty is closed. rfcomm_dev_add() puts the new device on rfcomm_dev_list first and only then registers the tty device and saves it in dev->tty_dev. If that registration fails, dev->tty_dev is never set at all. The device can be looked up in the meantime, so an open() of /dev/rfcommN gets through rfcomm_tty_install() and attaches to it. When that tty is closed again, rfcomm_dev_shutdown() uses dev->tty_dev without checking it: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047] RIP: 0010:rfcomm_dev_shutdown+0x48/0xb0 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c:131 Call Trace: tty_port_shutdown+0x1bf/0x220 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:372 tty_port_close+0x4e/0x150 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:705 tty_release+0x359/0x1670 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1718 __fput+0x418/0xa50 fs/file_table.c:512 rfcomm_dev_destruct() already copes with a NULL dev->tty_dev. Add the same check to rfcomm_dev_shutdown(), so the tty device is only moved when it was actually registered. Fixes: cad348a17e17 ("Bluetooth: Implement .activate, .shutdown and .carrier_raised methods") Reported-by: syzbot+4a807caf7680652d53b6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4a807caf7680652d53b6 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palla Raghunath Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c index dc3cdf614def..198c7dd1a95b 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static void rfcomm_dev_shutdown(struct tty_port *port) { struct rfcomm_dev *dev = container_of(port, struct rfcomm_dev, port); - if (dev->tty_dev->parent) + if (dev->tty_dev && dev->tty_dev->parent) device_move(dev->tty_dev, NULL, DPM_ORDER_DEV_LAST); /* close the dlc */ From 381a0925c556a8d91a80a9b9e3e86651d60ffee3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengfeng Ye Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 00:24:42 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] Bluetooth: hci_sock: Serialize dead-device detachment Rebinding an HCI socket after its controller is unregistered can race monitor control replay and crash the kernel. hci_sock_bind() clears hci_pi(sk)->hdev and drops the device reference under only the socket lock, whereas send_monitor_control_replay() holds hci_sk_list.lock for reading. Replay can observe a non-NULL hdev, then bind can clear it and drop the last reference before create_monitor_ctrl_open() reads hdev->id. This can cause a NULL pointer dereference if the pointer is reloaded, or a use-after-free if the old pointer is retained. The kernel reported: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f] RIP: 0010:create_monitor_ctrl_open+0x579/0x800 Call Trace: hci_sock_bind+0xd96/0x1190 __sys_bind+0x166/0x200 __x64_sys_bind+0x6d/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The same missing serialization lets hci_send_to_sock() select a socket for the old device and queue its frame after bind has detached the socket or installed a new binding. Take hci_sk_list.lock for writing when clearing the device pointer and resetting the socket state. This waits for existing replay and delivery readers to finish before detachment and prevents later readers from using the old binding. Keep hci_dev_put() outside the critical section because the final device release can sleep. Fixes: e04480920d1e ("Bluetooth: defer cleanup of resources in hci_unregister_dev()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GPT-6 Astra Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c index 6d56c77741e1..81068b585764 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c @@ -1223,8 +1223,10 @@ static int hci_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr, */ hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev; if (hdev && hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER)) { + write_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock); hci_pi(sk)->hdev = NULL; sk->sk_state = BT_OPEN; + write_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock); hci_dev_put(hdev); } hdev = NULL; From 9af12272061d206af8bc3e40215cb694421ab73a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengfeng Ye Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 00:26:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix command skb lifetime during scan setup During PA sync scan setup, hci_le_set_ext_scan_param_sync() gets the address used for the PA_LINK lookup from hci_sent_cmd_data(). The returned pointer borrows storage from sent_cmd or req_skb, without holding a reference to either skb. The scan worker runs on req_workqueue while hci_cmd_work() runs on the separate device workqueue. After the scan worker loads sent_cmd, the command worker can free and replace it before hci_sent_cmd_data() dereferences the skb. The command payload can also be freed between returning from the helper and comparing the address. The connection lookup's RCU critical section does not protect the command skb. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_sent_cmd_data+0x27c/0x2f0 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: hci_sent_cmd_data+0x27c/0x2f0 hci_le_set_scan_param_sync+0x43a/0x850 hci_passive_scan_sync+0xb09/0x1460 hci_update_passive_scan_sync+0x47c/0x6e0 hci_le_pa_create_sync+0x200/0xa70 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290 Allocated by task 95: skb_clone+0x13f/0x340 hci_cmd_work+0x2a9/0x7e0 Freed by task 95: kmem_cache_free+0xba/0x3a0 hci_cmd_work+0x29c/0x7e0 Use hdev->lock to serialize the address snapshot with sent_cmd replacement. Protect req_skb replacement and completion cleanup with the same lock because the helper falls back to that skb. Copy the address before releasing the lock and use the copy for the existing RCU-protected connection lookup. Release the mutex before sending or waiting for commands, preserving the lookup and completion ordering. Fixes: 22cbf4f84c00 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Use QoS to determine which PHY to scan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GPT-6 Astra Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 4 ++++ net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index 2076689eb302..74d9865e08c2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -4115,9 +4115,11 @@ static int hci_send_cmd_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "skb %p", skb); + hci_dev_lock(hdev); kfree_skb(hdev->sent_cmd); hdev->sent_cmd = skb_clone(skb, GFP_KERNEL); + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); if (!hdev->sent_cmd) { skb_queue_head(&hdev->cmd_q, skb); queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->cmd_work); @@ -4138,8 +4140,10 @@ static int hci_send_cmd_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) if (READ_ONCE(hdev->req_status) == HCI_REQ_PEND && !hci_dev_test_and_set_flag(hdev, HCI_CMD_PENDING)) { + hci_dev_lock(hdev); kfree_skb(hdev->req_skb); hdev->req_skb = skb_get(hdev->sent_cmd); + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); } return err; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index c01c8b58d9e8..a92a81846e9d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ static void hci_cmd_sync_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 result, u16 opcode, WRITE_ONCE(hdev->req_status, HCI_REQ_DONE); /* Free the request command so it is not used as response */ + hci_dev_lock(hdev); kfree_skb(hdev->req_skb); hdev->req_skb = NULL; + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); if (skb) { struct sock *sk = hci_skb_sk(skb); @@ -3064,15 +3066,21 @@ static int hci_le_set_ext_scan_param_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 type, */ if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PA_SYNC)) { struct hci_cp_le_add_to_accept_list *sent; + bdaddr_t bdaddr; + hci_dev_lock(hdev); sent = hci_sent_cmd_data(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_ADD_TO_ACCEPT_LIST); + if (sent) + bacpy(&bdaddr, &sent->bdaddr); + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + if (sent) { struct hci_conn *conn; rcu_read_lock(); conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, PA_LINK, - &sent->bdaddr); + &bdaddr); if (conn) { struct bt_iso_qos *qos = &conn->iso_qos; From 555ff78fa719f50ff4cdbdb40aa1acc6e8e327d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengfeng Ye Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 00:25:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] Bluetooth: ISO: Reject concurrent BIS listener setup iso_sock_listen() drops the socket lock before calling iso_listen_bis() to preserve the hdev->lock ordering. Two concurrent listen() calls on the same broadcast socket can therefore both observe BT_BOUND. Caller A can attach connA and release the locks, then caller B can acquire them and attach connB before A publishes BT_LISTEN. __iso_chan_add() checks whether connB already has a socket, but not whether the socket already has a connection. The second attachment overwrites iso_pi(sk)->conn, leaking the connA reference and leaving connA->sk intact. Socket teardown follows connB, so later events on connA can cause a stale socket access. Recheck BT_BOUND and require iso_pi(sk)->conn to be NULL after taking both the HCI device and socket locks in iso_listen_bis(). The connection check also covers the interval between attachment and publication of BT_LISTEN. Reject a competing setup with -EBADFD through the existing unlock path before allocating another connection. A recorded KASAN report from an instrumented kernel shows: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iso_sock_hold+0x119/0x1f0 Call Trace: iso_sock_hold+0x119/0x1f0 iso_conn_del+0xe4/0x270 hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x351/0x8c0 hci_event_packet+0x71b/0xb20 hci_rx_work+0x293/0x730 Allocated by task 93: sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x220 sk_alloc+0x2b/0x6d0 bt_sock_alloc+0x29/0x370 iso_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x19/0x300 iso_sock_create+0x94/0x100 Freed by task 93: kfree+0x121/0x3c0 __sk_destruct+0x42b/0x540 iso_sock_release+0x29d/0x340 __sock_release+0xa1/0x260 sock_close+0x10/0x20 Fixes: 168e28305b87 ("Bluetooth: iso: Fix circular lock in iso_listen_bis") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GPT-6 Astra Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c index 7657c2a0abbf..2e70c0df9ef3 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c @@ -1340,6 +1340,11 @@ static int iso_listen_bis(struct sock *sk) hci_dev_lock(hdev); lock_sock(sk); + if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND || iso_pi(sk)->conn) { + err = -EBADFD; + goto unlock; + } + /* Fail if user set invalid QoS */ if (iso_pi(sk)->qos_user_set && !check_bcast_qos(&iso_pi(sk)->qos)) { iso_pi(sk)->qos = default_qos; From e32d80293a0e1a160d5e5101daa8c82148c07510 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chengfeng Ye Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 15:50:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] Bluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls iso_sock_connect() checks the socket state before taking the socket lock and drops the lock again before setting up a connection. Two callers can both pass the admission check while the socket is open or bound. Caller A can copy its destination for route selection, then caller B can replace the socket destination before A binds or connects the CIS. A then uses B's destination with the route selected for its own request. B can also proceed after A attaches a connection and sets BT_CONNECT. For deferred BIS setup, B can bind a second BIS and overwrite iso_pi(sk)->conn, leaving the first connection's reference and conn->sk back-pointer stranded. Concurrent CIS connects can likewise replace the socket's connection. Later teardown only detaches the current connection, so a callback on the old connection can race with socket release and access a freed socket. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0 Call Trace: iso_sock_hold+0xf7/0x1b0 iso_conn_del+0x7b/0x1d0 iso_connect_cfm+0x186/0x16a0 hci_conn_failed+0x154/0x280 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x3dc/0x7d0 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x173/0x300 Allocated by task 121: sk_alloc+0x2b/0x6d0 bt_sock_alloc+0x29/0x370 iso_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x19/0x300 iso_sock_create+0x94/0x100 Freed by task 121: kfree+0x121/0x3c0 __sk_destruct+0x42b/0x540 iso_sock_release+0x29d/0x340 __sock_release+0xa1/0x260 Check admission under the socket lock and mark the connect operation in progress before publishing its destination. Keep that flag set across route lookup and connection setup, rejecting another connect with -EBADFD before it can change the destination or attach a connection. Clear the flag after either helper returns, including on failure, so a failed setup can be retried. A separate flag is needed because the socket lock must be released before acquiring the HCI device lock, while BT_CONNECT requires an attached connection. Keep the existing state transitions and the deferred CIS completion through iso_sock_recvmsg(). Reject an existing socket attachment in __iso_chan_add() before taking a new reference or publishing either pointer, so every caller preserves the connection association. Keep the same-socket, same-connection success case for deferred CIS setup. Reject an attached socket before BIS setup so a reusable BIS is not claimed before the attachment is rejected. In CIS setup, reject a different HCI connection before iso_conn_add() and drop the per-attempt HCI hold directly. An unowned iso_conn may still carry another reference after detachment, so its destruction cannot be relied on to release that hold. iso_listen_bis() creates a fresh PA HCI/ISO pair under the device lock, so the temporary iso_conn_put() frees the ISO candidate and drops its HCI hold on rejection. iso_conn_ready() uses a freshly allocated, unpublished child with no connection, making the socket-side rejection unreachable. Fixes: ccf74f2390d6 ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Pauli Virtanen Assisted-by: GPT-6 Astra Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c index 2e70c0df9ef3..d6ac5b1f49bc 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum { BT_SK_BIG_SYNC, BT_SK_PA_SYNC, BT_SK_KILLED, + BT_SK_CONNECTING, }; struct iso_pinfo { @@ -350,6 +351,9 @@ static int __iso_chan_add(struct iso_conn *conn, struct sock *sk, return -EBUSY; } + if (iso_pi(sk)->conn) + return -EISCONN; + if (!conn->hcon) { BT_ERR("conn->hcon missing"); return -EIO; @@ -410,6 +414,11 @@ static int iso_connect_bis(struct sock *sk) hci_dev_lock(hdev); lock_sock(sk); + if (iso_pi(sk)->conn) { + err = -EISCONN; + goto unlock; + } + if (!bis_capable(hdev)) { err = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto unlock; @@ -562,6 +571,13 @@ static int iso_connect_cis(struct sock *sk) lockdep_assert_held(&hcon->hdev->lock); + /* The socket lock keeps the current attachment and its hcon stable. */ + if (iso_pi(sk)->conn && iso_pi(sk)->conn->hcon != hcon) { + hci_conn_drop(hcon); + err = -EISCONN; + goto unlock; + } + conn = iso_conn_add(hcon); if (!conn) { hci_conn_drop(hcon); @@ -1269,17 +1285,26 @@ static int iso_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr, addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH) return -EINVAL; - if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN && sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND) - return -EBADFD; + lock_sock(sk); - if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) - return -EINVAL; + if ((sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN && sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND) || + test_bit(BT_SK_CONNECTING, &iso_pi(sk)->flags)) { + err = -EBADFD; + goto done; + } + + if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto done; + } /* Check if the address type is of LE type */ - if (!bdaddr_type_is_le(sa->iso_bdaddr_type)) - return -EINVAL; + if (!bdaddr_type_is_le(sa->iso_bdaddr_type)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto done; + } - lock_sock(sk); + set_bit(BT_SK_CONNECTING, &iso_pi(sk)->flags); bacpy(&iso_pi(sk)->dst, &sa->iso_bdaddr); iso_pi(sk)->dst_type = sa->iso_bdaddr_type; @@ -1291,16 +1316,18 @@ static int iso_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr, else err = iso_connect_bis(sk); - if (err) - return err; - lock_sock(sk); + clear_bit(BT_SK_CONNECTING, &iso_pi(sk)->flags); + if (err) + goto done; + if (!test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) { err = bt_sock_wait_state(sk, BT_CONNECTED, sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK)); } +done: release_sock(sk); return err; }