The sysctl tests for vm.memfd_noexec rely on the kernel to support PID
namespaces (i.e. the kernel is built with CONFIG_PID_NS=y). If the
kernel the test runs on does not support PID namespaces, the first sysctl
test will fail when attempting to spawn a new thread in a new PID
namespace, abort the test, preventing the remaining tests from being run.
This is not desirable, as not all kernels need PID namespaces, but can
still use the other features provided by memfd. Therefore, only run the
sysctl tests if the kernel supports PID namespaces. Otherwise, skip those
tests and emit an informative message to let the user know why the sysctl
tests are not being run.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241205192943.3228757-1-isaacmanjarres@google.com
Fixes: 11f75a0144 ("selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC")
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacmanjarres@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [6.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Locking around VMAs is complicated and confusing. While we have a number
of disparate comments scattered around the place, we seem to be reaching a
level of complexity that justifies a serious effort at clearly documenting
how locks are expected to be used when it comes to interacting with
mm_struct and vm_area_struct objects.
This is especially pertinent as regards the efforts to find sensible
abstractions for these fundamental objects in kernel rust code whose
compiler strictly requires some means of expressing these rules (and
through this expression, self-document these requirements as well as
enforce them).
The document limits scope to mmap and VMA locks and those that are
immediately adjacent and relevant to them - so additionally covers page
table locking as this is so very closely tied to VMA operations (and
relies upon us handling these correctly).
The document tries to cover some of the nastier and more confusing edge
cases and concerns especially around lock ordering and page table
teardown.
The document is split between generally useful information for users of mm
interfaces, and separately a section intended for mm kernel developers
providing a discussion around internal implementation details.
[lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com: v3]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241114205402.859737-1-lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
[lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com: docs/mm: minor corrections]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d3de735a-25ae-4eb2-866c-a9624fe6f795@lucifer.local
[jannh@google.com: docs/mm: add more warnings around page table access]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241118-vma-docs-addition1-onv3-v2-1-c9d5395b72ee@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241108135708.48567-1-lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'v6.13-rc3' into drm-next
Backmerge linux 6.13-rc3 as amd next has some dependencies on fixes in it.
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-6.13-20241218' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can
Marc Kleine-Budde says:
====================
pull-request: can 2024-12-18
There are 2 patches by Matthias Schiffer for the m_can_pci driver that
handles the m_can cores found on the Intel Elkhart Lake processor.
They fix the initialization and the interrupt handling under high CAN
bus load.
* tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-6.13-20241218' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can:
can: m_can: fix missed interrupts with m_can_pci
can: m_can: set init flag earlier in probe
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241218121722.2311963-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The bonding documentation had several "insure" which is not
properly used in the context. Suggest to change to "ensure"
to improve readability.
Signed-off-by: shunlizhou <shunlizhou@aliyun.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241216135447.57681-1-shunlizhou@aliyun.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Currently, io_uring_unreg_ringfd() (which cleans up registered rings) is
only called on exit, but __io_uring_free (which frees the tctx in which the
registered ring pointers are stored) is also called on execve (via
begin_new_exec -> io_uring_task_cancel -> __io_uring_cancel ->
io_uring_cancel_generic -> __io_uring_free).
This means: A process going through execve while having registered rings
will leak references to the rings' `struct file`.
Fix it by zapping registered rings on execve(). This is implemented by
moving the io_uring_unreg_ringfd() from io_uring_files_cancel() into its
callee __io_uring_cancel(), which is called from io_uring_task_cancel() on
execve.
This could probably be exploited *on 32-bit kernels* by leaking 2^32
references to the same ring, because the file refcount is stored in a
pointer-sized field and get_file() doesn't have protection against
refcount overflow, just a WARN_ONCE(); but on 64-bit it should have no
impact beyond a memory leak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e7a6c00dc7 ("io_uring: add support for registering ring file descriptors")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241218-uring-reg-ring-cleanup-v1-1-8f63e999045b@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Like direct file execution (e.g. ./script.sh), indirect file execution
(e.g. sh script.sh) needs to be measured and appraised. Instantiate
the new security_bprm_creds_for_exec() hook to measure and verify the
indirect file's integrity. Unlike direct file execution, indirect file
execution is optionally enforced by the interpreter.
Differentiate kernel and userspace enforced integrity audit messages.
