Add audit support for sb_mount, move_mount, sb_umount, sb_remount, and
sb_pivot_root hooks.
The new related blocker is "fs.change_topology".
Audit event sample:
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.change_topology name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=1
Remove landlock_get_applicable_domain() and get_current_fs_domain()
which are now fully replaced with landlock_get_applicable_subject().
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-12-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Asynchronously log domain information when it first denies an access.
This minimize the amount of generated logs, which makes it possible to
always log denials for the current execution since they should not
happen. These records are identified with the new AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN
type.
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN message contains:
- the "domain" ID which is described;
- the "status" which can either be "allocated" or "deallocated";
- the "mode" which is for now only "enforcing";
- for the "allocated" status, a minimal set of properties to easily
identify the task that loaded the domain's policy with
landlock_restrict_self(2): "pid", "uid", executable path ("exe"), and
command line ("comm");
- for the "deallocated" state, the number of "denials" accounted to this
domain, which is at least 1.
This requires each domain to save these task properties at creation
time in the new struct landlock_details. A reference to the PID is kept
for the lifetime of the domain to avoid race conditions when
investigating the related task. The executable path is resolved and
stored to not keep a reference to the filesystem and block related
actions. All these metadata are stored for the lifetime of the related
domain and should then be minimal. The required memory is not accounted
to the task calling landlock_restrict_self(2) contrary to most other
Landlock allocations (see related comment).
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN record follows the first AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS
record for the same domain, which is always followed by AUDIT_SYSCALL
and AUDIT_PROCTITLE. This is in line with the audit logic to first
record the cause of an event, and then add context with other types of
record.
Audit event sample for a first denial:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=LANDLOCK_DOMAIN msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): domain=195ba459b status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=300 uid=0 exe="/root/sandboxer" comm="sandboxer"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
Audit event sample for a following denial:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1732186800.372:45): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1732186800.372:45): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
Log domain deletion with the "deallocated" state when a domain was
previously logged. This makes it possible for log parsers to free
potential resources when a domain ID will never show again.
The number of denied access requests is useful to easily check how many
access requests a domain blocked and potentially if some of them are
missing in logs because of audit rate limiting, audit rules, or Landlock
log configuration flags (see following commit).
Audit event sample for a deletion of a domain that denied something:
type=LANDLOCK_DOMAIN msg=audit(1732186800.393:46): domain=195ba459b status=deallocated denials=2
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-11-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Update comment and GFP flag for landlock_log_drop_domain()]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Add a new AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS record type dedicated to an access
request denied by a Landlock domain. AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS indicates
that something unexpected happened.
For now, only denied access are logged, which means that any
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS record is always followed by a SYSCALL record with
"success=no". However, log parsers should check this syscall property
because this is the only sign that a request was denied. Indeed, we
could have "success=yes" if Landlock would support a "permissive" mode.
We could also add a new field to AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN for this mode
(see following commit).
By default, the only logged access requests are those coming from the
same executed program that enforced the Landlock restriction on itself.
In other words, no audit record are created for a task after it called
execve(2). This is required to avoid log spam because programs may only
be aware of their own restrictions, but not the inherited ones.
Following commits will allow to conditionally generate
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS records according to dedicated
landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags.
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS message contains:
- the "domain" ID restricting the action on an object,
- the "blockers" that are missing to allow the requested access,
- a set of fields identifying the related object (e.g. task identified
with "opid" and "ocomm").
The blockers are implicit restrictions (e.g. ptrace), or explicit access
rights (e.g. filesystem), or explicit scopes (e.g. signal). This field
contains a list of at least one element, each separated with a comma.
The initial blocker is "ptrace", which describe all implicit Landlock
restrictions related to ptrace (e.g. deny tracing of tasks outside a
sandbox).
Add audit support to ptrace_access_check and ptrace_traceme hooks. For
the ptrace_access_check case, we log the current/parent domain and the
child task. For the ptrace_traceme case, we log the parent domain and
the current/child task. Indeed, the requester and the target are the
current task, but the action would be performed by the parent task.
Audit event sample:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
A following commit adds user documentation.
Add KUnit tests to check reading of domain ID relative to layer level.
