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1,169,205 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Andrew Donnellan
c88017cf2a powerpc/powernv: Rate limit opal-elog read failure message
Sometimes we can't read an error log from OPAL, and we print an error
message accordingly. But the OPAL userspace tools seem to like retrying a
lot, in which case we flood the kernel log with a lot of messages.

Change pr_err() to pr_err_ratelimited() to help with this.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211021140.28402-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-12-15 22:53:27 +11:00
Laurent Dufour
20e9de85ed powerpc/pseries/memhotplug: Quieten some DLPAR operations
When attempting to remove by index a set of LMBs a lot of messages are
displayed on the console, even when everything goes fine:

  pseries-hotplug-mem: Attempting to hot-remove LMB, drc index 8000002d
  Offlined Pages 4096
  pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 2d0000000 was hot-removed

The 2 messages prefixed by "pseries-hotplug-mem" are not really
helpful for the end user, they should be debug outputs.

In case of error, because some of the LMB's pages couldn't be
offlined, the following is displayed on the console:

  pseries-hotplug-mem: Attempting to hot-remove LMB, drc index 8000003e
  pseries-hotplug-mem: Failed to hot-remove memory at 3e0000000
  dlpar: Could not handle DLPAR request "memory remove index 0x8000003e"

Again, the 2 messages prefixed by "pseries-hotplug-mem" are useless,
and the generic DLPAR prefixed message should be enough.

These 2 first changes are mainly triggered by the changes introduced
in drmgr:
  https://groups.google.com/g/powerpc-utils-devel/c/Y6ef4NB3EzM/m/9cu5JHRxAQAJ

Also, when adding a bunch of LMBs, a message is displayed in the console per LMB
like these ones:
  pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 7e0000000 (drc index 8000007e) was hot-added
  pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 7f0000000 (drc index 8000007f) was hot-added
  pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 800000000 (drc index 80000080) was hot-added
  pseries-hotplug-mem: Memory at 810000000 (drc index 80000081) was hot-added

When adding 1TB of memory and LMB size is 256MB, this leads to 4096
messages to be displayed on the console. These messages are not really
helpful for the end user, so moving them to the DEBUG level.

Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Tweak change log wording]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201211145954.90143-1-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
2020-12-15 22:51:40 +11:00
Vincent Stehlé
d0edaa28a1 powerpc/ps3: use dma_mapping_error()
The DMA address returned by dma_map_single() should be checked with
dma_mapping_error(). Fix the ps3stor_setup() function accordingly.

Fixes: 80071802cb ("[POWERPC] PS3: Storage Driver Core")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Stehlé <vincent.stehle@laposte.net>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201213182622.23047-1-vincent.stehle@laposte.net
2020-12-15 22:50:12 +11:00
Christophe Leroy
328e7e487a powerpc: force inlining of csum_partial() to avoid multiple csum_partial() with GCC10
ppc-linux-objdump -d vmlinux | grep -e "<csum_partial>" -e "<__csum_partial>"

With gcc9 I get:

	c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>:
	c00182fc:	4b ff fb fd 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c0018478:	4b ff fa 80 	b       c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c03e8458:	4b c2 fa a0 	b       c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c03e8518:	4b c2 f9 e1 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c03ef410:	4b c2 8a e9 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c03f0b24:	4b c2 73 d5 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04279a4:	4b bf 05 55 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c0429820:	4b be e6 d9 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c0429944:	4b be e5 b5 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c042b478:	4b be ca 81 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c042b554:	4b be c9 a5 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c045f15c:	4b bb 8d 9d 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c0492190:	4b b8 5d 69 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c0492310:	4b b8 5b e9 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c0495594:	4b b8 29 65 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c049c420:	4b b7 ba d9 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c049c870:	4b b7 b6 89 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c049c930:	4b b7 b5 c9 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04a9ca0:	4b b6 e2 59 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04bdde4:	4b b5 a1 15 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04be480:	4b b5 9a 79 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04be710:	4b b5 97 e9 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04c969c:	4b b4 e8 5d 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04ca2fc:	4b b4 db fd 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04cf5bc:	4b b4 89 3d 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>
	c04d0440:	4b b4 7a b9 	bl      c0017ef8 <__csum_partial>

