The snd_soc_dai_ops structures is only stored in the ops field of a
snd_soc_dai_driver structure, so make the snd_soc_dai_ops structure
const to allow the compiler to put it in read-only memory.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408062643.802908-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
In DT binding is mentioned that this driver is compatible with 3106.
So added compatibility string and model number.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Prchal <jiri.prchal@aksignal.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408135908.125667-1-jiri.prchal@aksignal.cz
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
The snd_soc_dai_ops structures is only stored in the ops field of a
snd_soc_dai_driver structure, so make the snd_soc_dai_ops structure
const to allow the compiler to put it in read-only memory.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408062700.803792-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
disable_irq() after request_irq() still has a time gap in which
interrupts can come. request_irq() with IRQF_NO_AUTOEN flag will
disable IRQ auto-enable because of requesting.
this patch is made base on "add IRQF_NO_AUTOEN for request_irq" which
is being merged: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1388765/
Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617778852-26492-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
disable_irq() after request_irq() still has a time gap in which
interrupts can come. request_irq() with IRQF_NO_AUTOEN flag will
disable IRQ auto-enable because of requesting.
this patch is made base on "add IRQF_NO_AUTOEN for request_irq" which
is being merged: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1388765/
Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com>
Acked-by: Vadim Pasternak <vadimp@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617785983-28878-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'irq-no-autoen-2021-03-25' into review-hans
Tag for the input subsystem to pick up
Current simple-card / audio-graph creates 1xCPU + 1xCodec + 1xPlatform
for all dai_link, but some of them is not needed.
For example Platform is not needed for DPCM BE case.
Moreover, we can share snd-soc-dummy DAI for CPU-dummy / dummy-Codec
in DPCM.
This patch adds dummy DAI and share it when DPCM case,
I beliave it can contribute to reduce memory.
By this patch, CPU-dummy / dummy-CPU are set at asoc_simple_init_priv(),
thus, its settings are no longer needed at DPCM detecting timing
on simple-card / audio-graph.
Moreover, we can remove triky Platform settings code for DPCM BE,
because un-needed Platform is not created.
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87tuoqod22.wl-kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Current simple-card / audio-graph are assuming fixed
single-CPU/Codec/Platform.
This patch prepares multi-CPU/Codec/Platform support.
Note is that it is not yet full-multi-support.
Signed-off-by: Kuninori Morimoto <kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87v996od2c.wl-kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Fix some coding style issues reported by checkpatch.pl, including the
following types:
ERROR: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
WARNING: Block comments use a trailing */ on a separate line
WARNING: braces {} are not necessary for single statement blocks
WARNING: void function return statements are not generally useful
WARNING: CVS style keyword markers, these will _not_ be updated
Signed-off-by: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
There is a timer wrap issue on dra7 for the ARM architected timer.
In a typical clock configuration the timer fails to wrap after 388 days.
To work around the issue, we need to use timer-ti-dm timers instead.
Let's prepare for adding support for percpu timers by adding a common
dmtimer_clkevt_init_common() and call it from dmtimer_clockevent_init().
This patch makes no intentional functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210323074326.28302-2-tony@atomide.com
We can't rely on the contents of the devres list during
spi_unregister_controller(), as the list is already torn down at the
time we perform devres_find() for devm_spi_release_controller. This
causes devices registered with devm_spi_alloc_{master,slave}() to be
mistakenly identified as legacy, non-devm managed devices and have their
reference counters decremented below 0.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 660 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
[<b0396f04>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<b03c56a4>] (kobject_put+0x90/0x98)
[<b03c5614>] (kobject_put) from [<b0447b4c>] (put_device+0x20/0x24)
r4:b6700140
[<b0447b2c>] (put_device) from [<b07515e8>] (devm_spi_release_controller+0x3c/0x40)
[<b07515ac>] (devm_spi_release_controller) from [<b045343c>] (release_nodes+0x84/0xc4)
r5:b6700180 r4:b6700100
[<b04533b8>] (release_nodes) from [<b0454160>] (devres_release_all+0x5c/0x60)
r8:b1638c54 r7:b117ad94 r6:b1638c10 r5:b117ad94 r4:b163dc10
[<b0454104>] (devres_release_all) from [<b044e41c>] (__device_release_driver+0x144/0x1ec)
r5:b117ad94 r4:b163dc10
[<b044e2d8>] (__device_release_driver) from [<b044f70c>] (device_driver_detach+0x84/0xa0)
r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:b117ad94 r6:b163dc54 r5:b1638c10 r4:b163dc10
[<b044f688>] (device_driver_detach) from [<b044d274>] (unbind_store+0xe4/0xf8)
Instead, determine the devm allocation state as a flag on the
controller which is guaranteed to be stable during cleanup.