The quick return for non-landlocked tasks is moved from task_ptrace() to
each LSM hooks.
It is not useful to inline the audit_enabled check because other
computation are performed by landlock_log_denial().
Use scoped guards for RCU read-side critical sections.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-10-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Extend struct landlock_cred_security with a domain_exec bitmask to
identify which Landlock domain were created by the current task's bprm.
The whole bitmask is reset on each execve(2) call.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change is needed for audit support, specifically to be
able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
struct landlock_file_security's size stay the same for now but it will
increase with struct landlock_cred_security's size.
Only save Landlock domain in hook_file_set_fowner() if the current
domain has LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL, which was previously done for each
hook_file_send_sigiotask() calls. This should improve a bit
performance.
Replace hardcoded LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL with the signal_scope.scope
variable.
Use scoped guards for RCU read-side critical sections.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change that is needed for audit support, specifically to
be able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
Replace hardcoded LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL with the signal_scope.scope
variable.
Use scoped guards for RCU read-side critical sections.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-7-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Update headers]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change that is needed for audit support, specifically to
be able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
Optimize current_check_access_socket() to only handle the access
request.
Remove explicit domain->num_layers check which is now part of the
landlock_get_applicable_subject() call.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change is needed for audit support, specifically to be
able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
Add landlock_get_applicable_subject(), mainly a copy of
landlock_get_applicable_domain(), which will fully replace it in a
following commit.
Optimize current_check_access_path() to only handle the access request.
Partially replace get_current_fs_domain() with explicit calls to
landlock_get_applicable_subject(). The remaining ones will follow with
more changes.
Remove explicit domain->num_layers check which is now part of the
landlock_get_applicable_subject() call.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Create a new domain.h file containing the struct landlock_hierarchy
definition and helpers. This type will grow with audit support. This
also prepares for a new domain type.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-4-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Landlock IDs can be generated to uniquely identify Landlock objects.
For now, only Landlock domains get an ID at creation time. These IDs
map to immutable domain hierarchies.
Landlock IDs have important properties:
- They are unique during the lifetime of the running system thanks to
the 64-bit values: at worse, 2^60 - 2*2^32 useful IDs.
- They are always greater than 2^32 and must then be stored in 64-bit
integer types.
- The initial ID (at boot time) is randomly picked between 2^32 and
2^33, which limits collisions in logs across different boots.
- IDs are sequential, which enables users to order them.
- IDs may not be consecutive but increase with a random 2^4 step, which
limits side channels.
Such IDs can be exposed to unprivileged processes, even if it is not the
case with this audit patch series. The domain IDs will be useful for
user space to identify sandboxes and get their properties.
These Landlock IDs are more secure that other absolute kernel IDs such
as pipe's inodes which rely on a shared global counter.
For checkpoint/restore features (i.e. CRIU), we could easily implement a
privileged interface (e.g. sysfs) to set the next ID counter.
IDR/IDA are not used because we only need a bijection from Landlock
objects to Landlock IDs, and we must not recycle IDs. This enables us
to identify all Landlock objects during the lifetime of the system (e.g.
in logs), but not to access an object from an ID nor know if an ID is
assigned. Using a counter is simpler, it scales (i.e. avoids growing
memory footprint), and it does not require locking. We'll use proper
file descriptors (with IDs used as inode numbers) to access Landlock
objects.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Extract code from dump_common_audit_data() into the audit_log_lsm_data()
helper. This helps reuse common LSM audit data while not abusing
AUDIT_AVC records because of the common_lsm_audit() helper.
Depends-on: 7ccbe076d9 ("lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-2-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
The new signal_scoping_thread_setuid tests check that the libc's
setuid() function works as expected even when a thread is sandboxed with
scoped signal restrictions.