With gcc10 I get:

	c0018d08 <__csum_partial>:
	c0019020 <csum_partial>:
	c0019020:	4b ff fc e8 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c001914c:	4b ff fe d4 	b       c0019020 <csum_partial>
	c0019250:	4b ff fd d1 	bl      c0019020 <csum_partial>
	c03e404c <csum_partial>:
	c03e404c:	4b c3 4c bc 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c03e4050:	4b ff ff fc 	b       c03e404c <csum_partial>
	c03e40fc:	4b ff ff 51 	bl      c03e404c <csum_partial>
	c03e6680:	4b ff d9 cd 	bl      c03e404c <csum_partial>
	c03e68c4:	4b ff d7 89 	bl      c03e404c <csum_partial>
	c03e7934:	4b ff c7 19 	bl      c03e404c <csum_partial>
	c03e7bf8:	4b ff c4 55 	bl      c03e404c <csum_partial>
	c03eb148:	4b ff 8f 05 	bl      c03e404c <csum_partial>
	c03ecf68:	4b c2 bd a1 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04275b8 <csum_partial>:
	c04275b8:	4b bf 17 50 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0427884:	4b ff fd 35 	bl      c04275b8 <csum_partial>
	c0427b18:	4b ff fa a1 	bl      c04275b8 <csum_partial>
	c0427bd8:	4b ff f9 e1 	bl      c04275b8 <csum_partial>
	c0427cd4:	4b ff f8 e5 	bl      c04275b8 <csum_partial>
	c0427e34:	4b ff f7 85 	bl      c04275b8 <csum_partial>
	c045a1c0:	4b bb eb 49 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0489464 <csum_partial>:
	c0489464:	4b b8 f8 a4 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04896b0:	4b ff fd b5 	bl      c0489464 <csum_partial>
	c048982c:	4b ff fc 39 	bl      c0489464 <csum_partial>
	c0490158:	4b b8 8b b1 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0492f0c <csum_partial>:
	c0492f0c:	4b b8 5d fc 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c049326c:	4b ff fc a1 	bl      c0492f0c <csum_partial>
	c049333c:	4b ff fb d1 	bl      c0492f0c <csum_partial>
	c0493b18:	4b ff f3 f5 	bl      c0492f0c <csum_partial>
	c0493f50:	4b ff ef bd 	bl      c0492f0c <csum_partial>
	c0493ffc:	4b ff ef 11 	bl      c0492f0c <csum_partial>
	c04a0f78:	4b b7 7d 91 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04b3e3c:	4b b6 4e cd 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04b40d0 <csum_partial>:
	c04b40d0:	4b b6 4c 38 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04b4448:	4b ff fc 89 	bl      c04b40d0 <csum_partial>
	c04b46f4:	4b ff f9 dd 	bl      c04b40d0 <csum_partial>
	c04bf448:	4b b5 98 c0 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04c5264:	4b b5 3a a5 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04c61e4:	4b b5 2b 25 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>

gcc10 defines multiple versions of csum_partial() which are just
an unconditionnal branch to __csum_partial().

To enforce inlining of that branch to __csum_partial(),
mark csum_partial() as __always_inline.

With this patch with gcc10:

	c0018d08 <__csum_partial>:
	c0019148:	4b ff fb c0 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c001924c:	4b ff fa bd 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c03e40ec:	4b c3 4c 1d 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c03e4120:	4b c3 4b e8 	b       c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c03eb004:	4b c2 dd 05 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c03ecef4:	4b c2 be 15 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0427558:	4b bf 17 b1 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04286e4:	4b bf 06 25 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0428cd8:	4b bf 00 31 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0428d84:	4b be ff 85 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c045a17c:	4b bb eb 8d 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0489450:	4b b8 f8 b9 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0491860:	4b b8 74 a9 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c0492eec:	4b b8 5e 1d 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04a0eac:	4b b7 7e 5d 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04b3e34:	4b b6 4e d5 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04b426c:	4b b6 4a 9d 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04b463c:	4b b6 46 cd 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04c004c:	4b b5 8c bd 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04c0368:	4b b5 89 a1 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04c5254:	4b b5 3a b5 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>
	c04c60d4:	4b b5 2c 35 	bl      c0018d08 <__csum_partial>

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool  <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a1d31f84ddb0926813b17fcd5cc7f3fa7b4deac2.1602759123.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
2020-12-15 22:50:11 +11:00
Madhavan Srinivasan
ef0e3b650f powerpc/perf: Fix Threshold Event Counter Multiplier width for P10
Threshold Event Counter Multiplier (TECM) is part of Monitor Mode
Control Register A (MMCRA). This field along with Threshold Event
Counter Exponent (TECE) is used to get threshould counter value.
In Power10, this is a 8bit field, so patch fixes the
current code to modify the MMCRA[TECM] extraction macro to
handle this change. ISA v3.1 says this is a 7 bit field but
POWER10 it's actually 8 bits which will hopefully be fixed
in ISA v3.1 update.

