Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available
and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use.
Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages.
In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access
enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of
functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory
to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in
the process.
Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in
LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel
thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks,
similar to normal kswapd.
All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some
limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be
reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old
reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet
implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are
currently reclaimable.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
Add a selftest for SGX. It is a trivial test where a simple enclave
copies one 64-bit word of memory between two memory locations,
but ensures that all SGX hardware and software infrastructure is
functioning.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-21-jarkko@kernel.org
Enclaves encounter exceptions for lots of reasons: everything from enclave
page faults to NULL pointer dereferences, to system calls that must be
“proxied” to the kernel from outside the enclave.
In addition to the code contained inside an enclave, there is also
supporting code outside the enclave called an “SGX runtime”, which is
virtually always implemented inside a shared library. The runtime helps
build the enclave and handles things like *re*building the enclave if it
got destroyed by something like a suspend/resume cycle.
The rebuilding has traditionally been handled in SIGSEGV handlers,
registered by the library. But, being process-wide, shared state, signal
handling and shared libraries do not mix well.
Introduce a vDSO function call that wraps the enclave entry functions
(EENTER/ERESUME functions of the ENCLU instruciton) and returns information
about any exceptions to the caller in the SGX runtime.
Instead of generating a signal, the kernel places exception information in
RDI, RSI and RDX. The kernel-provided userspace portion of the vDSO handler
will place this information in a user-provided buffer or trigger a
user-provided callback at the time of the exception.
The vDSO function calling convention uses the standard RDI RSI, RDX, RCX,
R8 and R9 registers. This makes it possible to declare the vDSO as a C
prototype, but other than that there is no specific support for SystemV
ABI. Things like storing XSAVE are the responsibility of the enclave and
the runtime.
[ bp: Change vsgx.o build dependency to CONFIG_X86_SGX. ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-20-jarkko@kernel.org
vDSO functions can now leverage an exception fixup mechanism similar to
kernel exception fixup. For vDSO exception fixup, the initial user is
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which will wrap the low-level
transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. EENTER and ERESUME instructions,
in a vDSO function and leverage fixup to intercept exceptions that would
otherwise generate a signal. This allows the vDSO wrapper to return the
fault information directly to its caller, obviating the need for SGX
applications and libraries to juggle signal handlers.
Attempt to fixup vDSO exceptions immediately prior to populating and
sending signal information. Except for the delivery mechanism, an
exception in a vDSO function should be treated like any other exception
in userspace, e.g. any fault that is successfully handled by the kernel
should not be directly visible to userspace.
Although it's debatable whether or not all exceptions are of interest to
enclaves, defer to the vDSO fixup to decide whether to do fixup or
generate a signal. Future users of vDSO fixup, if there ever are any,
will undoubtedly have different requirements than SGX enclaves, e.g. the
fixup vs. signal logic can be made function specific if/when necessary.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-19-jarkko@kernel.org
vDSO exception fixup is a replacement for signals in limited situations.
Signals and vDSO exception fixup need to provide similar information to
userspace, including the hardware error code.
That hardware error code needs to be sanitized. For instance, if userspace
accesses a kernel address, the error code could indicate to userspace
whether the address had a Present=1 PTE. That can leak information about
the kernel layout to userspace, which is bad.
The existing signal code does this sanitization, but fairly late in the
signal process. The vDSO exception code runs before the sanitization
happens.
Move error code sanitization out of the signal code and into a helper.
Call the helper in the signal code.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-18-jarkko@kernel.org
Signals are a horrid little mechanism. They are especially nasty in
multi-threaded environments because signal state like handlers is global
across the entire process. But, signals are basically the only way that
userspace can “gracefully” handle and recover from exceptions.
The kernel generally does not like exceptions to occur during execution.
But, exceptions are a fact of life and must be handled in some
circumstances. The kernel handles them by keeping a list of individual
instructions which may cause exceptions. Instead of truly handling the
exception and returning to the instruction that caused it, the kernel
instead restarts execution at a *different* instruction. This makes it
obvious to that thread of execution that the exception occurred and lets
*that* code handle the exception instead of the handler.
