This patch updates the topology initialization code to use the newly
defined accessors to retrieve the MPIDR affinity levels.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Kernel subsystems other than the topology layer need the MPIDR
mask definitions to access the MPIDR without relying on hardcoded
masks. This patch moves the MPIDR register masks definition to
a header file and defines a macro to simplify access to MPIDR bit fields
representing affinity levels.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
vtime_account() is only called from irq entry. irqs
are always disabled at this point so we can safely
remove the irq disabling guards on that function.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
On ia64 and powerpc, vtime context switch only consists
in flushing system and user pending time, plus a few
arch housekeeping.
Consolidate that into a generic implementation. s390 is
a special case because pending user and system time accounting
there is hard to dissociate. So it's keeping its own implementation.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
All vtime implementations just flush the user time on process
tick. Consolidate that in generic code by calling a user time
accounting helper. This avoids an indirect call in ia64 and
prepare to also consolidate vtime context switch code.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Prepending irq-unsafe vtime APIs with underscores was actually
a bad idea as the result is a big mess in the API namespace that
is even waiting to be further extended. Also these helpers
are always called from irq safe callers except kvm. Just
provide a vtime_account_system_irqsafe() for this specific
case so that we can remove the underscore prefix on other
vtime functions.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Commit "ath9k: improve suspend/resume reliability" broke ath9k_htc
and bringing up the device would hang indefinitely. Fix this.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Drivers (e.g. wl12xx) might need to know the vif
to roc on (mainly in order to configure the
rx filters correctly).
Add the vif to the op params, and update the current
users (iwlwifi) to use the new api.
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliad@wizery.com>
[fix hwsim]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Currently, reading /proc/cpuinfo provides userspace with CPU ID of
the CPU carrying out the read from the file. This is fine as long as all
CPUs in the system are the same. With the advent of big.LITTLE and
heterogenous ARM systems this approach provides user space with incorrect
bits of information since CPU ids in the system might differ from the one
provided by the CPU reading the file.
This patch updates the cpuinfo show function so that a read from
/proc/cpuinfo prints HW information for all online CPUs at once, mirroring
x86 behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
The advent of big.LITTLE ARM platforms requires the kernel to be able
to identify the MIDRs of all online CPUs upon request. MIDRs are stashed
at boot time so that kernel subsystems can detect the MIDR of online CPUs
by simply retrieving per-CPU data updated by all booted CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
The NL80211_CMD_TDLS_OPER command was previously used only for userspace
request for the kernel code to perform TDLS operations. However, there
are also cases where the driver may need to request operations from
userspace, e.g., when using security on the AP path. Add a new cfg80211
function for generating a TDLS operation event for drivers to request a
new link to be set up (NL80211_TDLS_SETUP) or an existing link to be
torn down (NL80211_TDLS_TEARDOWN). Drivers can optionally use these
events, e.g., based on noticing data traffic being sent to a peer
station that is seen with good signal strength.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
In some cases, in particular for experimentation, it
can be useful to be able to add vendor namespace data
to received frames in addition to the normal radiotap
data.
Allow doing this through mac80211 by adding fields to
the RX status descriptor that describe the data while
the data itself is prepended to the frame.
Also add some example code to hwsim, but don't enable
it because it doesn't use a proper OUI identifier.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS in the generic 802.11
header file and use it in place of STA_TID_NUM and
NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES which are both really the number
of TIDs.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Reflect architectural support for seccomp filter.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
On tracehook-friendly platforms, a system call number of -1 falls
through without running much code or taking much action.
ARM is different. This adds a short-circuit check in the trace path to
avoid any additional work, as suggested by Russell King, to make sure
that ARM behaves the same way as other platforms.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
There is very little difference in the TIF_SECCOMP and TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
path in entry-common.S, so merge TIF_SECCOMP into TIF_SYSCALL_WORK and
move seccomp into the syscall_trace_enter() handler.
Expanded some of the tracehook logic into the callers to make this code
more readable. Since tracehook needs to do register changing, this portion
is best left in its own function instead of copy/pasting into the callers.
Additionally, the return value for secure_computing() is now checked
and a -1 value will result in the system call being skipped.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Provide an ARM implementation of syscall_get_arch. This is a pre-requisite
for CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
This will allow to reduce slightly the number of interrupts
without sacrificing too much the latency in the Rx path.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
It is not used outside pcie/rx.c.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
When software crypto is enabled, it isn't safe
to enable MFP since the firmware interprets some
management packets, and with MFP it would do so
without proper validation.
