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127,691 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Geoff Levand
221f2c770e arm64/kexec: Add pr_debug output
To aid in debugging kexec problems or when adding new functionality to
kexec add a new routine kexec_image_info() and several inline pr_debug
statements.

Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-06-27 16:31:26 +01:00
Geoff Levand
b26a4ae399 arm64/kexec: Enable kexec in the arm64 defconfig
Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-06-27 16:31:25 +01:00
Geoff Levand
d28f6df130 arm64/kexec: Add core kexec support
Add three new files, kexec.h, machine_kexec.c and relocate_kernel.S to the
arm64 architecture that add support for the kexec re-boot mechanism
(CONFIG_KEXEC) on arm64 platforms.

Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: removed dead code following James Morse's comments]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-06-27 16:31:25 +01:00
Geoff Levand
f9076ecfb1 arm64: Add back cpu reset routines
Commit 68234df4ea ("arm64: kill flush_cache_all()") removed the global
arm64 routines cpu_reset() and cpu_soft_restart() needed by the arm64
kexec and kdump support.  Add back a simplified version of
cpu_soft_restart() with some changes needed for kexec in the new files
cpu_reset.S, and cpu_reset.h.

When a CPU is reset it needs to be put into the exception level it had when
it entered the kernel. Update cpu_soft_restart() to accept an argument
which signals if the reset address should be entered at EL1 or EL2, and
add a new hypercall HVC_SOFT_RESTART which is used for the EL2 switch.

Signed-off-by: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-06-27 16:31:25 +01:00
James Morse
b69e0dc14c arm64: smp: Add function to determine if cpus are stuck in the kernel
kernel/smp.c has a fancy counter that keeps track of the number of CPUs
it marked as not-present and left in cpu_park_loop(). If there are any
CPUs spinning in here, features like kexec or hibernate may release them
by overwriting this memory.

This problem also occurs on machines using spin-tables to release
secondary cores.
After commit 44dbcc93ab ("arm64: Fix behavior of maxcpus=N")
we bring all known cpus into the secondary holding pen, meaning this
memory can't be re-used by kexec or hibernate.

Add a function cpus_are_stuck_in_kernel() to determine if either of these
cases have occurred.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: cherry-picked from mainline for kexec dependency]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-06-27 16:24:51 +01:00
Quentin Casasnovas
ff30ef40de KVM: nVMX: VMX instructions: fix segment checks when L1 is in long mode.
I couldn't get Xen to boot a L2 HVM when it was nested under KVM - it was
getting a GP(0) on a rather unspecial vmread from Xen:

     (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.7.0-rc  x86_64  debug=n  Not tainted ]----
     (XEN) CPU:    1
     (XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff82d0801e629e>] vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450
     (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010202   CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0)
     (XEN) rax: ffff82d0801e6288   rbx: ffff83003ffbfb7c   rcx: fffffffffffab928
     (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000000   rsi: 0000000000000000   rdi: ffff83000bdd0000
     (XEN) rbp: ffff83000bdd0000   rsp: ffff83003ffbfab0   r8:  ffff830038813910
     (XEN) r9:  ffff83003faf3958   r10: 0000000a3b9f7640   r11: ffff83003f82d418
     (XEN) r12: 0000000000000000   r13: ffff83003ffbffff   r14: 0000000000004802
     (XEN) r15: 0000000000000008   cr0: 0000000080050033   cr4: 00000000001526e0
     (XEN) cr3: 000000003fc79000   cr2: 0000000000000000
     (XEN) ds: 0000   es: 0000   fs: 0000   gs: 0000   ss: 0000   cs: e008
     (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d0801e629e> (vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450):
     (XEN)  00 00 41 be 02 48 00 00 <44> 0f 78 74 24 08 0f 86 38 56 00 00 b8 08 68 00
     (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83003ffbfab0:

     ...

     (XEN) Xen call trace:
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801e629e>] vmx_get_segment_register+0x14e/0x450
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801f3695>] get_page_from_gfn_p2m+0x165/0x300
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bfe32>] hvmemul_get_seg_reg+0x52/0x60
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801bfe93>] hvm_emulate_prepare+0x53/0x70
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801ccacb>] handle_mmio+0x2b/0xd0
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801be591>] emulate.c#_hvm_emulate_one+0x111/0x2c0
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801cd6a4>] handle_hvm_io_completion+0x274/0x2a0
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801f334a>] __get_gfn_type_access+0xfa/0x270
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d08012f3bb>] timer.c#add_entry+0x4b/0xb0
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d08012f80c>] timer.c#remove_entry+0x7c/0x90
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801c8433>] hvm_do_resume+0x23/0x140
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801e4fe7>] vmx_do_resume+0xa7/0x140
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d080164aeb>] context_switch+0x13b/0xe40
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d080128e6e>] schedule.c#schedule+0x22e/0x570
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d08012c0cc>] softirq.c#__do_softirq+0x5c/0x90
     (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801602c5>] domain.c#idle_loop+0x25/0x50
     (XEN)
     (XEN)
     (XEN) ****************************************
     (XEN) Panic on CPU 1:
     (XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT
     (XEN) [error_code=0000]
     (XEN) ****************************************