This is not dissimilar to the try/catch exceptions mechanisms that some
programming languages have, but applied *very* surgically to single
instructions. It effectively changes the visible architecture of the
instruction.
Problem
=======
SGX generates a lot of signals, and the code to enter and exit enclaves and
muck with signal handling is truly horrid. At the same time, an approach
like kernel exception fixup can not be easily applied to userspace
instructions because it changes the visible instruction architecture.
Solution
========
The vDSO is a special page of kernel-provided instructions that run in
userspace. Any userspace calling into the vDSO knows that it is special.
This allows the kernel a place to legitimately rewrite the user/kernel
contract and change instruction behavior.
Add support for fixing up exceptions that occur while executing in the
vDSO. This replaces what could traditionally only be done with signal
handling.
This new mechanism will be used to replace previously direct use of SGX
instructions by userspace.
Just introduce the vDSO infrastructure. Later patches will actually
replace signal generation with vDSO exception fixup.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-17-jarkko@kernel.org
The whole point of SGX is to create a hardware protected place to do
“stuff”. But, before someone is willing to hand over the keys to
the castle , an enclave must often prove that it is running on an
SGX-protected processor. Provisioning enclaves play a key role in
providing proof.
There are actually three different enclaves in play in order to make this
happen:
1. The application enclave. The familiar one we know and love that runs
the actual code that’s doing real work. There can be many of these on
a single system, or even in a single application.
2. The quoting enclave (QE). The QE is mentioned in lots of silly
whitepapers, but, for the purposes of kernel enabling, just pretend they
do not exist.
3. The provisioning enclave. There is typically only one of these
enclaves per system. Provisioning enclaves have access to a special
hardware key.
They can use this key to help to generate certificates which serve as
proof that enclaves are running on trusted SGX hardware. These
certificates can be passed around without revealing the special key.
Any user who can create a provisioning enclave can access the
processor-unique Provisioning Certificate Key which has privacy and
fingerprinting implications. Even if a user is permitted to create
normal application enclaves (via /dev/sgx_enclave), they should not be
able to create provisioning enclaves. That means a separate permissions
scheme is needed to control provisioning enclave privileges.
Implement a separate device file (/dev/sgx_provision) which allows
creating provisioning enclaves. This device will typically have more
strict permissions than the plain enclave device.
The actual device “driver” is an empty stub. Open file descriptors for
this device will represent a token which allows provisioning enclave duty.
This file descriptor can be passed around and ultimately given as an
argument to the /dev/sgx_enclave driver ioctl().
[ bp: Touchups. ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-16-jarkko@kernel.org
Enclaves have two basic states. They are either being built and are
malleable and can be modified by doing things like adding pages. Or,
they are locked down and not accepting changes. They can only be run
after they have been locked down. The ENCLS[EINIT] function induces the
transition from being malleable to locked-down.
Add an ioctl() that performs ENCLS[EINIT]. After this, new pages can
no longer be added with ENCLS[EADD]. This is also the time where the
enclave can be measured to verify its integrity.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-15-jarkko@kernel.org
SGX enclave pages are inaccessible to normal software. They must be
populated with data by copying from normal memory with the help of the
EADD and EEXTEND functions of the ENCLS instruction.
Add an ioctl() which performs EADD that adds new data to an enclave, and
optionally EEXTEND functions that hash the page contents and use the
hash as part of enclave “measurement” to ensure enclave integrity.
The enclave author gets to decide which pages will be included in the
enclave measurement with EEXTEND. Measurement is very slow and has
sometimes has very little value. For instance, an enclave _could_
measure every page of data and code, but would be slow to initialize.
Or, it might just measure its code and then trust that code to
initialize the bulk of its data after it starts running.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-14-jarkko@kernel.org
Add an ioctl() that performs the ECREATE function of the ENCLS
instruction, which creates an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS).
Although the SECS is an in-memory data structure, it is present in
enclave memory and is not directly accessible by software.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-13-jarkko@kernel.org
Intel(R) SGX is a new hardware functionality that can be used by
applications to set aside private regions of code and data called
enclaves. New hardware protects enclave code and data from outside
access and modification.