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Assaf Krauss <assaf.krauss@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
One one just a wrapper of the second, squash them.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Rename static functions. Function moved from trans.c to
tx.c. A few could be made static, others had to be exported.
Functions that implement the transport API are prefixed by
iwl_trans_pcie_, the others by iwl_pcie_.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Functions that implement the transport API are prefixed by
iwl_trans_pcie_, the others by iwl_pcie_.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Rename static functions. Function moved from trans.c to
rx.c. A few could be made static, others had to be exported.
Also, don't use rxb or rxbuf, but rb which stands for receive
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
1) s/tx_queue/txq
for the sake of consistency.
2) s/rx_queue/rxq
for the sake of consistency.
3) Make all functions begin with iwl_pcie_
iwl_queue_init and iwl_queue_space are an exception
since they are not PCIE specific although they are in
pcie subdir.
4) s/trans_pcie_get_cmd_string/get_cmd_string
it is much shorter and used in debug prints which
are long lines.
5) s/iwl_bg_rx_replenish/iwl_pcie_rx_replenish_work
this better emphasizes that it is a work
6) remove invalid kernelDOC markers
pcie/tx.c and pcie/trans.c still needs to be cleaned up.
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Now that we have been through every permission check in the kernel
having uid == 0 and gid == 0 in your local user namespace no
longer adds any special privileges. Even having a full set
of caps in your local user namespace is safe because capabilies
are relative to your local user namespace, and do not confer
unexpected privileges.
Over the long term this should allow much more of the kernels
functionality to be safely used by non-root users. Functionality
like unsharing the mount namespace that is only unsafe because
it can fool applications whose privileges are raised when they
are executed. Since those applications have no privileges in
a user namespaces it becomes safe to spoof and confuse those
applications all you want.
Those capabilities will still need to be enabled carefully because
we may still need things like rlimits on the number of unprivileged
mounts but that is to avoid DOS attacks not to avoid fooling root
owned processes.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
When performing an exec where the binary lives in one user namespace and
the execing process lives in another usre namespace there is the possibility
that the target uids can not be represented.
Instead of failing the exec simply ignore the suid/sgid bits and run
the binary with lower privileges. We already do this in the case
of MNT_NOSUID so this should be a well tested code path.
As the user and group are not changed this should not introduce any
security issues.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Change return value from -EINVAL to -EPERM when the permission check fails.
Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that are safe to mount as
an unprivileged user.
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that don't need MNT_NODEV
when mounted by an unprivileged user.
- Relax the permission checks to allow unprivileged users that have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN permissions in the user namespace referred to by the
current mount namespace to be allowed to mount, unmount, and move
filesystems.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Sharing mount subtress with mount namespaces created by unprivileged
users allows unprivileged mounts created by unprivileged users to
propagate to mount namespaces controlled by privileged users.
Prevent nasty consequences by changing shared subtrees to slave
subtress when an unprivileged users creates a new mount namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This will allow for support for unprivileged mounts in a new user namespace.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
setns support for the mount namespace is a little tricky as an
arbitrary decision must be made about what to set fs->root and
fs->pwd to, as there is no expectation of a relationship between
the two mount namespaces. Therefore I arbitrarily find the root
mount point, and follow every mount on top of it to find the top
of the mount stack. Then I set fs->root and fs->pwd to that
location. The topmost root of the mount stack seems like a
reasonable place to be.
Bind mount support for the mount namespace inodes has the
possibility of creating circular dependencies between mount
namespaces. Circular dependencies can result in loops that
prevent mount namespaces from every being freed. I avoid
creating those circular dependencies by adding a sequence number
to the mount namespace and require all bind mounts be of a
younger mount namespace into an older mount namespace.
Add a helper function proc_ns_inode so it is possible to
detect when we are attempting to bind mound a namespace inode.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Once you are confined to a user namespace applications can not gain
privilege and escape the user namespace so there is no longer a reason
to restrict chroot.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Unsharing of the pid namespace unlike unsharing of other namespaces
does not take affect immediately. Instead it affects the children
created with fork and clone. The first of these children becomes the init
process of the new pid namespace, the rest become oddball children
of pid 0. From the point of view of the new pid namespace the process
that created it is pid 0, as it's pid does not map.