Before the signal scoping fix, this test would have failed with the
setuid() call:
[pid 65] getpid() = 65
[pid 65] tgkill(65, 66, SIGRT_1) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
[pid 65] futex(0x40a66cdc, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 0
[pid 65] setuid(1001) = 0
After the fix, tgkill(2) is successfully leveraged to synchronize
credentials update across threads:
[pid 65] getpid() = 65
[pid 65] tgkill(65, 66, SIGRT_1) = 0
[pid 66] <... read resumed>0x40a65eb7, 1) = ? ERESTARTSYS (To be restarted if SA_RESTART is set)
[pid 66] --- SIGRT_1 {si_signo=SIGRT_1, si_code=SI_TKILL, si_pid=65, si_uid=1000} ---
[pid 66] getpid() = 65
[pid 66] setuid(1001) = 0
[pid 66] futex(0x40a66cdc, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 0
[pid 66] rt_sigreturn({mask=[]}) = 0
[pid 66] read(3, <unfinished ...>
[pid 65] setuid(1001) = 0
Test coverage for security/landlock is 92.9% of 1137 lines according to
gcc/gcov-14.
Fixes: c899496501 ("selftests/landlock: Test signal scoping for threads")
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-8-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Update test coverage]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Split signal_scoping_threads tests into signal_scoping_thread_before
and signal_scoping_thread_after.
Use local variables for thread synchronization. Fix exported function.
Replace some asserts with expects.
Fixes: c899496501 ("selftests/landlock: Test signal scoping for threads")
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-7-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Because Linux credentials are managed per thread, user space relies on
some hack to synchronize credential update across threads from the same
process. This is required by the Native POSIX Threads Library and
implemented by set*id(2) wrappers and libcap(3) to use tgkill(2) to
synchronize threads. See nptl(7) and libpsx(3). Furthermore, some
runtimes like Go do not enable developers to have control over threads
[1].
To avoid potential issues, and because threads are not security
boundaries, let's relax the Landlock (optional) signal scoping to always
allow signals sent between threads of the same process. This exception
is similar to the __ptrace_may_access() one.
hook_file_set_fowner() now checks if the target task is part of the same
process as the caller. If this is the case, then the related signal
triggered by the socket will always be allowed.
Scoping of abstract UNIX sockets is not changed because kernel objects
(e.g. sockets) should be tied to their creator's domain at creation
time.
Note that creating one Landlock domain per thread puts each of these
threads (and their future children) in their own scope, which is
probably not what users expect, especially in Go where we do not control
threads. However, being able to drop permissions on all threads should
not be restricted by signal scoping. We are working on a way to make it
possible to atomically restrict all threads of a process with the same
domain [2].
Add erratum for signal scoping.
Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/go-landlock/issues/36
Fixes: 54a6e6bbf3 ("landlock: Add signal scoping")
Fixes: c899496501 ("selftests/landlock: Test signal scoping for threads")
Depends-on: 26f204380a ("fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies")
Link: https://pkg.go.dev/kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/libcap/psx [1]
Link: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/2 [2]
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-6-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Add extra pointer check and RCU guard, and ease backport]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
From: Tomasz Pakuła <tomasz.pakula.oficjalny@gmail.com>
This patch series is focused on improving the compatibility and usability of the
hid-pidff force feedback driver. Last patch introduces a new, universal driver
for PID devices that need some special handling like report fixups, remapping the
button range, managing new pidff quirks and setting desirable fuzz/flat values.
This work has been done in the span of the past months with the help of the great
Linux simracing community, with a little input from sim flight fans from FFBeast.
No changes interfere with compliant and currently working PID devices.
"Generic" codepath was tested as well with Moza and Simxperience AccuForce v2.
I'm not married to the name. It's what we used previously, but if "universal" is
confusing (pidff is already the generic driver), we can come up with something
better like "hid-quirky-pidff" :)
With v8 and tiny finx in v9, all the outstanding issues were resolved,
additional pidff issues were fixed and hid-pidff defines moved to a dedicated
header file. This patch series could be considered done bar any comments and
requests from input maintainers.
I could save more then a dozen lines of code by changing simple if statements
to only occupy on line instead of two in there's a need for that.
From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Some platforms include a human presence detection (HPD) sensor. When
enabled and a user is detected a wake event will be emitted from the
sensor fusion hub that software can react to.
Example use cases are "wake from suspend on approach" or to "lock
when leaving".
This is currently enabled by default on supported systems, but users
can't control it. This essentially means that wake on approach is
enabled which is a really surprising behavior to users that don't
expect it.