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Add a very simple script interpreter called "inc" that can evaluate two
different commands (one per line):
- "?" to initialize a counter from user's input;
- "+" to increment the counter (which is set to 0 by default).
It is enlighten to only interpret executable files according to
AT_EXECVE_CHECK and the related securebits:
# Executing a script with RESTRICT_FILE is only allowed if the script
# is executable:
./set-exec -f -- ./inc script-exec.inc # Allowed
./set-exec -f -- ./inc script-noexec.inc # Denied
# Executing stdin with DENY_INTERACTIVE is only allowed if stdin is an
# executable regular file:
./set-exec -i -- ./inc -i < script-exec.inc # Allowed
./set-exec -i -- ./inc -i < script-noexec.inc # Denied
# However, a pipe is not executable and it is then denied:
cat script-noexec.inc | ./set-exec -i -- ./inc -i # Denied
# Executing raw data (e.g. command argument) with DENY_INTERACTIVE is
# always denied.
./set-exec -i -- ./inc -c "+" # Denied
./inc -c "$(<script-ask.inc)" # Allowed
# To directly execute a script, we can update $PATH (used by `env`):
PATH="${PATH}:." ./script-exec.inc
# To execute several commands passed as argument:
Add a complete test suite to check the script interpreter against all
possible execution cases:
make TARGETS=exec kselftest-install
./tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_install/run_kselftest.sh
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
__ktap_test() may be called without the optional third argument which is
an issue for scripts using `set -u` to detect uninitialized variables
and potential bugs.
Fix this optional "directive" argument by either using the third
argument or an empty string.
This is required for the next commit to properly test script execution
control.
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Nícolas F. R. A. Prado <nfraprado@collabora.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 14571ab1ad ("kselftest: Add new test for detecting unprobed Devicetree devices")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-7-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Add a simple tool to set SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE or
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE before executing a command. This is useful
to easily test against enlighten script interpreters.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Extend layout1.execute with the new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag. The semantic
with AT_EXECVE_CHECK is the same as with a simple execve(2),
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE is enforced the same way.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Test that checks performed by execveat(..., AT_EXECVE_CHECK) are
consistent with noexec mount points and file execute permissions.
Test that SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE are
inherited by child processes and that they can be pinned with the
appropriate SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED and
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED bits.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
The new SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and
their *_LOCKED counterparts are designed to be set by processes setting
up an execution environment, such as a user session, a container, or a
security sandbox. Unlike other securebits, these ones can be set by
unprivileged processes. Like seccomp filters or Landlock domains, the
securebits are inherited across processes.
When SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is set, programs interpreting code should
control executable resources according to execveat(2) + AT_EXECVE_CHECK
(see previous commit).
When SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set, a process should deny
execution of user interactive commands (which excludes executable
regular files).
Being able to configure each of these securebits enables system
administrators or owner of image containers to gradually validate the
related changes and to identify potential issues (e.g. with interpreter
or audit logs).
It should be noted that unlike other security bits, the
SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE bits are
dedicated to user space willing to restrict itself. Because of that,
they only make sense in the context of a trusted environment (e.g.
sandbox, container, user session, full system) where the process
changing its behavior (according to these bits) and all its parent
processes are trusted. Otherwise, any parent process could just execute
its own malicious code (interpreting a script or not), or even enforce a
seccomp filter to mask these bits.
Such a secure environment can be achieved with an appropriate access
control (e.g. mount's noexec option, file access rights, LSM policy) and
an enlighten ld.so checking that libraries are allowed for execution
e.g., to protect against illegitimate use of LD_PRELOAD.
Ptrace restrictions according to these securebits would not make sense
because of the processes' trust assumption.
Scripts may need some changes to deal with untrusted data (e.g. stdin,
environment variables), but that is outside the scope of the kernel.
See chromeOS's documentation about script execution control and the
related threat model:
https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/guides/security/noexec-shell-scripts/
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would
be allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters
and dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the
kernel's security policy. Another use case is to add context to access
logs e.g., which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As
any executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
This is different from faccessat(2) + X_OK which only checks a subset of
access rights (i.e. inode permission and mount options for regular
files), but not the full context (e.g. all LSM access checks). The main
use case for access(2) is for SUID processes to (partially) check access
on behalf of their caller. The main use case for execveat(2) +
AT_EXECVE_CHECK is to check if a script execution would be allowed,
according to all the different restrictions in place. Because the use
of AT_EXECVE_CHECK follows the exact kernel semantic as for a real
execution, user space gets the same error codes.