Add a driver that presents a device file and ioctl API to build and
manage enclaves.
[ bp: Small touchups, remove unused encl variable in sgx_encl_find() as
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> ]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-12-jarkko@kernel.org
Some C code in the ftrace-users.rst document is missing RST C block
annotation, which has to be added.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116173502.392a769c@canb.auug.org.au
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fix a missing prototype warning for function
amdgpu_info_ioctl(),
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c:482:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'amdgpu_info_ioctl' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201110051548.685725-1-luben.tuikov@amd.com
Add support to program the ATU to enable translations for >4GB sizes of
the prefetchable memory apertures.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118144626.32189-3-vidyas@nvidia.com
Tested-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jingoo <jingoohan1@gmail.com>
As per PCIe spec r5.0, sec 7.5.1.3.8 only 32-bit BAR registers are defined
for non-prefetchable memory and hence a warning should be reported when
the size of them go beyond 32-bits.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118144626.32189-2-vidyas@nvidia.com
Tested-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
The pl353-smc driver uses module_amba_driver so it has a build
dependency on CONFIG_ARM_AMBA:
/usr/bin/arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: drivers/memory/pl353-smc.o: in function `pl353_smc_driver_init':
pl353-smc.c:(.init.text+0x10): undefined reference to `amba_driver_register'
However it still can be compile tested on platforms other than ARM,
which in practice is limited to those selecting ARM_AMBA (so only
ARM64).
Fixes: ea0c0ad6b6 ("memory: Enable compile testing for most of the drivers")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029193357.389593-1-krzk@kernel.org
The current ATU setup only supports a single memory resource which
isn't sufficient if there are also prefetchable memory regions. In order
to support multiple memory regions, we need to move away from fixed ATU
slots and rework the assignment. As there's always an ATU entry for
config space, let's assign index 0 to config space. Then we assign
memory resources to index 1 and up. Finally, if we have an I/O region
and slots remaining, we assign the I/O region last. If there aren't
remaining slots, we keep the same config and I/O space sharing.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201026181652.418729-1-robh@kernel.org
Tested-by: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Jingoo Han <jingoohan1@gmail.com>
Cc: Vidya Sagar <vidyas@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jingoo Han <jingoohan1@gmail.com>
Cc: Gustavo Pimentel <gustavo.pimentel@synopsys.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Avoid processing bogus interrupt statuses when the HW is runtime suspended and
the M_CAN_IR register read may get all bits 1's. Handler can be called if the
interrupt request is shared with other peripherals or at the end of free_irq().
Therefore check the runtime suspended status before processing.
Fixes: cdf8259d65 ("can: m_can: Add PM Support")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915134715.696303-1-jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Patch 541656d3a5 ("gfs2: freeze should work on read-only mounts") changed
the check for glock state in function freeze_go_sync() from "gl->gl_state
== LM_ST_SHARED" to "gl->gl_req == LM_ST_EXCLUSIVE". That's wrong and it
regressed gfs2's freeze/thaw mechanism because it caused only the freezing
node (which requests the glock in EX) to queue freeze work.
All nodes go through this go_sync code path during the freeze to drop their
SHared hold on the freeze glock, allowing the freezing node to acquire it
in EXclusive mode. But all the nodes must freeze access to the file system
locally, so they ALL must queue freeze work. The freeze_work calls
freeze_func, which makes a request to reacquire the freeze glock in SH,
effectively blocking until the thaw from the EX holder. Once thawed, the
freezing node drops its EX hold on the freeze glock, then the (blocked)
freeze_func reacquires the freeze glock in SH again (on all nodes, including
the freezer) so all nodes go back to a thawed state.
This patch changes the check back to gl_state == LM_ST_SHARED like it was
prior to 541656d3a5.
Fixes: 541656d3a5 ("gfs2: freeze should work on read-only mounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reorder the code to fix checking if blitting is available.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/401019/
Commit
8570978ea0 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Don't pre-map memory in KASLR code")
removed all the references to finalize_identity_maps(), but neglected to
delete the actual function. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201005151208.2212886-2-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
If the CAN controller goes into bus off, the do_set_mode() callback with
CAN_MODE_START can be used to recover the controller, which then calls
flexcan_chip_start(). If configured, this is done automatically by the
framework or manually by the user.