Fixes: 5e844cc37a ("spi: Introduce device-managed SPI controller allocation")
Signed-off-by: William A. Kennington III <wak@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210407095527.2771582-1-wak@google.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
When platform_get_irq() fails, a pairing PM usage counter
increment is needed to keep the counter balanced. It's the
same for the following error paths.
Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408092559.3824-1-dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
There is a rumtime PM imbalance between the error handling path
after devm_snd_soc_register_component() and all other error
handling paths. Add a PM runtime increment to balance refcount.
Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408064036.6691-1-dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
For latest design, different package could use the same setting,
therefore the check of pack_id will no longer be used.
Signed-off-by: Jack Yu <jack.yu@realtek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4cbe1cd3b8664140889132464c7dee7b@realtek.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Performing the 'unbind' operation on pinctrl drivers is
not a sensible usecase, so pass the suppress_bind_attrs
atribute to prevent it.
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210328183034.555702-2-festevam@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
i.MX is a DT-only platform, so of_match_ptr() can be safely
removed.
Remove the unneeded of_match_ptr().
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210328183034.555702-1-festevam@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
when devm_kcalloc fails, use -ENOMEM instead of -EINVAL,
and consistent with other devm_kcalloc return values.
Signed-off-by: Junlin Yang <yangjunlin@yulong.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210330062655.1027-1-angkery@163.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
"mhi_controller_config" struct is not modified inside "mhi_pci_dev_info"
struct. So constify the instances.
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Add support for T99W175 modems, this modem series is based on SDX55
qcom chip. The modem is mainly based on MBIM protocol for both the
data and control path.
This patch adds support for below modems:
- T99W175(based on sdx55), Both for eSIM and Non-eSIM
- DW5930e(based on sdx55), With eSIM, It's also T99W175
- DW5930e(based on sdx55), Non-eSIM, It's also T99W175
This patch was tested with Ubuntu 20.04 X86_64 PC as host
Signed-off-by: Jarvis Jiang <jarvis.w.jiang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Loic Poulain <loic.poulain@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408095524.3559-1-jarvis.w.jiang@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
If any of the cipher schemes specified by the driver are invalid, bail
out and fail the registration rather than just warning. Otherwise, we
might later crash when we try to use the invalid cipher scheme, e.g.
if the hdr_len is (significantly) less than the pn_offs + pn_len, we'd
have an out-of-bounds access in RX validation.
Fixes: 2475b1cc0d ("mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408143149.38a3a13a1b19.I6b7f5790fa0958ed8049cf02ac2a535c61e9bc96@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
After channel switch, we should consider any beacon with a
CSA IE as a new switch. If the CSA IE is a leftover from
before the switch that the AP forgot to remove, we'll get
a CSA-to-Self.
This caused issues in iwlwifi where the firmware saw a beacon
with a CSA-to-Self with mode = 1 on the new channel after a
switch. The firmware considered this a new switch and closed
its queues. Since the beacon didn't change between before and
after the switch, we wouldn't handle it (the CRC is the same)
and we wouldn't let the firmware open its queues again or
disconnect if the CSA IE stays for too long.
Clear the CRC valid state after we switch to make sure that
we handle the beacon and handle the CSA IE as required.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408143124.b9e68aa98304.I465afb55ca2c7d59f7bf610c6046a1fd732b4c28@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Some drivers, for example mt76, use the skb priority field, and
expects that to be consistent with the skb queue mapping. On some
frame injection code paths that was not true, and it broke frame
injection. Now the skb queue mapping is set according to the skb
priority value when the frame is injected. The skb priority value
is also derived from the frame data for all frame types, as it
was done prior to commit dbd50a851c (only allocate one queue
when using iTXQs). Fixes frame injection with the mt76 driver on
MT7610E chipset.
Signed-off-by: Johan Almbladh <johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401164455.978245-1-johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
The documentation build legitimately screams about the PTP
documentation table being misformated.
Fix it by adjusting the table width guides.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Some HW/driver can support passing ethernet rx decap frames and
raw 802.11 frames for the monitor interface concurrently and
via separate RX calls to mac80211. Packets going to the monitor
interface(s) would be in 802.11 format and thus not have the
RX_FLAG_8023 set, and 802.11 format monitoring frames should have
RX_FLAG_ONLY_MONITOR set.
Drivers doing such can enable the SUPPORTS_CONC_MON_RX_DECAP to
allow using ethernet decap offload while a monitor interface is
active, currently RX decapsulation offload gets disabled when a
monitor interface is added.