Tracing my host KVM showed it was the one injecting the GP(0) when
emulating the VMREAD and checking the destination segment permissions in
get_vmx_mem_address():

     3)               |    vmx_handle_exit() {
     3)               |      handle_vmread() {
     3)               |        nested_vmx_check_permission() {
     3)               |          vmx_get_segment() {
     3)   0.074 us    |            vmx_read_guest_seg_base();
     3)   0.065 us    |            vmx_read_guest_seg_selector();
     3)   0.066 us    |            vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
     3)   1.636 us    |          }
     3)   0.058 us    |          vmx_get_rflags();
     3)   0.062 us    |          vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
     3)   3.469 us    |        }
     3)               |        vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits() {
     3)   0.058 us    |          vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
     3)   0.662 us    |        }
     3)               |        get_vmx_mem_address() {
     3)   0.068 us    |          vmx_cache_reg();
     3)               |          vmx_get_segment() {
     3)   0.074 us    |            vmx_read_guest_seg_base();
     3)   0.068 us    |            vmx_read_guest_seg_selector();
     3)   0.071 us    |            vmx_read_guest_seg_ar();
     3)   1.756 us    |          }
     3)               |          kvm_queue_exception_e() {
     3)   0.066 us    |            kvm_multiple_exception();
     3)   0.684 us    |          }
     3)   4.085 us    |        }
     3)   9.833 us    |      }
     3) + 10.366 us   |    }

Cross-checking the KVM/VMX VMREAD emulation code with the Intel Software
Developper Manual Volume 3C - "VMREAD - Read Field from Virtual-Machine
Control Structure", I found that we're enforcing that the destination
operand is NOT located in a read-only data segment or any code segment when
the L1 is in long mode - BUT that check should only happen when it is in
protected mode.

Shuffling the code a bit to make our emulation follow the specification
allows me to boot a Xen dom0 in a nested KVM and start HVM L2 guests
without problems.

Fixes: f9eb4af67c ("KVM: nVMX: VMX instructions: add checks for #GP/#SS exceptions")
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-06-27 15:30:44 +02:00
Marcelo Tosatti
b606f189c7 KVM: LAPIC: cap __delay at lapic_timer_advance_ns
The host timer which emulates the guest LAPIC TSC deadline
timer has its expiration diminished by lapic_timer_advance_ns
nanoseconds. Therefore if, at wait_lapic_expire, a difference
larger than lapic_timer_advance_ns is encountered, delay at most
lapic_timer_advance_ns.

This fixes a problem where the guest can cause the host
to delay for large amounts of time.

Reported-by: Alan Jenkins <alan.christopher.jenkins@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-06-27 15:30:41 +02:00
Marcelo Tosatti
8d93c874ac KVM: x86: move nsec_to_cycles from x86.c to x86.h
Move the inline function nsec_to_cycles from x86.c to x86.h, as
the next patch uses it from lapic.c.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-06-27 15:30:38 +02:00
Minfei Huang
ed911b43ad pvclock: Get rid of __pvclock_read_cycles in function pvclock_read_flags
There is a generic function __pvclock_read_cycles to be used to get both
flags and cycles. For function pvclock_read_flags, it's useless to get
cycles value. To make this function be more effective, get this variable
flags directly in function.

Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang <mnghuan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-06-27 15:12:15 +02:00
Minfei Huang
f7550d076d pvclock: Cleanup to remove function pvclock_get_nsec_offset
Function __pvclock_read_cycles is short enough, so there is no need to
have another function pvclock_get_nsec_offset to calculate tsc delta.
It's better to combine it into function __pvclock_read_cycles.

Remove useless variables in function __pvclock_read_cycles.

Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang <mnghuan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-06-27 15:12:14 +02:00
Minfei Huang
749d088b8e pvclock: Add CPU barriers to get correct version value
Protocol for the "version" fields is: hypervisor raises it (making it
uneven) before it starts updating the fields and raises it again (making
it even) when it is done.  Thus the guest can make sure the time values
it got are consistent by checking the version before and after reading
them.