An interesting point of using execveat(2) instead of openat2(2) is that
it decouples the check from the enforcement. Indeed, the security check
can be logged (e.g. with audit) without blocking an execution
environment not yet ready to enforce a strict security policy.
LSMs can control or log execution requests with
security_bprm_creds_for_exec(). However, to enforce a consistent and
complete access control (e.g. on binary's dependencies) LSMs should
restrict file executability, or measure executed files, with
security_file_open() by checking file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC.
Because AT_EXECVE_CHECK is dedicated to user space interpreters, it
doesn't make sense for the kernel to parse the checked files, look for
interpreters known to the kernel (e.g. ELF, shebang), and return ENOEXEC
if the format is unknown. Because of that, security_bprm_check() is
never called when AT_EXECVE_CHECK is used.
It should be noted that script interpreters cannot directly use
execveat(2) (without this new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag) because this could
lead to unexpected behaviors e.g., `python script.sh` could lead to Bash
being executed to interpret the script. Unlike the kernel, script
interpreters may just interpret the shebang as a simple comment, which
should not change for backward compatibility reasons.
Because scripts or libraries files might not currently have the
executable permission set, or because we might want specific users to be
allowed to run arbitrary scripts, the following patch provides a dynamic
configuration mechanism with the SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits.
This is a redesign of the CLIP OS 4's O_MAYEXEC:
f5cb330d6b/1901_open_mayexec.patch
This patch has been used for more than a decade with customized script
interpreters. Some examples can be found here:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Link: https://docs.python.org/3/library/io.html#io.open_code [1]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
gcc runs into undefined behavior at the end of the three led_polarity_set()
callback functions if it were called with a zero 'modes' argument and it
just ends the function there without returning from it.
This gets flagged by 'objtool' as a function that continues on
to the next one:
drivers/net/phy/aquantia/aquantia_leds.o: warning: objtool: aqr_phy_led_polarity_set+0xf: can't find jump dest instruction at .text+0x5d9
drivers/net/phy/intel-xway.o: warning: objtool: xway_gphy_led_polarity_set() falls through to next function xway_gphy_config_init()
drivers/net/phy/mxl-gpy.o: warning: objtool: gpy_led_polarity_set() falls through to next function gpy_led_hw_control_get()
There is no point to micro-optimize the behavior here to save a single-digit
number of bytes in the kernel, so just change this to a "return -EINVAL"
as we do when any unexpected bits are set.
Fixes: 1758af47b9 ("net: phy: intel-xway: add support for PHY LEDs")
Fixes: 9d55e68b19 ("net: phy: aquantia: correctly describe LED polarity override")
Fixes: eb89c79c1b ("net: phy: mxl-gpy: correctly describe LED polarity")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241217081056.238792-1-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Continuously track the charging status register in order to send uevents
whenever the state changes. Generate an uevent also when the chip's OTG
line is toggled, in bq2415x_notifier_call().
Signed-off-by: Sicelo A. Mhlongo <absicsz@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128085759.11840-2-absicsz@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
The bq27x00 gauges have an EEPROM register which contains the value of
the voltage that should be considered to be zero battery capacity. Expose
this to userspace using the VOLTAGE_MIN_DESIGN property.
Tested on Nokia N900 with bq27200.
Signed-off-by: Sicelo A. Mhlongo <absicsz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241125151321.45440-1-absicsz@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
The return is executed on the devm_register_sys_off_handler() line in
as3722_poweroff_probe, so the last return line is unnecessary. Remove it.
Fixes: 348fde771c ("power: reset: as3722-poweroff: Use devm_register_sys_off_handler(POWER_OFF)")
Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <iwamatsu@nigauri.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Davis <afd@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241117053443.1148902-1-iwamatsu@nigauri.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
In PREEMPT_RT, kmalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) is still not safe in non preemptible
context. bpf_mem_alloc must be used in PREEMPT_RT. This patch is
to enforce bpf_mem_alloc in the bpf_local_storage when CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
is enabled.