Signed-off-by: Sriram R <srirrama@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617068116-32253-1-git-send-email-srirrama@codeaurora.org
[add proper documentation, rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
This patch adds a new file: /sys/fs/gfs2/*/status which will report
the status of the file system. Catting this file dumps the current
status of the file system according to various superblock variables.
For example:
Journal Checked: 1
Journal Live: 1
Journal ID: 0
Spectator: 0
Withdrawn: 0
No barriers: 0
No recovery: 0
Demote: 0
No Journal ID: 1
Mounted RO: 0
RO Recovery: 0
Skip DLM Unlock: 0
Force AIL Flush: 0
FS Frozen: 0
Withdrawing: 0
Withdraw In Prog: 0
Remote Withdraw: 0
Withdraw Recovery: 0
sd_log_error: 0
sd_log_flush_lock: 0
sd_log_num_revoke: 0
sd_log_in_flight: 0
sd_log_blks_needed: 0
sd_log_blks_free: 32768
sd_log_flush_head: 0
sd_log_flush_tail: 5384
sd_log_blks_reserved: 0
sd_log_revokes_available: 503
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Experimentally have found PV on hvs4 reports fifo full
error with expected settings and does not with one less
This appears as:
[drm:drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_flip_done] *ERROR* [CRTC:82:crtc-3] flip_done timed out
with bit 10 of PV_STAT set "HVS driving pixels when the PV FIFO is full"
Fixes: c8b75bca92 ("drm/vc4: Add KMS support for Raspberry Pi.")
Signed-off-by: Dom Cobley <popcornmix@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210318161328.1471556-3-maxime@cerno.tech
The vc4_plane_atomic_async_update function assigns twice in a row the
src_h field in the drm_plane_state structure to the same value. Remove
the second one.
Reviewed-by: Dave Stevenson <dave.stevenson@raspberrypi.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210318161328.1471556-2-maxime@cerno.tech
This driver's remove path calls cancel_delayed_work(). However, that
function does not wait until the work function finishes. This means
that the callback function may still be running after the driver's
remove function has finished, which would result in a use-after-free.
Fix by calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(), which ensures that
the work is properly cancelled, no longer running, and unable
to re-schedule itself.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
This driver's remove path calls cancel_delayed_work(). However, that
function does not wait until the work function finishes. This means
that the callback function may still be running after the driver's
remove function has finished, which would result in a use-after-free.
Fix by calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(), which ensures that
the work is properly cancelled, no longer running, and unable
to re-schedule itself.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
On newer Microsoft Surface models (specifically 7th-generation, i.e.
Surface Pro 7, Surface Book 3, Surface Laptop 3, and Surface Laptop Go),
battery and AC status/information is no longer handled via standard ACPI
devices, but instead directly via the Surface System Aggregator Module
(SSAM), i.e. the embedded controller on those devices.
While on previous generation models, AC status is also handled via SSAM,
an ACPI shim was present to translate the standard ACPI AC interface to
SSAM requests. The SSAM interface itself, which is modeled closely after
the ACPI interface, has not changed.
This commit introduces a new SSAM client device driver to support AC
status/information via the aforementioned interface on said Surface
models.
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
On newer Microsoft Surface models (specifically 7th-generation, i.e.
Surface Pro 7, Surface Book 3, Surface Laptop 3, and Surface Laptop Go),
battery and AC status/information is no longer handled via standard ACPI
devices, but instead directly via the Surface System Aggregator Module
(SSAM), i.e. the embedded controller on those devices.
While on previous generation models, battery status is also handled via
SSAM, an ACPI shim was present to translate the standard ACPI battery
interface to SSAM requests. The SSAM interface itself, which is modeled
closely after the ACPI interface, has not changed.
This commit introduces a new SSAM client device driver to support
battery status/information via the aforementioned interface on said
Surface models. It is in parts based on the standard ACPI battery
driver.
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
branch for merging into other sub-systems.
Note this is based on v5.12-rc2.
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Merge tag 'tags/platform-drivers-x86-surface-aggregator-v5.13-1' into psy-next
Signed tag for the immutable platform-surface-aggregator-registry
branch for merging into other sub-systems.
Note this is based on v5.12-rc2.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
The INTEL_FAM6 list has become a mess again. Try and bring some sanity
back into it.
Where previously we had one microarch per year and a number of SKUs
within that, this no longer seems to be the case. We now get different
uarch names that share a 'core' design.
Add the core name starting at skylake and reorder to keep the cores
in chronological order. Furthermore, Intel marketed the names {Amber,
Coffee, Whiskey} Lake, but those are in fact steppings of Kaby Lake, add
comments for them.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YE+HhS8i0gshHD3W@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
5 bits of entropy. (And include AAPCS rationale AAPCS thanks to Mark
Rutland.)