Add CPU barries after getting version value just like what function
vread_pvclock does, because all of callees in this function is inline.

Fixes: 502dfeff23
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang <mnghuan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-06-27 15:12:14 +02:00
James Morse
591d215afc KVM: arm/arm64: Stop leaking vcpu pid references
kvm provides kvm_vcpu_uninit(), which amongst other things, releases the
last reference to the struct pid of the task that was last running the vcpu.

On arm64 built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK, starting a guest with kvmtool,
then killing it with SIGKILL results (after some considerable time) in:
> cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
> unreferenced object 0xffff80007d5ea080 (size 128):
>  comm "lkvm", pid 2025, jiffies 4294942645 (age 1107.776s)
>  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
>    01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
>    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
>  backtrace:
>    [<ffff8000001b30ec>] create_object+0xfc/0x278
>    [<ffff80000071da34>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x70
>    [<ffff80000019fa2c>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x16c/0x1d8
>    [<ffff8000000d0474>] alloc_pid+0x34/0x4d0
>    [<ffff8000000b5674>] copy_process.isra.6+0x79c/0x1338
>    [<ffff8000000b633c>] _do_fork+0x74/0x320
>    [<ffff8000000b66b0>] SyS_clone+0x18/0x20
>    [<ffff800000085cb0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
>    [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

On x86 kvm_vcpu_uninit() is called on the path from kvm_arch_destroy_vm(),
on arm no equivalent call is made. Add the call to kvm_arch_vcpu_free().

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Fixes: 749cf76c5a ("KVM: ARM: Initial skeleton to compile KVM support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10+
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
2016-06-27 13:08:10 +02:00
Arnd Bergmann
b684e9bc75 x86/efi: Remove the unused efi_get_time() function
Nothing calls the efi_get_time() function on x86, but it does suffer
from the 32-bit time_t overflow in 2038.

This removes the function, we can always put it back in case we need
it later.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466839230-12781-8-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 13:06:58 +02:00
Alex Thorlton
21f866257c x86/efi: Update efi_thunk() to use the the arch_efi_call_virt*() macros
Currently, the efi_thunk macro has some semi-duplicated code in it that
can be replaced with the arch_efi_call_virt_setup/teardown macros. This
commit simply replaces the duplicated code with those macros.

Suggested-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@sgi.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466839230-12781-7-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
[ Renamed variables to the standard __ prefix. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 13:06:57 +02:00
Alex Thorlton
d1be84a232 x86/uv: Update uv_bios_call() to use efi_call_virt_pointer()
Now that the efi_call_virt() macro has been generalized to be able to
use EFI system tables besides efi.systab, we are able to convert our
uv_bios_call() wrapper to use this standard EFI callback mechanism.

This simple change is part of a much larger effort to recover from some
issues with the way we were mapping in some of our MMRs, and the way
that we were doing our BIOS callbacks, which were uncovered by commit
67a9108ed4 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures").

The first issue that this uncovered was that we were relying on the EFI
memory mapping mechanism to map in our MMR space for us, which, while
reliable, was technically a bug, as it relied on "undefined" behavior in
the mapping code.

The reason we were able to piggyback on the EFI memory mapping code to
map in our MMRs was because, previously, EFI code used the
trampoline_pgd, which shares a few entries with the main kernel pgd.  It
just so happened, that the memory range containing our MMRs was inside
one of those shared regions, which kept our code working without issue
for quite a while.

Anyways, once we discovered this problem, we brought back our original
code to map in the MMRs with commit:

  08914f436b ("x86/platform/UV: Bring back the call to map_low_mmrs in uv_system_init")

This got our systems a little further along, but we were still running
into trouble with our EFI callbacks, which prevented us from booting
all the way up.

Our first step towards fixing the BIOS callbacks was to get our
uv_bios_call() wrapper updated to use efi_call_virt() instead of the plain
efi_call().  The previous patch took care of the effort needed to make
that possible.  Along the way, we hit a major issue with some confusion
about how to properly pull arguments higher than number 6 off the stack
in the efi_call() code, which resulted in the following commit from Linus:

  683ad8092c ("x86/efi: Fix 7-parameter efi_call()s")

Now that all of those issues are out of the way, we're able to make this
simple change to use the new efi_call_virt_pointer() in uv_bios_call()
which gets our machines booting, running properly, and able to execute our
callbacks with 6+ arguments.