[ 35.118559] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
[ 35.118566] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1832, name: test_progs
[ 35.118569] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[ 35.118571] RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1
[ 35.118577] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
...
[ 35.118647] __might_resched+0x433/0x5b0
[ 35.118677] rt_spin_lock+0xc3/0x290
[ 35.118700] ___slab_alloc+0x72/0xc40
[ 35.118723] __kmalloc_noprof+0x13f/0x4e0
[ 35.118732] bpf_map_kzalloc+0xe5/0x220
[ 35.118740] bpf_selem_alloc+0x1d2/0x7b0
[ 35.118755] bpf_local_storage_update+0x2fa/0x8b0
[ 35.118784] bpf_sk_storage_get_tracing+0x15a/0x1d0
[ 35.118791] bpf_prog_9a118d86fca78ebb_trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x44/0x66
[ 35.118795] bpf_trace_run3+0x222/0x400
[ 35.118820] __bpf_trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x11/0x20
[ 35.118824] trace_inet_sock_set_state+0x112/0x130
[ 35.118830] inet_sk_state_store+0x41/0x90
[ 35.118836] tcp_set_state+0x3b3/0x640
There is no need to adjust the gfp_flags passing to the
bpf_mem_cache_alloc_flags() which only honors the GFP_KERNEL.
The verifier has ensured GFP_KERNEL is passed only in sleepable context.
It has been an old issue since the first introduction of the
bpf_local_storage ~5 years ago, so this patch targets the bpf-next.
bpf_mem_alloc is needed to solve it, so the Fixes tag is set
to the commit when bpf_mem_alloc was first used in the bpf_local_storage.
Fixes: 08a7ce384e ("bpf: Use bpf_mem_cache_alloc/free in bpf_local_storage_elem")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241218193000.2084281-1-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
There are 2 issues with bq24296_set_otg_vbus():
1. When writing the OTG_CONFIG bit it uses POC_CHG_CONFIG_SHIFT which
should be POC_OTG_CONFIG_SHIFT.
2. When turning the regulator off it never turns charging back on. Note
this must be done through bq24190_charger_set_charge_type(), to ensure
that the charge_type property value of none/trickle/fast is honored.
Resolve both issues to fix BQ24296 Vbus regulator support not working.
Fixes: b150a703b5 ("power: supply: bq24190_charger: Add support for BQ24296")
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241116203648.169100-2-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
The BQ24297 is identical to the BQ24296 except that it uses USB D+ / D-
data-lines for charger-type (max. input-current) detection instead of
a PSEL input pin.
This is the same difference as between the already supported BQ24190
(D+ / D-) and the BQ24192 (PSEL).
Note just like with the BQ24190 vs BQ24192 there is no difference how
the charger-IC works at the register-level. The only difference is in
the external hardware interface.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241116203648.169100-3-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
The BQ24297 is identical to the BQ24296 except that it uses USB D+ / D-
data-lines for charger-type (max. input-current) detection instead of
a PSEL input pin.
This is the same difference as between the already supported BQ24190
(D+ / D-) and the BQ24192 (PSEL).
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241116203648.169100-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
With CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, when creating a set of type bitmap:ip, adding
it to a set of type list:set and populating it from iptables SET target
triggers a kernel warning:
| WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
| 6.12.0-rc7-01692-g5e9a28f41134-dirty #594 Not tainted
| --------------------------------------------
| ping/4018 is trying to acquire lock:
| ffff8881094a6848 (&set->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: ip_set_add+0x28c/0x360 [ip_set]
|
| but task is already holding lock:
| ffff88811034c048 (&set->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: ip_set_add+0x28c/0x360 [ip_set]
This is a false alarm: ipset does not allow nested list:set type, so the
loop in list_set_kadd() can never encounter the outer set itself. No
other set type supports embedded sets, so this is the only case to
consider.
To avoid the false report, create a distinct lock class for list:set
type ipset locks.
Fixes: f830837f0e ("netfilter: ipset: list:set set type support")
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Add support for the Xilinx Versal CPM5 Root Port Controller 1. The key
difference between Controller 0 and Controller 1 lies in the
platform-specific error interrupt bits, which are located at different
register offsets.