In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to
the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering
needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general
way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute[1],
this must be disabled at the compilation unit level. This isn't a problem
here, though, since stack protector was not triggered before: examining
the resulting syscall.o, there are no changes in canary coverage (none
before, none now).
[1] a working __attribute__((no_stack_protector)) has been added to GCC
and Clang but has not been released in any version yet:
https://gcc.gnu.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=gcc.git;h=346b302d09c1e6db56d9fe69048acb32fbb97845https://reviews.llvm.org/rG4fbf84c1732fca596ad1d6e96015e19760eb8a9b
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-6-keescook@chromium.org
For validating the stack offset behavior, report the offset from a given
process's first seen stack address. Add s script to calculate the results
to the LKDTM kselftests.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-7-keescook@chromium.org
Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
5-6 bits of entropy, depending on compiler and word size. Since the
method of offsetting uses macros, this cannot live in the common entry
code (the stack offset needs to be retained for the life of the syscall,
which means it needs to happen at the actual entry point).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-5-keescook@chromium.org
This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot
param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.
This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release
of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt
All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that
the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset
feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below).
Reasoning for the feature:
This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that
rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in
past (just to name few):
https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdfhttps://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdfhttps://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html
As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving
(vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info,
STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits
to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack
determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT
were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have
been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls:
https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
(page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow)
https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
(leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall)
The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system
call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place
on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will
change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after
placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized
offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible.
Design description:
During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack",
which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size,
and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread
stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu
cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the
thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers
and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called,
with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request.
The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset
after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the
thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every
time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently
architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future
improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope
for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets
are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less
easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored
in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay
explicitly tied to a single task.
As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca()
and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids
changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides
correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler.
In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact
for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static
branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be
left turned off with no performance impact.
The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this:
...
ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax
# 12380 <kstack_offset>
ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00 and $0x3ff,%eax
ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%rax
ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00 and $0x7f8,%eax
ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4 sub %rax,%rsp
ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax
ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax
...
As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about
5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on
x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for
stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how
much of the stack space we wish to trade for security.
My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64):
lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null
randomize_kstack_offset=y Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds
randomize_kstack_offset=n Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds
So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very
manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default.
There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First,
compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection)
enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to
any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is
always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain
(unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To
avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to
the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in
the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe
from Stack Clash style attacks.
The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with
-fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation,
which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function
pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static
branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated
performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of
-fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units
that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack
mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No
change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already
unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is
required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be
used to disable stack protector for specific functions.
Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature:
The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start
(cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs
structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same
approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined
to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for
an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write
different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of
the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another
difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable,
rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations
differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though
obviously the intent is similar.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/
[3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html
Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org
The state of CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON (and ...ON_FREE...) did not
change the assembly ordering of the static branches: they were always out
of line. Use the new jump_label macros to check the CONFIG settings to
default to the "expected" state, which slightly optimizes the resulting
assembly code.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-3-keescook@chromium.org
As shown in the comment in jump_label.h, choosing the initial state of
static branches changes the assembly layout. If the condition is expected
to be likely it's inline, and if unlikely it is out of line via a jump.
A few places in the kernel use (or could be using) a CONFIG to choose the
default state, which would give a small performance benefit to their
compile-time declared default. Provide the infrastructure to do this.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-2-keescook@chromium.org
Right now, if a call to kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp returns false, the caller
will skip the TLB flush, which is wrong. There are two ways to fix
it:
- since kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp will not yield and therefore will not flush
the TLB itself, we could change the call to kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp to
use "flush |= ..."
- or we can chain the flush argument through kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp down
to __kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_gfn_range. Note that kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp will
neither yield nor flush, so flush would never go from true to
false.
This patch does the former to simplify application to stable kernels,
and to make it further clearer that kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp will not flush.
Cc: seanjc@google.com
Fixes: 048f49809c ("KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure TLBs are flushed for TDP MMU during NX zapping")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x: 048f49809c: KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure TLBs are flushed for TDP MMU during NX zapping
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x: 33a3164161: KVM: x86/mmu: Don't allow TDP MMU to yield when recovering NX pages
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements
(called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is
limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This
limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may
have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or
1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain
the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB,
respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB --
it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size.
OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number
of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user
controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too.
For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of
user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of
user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the
upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory
consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than
the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB)
as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the
risk of DoS.
As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory
limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that
user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de
Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Add calls to disable the clock and unmap the timer base address in case
of any failures.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210322121844.2271041-1-dinguyen@kernel.org