Fixes: 170a315f41 ("powerpc/perf: Support to export MMCRA[TEC*] field to userspace")
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1608022578-1532-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
2020-12-15 22:50:04 +11:00
Christophe Leroy
2198d4934e powerpc/mm: Fix hugetlb_free_pmd_range() and hugetlb_free_pud_range()
Commit 7bfe54b5f1 ("powerpc/mm: Refactor the floor/ceiling check in
hugetlb range freeing functions") inadvertely removed the mask
applied to start parameter in those two functions, leading to the
following crash on power9.

  LTP: starting hugemmap05_1 (hugemmap05 -m)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c:387!
  Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=256 NUMA PowerNV
  ...
  CPU: 99 PID: 308 Comm: ksoftirqd/99 Tainted: G           O      5.10.0-rc7-next-20201211 #1
  NIP:  c00000000005dbec LR: c0000000003352f4 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c00020000bb6f830 TRAP: 0700   Tainted: G           O       (5.10.0-rc7-next-20201211)
  MSR:  900000000282b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24002284  XER: 20040000
  GPR00: c0000000003352f4 c00020000bb6fad0 c000000007f70b00 c0002000385b3ff0
  GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 c00020000bb6f8b4 0000000000000001
  GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000009 0000000000000008 0000000000000002
  GPR12: 0000000024002488 c000201fff649c00 c000000007f2a20c 0000000000000000
  GPR16: 0000000000000007 0000000000000000 c000000000194d10 c000000000194d10
  GPR24: 0000000000000014 0000000000000015 c000201cc6e72398 c000000007fac4b4
  GPR28: c000000007f2bf80 c000000007fac2f8 0000000000000008 c000200033870000
  NIP [c00000000005dbec] __tlb_remove_table+0x1dc/0x1e0
                         pgtable_free at arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c:387
                         (inlined by) __tlb_remove_table at arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c:405
  LR [c0000000003352f4] tlb_remove_table_rcu+0x54/0xa0
  Call Trace:
    __tlb_remove_table+0x13c/0x1e0 (unreliable)
    tlb_remove_table_rcu+0x54/0xa0
    __tlb_remove_table_free at mm/mmu_gather.c:101
    (inlined by) tlb_remove_table_rcu at mm/mmu_gather.c:156
    rcu_core+0x35c/0xbb0
    rcu_do_batch at kernel/rcu/tree.c:2502
    (inlined by) rcu_core at kernel/rcu/tree.c:2737
    __do_softirq+0x480/0x704
    run_ksoftirqd+0x74/0xd0
    run_ksoftirqd at kernel/softirq.c:651
    (inlined by) run_ksoftirqd at kernel/softirq.c:642
    smpboot_thread_fn+0x278/0x320
    kthread+0x1c4/0x1d0
    ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x80

Properly apply the masks before calling pmd_free_tlb() and
pud_free_tlb() respectively.

Fixes: 7bfe54b5f1 ("powerpc/mm: Refactor the floor/ceiling check in hugetlb range freeing functions")
Reported-by: Qian Cai <qcai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/56feccd7b6fcd98e353361a233fa7bb8e67c3164.1607780469.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
2020-12-15 22:22:07 +11:00
Leonardo Bras
87fb4978ef KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix mask size for emulated msgsndp
According to ISAv3.1 and ISAv3.0b, the msgsndp is described to split
RB in:
  msgtype <- (RB) 32:36
  payload <- (RB) 37:63
  t       <- (RB) 57:63

The current way of getting 'msgtype', and 't' is missing their MSB:
  msgtype: ((arg >> 27) & 0xf) : Gets (RB) 33:36, missing bit 32
  t:       (arg &= 0x3f)       : Gets (RB) 58:63, missing bit 57

Fixes this by applying the correct mask.