To handle these differences, updated variant structure to hold the
following platform-specific details:
- Interrupt status register offset (ir_status)
- Interrupt enable register offset (ir_enable)
- Miscellaneous interrupt values (ir_misc_value)
The driver differentiates between Controller 0 and Controller 1 using the
compatible string in the device tree. This ensures that the appropriate
register offsets are used for each controller, allowing for correct
handling of platform-specific interrupts and initialization.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240922061318.2653503-3-thippesw@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Thippeswamy Havalige <thippesw@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
We noticed a high number of rx_discards_phy events on certain servers while
running `ethtool -S`. However, this critical counter is not currently
included in the standard /proc/net/dev statistics file, making it difficult
to monitor effectively—especially given the diversity of vendors across a
large fleet of servers.
Let's report it via the standard rx_dropped metric.
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241210022706.6665-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Print pending requests in the kvm_exit tracepoint, which allows userspace
to gather information on how often KVM interrupts vCPUs due to specific
requests.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240910200350.264245-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Add VMX/SVM specific interrupt injection info the kvm_entry tracepoint.
As is done with kvm_exit, gather the information via a kvm_x86_ops hook
to avoid the moderately costly VMREADs on VMX when the tracepoint isn't
enabled.
Opportunistically rename the parameters in the get_exit_info()
declaration to match the names used by both SVM and VMX.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240910200350.264245-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com
[sean: drop is_guest_mode() change, use intr_info/error_code for names]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Extend the 'set_memory_region_test' with an x86-only test case which
covers emulated MMIO during event vectoring error handling. The test case
1) Sets an IDT descriptor base to point to an MMIO address
2) Generates a #GP in the guest
3) Verifies userspace gets the correct exit reason, suberror code, and
GPA in internal.data[3]
Opportunistically add a definition for a non-canonical address to
processor.h so that the source of the #GP is somewhat self-documenting,
and so that future tests don't have to reinvent the wheel.
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241217181458.68690-8-iorlov@amazon.com
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Implement a function for setting the IDT descriptor from the guest
code. Replace the existing lidt occurrences with calls to this function
as `lidt` is used in multiple places.
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241217181458.68690-7-iorlov@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Detect unhandleable vectoring in check_emulate_instruction() to prevent
infinite retry loops on SVM, and to eliminate the main differences in how
VM-Exits during event vectoring are handled on SVM versus VMX. E.g. if
the vCPU puts its IDT in emulated MMIO memory and generates an event,
without the check_emulate_instruction() change, SVM will re-inject the
event and resume the guest, and effectively put the vCPU into an infinite
loop.
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241217181458.68690-6-iorlov@amazon.com
[sean: grab "svm" locally, massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Move handling of emulation during event vectoring, which KVM doesn't
support, into VMX's check_emulate_instruction(), so that KVM detects
all unsupported emulation, not just cached emulated MMIO (EPT misconfig).
E.g. on emulated MMIO that isn't cached (EPT Violation) or occurs with
legacy shadow paging (#PF).
Rejecting emulation on other sources of emulation also fixes a largely
theoretical flaw (thanks to the "unprotect and retry" logic), where KVM
could incorrectly inject a #DF:
1. CPU executes an instruction and hits a #GP
2. While vectoring the #GP, a shadow #PF occurs
3. On the #PF VM-Exit, KVM re-injects #GP
4. KVM emulates because of the write-protected page
5. KVM "successfully" emulates and also detects the #GP
6. KVM synthesizes a #GP, and since #GP has already been injected,
incorrectly escalates to a #DF.
Fix the comment about EMULTYPE_PF as this flag doesn't necessarily
mean MMIO anymore: it can also be set due to the write protection
violation.
Note, handle_ept_misconfig() checks vmx_check_emulate_instruction() before
attempting emulation of any kind.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241217181458.68690-5-iorlov@amazon.com
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
If emulation is "rejected" by check_emulate_instruction(), try to
unprotect and retry instruction execution before reporting the error to
userspace. Currently, check_emulate_instruction() never signals failure
when "unprotect and retry" is possible, but that will change in the
future as both VMX and SVM will reject emulation due to coincident
exception vectoring. E.g. if there is a write to a shadowed page table
when vectoring an event, then unprotecting the gfn and retrying the
instruction will allow the guest to make forward progress in most cases,
i.e. will allow the vCPU to keep running instead of returning an error to
userspace.