Note that, since we are now using the EFI page table when we make our
function call, we are no longer able to make the call using the __va()
of our function pointer, since the memory range containing that address
isn't mapped into the EFI page table.  For now, we will use the physical
address of the function directly, since that is mapped into the EFI page
table.  In the near future, we're going to get some code added in to
properly update our function pointer to its virtual address during
SetVirtualAddressMap.

Signed-off-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@sgi.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466839230-12781-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 13:06:56 +02:00
Alex Thorlton
80e7559607 efi: Convert efi_call_virt() to efi_call_virt_pointer()
This commit makes a few slight modifications to the efi_call_virt() macro
to get it to work with function pointers that are stored in locations
other than efi.systab->runtime, and renames the macro to
efi_call_virt_pointer().  The majority of the changes here are to pull
these macros up into header files so that they can be accessed from
outside of drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c.

The most significant change not directly related to the code move is to
add an extra "p" argument into the appropriate efi_call macros, and use
that new argument in place of the, formerly hard-coded,
efi.systab->runtime pointer.

The last piece of the puzzle was to add an efi_call_virt() macro back into
drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c to wrap around the new
efi_call_virt_pointer() macro - this was mainly to keep the code from
looking too cluttered by adding a bunch of extra references to
efi.systab->runtime everywhere.

Note that I also broke up the code in the efi_call_virt_pointer() macro a
bit in the process of moving it.

Signed-off-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@sgi.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466839230-12781-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 13:06:56 +02:00
Colin Ian King
f6d1747f89 x86/efi: Remove unused variable 'efi'
Remove unused variable 'efi', it is never used. This fixes the following
clang build warning:

  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c:803:2: warning: Value stored to 'efi' is never read

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466839230-12781-4-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 13:06:55 +02:00
Cyril Bur
8e96a87c54 powerpc/tm: Always reclaim in start_thread() for exec() class syscalls
Userspace can quite legitimately perform an exec() syscall with a
suspended transaction. exec() does not return to the old process, rather
it load a new one and starts that, the expectation therefore is that the
new process starts not in a transaction. Currently exec() is not treated
any differently to any other syscall which creates problems.

Firstly it could allow a new process to start with a suspended
transaction for a binary that no longer exists. This means that the
checkpointed state won't be valid and if the suspended transaction were
ever to be resumed and subsequently aborted (a possibility which is
exceedingly likely as exec()ing will likely doom the transaction) the
new process will jump to invalid state.

Secondly the incorrect attempt to keep the transactional state while
still zeroing state for the new process creates at least two TM Bad
Things. The first triggers on the rfid to return to userspace as
start_thread() has given the new process a 'clean' MSR but the suspend
will still be set in the hardware MSR. The second TM Bad Thing triggers
in __switch_to() as the processor is still transactionally suspended but
__switch_to() wants to zero the TM sprs for the new process.

This is an example of the outcome of calling exec() with a suspended
transaction. Note the first 700 is likely the first TM bad thing
decsribed earlier only the kernel can't report it as we've loaded
userspace registers. c000000000009980 is the rfid in
fast_exception_return()

  Bad kernel stack pointer 3fffcfa1a370 at c000000000009980
  Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
  CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Not tainted
  NIP: c000000000009980 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c00000003ffefd40 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted
  MSR: 8000000300201031 <SF,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]>  CR: 00000000  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c0000000000098b4 SOFTE: 0
  PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033
  GPR00: 0000000000000000 00003fffcfa1a370 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR12: 00003fff966611c0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  NIP [c000000000009980] fast_exception_return+0xb0/0xb8
  LR [0000000000000000]           (null)
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  f84d0278 e9a100d8 7c7b03a6 e84101a0 7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 e8010070
  e8410080 e8610088 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed023b

  Kernel BUG at c000000000043e80 [verbose debug info unavailable]
  Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c000000000043e80 (msr 0x201033)
  Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#2]
  CPU: 0 PID: 2006 Comm: tm-execed Tainted: G      D
  task: c0000000fbea6d80 ti: c00000003ffec000 task.ti: c0000000fb7ec000
  NIP: c000000000043e80 LR: c000000000015a24 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c00000003ffef7e0 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G      D
  MSR: 8000000300201033 <SF,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[SE]>  CR: 28002828  XER: 00000000
  CFAR: c000000000015a20 SOFTE: 0
  PACATMSCRATCH: b00000010000d033
  GPR00: 0000000000000000 c00000003ffefa60 c000000000db5500 c0000000fbead000
  GPR04: 8000000300001033 2222222222222222 2222222222222222 00000000ff160000
  GPR08: 0000000000000000 800000010000d033 c0000000fb7e3ea0 c00000000fe00004
  GPR12: 0000000000002200 c00000000fe00000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000fbea7410 00000000ff160000
  GPR24: c0000000ffe1f600 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbea8700 c0000000fbead000
  GPR28: c000000000e20198 c0000000fbea6d80 c0000000fbeab680 c0000000fbea6d80
  NIP [c000000000043e80] tm_restore_sprs+0xc/0x1c
  LR [c000000000015a24] __switch_to+0x1f4/0x420
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  7c800164 4e800020 7c0022a6 f80304a8 7c0222a6 f80304b0 7c0122a6 f80304b8
  4e800020 e80304a8 7c0023a6 e80304b0 <7c0223a6> e80304b8 7c0123a6 4e800020

This fixes CVE-2016-5828.

