Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to
read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the
functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read
the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Use the timer API function setup_timer instead of structure field
assignments to initialize a timer.
Signed-off-by: Vaishali Thakkar <vaishali.thakkar@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Rule r is only use in org or report mode, so only execute it in those
cases.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Rule r is only used in org or report mode, so only execute it in those
cases.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Yuval Mintz says:
====================
qed{,e}: Add vlan filtering offload
This series adds vlan filtering offload to qede.
First patch introduces small additional infrastructure needed in
qed to support it, while second contains the main bulk of driver changes.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Device would start receiving only vlan-tagged traffic with tags matching
that of one of the configured vlan IDs, unless:
- Device is expliicly placed in PROMISC mode.
- Device exhausts its vlan filter credits.
Signed-off-by: Sudarsana Reddy Kalluru <sudarsana.kalluru@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuval Mintz <Yuval.Mintz@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Today, interfaces are working in vlan-promisc mode; But once
vlan filtering offloaded would be supported, we'll need a method to
control it directly [e.g., when setting device to PROMISC, or when
running out of vlan credits].
This adds the necessary API for L2 client to manually choose whether to
accept all vlans or only those for which filters were configured.
Signed-off-by: Yuval Mintz <Yuval.Mintz@qlogic.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Rule r is only use in org or report mode, so only execute it in those
cases.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Rule r is only use in org or report mode, so only execute it in those
cases.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
This avoids a harmless randconfig warning I get when USB_NET_CDC_SUBSET
is enabled, but all of the more specific drivers are not:
drivers/net/usb/cdc_subset.c:241:2: #warning You need to configure some hardware for this driver
The current behavior is clearly intentional, giving a warning when
a user picks a configuration that won't do anything good. The only
reason for even addressing this is that I'm getting close to
eliminating all 'randconfig' warnings on ARM, and this came up
a couple of times.
My workaround is to not even build the module when none of the
configurations are enable.
Alternatively we could simply remove the #warning (nothing wrong
for compile-testing), turn it into a runtime warning, or
change the Kconfig options into a menu to hide CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_SUBSET.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Files in sysfs are created using the name from the phy_driver struct,
when two names are the same we may get a duplicate filename warning,
fix this.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch takes advantage of several assumptions we can make about the
headers of the frame in order to reduce overall processing overhead for
computing the outer header checksum.
First we can assume the entire header is in the region pointed to by
skb->head as this is what csum_start is based on.
Second, as a result of our first assumption, we can just call csum_partial
instead of making a call to skb_checksum which would end up having to
configure things so that we could walk through the frags list.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
follows up commit 45f6fad84c ("ipv6: add complete rcu protection around
np->opt") which added mixed rcu/refcount protection to np->opt.
Given the current implementation of rcu_pointer_handoff(), this has no
effect at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In metadata mode, the vxlan interface is not supposed to use the fdb control
plane but an external one (openvswitch or static routes). With the current
code, packets may leak into the fdb handling code which usually causes them
to be dropped anyway but may have strange side effects.
Just drop the packets directly when in metadata mode if the destination data
are not correctly provided on egress.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A return value of the bchannel_get_rxbuf() function is compared with the
positive ENOMEM value instead of the negative -ENOMEM value to detect a
memory allocation problem. Thus, after a possible memory allocation
failure the bc->bch.rx_skb will be NULL which will lead to a NULL
pointer dereference.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The cfrfml_receive() function might return positive value EPROTO
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The atalk_sendmsg() function might return wrong value ENETUNREACH
instead of -ENETUNREACH.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Failure of kzalloc should cause the enclosing function
to return -ENOMEM, not -ENODEV.
Additionally, removed the following checkpatch warnings:
ERROR: spaces required around that '==' (ctx:VxV)
ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '('
CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!lp"
Signed-off-by: Amitoj Kaur Chawla <amitoj1606@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
My implementation around IFF_NO_QUEUE driver flag assumed that leaving
tx_queue_len untouched (specifically: not setting it to zero) by drivers
would make it possible to assign a regular qdisc to them without having
to worry about setting tx_queue_len to a useful value. This was only
partially true: I overlooked that some drivers don't call ether_setup()
and therefore not initialize tx_queue_len to the default value of 1000.
Consequently, removing the workarounds in place for that case in qdisc
implementations which cared about it (namely, pfifo, bfifo, gred, htb,
plug and sfb) leads to problems with these specific interface types and
qdiscs.
Luckily, there's already a sanitization point for drivers setting
tx_queue_len to zero, which can be reused to assign the fallback value
most qdisc implementations used, which is 1.
Fixes: 348e3435cb ("net: sched: drop all special handling of tx_queue_len == 0")
Tested-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add regex for [get|free]_[insn|optinsn|dmainsn]_slot() functions.