This ensures that the subsequent patches won't make KVM exit to
userspace when handling an intercepted #PF during vectoring without
checking whether unprotect and retry is possible.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241217181458.68690-4-iorlov@amazon.com
[sean: massage changelog to clarify this is a nop for the current code]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Add emulation status for unhandleable vectoring, i.e. when KVM can't
emulate an instruction because emulation was triggered on an exit that
occurred while the CPU was vectoring an event. Such a situation can
occur if guest sets the IDT descriptor base to point to MMIO region,
and triggers an exception after that.
Exit to userspace with event delivery error when KVM can't emulate
an instruction when vectoring an event.
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241217181458.68690-3-iorlov@amazon.com
[sean: massage changelog and X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE_VECTORING comment]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Extract VMX code for unhandleable VM-Exit during vectoring into
vendor-agnostic function so that boiler-plate code can be shared by SVM.
To avoid unnecessarily complexity in the helper, unconditionally report a
GPA to userspace instead of having a conditional entry. For exits that
don't report a GPA, i.e. everything except EPT Misconfig, simply report
KVM's "invalid GPA".
Signed-off-by: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241217181458.68690-2-iorlov@amazon.com
[sean: clarify that the INVALID_GPA logic is new]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Refactor the kvm_cpu_cap_init() macro magic to collect supported features
in a local variable instead of passing them to the macro as a "mask". As
pointed out by Maxim, relying on macros to "return" a value and set local
variables is surprising, as the bitwise-OR logic suggests the macros are
pure, i.e. have no side effects.
Ideally, the feature initializers would have zero side effects, e.g. would
take local variables as params, but there isn't a sane way to do so
without either sacrificing the various compile-time assertions (basically
a non-starter), or passing at least one variable, e.g. a struct, to each
macro usage (adds a lot of noise and boilerplate code).
Opportunistically force callers to emit a trailing comma by intentionally
omitting a semicolon after invoking the feature initializers. Forcing a
trailing comma isotales futures changes to a single line, i.e. doesn't
cause churn for unrelated features/lines when adding/removing/modifying a
feature.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128013424.4096668-58-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Remove the temporary context variable `tctx` to simplify the code. use
the original context `ctx` directly in calls to `lsm_get_self_attr`,
eliminating redundancy without any functional changes.
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Vadhavana <av2082000@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The Xilinx Versal premium series has CPM5 block which supports two typeA
Root Port controller functionality at Gen5 speed.
Add compatible string to distinguish between two CPM5 rootport controller1.
since Legacy and error interrupt register and bits for both the controllers
are at different offsets.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240922061318.2653503-2-thippesw@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Thippeswamy Havalige <thippesw@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
The 'max_avail' value is calculated from the system memory
size using order_base_2().
order_base_2(x) is defined as '(x) ? fn(x) : 0'.
The compiler generates two copies of the code that follows
and then expands clamp(max, min, PAGE_SHIFT - 12) (11 on 32bit).
This triggers a compile-time assert since min is 5.
In reality a system would have to have less than 512MB memory
for the bounds passed to clamp to be reversed.
Swap the order of the arguments to clamp() to avoid the warning.
Replace the clamp_val() on the line below with clamp().
clamp_val() is just 'an accident waiting to happen' and not needed here.
Detected by compile time checks added to clamp(), specifically:
minmax.h: use BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG() for the lo < hi test in clamp()
Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CA+G9fYsT34UkGFKxus63H6UVpYi5GRZkezT9MRLfAbM3f6ke0g@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 4f325e2627 ("ipvs: dynamically limit the connection hash table")
Tested-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Old TDX modules can clobber RBP in the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL. However
RBP is used as frame pointer in the x86_64 calling convention, and
clobbering RBP could result in bad things like being unable to unwind
the stack if any non-maskable exceptions (NMI, #MC etc) happens in that
gap.
A new "NO_RBP_MOD" feature was introduced to more recent TDX modules to
not clobber RBP. KVM will need to use the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL to run
TDX guests. It won't be safe to run TDX guests w/o this feature. To
prevent it, just don't initialize the TDX module if this feature is not
supported [1].
Note the bit definitions of TDX_FEATURES0 are not auto-generated in
tdx_global_metadata.h. Manually define a macro for it in "tdx.h".