In flexcan_chip_start() there is an explicit call to
flexcan_transceiver_enable(), which does a regulator_enable() on the
transceiver regulator. This results in a net usage counter increase, as there
is no corresponding flexcan_transceiver_disable() in the bus off code path.
This further leads to the transceiver stuck enabled, even if the CAN interface
is shut down.
To fix this problem the
flexcan_transceiver_enable()/flexcan_transceiver_disable() are moved out of
flexcan_chip_start()/flexcan_chip_stop() into flexcan_open()/flexcan_close().
Fixes: e955cead03 ("CAN: Add Flexcan CAN controller driver")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118150148.2664024-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Don't recycle a refnode until we're done with all requests of nodes
ejected before.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
An active ref_node always can be found in ctx->files_data, it's much
safer to get it this way instead of poking into files_data->ref_list.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
I totally fumbled the ?: usage when generating the DDI encoder
names. Reverse the things that need reversing, and to make it
a bit less messy add a few macros to hide the arithmetic on the
port enums.
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 2d709a5a62 ("drm/i915: Give DDI encoders even better names")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201117154028.8516-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
"intel_iommu=off" command line is used to disable iommu but iommu is force
enabled in a tboot system for security reason.
However for better performance on high speed network device, a new option
"intel_iommu=tboot_noforce" is introduced to disable the force on.
By default kernel should panic if iommu init fail in tboot for security
reason, but it's unnecessory if we use "intel_iommu=tboot_noforce,off".
Fix the code setting force_on and move intel_iommu_tboot_noforce
from tboot code to intel iommu code.
Fixes: 7304e8f28b ("iommu/vt-d: Correctly disable Intel IOMMU force on")
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Lukasz Hawrylko <lukasz.hawrylko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110071908.3133-1-zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
The error codes were not set on some of these error paths.
Also the error handling was more confusing than it needed to be so I
cleaned it up and shuffled it around a bit.
Fixes: d2fb0a0438 ("dmaengine: break out channel registration")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113101631.GE168908@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Since 5.10-rc1 i.MX is a devicetree-only platform and the existing
.id_table support in this driver was only useful for old non-devicetree
platforms.
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116202403.29749-1-festevam@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Document the functionality of copy_from_user_nmi() to avoid further
confusion. Fix the typo in the existing comment while at it.
Requested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.806376613@linutronix.de
Add a field to the typec_plug struct to record the number of available
altmodes as well as the corresponding sysfs attribute to expose this to
userspace.
This allows userspace to determine whether there are any
remaining alternate modes left to be registered by the kernel driver. It
can begin executing any policy state machine after all available
alternate modes have been registered with the connector class framework.
This value is set to "-1" initially, signifying that a valid number of
alternate modes haven't been set for the plug. The sysfs file remains
hidden as long as the attribute value is -1.
We re-use the partner attribute for number_of_alternate_modes since the
usage and name is similar, and update the corresponding *_show() command
to support both partner and plugs.
Signed-off-by: Prashant Malani <pmalani@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116201150.2919178-4-pmalani@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Most changes in uv.c are related to KVM. Involve also the KVM team
regarding changes to uv.c.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Older firmware can return rc=0x107 rrc=0xd for destroy page if the
page is already non-secure. This should be handled like a success
as already done by newer firmware.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Fixes: 1a80b54d1c ("s390/uv: add destroy page call")
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Since 5.10-rc1 i.MX is a devicetree-only platform and the existing
.id_table support in this driver was only useful for old non-devicetree
platforms.
Get rid of the .id_table since it is no longer used.
Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201115110341.22761-1-festevam@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
New smatch warnings:
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci_maxim.c:324 max_tcpci_irq() error: uninitialized symbol 'irq_return'.