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
The use of kmalloc() to allocate the gpio_device leaves the contained struct
device object in an unknown state. Calling dev_set_name() on a struct device
of unknown state can trigger the free() of an invalid pointer, as seen in the
following backtrace (collected by Tony Lindgren):
kfree
kobject_set_name_vargs
dev_set_name
gpiochip_add_data
omap_gpio_probe
platform_drv_probe
...
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reported-by: Michael Welling <mwelling@ieee.org>
Reported-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Tested-by: Michael Welling <mwelling@ieee.org>
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Cartwright <joshc@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
ether_setup sets IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING but this is not supported by gre
as it modifies the skb on xmit.
Also, clean up whitespace in ipgre_tap_setup when we're already touching it.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ether_setup sets IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING but this is not supported by
geneve as it modifies the skb on xmit.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ether_setup sets IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING but this is not supported by vxlan
as it modifies the skb on xmit.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Jiri Benc says:
====================
iptunnel: scrub packet in iptunnel_pull_header
As every IP tunnel has to scrub skb on decapsulation, iptunnel_pull_header
tried to do that and open coded part of skb_scrub_packet. Various tunneling
protocols (VXLAN, Geneve) then called full skb_scrub_packet on their own,
duplicating part of the scrubbing already done.
Consolidate the code, calling skb_scrub_packet from iptunnel_pull_header.
This will allow additional cleanups in VXLAN code, as the packet is scrubbed
early during rx processing after this patchset and VXLAN can start filling
out skb fields earlier.
The full picture of vxlan cleanup patches can be seen at:
https://github.com/jbenc/linux-vxlan/commits/master
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Part of skb_scrub_packet was open coded in iptunnel_pull_header. Let it call
skb_scrub_packet directly instead.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is in preparation for iptunnel_pull_header calling skb_scrub_packet.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is in preparation for iptunnel_pull_header calling skb_scrub_packet.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This just swaps a colon for a quote in the intel_pstate documentation.
Signed-off-by: Felipe Franciosi <felipe@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Remove the shared br_log_state function and print the info directly in
br_set_state, where the net_bridge_port state is actually changed.
Signed-off-by: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com>
Acked-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Hariprasad Shenai says:
====================
cxgb4: Use __dev_[um]c_[un]sync for MAC address syncing
This patch series adds support to use __dev_uc_sync/__dev_mc_sync to add
MAC address and __dev_uc_unsync/__dev_mc_unsync to delete MAC address.
This patch series has been created against net-next tree and includes
patches on cxgb4 and cxgb4vf driver.
We have included all the maintainers of respective drivers. Kindly review
the change and let us know in case of any review comments.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit 1a1ebd5 ("irqchip/gic-v3: Make sure read from ICC_IAR1_EL1 is
visible on redestributor") fixed the missing barrier on arm64, but
forgot to update the 32bit counterpart, which has the same requirements.
Let's fix it.
Fixes: 1a1ebd5 ("irqchip/gic-v3: Make sure read from ICC_IAR1_EL1 is visible on redestributor")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Add exception handling to the Tx checksum path so that we can handle cases
of TSO where the frame is bad, or Tx checksum where we didn't recognize a
protocol
Drop I40E_TX_FLAGS_CSUM as it is unused, move the CHECKSUM_PARTIAL check
into the function itself so that we can decrease indent.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
This patch defers writing to the Tx descriptor bits until we know we have
successfully completed a given operation. So for example we defer updating
the tunnelling portion of the context descriptor until we have fully
identified the type.
The advantage to this approach is that we can assemble values as we go
instead of having to try and kludge everything together all at once. As a
result we can significantly clean up the tunneling configuration for
instance as we can just do a pointer walk and do the math for the distance
between each set of points.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Calculate the maximum MTU taking into account the size of headers
involved in GENEVE encapsulation, as for other tunnel types.
Changes in v3:
- Correct comment style
Changes in v2:
- Conform more closely to ip_tunnel_change_mtu
- Exclude GENEVE options from max MTU calculation
Signed-off-by: David Wragg <david@weave.works>
Acked-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The tun_id field in struct ip_tunnel_key is __be64, not __be32. We need to
convert the vni to tun_id correctly.
Fixes: 54bfd872bf ("vxlan: keep flags and vni in network byte order")
Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds support for IPv6 extension headers in setting up the Tx
checksum. Without this patch extension headers would cause IPv6 traffic to
fail as the transport protocol could not be identified.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware.
But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data
accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that
if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via
protection keys, we can still execute from it.
This patch uses protection keys to set up mappings to do just that.
If a user calls:
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);
(note PROT_EXEC-only without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will
notice this, and set a special protection key on the memory. It
also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights
(PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and
unwritable.
I haven't found any userspace that does this today. With this
facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it
eventually. Userspace _could_ start doing this today. Any
PROT_EXEC calls get converted to PROT_READ inside the kernel, and
would transparently be upgraded to "true" PROT_EXEC with this
code. IOW, userspace never has to do any PROT_EXEC runtime
detection.
This feature provides enhanced protection against leaking
executable memory contents. This helps thwart attacks which are
attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly.