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/fc0e8ab7-86d4-4428-be31-82e1ece6dd21@intel.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/76ae5025502c84d799e3a56a6fc4f69a82da8f93.1734188033.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
Continue the process to have a centralized solution for TDX global
metadata reading. Now that the new autogenerated solution is ready for
use, switch to it and remove the old one.
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/fc025d1e13b92900323f47cfe9aac3157bf08ee7.1734188033.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
Currently, the 'struct tdmr_sys_info_tdmr' which includes TDMR related
fields defines the PAMT entry sizes for TDX supported page sizes (4KB,
2MB and 1GB) as an array:
struct tdx_sys_info_tdmr {
...
u16 pamt_entry_sizes[TDX_PS_NR];
};
PAMT entry sizes are needed when allocating PAMTs for each TDMR. Using
the array to contain PAMT entry sizes reduces the number of arguments
that need to be passed when calling tdmr_set_up_pamt(). It also makes
the code pattern like below clearer:
for (pgsz = TDX_PS_4K; pgsz < TDX_PS_NR; pgsz++) {
pamt_size[pgsz] = tdmr_get_pamt_sz(tdmr, pgsz,
pamt_entry_size[pgsz]);
tdmr_pamt_size += pamt_size[pgsz];
}
However, the auto-generated metadata reading code generates a structure
member for each field. The 'global_metadata.json' has a dedicated field
for each PAMT entry size, and the new 'struct tdx_sys_info_tdmr' looks
like:
struct tdx_sys_info_tdmr {
...
u16 pamt_4k_entry_size;
u16 pamt_2m_entry_size;
u16 pamt_1g_entry_size;
};
Prepare to use the autogenerated code by making the existing 'struct
tdx_sys_info_tdmr' look like the generated one. When passing to
tdmrs_set_up_pamt_all(), build a local array of PAMT entry sizes from
the structure so the code to allocate PAMTs can stay the same.
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ccf46f3dacb01be1fb8309592616d443ac17caba.1734188033.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
The TDX module provides a set of "Global Metadata Fields". They report
things like TDX module version, supported features, and fields related
to create/run TDX guests and so on.
Currently the kernel only reads "TD Memory Region" (TDMR) related fields
for module initialization. There are needs to read more global metadata
fields for future use:
- Supported features ("TDX_FEATURES0") to fail module initialization
when the module doesn't support "not clobbering host RBP when exiting
from TDX guest" feature [1].
- KVM TDX baseline support and other features like TDX Connect will
need to read more.
The current global metadata reading code has limitations (e.g., it only
has a primitive helper to read metadata field with 16-bit element size,
while TDX supports 8/16/32/64 bits metadata element sizes). It needs
tweaks in order to read more metadata fields.
But even with the tweaks, when new code is added to read a new field,
the reviewers will still need to review against the spec to make sure
the new code doesn't screw up things like using the wrong metadata
field ID (each metadata field is associated with a unique field ID,
which is a TDX-defined u64 constant) etc.
TDX documents all global metadata fields in a 'global_metadata.json'
file as part of TDX spec [2]. JSON format is machine readable. Instead
of tweaking the metadata reading code, use a script to generate the code
so that:
1) Using the generated C is simple.
2) Adding a field is simple, e.g., the script just pulls the field ID
out of the JSON for a given field thus no manual review is needed.
Specifically, to match the layout of the 'struct tdx_sys_info' and its
sub-structures, the script uses a table with each entry containing the
the name of the sub-structures (which reflects the "Class") and the
"Field Name" of all its fields, and auto-generate:
1) The 'struct tdx_sys_info' and all 'struct tdx_sys_info_xx'
sub-structures in 'tdx_global_metadata.h'.
2) The main function 'get_tdx_sys_info()' which reads all metadata to
'struct tdx_sys_info' and the 'get_tdx_sys_info_xx()' functions
which read 'struct tdx_sys_info_xx()' in 'tdx_global_metadata.c'.
Using the generated C is simple: 1) include "tdx_global_metadata.h" to
the local "tdx.h"; 2) explicitly include "tdx_global_metadata.c" to the
local "tdx.c" after the read_sys_metadata_field() primitive (which is a
wrapper of TDH.SYS.RD SEAMCALL to read global metadata).
Adding a field is also simple: 1) just add the new field to an existing
structure, or add it with a new structure; 2) re-run the script to
generate the new code; 3) update the existing tdx_global_metadata.{hc}
with the new ones.