Instead of defaulting to enabled add a sysfs knob that users can
use to enable the feature if desirable and set it to disabled by
default.
Add LED and memory nodes, and enabled GPIO0 for Agilex5 devkit.
Signed-off-by: Niravkumar L Rabara <niravkumar.l.rabara@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Add clock-frequency property to the internal oscillators, cb_intosc_ls_clk
and cb_intosc_hs_div2_clk.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Gerlach <matthew.gerlach@altera.com>
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
This dts is enough to make the board boot to Linux with the rootfs on
a micro SD card.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
The Terasic DE10-nano development board features a Cyclone5 FPGA, USB,
HDMI output and an Arduino compatible header.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
The Agilex5 devkit supports a separate NAND daughter card.
The NAND daughter card replaces the SDMMC slot that is on the default
daughter card thus requires a separate board dts file.
Signed-off-by: Niravkumar L Rabara <niravkumar.l.rabara@intel.com>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Instead of a bool field in struct io_sr_msg, use REQ_F_IMPORT_BUFFER to
track whether io_send_zc() has already imported the buffer. This flag
already serves a similar purpose for sendmsg_zc and {read,write}v_fixed.
Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander Mateos <csander@purestorage.com>
Suggested-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250325143943.1226467-1-csander@purestorage.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Add fault injection for xe_oa_alloc_regs to allow it to fail while
executing xe_oa_add_config_ioctl().
This need to be added as it cannot be reached by injecting error through
IOCTL arguments.
Signed-off-by: Nakshtra Goyal <nakshtra.goyal@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Francois Dugast <francois.dugast@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227102339.2859726-1-nakshtra.goyal@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com>
Direct HLT instruction execution causes #VEs for TDX VMs which is routed
to hypervisor via TDCALL. safe_halt() routines execute HLT in STI-shadow
so IRQs need to remain disabled until the TDCALL to ensure that pending
IRQs are correctly treated as wake events.
Emit warning and fail emulation if IRQs are enabled during HLT #VE handling
to avoid running into scenarios where IRQ wake events are lost resulting in
indefinite HLT execution times.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Ryan Afranji <afranji@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228014416.3925664-4-vannapurve@google.com
Direct HLT instruction execution causes #VEs for TDX VMs which is routed
to hypervisor via TDCALL. If HLT is executed in STI-shadow, resulting #VE
handler will enable interrupts before TDCALL is routed to hypervisor
leading to missed wakeup events, as current TDX spec doesn't expose
interruptibility state information to allow #VE handler to selectively
enable interrupts.
Commit bfe6ed0c67 ("x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests")
prevented the idle routines from executing HLT instruction in STI-shadow.
But it missed the paravirt routine which can be reached via this path
as an example:
kvm_wait() =>
safe_halt() =>
raw_safe_halt() =>
arch_safe_halt() =>
irq.safe_halt() =>
pv_native_safe_halt()
To reliably handle arch_safe_halt() for TDX VMs, introduce explicit
dependency on CONFIG_PARAVIRT and override paravirt halt()/safe_halt()
routines with TDX-safe versions that execute direct TDCALL and needed
interrupt flag updates. Executing direct TDCALL brings in additional
benefit of avoiding HLT related #VEs altogether.
As tested by Ryan Afranji:
"Tested with the specjbb2015 benchmark. It has heavy lock contention which leads
to many halt calls. TDX VMs suffered a poor score before this patchset.
Verified the major performance improvement with this patchset applied."
Fixes: bfe6ed0c67 ("x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests")
Signed-off-by: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Ryan Afranji <afranji@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228014416.3925664-3-vannapurve@google.com
CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL is mainly defined/used by XEN PV guests. For
other VM guest types, features supported under CONFIG_PARAVIRT
are self sufficient. CONFIG_PARAVIRT mainly provides support for
TLB flush operations and time related operations.
For TDX guest as well, paravirt calls under CONFIG_PARVIRT meets
most of its requirement except the need of HLT and SAFE_HLT
paravirt calls, which is currently defined under
CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL.
Since enabling CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL is too bloated for TDX guest
like platforms, move HLT and SAFE_HLT paravirt calls under
CONFIG_PARAVIRT.