Fixes: bc2a9408fa ("powerpc: Hook in new transactional memory code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-06-27 20:35:17 +10:00
Borislav Petkov
dbf984d825 x86/boot/64: Add forgotten end of function marker
Add secondary_startup_64()'s ENDPROC() marker.

No functionality change.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160625112457.16930-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 12:20:31 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
630741fb60 Merge branch 'sched/urgent' into sched/core, to pick up fixes
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 11:35:02 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
d4cf1949f9 perf/x86/intel: Add {rd,wr}lbr_{to,from} wrappers
The whole rdmsr()/wrmsr() for lbr_from got a little unweildy with the
sign extension quirk, provide a few simple wrappers to clean things up.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 11:34:21 +02:00
David Carrillo-Cisneros
71adae99ed perf/x86/intel: Add MSR_LAST_BRANCH_FROM_x quirk for ctx switch
Add quirk for context switch to save/restore the value of
MSR_LAST_BRANCH_FROM_x when LBR is enabled and there is potential for
kernel addresses to be in the lbr_from register.

To test this patch, use a perf tool and kernel with the patch
next in this series. That patch removes the work around that masked
the hw bug:

  $ ./lbr_perf record --call-graph lbr -e cycles:k sleep 1

where lbr_perf is the patched perf tool, that allows to specify :k
on lbr mode. The above command will trigger a #GPF :

 WARNING: CPU: 28 PID: 14096 at arch/x86/mm/extable.c:65 ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe+0x70/0x80
 unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x681 (tried to write 0x1fffffff81010794)
 ...
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff8167af49>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x63
  [<ffffffff810b9b15>] __warn+0xe5/0x100
  [<ffffffff810b9be9>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x49/0x50
  [<ffffffff810abb40>] ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe+0x70/0x80
  [<ffffffff810abc42>] fixup_exception+0x42/0x50
  [<ffffffff81079d1a>] do_general_protection+0x8a/0x160
  [<ffffffff81684ec2>] general_protection+0x22/0x30
  [<ffffffff810101b9>] ? intel_pmu_lbr_sched_task+0xc9/0x380
  [<ffffffff81009d7c>] intel_pmu_sched_task+0x3c/0x60
  [<ffffffff81003a2b>] x86_pmu_sched_task+0x1b/0x20
  [<ffffffff81192a5b>] perf_pmu_sched_task+0x6b/0xb0
  [<ffffffff8119746d>] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x7d/0x150
  [<ffffffff810dd9dc>] finish_task_switch+0x15c/0x200
  [<ffffffff8167f894>] __schedule+0x274/0x6cc
  [<ffffffff8167fdd9>] schedule+0x39/0x90
  [<ffffffff81675398>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x39/0x89
  [<ffffffff810028ce>] prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x2e/0x30
  [<ffffffff81683c1b>] retint_user+0x8/0x10

Signed-off-by: David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466533874-52003-5-git-send-email-davidcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 11:34:20 +02:00
David Carrillo-Cisneros
3812bba84f perf/x86/intel: Fix trivial formatting and style bug
Replace spaces by tabs in LBR_FROM_* constants to align with newly
defined constant. Use BIT_ULL.

Signed-off-by: David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466533874-52003-4-git-send-email-davidcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 11:34:19 +02:00
David Carrillo-Cisneros
19fc9ddd61 perf/x86/intel: Fix MSR_LAST_BRANCH_FROM_x bug when no TSX
Intel's SDM states that bits 61:62 in MSR_LAST_BRANCH_FROM_x are the
TSX flags for formats with LBR_TSX flags (i.e. LBR_FORMAT_EIP_EFLAGS2).

However, when the CPU has TSX support deactivated, bits 61:62 actually
behave as follows:

  - For wrmsr(), bits 61:62 are considered part of the sign extension.
  - When capturing branches, the LBR hw will always clear bits 61:62.
    regardless of the sign extension.