But, the security provided by this approach is not comprehensive.
The PKRU register which controls access permissions is a normal
user register writable from unprivileged userspace. An attacker
who can execute the 'wrpkru' instruction can easily disable the
protection provided by this feature.
The protection key that is used for execute-only support is
permanently dedicated at compile time. This is fine for now
because there is currently no API to set a protection key other
than this one.
Despite there being a constant PKRU value across the entire
system, we do not set it unless this feature is in use in a
process. That is to preserve the PKRU XSAVE 'init state',
which can lead to faster context switches.
PKRU *is* a user register and the kernel is modifying it. That
means that code doing:
pkru = rdpkru()
pkru |= 0x100;
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
wrpkru(pkru);
could lose the bits in PKRU that enforce execute-only
permissions. To avoid this, we suggest avoiding ever calling
mmap() or mprotect() when the PKRU value is expected to be
unstable.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Piotr Kwapulinski <kwapulinski.piotr@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210240.CB4BB5CA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
calc_vm_prot_bits() takes PROT_{READ,WRITE,EXECUTE} bits and
turns them in to the vma->vm_flags/VM_* bits. We need to do a
similar thing for protection keys.
We take a protection key (4 bits) and encode it in to the 4
VM_PKEY_* bits.
Note: this code is not new. It was simply a part of the
mprotect_pkey() patch in the past. I broke it out for use
in the execute-only support.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210237.CFB94AD5@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The Protection Key Rights for User memory (PKRU) is a 32-bit
user-accessible register. It contains two bits for each
protection key: one to write-disable (WD) access to memory
covered by the key and another to access-disable (AD).
Userspace can read/write the register with the RDPKRU and WRPKRU
instructions. But, the register is saved and restored with the
XSAVE family of instructions, which means we have to treat it
like a floating point register.
The kernel needs to write to the register if it wants to
implement execute-only memory or if it implements a system call
to change PKRU.
To do this, we need to create a 'pkru_state' buffer, read the old
contents in to it, modify it, and then tell the FPU code that
there is modified data in there so it can (possibly) move the
buffer back in to the registers.
This uses the fpu__xfeature_set_state() function that we defined
in the previous patch.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210236.0BE13217@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We want to modify the Protection Key rights inside the kernel, so
we need to change PKRU's contents. But, if we do a plain
'wrpkru', when we return to userspace we might do an XRSTOR and
wipe out the kernel's 'wrpkru'. So, we need to go after PKRU in
the xsave buffer.
We do this by:
1. Ensuring that we have the XSAVE registers (fpregs) in the
kernel FPU buffer (fpstate)
2. Looking up the location of a given state in the buffer
3. Filling in the stat
4. Ensuring that the hardware knows that state is present there
(basically that the 'init optimization' is not in place).
5. Copying the newly-modified state back to the registers if
necessary.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210235.5A3139BF@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The arch-specific mm_context_t is a great place to put
protection-key allocation state.
But, we need to initialize the allocation state because pkey 0 is
always "allocated". All of the runtime initialization of
mm_context_t is done in *_ldt() manipulation functions. This
renames the existing LDT functions like this:
init_new_context() -> init_new_context_ldt()
destroy_context() -> destroy_context_ldt()
and makes init_new_context() and destroy_context() available for
generic use.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210234.DB34FCC5@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The syscall-level code is passed a protection key and need to
return an appropriate error code if the protection key is bogus.
We will be using this in subsequent patches.
Note that this also begins a series of arch-specific calls that
we need to expose in otherwise arch-independent code. We create
a linux/pkeys.h header where we will put *all* the stubs for
these functions.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210232.774EEAAB@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This plumbs a protection key through calc_vm_flag_bits(). We
could have done this in calc_vm_prot_bits(), but I did not feel
super strongly which way to go. It was pretty arbitrary which
one to use.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@leon.nu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Maxime Coquelin <mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Riley Andrews <riandrews@android.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210231.E6F1F0D6@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This sets the bit in 'cr4' to actually enable the protection
keys feature. We also include a boot-time disable for the
feature "nopku".
Seting X86_CR4_PKE will cause the X86_FEATURE_OSPKE cpuid
bit to appear set. At this point in boot, identify_cpu()
has already run the actual CPUID instructions and populated
the "cpu features" structures. We need to go back and
re-run identify_cpu() to make sure it gets updated values.
We *could* simply re-populate the 11th word of the cpuid
data, but this is probably quick enough.
Also note that with the cpu_has() check and X86_FEATURE_PKU
present in disabled-features.h, we do not need an #ifdef
for setup_pku().
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210229.6708027C@viggo.jf.intel.com
[ Small readability edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
I don't have a strong opinion on whether we need this or not.
Protection Keys has relatively little code associated with it,
and it is not a heavyweight feature to keep enabled. However,
I can imagine that folks would still appreciate being able to
disable it.
Here's the option if folks want it.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210228.7E79386C@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