Moving HLT and SAFE_HLT paravirt calls are not fatal and should not
break any functionality for current users of CONFIG_PARAVIRT.
Fixes: bfe6ed0c67 ("x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests")
Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Ryan Afranji <afranji@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228014416.3925664-2-vannapurve@google.com
Commit e49ad66781 ("PCI: j721e: Add TI J784S4 PCIe configuration")
assigned the value of .linkdown_irq_regfield for the J784S4 SoC as the
"LINK_DOWN" macro corresponding to BIT(1), and as a result, the Link
Down interrupts on J784S4 SoC are missed.
According to the Technical Reference Manual and Register Documentation
for the J784S4 SoC[1], BIT(1) corresponds to "ENABLE_SYS_EN_PCIE_DPA_1",
which is not the correct field for the link-state interrupt. Instead, it
is BIT(10) of the "PCIE_INTD_ENABLE_REG_SYS_2" register that corresponds
to the link-state field named as "ENABLE_SYS_EN_PCIE_LINK_STATE".
Thus, set .linkdown_irq_regfield to the macro "J7200_LINK_DOWN", which
expands to BIT(10) and was first defined for the J7200 SoC. Other SoCs
already reuse this macro since it accurately represents the "link-state"
field in their respective "PCIE_INTD_ENABLE_REG_SYS_2" register.
1: https://www.ti.com/lit/zip/spruj52
Fixes: e49ad66781 ("PCI: j721e: Add TI J784S4 PCIe configuration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Siddharth Vadapalli <s-vadapalli@ti.com>
[kwilczynski: commit log, add a missing .linkdown_irq_regfield member
set to the J7200_LINK_DOWN macro to struct j7200_pcie_ep_data]
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250305132018.2260771-1-s-vadapalli@ti.com
For PCITEST_MSI we really want to set PCITEST_SET_IRQTYPE explicitly
to PCITEST_IRQ_TYPE_MSI, since we want to test if MSI works.
For PCITEST_MSIX we really want to set PCITEST_SET_IRQTYPE explicitly
to PCITEST_IRQ_TYPE_MSIX, since we want to test if MSI works.
For PCITEST_LEGACY_IRQ we really want to set PCITEST_SET_IRQTYPE
explicitly to PCITEST_IRQ_TYPE_INTX, since we want to test if INTx
works.
However, for PCITEST_WRITE, PCITEST_READ, PCITEST_COPY, we really don't
care which IRQ type that is used, we just want to use a IRQ type that is
supported by the EPC.
The old behavior was to always use MSI for PCITEST_WRITE, PCITEST_READ,
PCITEST_COPY, was to always set IRQ type to MSI before doing the actual
test, however, there are EPC drivers that do not support MSI.
Add a new PCITEST_IRQ_TYPE_AUTO, that will use the CAPS register to see
which IRQ types the endpoint supports, and use one of the supported IRQ
types.
For backwards compatibility, if the endpoint does not expose any supported
IRQ type in the CAPS register, simply fallback to using MSI, as it was
unconditionally done before.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310111016.859445-16-cassel@kernel.org
Expose the supported IRQ types in the CAPS register.
This way, the host side driver (drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c) can
know which IRQ types that the endpoint supports.
The host side driver will make use of this information in a follow-up
commit.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310111016.859445-15-cassel@kernel.org
Neither RK3568 or RK3588 supports INTx interrupts.
Since epc_features is zero initialized, this is strictly not needed.
However, setting intx_capable explicitly to false makes it more clear
that neither RK3568 or RK3588 supports INTx interrupts.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310111016.859445-14-cassel@kernel.org
In struct pci_epc_features, an EPC driver can already specify if they
support MSI (by setting msi_capable) and MSI-X (by setting msix_capable).
Thus, for consistency, allow an EPC driver to specify if it supports
INTx interrupts as well (by setting intx_capable).
Since this struct is zero initialized, EPC drivers that want to claim
INTx support will need to set intx_capable to true.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
[kwilczynski: add missing kernel-doc for "intx_capable"]
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński <kwilczynski@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310111016.859445-13-cassel@kernel.org