Therefore, if:

  1) LBR has TSX format.
  2) CPU has no TSX support enabled.

... then any value passed to wrmsr() must be sign extended to 63 bits
and any value from rdmsr() must be converted to have a sign extension
of 61 bits, ignoring the values at TSX flags.

This bug was masked by the work-around to the Intel's CPU bug:
BJ94. "LBR May Contain Incorrect Information When Using FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI"
in Document Number: 324643-037US.

The aforementioned work-around uses hw flags to filter out all kernel
branches, limiting LBR callstack to user level execution only.

Since user addresses are not sign extended, they do not trigger the wrmsr()
bug in MSR_LAST_BRANCH_FROM_x when saved/restored at context switch.

To verify the hw bug:

  $ perf record -b -e cycles sleep 1
  $ rdmsr -p 0 0x680
  0x1fffffffb0b9b0cc
  $ wrmsr -p 0 0x680 0x1fffffffb0b9b0cc
  write(): Input/output error

The quirk for LBR_FROM_ MSRs is required before calls to wrmsrl() and
after rdmsrl().

This patch introduces it for wrmsrl()'s done for testing LBR support.

Future patch in series adds the quirk for context switch, that would
be required if LBR callstack is to be enabled for ring 0.

Signed-off-by: David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466533874-52003-3-git-send-email-davidcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 11:34:19 +02:00
David Carrillo-Cisneros
f09509b939 perf/x86/intel: Print LBR support statement after validation
The following commit:

  338b522ca4 ("perf/x86/intel: Protect LBR and extra_regs against KVM lying")

added an additional test to LBR support detection that is performed after
printing the LBR support statement to dmesg.

Move the LBR support output after the very last test, to make sure we
print the true status of LBR support.

Signed-off-by: David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466533874-52003-2-git-send-email-davidcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 11:34:18 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
8114e90ea4 Linux 4.7-rc5
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Merge tag 'v4.7-rc5' into perf/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-27 11:20:46 +02:00
Megha Dey
4c79f6f81a crypto: sha1-mb - rename sha-mb to sha1-mb
Until now, there was only support for the SHA1 multibuffer algorithm.
Hence, there was just one sha-mb folder. Now, with the introduction of
the SHA256 multi-buffer algorithm , it is logical to name the existing
folder as sha1-mb.

Signed-off-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-06-27 16:57:47 +08:00
Megha Dey
992532474f crypto: sha256-mb - Crypto computation (x8 AVX2)
This patch introduces the assembly routines to do SHA256 computation
on buffers belonging to several jobs at once.  The assembly routines
are optimized with AVX2 instructions that have 8 data lanes and using
AVX2 registers.

Signed-off-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-06-27 16:57:45 +08:00
Megha Dey
98cf10383a crypto: sha256-mb - Algorithm data structures
This patch introduces the data structures and prototypes of
functions needed for computing SHA256 hash using multi-buffer.
Included are the structures of the multi-buffer SHA256 job,
job scheduler in C and x86 assembly.

Signed-off-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-06-27 16:57:45 +08:00
Megha Dey
a377c6b187 crypto: sha256-mb - submit/flush routines for AVX2
This patch introduces the routines used to submit and flush buffers
belonging to SHA256 crypto jobs to the SHA256 multibuffer algorithm. It
is implemented mostly in assembly optimized with AVX2 instructions.

Signed-off-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-06-27 16:57:44 +08:00
Megha Dey
f876f440df crypto: sha256-mb - SHA256 multibuffer job manager and glue code
This patch introduces the multi-buffer job manager which is responsible for
submitting scatter-gather buffers from several SHA256 jobs to the
multi-buffer algorithm. It also contains the flush routine to that's
called by the crypto daemon to complete the job when no new jobs arrive
before the deadline of maximum latency of a SHA256 crypto job.

The SHA256 multi-buffer crypto algorithm is defined and initialized in
this patch.

Signed-off-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-06-27 16:57:41 +08:00
Stephan Linz
fed758f6b7 unicore32: use the new LED disk activity trigger
- platform: rename 'ide-disk' to 'disk-activity'
- defconfig: rename 'LEDS_TRIGGER_IDE_DISK' to 'LEDS_TRIGGER_DISK'

Signed-off-by: Stephan Linz <linz@li-pro.net>
Acked-by: GUAN Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Anaszewski <j.anaszewski@samsung.com>
2016-06-27 08:58:42 +02:00
Stephan Linz
f457253708 parisc: use the new LED disk activity trigger
- platform: rename 'ide-disk' to 'disk-activity'