For now, use the auto-generated code to read the TDMR related fields and
the aforesaid metadata field "TDX_FEATURES0".
The tdx_global_metadata.{hc} can be generated by running below:
#python tdx_global_metadata.py global_metadata.json \
tdx_global_metadata.h tdx_global_metadata.c
.. where the 'global_metadata.json' can be fetched from [2] and the
'tdx_global_metadata.py' can be found from [3].
Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/fc0e8ab7-86d4-4428-be31-82e1ece6dd21@intel.com/ [1]
Link: https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/795381 [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/762a50133300710771337398284567b299a86f67.camel@intel.com/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cbe3f12b1e5479399b53f4873f2ff783d9fc669b.1734188033.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
The TDX module provides a set of "Global Metadata Fields". They report
things like TDX module version, supported features, and fields related
to create/run TDX guests and so on.
Today the kernel only reads "TD Memory Region" (TDMR) related fields for
module initialization. KVM will need to read additional metadata fields
to run TDX guests. Move towards having the TDX host core-kernel provide
a centralized, canonical, and immutable structure for the global
metadata that comes out from the TDX module for all kernel components to
use.
As the first step, introduce a new 'struct tdx_sys_info' to track all
global metadata fields.
TDX categorizes global metadata fields into different "Classes". E.g.,
the TDMR related fields are under class "TDMR Info". Instead of making
'struct tdx_sys_info' a plain structure to contain all metadata fields,
organize them in smaller structures based on the "Class".
This allows those metadata fields to be used in finer granularity thus
makes the code clearer. E.g., construct_tdmrs() can just take the
structure which contains "TDMR Info" metadata fields.
Add get_tdx_sys_info() as the placeholder to read all metadata fields.
Have it only call get_tdx_sys_info_tdmr() to read TDMR related fields
for now.
Place get_tdx_sys_info() as the first step of init_tdx_module() to
enable early prerequisite checks on the metadata to support early module
initialization abort. This results in moving get_tdx_sys_info_tdmr() to
be before build_tdx_memlist(), but this is fine because there are no
dependencies between these two functions.
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/bfacb4e90527cf79d4be0d1753e6f318eea21118.1734188033.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
The TDX module provides a set of "Global Metadata Fields". They report
things like TDX module version, supported features, and fields related
to create/run TDX guests and so on.
TDX organizes those metadata fields by "Classes" based on the meaning of
those fields. E.g., for now the kernel only reads "TD Memory Region"
(TDMR) related fields for module initialization. Those fields are
defined under class "TDMR Info".
Today the kernel reads some of the global metadata to initialize the TDX
module. KVM will need to read additional metadata fields to run TDX
guests. Move towards having the TDX host core-kernel provide a
centralized, canonical, and immutable structure for the global metadata
that comes out from the TDX module for all kernel components to use.
More specifically, prepare the code to end up with an organization like:
struct tdx_sys_info {
struct tdx_sys_info_classA a;
struct tdx_sys_info_classB b;
...
};
Currently the kernel organizes all fields under "TDMR Info" class in
'struct tdx_tdmr_sysinfo'. Prepare for the above by renaming the
structure to 'struct tdx_sys_info_tdmr' to follow the class name better.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/de165d09e0b571cfeb119a368f4be6e2888ebb93.1734188033.git.kai.huang%40intel.com
Add one last (hopefully) CPUID feature macro, RUNTIME_F(), and use it
to track features that KVM supports, but that are only set at runtime
(in response to other state), and aren't advertised to userspace via
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
Currently, RUNTIME_F() is mostly just documentation, but tracking all
KVM-supported features will allow for asserting, at build time, take),
that all features that are set, cleared, *or* checked by KVM are known to
kvm_set_cpu_caps().
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128013424.4096668-57-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Add another CPUID feature macro, VENDOR_F(), and use it to track features
that KVM supports, but that need additional vendor support and so are
conditionally enabled in vendor code.
Currently, VENDOR_F() is mostly just documentation, but tracking all
KVM-supported features will allow for asserting, at build time, take),
that all features that are set, cleared, *or* checked by KVM are known to
kvm_set_cpu_caps().
To fudge around a macro collision on 32-bit kernels, #undef DS to be able
to get at X86_FEATURE_DS.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128013424.4096668-56-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