A couple of different semantics were considered but this one was
settled on because it is easy to implement and it is usable from
pam modules. The core reasons for the existence of unshare.
I took a survey of the callers of pam modules and the following
appears to be a representative sample of their logic.
{
setup stuff include pam
child = fork();
if (!child) {
setuid()
exec /bin/bash
}
waitpid(child);
pam and other cleanup
}
As you can see there is a fork to create the unprivileged user
space process. Which means that the unprivileged user space
process will appear as pid 1 in the new pid namespace. Further
most login processes do not cope with extraneous children which
means shifting the duty of reaping extraneous child process to
the creator of those extraneous children makes the system more
comprehensible.
The practical reason for this set of pid namespace semantics is
that it is simple to implement and verify they work correctly.
Whereas an implementation that requres changing the struct
pid on a process comes with a lot more races and pain. Not
the least of which is that glibc caches getpid().
These semantics are implemented by having two notions
of the pid namespace of a proces. There is task_active_pid_ns
which is the pid namspace the process was created with
and the pid namespace that all pids are presented to
that process in. The task_active_pid_ns is stored
in the struct pid of the task.
Then there is the pid namespace that will be used for children
that pid namespace is stored in task->nsproxy->pid_ns.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Instead of setting child_reaper and SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE one way
for the system init process, and another way for pid namespace
init processes test pid->nr == 1 and use the same code for both.
For the global init this results in SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE being set
much earlier in the initialization process.
This is a small cleanup and it paves the way for allowing unshare and
enter of the pid namespace as that path like our global init also will
not set CLONE_NEWPID.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Pid namespaces are designed to be inescapable so verify that the
passed in pid namespace is a child of the currently active
pid namespace or the currently active pid namespace itself.
Allowing the currently active pid namespace is important so
the effects of an earlier setns can be cancelled.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns will
soon be allowed to support unshare and setns.
The definition of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns could be that
we create a child pid namespace of current->ns_proxy->pid_ns. However
that leads to strange cases like trying to have a single process be
init in multiple pid namespaces, which is racy and hard to think
about.
The definition of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns could be that
we create a child pid namespace of task_active_pid_ns(current). While
that seems less racy it does not provide any utility.
Therefore define the semantics of creating a child pid namespace when
task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->ns_proxy->pid_ns to be that the
pid namespace creation fails. That is easy to implement and easy
to think about.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Looking at pid_ns->nr_hashed is a bit simpler and it works for
disjoint process trees that an unshare or a join of a pid_namespace
may create.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Set nr_hashed to -1 just before we schedule the work to cleanup proc.
Test nr_hashed just before we hash a new pid and if nr_hashed is < 0
fail.
This guaranteees that processes never enter a pid namespaces after we
have cleaned up the state to support processes in a pid namespace.
Currently sending SIGKILL to all of the process in a pid namespace as
init exists gives us this guarantee but we need something a little
stronger to support unsharing and joining a pid namespace.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Track the number of pids in the proc hash table. When the number of
pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc.
Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for
init.
Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and
proc_flush_task. Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc
namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several
times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and
non-obvious.
Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the
rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to
unmounting proc is moved to a work queue. This has the side benefit
of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary
rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super.
In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug
reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a
mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns
succeeded and copy_net_ns failed.
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The expressions tsk->nsproxy->pid_ns and task_active_pid_ns
aka ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) should have the same number of
cache line misses with the practical difference that
ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk)) is released later in a processes life.
Furthermore by using task_active_pid_ns it becomes trivial
to write an unshare implementation for the the pid namespace.
So I have used task_active_pid_ns everywhere I can.
In fork since the pid has not yet been attached to the
process I use ns_of_pid, to achieve the same effect.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Capture the the user namespace that creates the pid namespace
- Use that user namespace to test if it is ok to write to
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid.
Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com> noticed I was missing a put_user_ns
in when destroying a pid_ns. I have foloded his patch into this one
so that bisects will work properly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
During testing our mac80211 driver a fatal error occurred which was
signalled to mac80211. Upon performing the reconfiguration of the
device a WARN_ON was triggered. This warning checked the return value
of drv_add_chanctx(). However, this returns -EOPNOTSUPP when the
driver does not provide the callback. As the callback is optional
better check it is defined before calling drv_add_chanctx().
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
"Asynchronous" is misspelled in some comments. No code changes.
Signed-off-by: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