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci_maxim.c:407 max_tcpci_probe() warn: passing zero to 'PTR_ERR'
The change fixes the above warnings by initializing irq_return
and replacing IS_ERR_OR_NULL with IS_ERR.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029063138.1429760-11-badhri@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
vImplement callbacks for enabling/disabling
POWER_CONTROL.AutoDischargeDisconnect.
Programs VBUS_SINK_DISCONNECT_THRESHOLD based on the
voltage requested as sink, mode of operation.
The programmed threshold is based on vSinkDisconnect and
vSinkDisconnectPD values.
Add auto_discharge_disconnect to tdata to allow TCPC chip
level drivers enable AutoDischargeDisconnect.
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029063138.1429760-9-badhri@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
TCPCI spec allows TCPC hardware to autonomously discharge the vbus
capacitance upon disconnect. The expectation is that the TCPM enables
AutoDischargeDisconnect while entering SNK/SRC_ATTACHED states. Hardware
then automously discharges vbus when the vbus falls below a certain
threshold i.e. VBUS_SINK_DISCONNECT_THRESHOLD.
Apart from enabling the vbus discharge circuit, AutoDischargeDisconnect
is also used a flag to move TCPCI based TCPC implementations into
Attached.Snk/Attached.Src state as mentioned in
Figure 4-15. TCPC State Diagram before a Connection of the
USB Type-C Port Controller Interface Specification.
In such TCPC implementations, setting AutoDischargeDisconnect would
prevent TCPC into entering "Connection_Invalid" state as well.
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029063138.1429760-8-badhri@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Occasionally, POWER_STATUS.sourcing_vbus takes a while to clear after
writing to MAX_BUCK_BOOST_OP register. This causes vbus to turn back
on while disconnecting the sink. Overcome this issue by writing into
MAX_BUCK_BOOST_OP during frs while sourcing vbu, instead of always
into the register whenever POWER_STATUS.sourcing_vbus is set.
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029063138.1429760-7-badhri@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
During FRS hardware autonomously starts to source vbus. Provide
callback to perform chip specific operations.
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029063138.1429760-6-badhri@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
During FRS hardware autonomously starts to source vbus. Provide
callback to perform chip specific operations.
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029063138.1429760-5-badhri@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
New source's current capability is now defined as string based
device tree property through new-source-frs-typec-current.
Refactor tcpm code to parse new-source-frs-typec-current and
infer local port's new source current capability during frs.
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029063138.1429760-4-badhri@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes, which is obviously bogus.
It either manages to dump where the foreign task's regs->ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.
Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.
While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de
Add a user-visible attribute for the number of alternate modes available
in a partner. This allows userspace to determine whether there are any
remaining alternate modes left to be registered by the kernel driver. It
can begin executing any policy state machine after all available
alternate modes have been registered with the connector class framework.
This value is set to "-1" initially, signifying that a valid number of
alternate modes haven't been set for the partner.
Also add a sysfs file which exposes this attribute. The file remains
hidden as long as the attribute value is -1.
Cc: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org>
Cc: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Prashant Malani <pmalani@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116201150.2919178-3-pmalani@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The USB Power Delivery Specification R3.0 adds a captive cable type
to the "USB Type-C plug to USB Type-C/Captive" field (Bits 19-18,
Passive/Active Cable VDO, Table 6-38 & 6-39).
Add the corresponding definition to the Cable VDO header. Also add a
helper macro to get the Type C cable connector type, when provided
the cable VDO.
Cc: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Prashant Malani <pmalani@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116201150.2919178-2-pmalani@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
retval may be reassigned to 0 after max3421_of_vbus_en_pin(),
if allocate memory failed after this, max3421_probe() cann't
return ENOMEM, fix this by moving assign retval afther max3421_probe().
Fixes: 721fdc83b3 ("usb: max3421: Add devicetree support")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117061500.3454223-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Two bits support for the Thunderbolt rounded/non-rounded cable has been
added to the header file.
Hence, removing unused TBT_CABLE_ROUNDED definition from the header file.
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Patel <utkarsh.h.patel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
--
changes in v2:
- Removed the fixes tag as there is no functional implication.
--
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113202503.6559-5-utkarsh.h.patel@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