Signed-off-by: Stephan Linz <linz@li-pro.net>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Anaszewski <j.anaszewski@samsung.com>
2016-06-27 08:58:41 +02:00
Stephan Linz
dde005128e mips: use the new LED disk activity trigger
- platform: rename 'ide-disk' to 'disk-activity'
- defconfig: rename 'LEDS_TRIGGER_IDE_DISK' to 'LEDS_TRIGGER_DISK'

Signed-off-by: Stephan Linz <linz@li-pro.net>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Anaszewski <j.anaszewski@samsung.com>
2016-06-27 08:58:41 +02:00
Stephan Linz
e580822775 arm: use the new LED disk activity trigger
- dts: rename 'ide-disk' to 'disk-activity'
- platform: rename 'ide-disk' to 'disk-activity'
- defconfig: rename 'LEDS_TRIGGER_IDE_DISK' to 'LEDS_TRIGGER_DISK'

Signed-off-by: Stephan Linz <linz@li-pro.net>
Acked-by: Sekhar Nori <nsekhar@ti.com>
Acked-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Anaszewski <j.anaszewski@samsung.com>
2016-06-27 08:58:40 +02:00
Stephan Linz
83e2c70e84 powerpc: use the new LED disk activity trigger
- dts: rename 'ide-disk' to 'disk-activity'
- defconfig: rename 'ADB_PMU_LED_IDE' to 'ADB_PMU_LED_DISK'

Cc: Joseph Jezak <josejx@gentoo.org>
Cc: Jörg Sommer <joerg@alea.gnuu.de>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Linz <linz@li-pro.net>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Anaszewski <j.anaszewski@samsung.com>
2016-06-27 08:58:40 +02:00
Javier Martinez Canillas
0650692487 ARM: multi_v7_defconfig: Enable vivid driver as a module
The Virtual Video Test Driver can be used to emulate video capture and
output devices so it's very useful for testing. Since is not necessary
to boot, can be enabled as module to avoid increasing the kernel size.

Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski@samsung.com>
2016-06-27 08:19:09 +02:00
Javier Martinez Canillas
4d7406ef08 ARM: exynos_defconfig: Enable vivid driver as a module
The Virtual Video Test Driver can be used to emulate video capture and
output devices so it's very useful for testing. Since is not necessary
to boot, can be enabled as module to avoid increasing the kernel size.

Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski@samsung.com>
2016-06-27 08:18:54 +02:00
Douglas Anderson
5d26ad9cfb arm64: dts: rockchip: add ap_pwroff and ddrio_pwroff pins for rk3399
There are two sleep related pins on rk3399: ap_pwroff and ddrio_pwroff.
Let's add the definition of these two pins to rk3399's main dtsi file so
that boards can use them.

These two pins are similar to the global_pwroff and ddrio_pwroff pins in
rk3288 and are expected to be used in the same way: boards will likely
want to configure these pinctrl settings in their global pinctrl hog
list.

Note that on rk3288 there were two additional pins in the "sleep"
section: "ddr0_retention" and "ddr1_retention".  On rk3288 designs these
pins appeared to actually route from rk3288 back to rk3288.  Presumably
on rk3399 this is simply not needed since the pins don't appear to exist
there.

Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
2016-06-27 01:07:40 +02:00
Yinghai Lu
e066cc4777 x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the load address
Currently the kernel image physical address randomization's lower
boundary is the original kernel load address.

For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory (e.g. kexec),
this means randomization takes place in a very small window at the
top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below
the load address.

Since mem_avoid[] is already correctly tracking the regions that must be
avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less:
512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the
load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M,
8G) will be added to the list of possible physical memory positions.

Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
[ Rewrote the changelog, refactored the code to use min(). ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
[ Edited the changelog some more, plus the code comment as well. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-26 12:32:05 +02:00
Kees Cook
ed9f007ee6 x86/KASLR: Extend kernel image physical address randomization to addresses larger than 4G
We want the physical address to be randomized anywhere between
16MB and the top of physical memory (up to 64TB).

This patch exchanges the prior slots[] array for the new slot_areas[]
array, and lifts the limitation of KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on the physical
address offset for 64-bit. As before, process_e820_entry() walks
memory and populates slot_areas[], splitting on any detected mem_avoid
collisions.

Finally, since the slots[] array and its associated functions are not
needed any more, so they are removed.

Based on earlier patches by Baoquan He.

Originally-from: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-26 12:32:05 +02:00
Baoquan He
8391c73c96 x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately
The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual
addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It
calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked
to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0
(i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done.

On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel
is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and
will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function
arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly
updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address,
we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing
kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new
virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address,
so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset.

Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel
addresses since they are potentially separate now.

[kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks]
[kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure]
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-26 12:32:04 +02:00
Kees Cook
11fdf97a3c x86/KASLR: Clarify identity map interface
This extracts the call to prepare_level4() into a top-level function
that the user of the pagetable.c interface must call to initialize
the new page tables. For clarity and to match the "finalize" function,
it has been renamed to initialize_identity_maps(). This function also
gains the initialization of mapping_info so we don't have to do it each
time in add_identity_map().

Additionally add copyright notice to the top, to make it clear that the
bulk of the pagetable.c code was written by Yinghai, and that I just
added bugs later. :)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-26 12:32:04 +02:00
Kees Cook
98f7852537 x86/boot: Refuse to build with data relocations
The compressed kernel is built with -fPIC/-fPIE so that it can run in any
location a bootloader happens to put it. However, since ELF relocation
processing is not happening (and all the relocation information has
already been stripped at link time), none of the code can use data
relocations (e.g. static assignments of pointers). This is already noted
in a warning comment at the top of misc.c, but this adds an explicit
check for the condition during the linking stage to block any such bugs
from appearing.

If this was in place with the earlier bug in pagetable.c, the build
would fail like this:

  ...
    CC      arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.o
    DATAREL arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux
  error: arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.o has data relocations!
  make[2]: *** [arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux] Error 1
  ...

A clean build shows:

  ...
    CC      arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.o
    DATAREL arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux
    LD      arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux
  ...

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-26 12:32:03 +02:00
Kees Cook
65fe935dd2 x86/KASLR, x86/power: Remove x86 hibernation restrictions
With the following fix:

  70595b479ce1 ("x86/power/64: Fix crash whan the hibernation code passes control to the image kernel")

... there is no longer a problem with hibernation resuming a
KASLR-booted kernel image, so remove the restriction.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linux PM list <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160613221002.GA29719@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-26 12:32:03 +02:00
Olof Johansson
ed749a53b2 mvebu fixes for 4.7 (part 1)
Various I/O memory fix for Cortex A9 based SoCs
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Merge tag 'mvebu-fixes-4.7-1' of git://git.infradead.org/linux-mvebu into fixes

mvebu fixes for 4.7 (part 1)

Various I/O memory fix for Cortex A9 based SoCs

* tag 'mvebu-fixes-4.7-1' of git://git.infradead.org/linux-mvebu:
  ARM: dts: armada-38x: fix MBUS_ID for crypto SRAM on Armada 385 Linksys
  ARM: mvebu: map PCI I/O regions strongly ordered
  ARM: mvebu: fix HW I/O coherency related deadlocks

Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
2016-06-25 21:19:37 -07:00
Arnd Bergmann
d6faca40f4 rtc: move mc146818 helper functions out-of-line
The mc146818_get_time/mc146818_set_time functions are rather large
inline functions in a global header file and are used in several
drivers and in x86 specific code.

Here we move them into a separate .c file that is compiled whenever
any of the users require it. This also lets us remove the linux/acpi.h
header inclusion from mc146818rtc.h, which in turn avoids some
warnings about duplicate definition of the TRUE/FALSE macros.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
2016-06-26 01:20:08 +02:00
Arnd Bergmann
5ee98ab3a8 mn10300: use RTC_DRV_CMOS instead of CONFIG_RTC
nn10300 has a dependency on mc146818_get_time/mc146818_set_time,
which we want to move from the mc146818rtc.h header into the
rtc subsystem, which in turn is not usable on mn10300.

This changes mn10300 to use the modern rtc-cmos driver instead
of the old RTC driver, and that in turn lets us completely
remove the read_persistent_clock/update_persistent_clock callbacks.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
2016-06-26 01:20:08 +02:00
Jiri Slaby
6137b7a629 tty: stop defining STD_COM_FLAGS in drivers
STD_COM_FLAGS is mostly a bad name for what the drivers thinks it is.
Stop using it and pass the flags directly.

cyclades defines it as 0, so we do not assign anything to freshly
tty_port_init'ed structure.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-06-25 08:56:30 -07:00
Jiri Slaby
5691e03593 tty: frv, remove unused serial macros
STD_COM_FLAGS needs not be defined as it is not used anywhere on frv.

SERIAL_PORT_DFNS is defined to be empty. 8250 is aware of empty
SERIAL_PORT_DFNS and does:
 #ifndef SERIAL_PORT_DFNS
 #define SERIAL_PORT_DFNS
 #endif

So no need to define it on frv.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-06-25 08:56:30 -07:00