Signed-off-by: Leonardo Bras <leobras.c@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208215707.31149-1-leobras.c@gmail.com
2020-12-15 22:22:06 +11:00
Kaixu Xia
a300bf8c5f KVM: PPC: fix comparison to bool warning
Fix the following coccicheck warning:

./arch/powerpc/kvm/booke.c:503:6-16: WARNING: Comparison to bool
./arch/powerpc/kvm/booke.c:505:6-17: WARNING: Comparison to bool
./arch/powerpc/kvm/booke.c:507:6-16: WARNING: Comparison to bool

Reported-by: Tosk Robot <tencent_os_robot@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <kaixuxia@tencent.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604764178-8087-1-git-send-email-kaixuxia@tencent.com
2020-12-15 22:22:06 +11:00
Kaixu Xia
13751f8747 KVM: PPC: Book3S: Assign boolean values to a bool variable
Fix the following coccinelle warnings:

./arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xics.c:476:3-15: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable
./arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xics.c:504:3-15: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable

Reported-by: Tosk Robot <tencent_os_robot@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <kaixuxia@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604730382-5810-1-git-send-email-kaixuxia@tencent.com
2020-12-15 22:22:06 +11:00
Thomas Gleixner
3dcb8b53cb Followup fixes for EFI:
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes
 - suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
   EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
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 6NATV9w3NM1+OZMRfnFH5Tqet18II9Lgri5r+Cgngq55QT9lnJuRdRfkzGjplPwu
 +kSk84twUVSwrhy1/h9+zzlzLPWlRSKPqY/IfxXpzQZzxGzD01YgreyneLxBvphh
 QUsRD1I5W1UqBXhuindr0jAd7J94uPp0wSoQziafSUzAA2E6ntgGVUqEr78+ktGy
 g50h+odETjwxVRNdFW+CFl1t/dvrWxewgiuO9MxHko4J9ySGmRUkqy5x9p++q/3S
 6Mpzk+xGCPLKqX109pJFI3uNdDyc3spFa6uDyRGashf+UBPcAPWP0lfR5gqB2L8f
 r5xpnt4BCTjzRnv5dryjHd3BJYn8/QmxvU81uDfkJ7yRQwA8WcGoexSz2DvChM8U
 y1x2SANyHk5YzctNoe0OY2KC2wu1US006l3CdQEVZB6iEW5LkER/6RyZ5uNR/98b
 Nvv16Xdy
 =ZTHO
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.11-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core

Pull followup fixes for EFI from Ard Biesheuvel:

 - fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes

 - suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
   EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201215080144.17077-1-ardb@kernel.org
2020-12-15 12:14:38 +01:00
Tian Tao
c855af2f9c drm/hisilicon: Fix use-after-free
Fix the problem of dev being released twice.
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 75 PID: 15700 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd4/0x150
CPU: 75 PID: 15700 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G            E     5.10.0-rc3+ #3
Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 200 (Model 2280)/BC82AMDDA, BIOS 0.88 07/24/2019
pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xd4/0x150
lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xd4/0x150
sp : ffff2028150cbc00
x29: ffff2028150cbc00 x28: ffff2028150121c0
x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000003
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff2028150cbc90
x21: ffff2020038a30a8 x20: ffff2028150cbc90
x19: ffff0020cd938020 x18: 0000000000000010
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffff2028950cb88f
x13: ffff2028150cb89d x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000005f5e0ff x10: ffff2028150cb800
x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 x8 : 75203b776f6c6672
x7 : ffff800011a6f7c8 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff202ffe2f9dc0
x1 : ffffa02fecf40000 x0 : 0000000000000026
Call trace:
 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd4/0x150
 devm_drm_dev_init_release+0x50/0x70
 devm_action_release+0x20/0x30
 release_nodes+0x13c/0x218
 devres_release_all+0x80/0x170
 device_release_driver_internal+0x128/0x1f0
 driver_detach+0x6c/0xe0
 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0x100
 driver_unregister+0x34/0x60
 pci_unregister_driver+0x24/0xd8
 hibmc_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0xe858 [hibmc_drm]
 __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1fc/0x2d0
 el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xa8/0x188
 do_el0_svc+0x80/0xa0
 el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xb0
 el0_sync+0x15c/0x180
CPU: 75 PID: 15700 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G            E     5.10.0-rc3+ #3
Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 200 (Model 2280)/BC82AMDDA, BIOS 0.88 07/24/2019
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x208
 show_stack+0x2c/0x40
 dump_stack+0xd8/0x10c
 __warn+0xac/0x128
 report_bug+0xcc/0x180
 bug_handler+0x24/0x78
 call_break_hook+0x80/0xa0
 brk_handler+0x28/0x68
 do_debug_exception+0x9c/0x148
 el1_sync_handler+0x7c/0x128
 el1_sync+0x80/0x100
 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd4/0x150
 devm_drm_dev_init_release+0x50/0x70
 devm_action_release+0x20/0x30
 release_nodes+0x13c/0x218
 devres_release_all+0x80/0x170
 device_release_driver_internal+0x128/0x1f0
 driver_detach+0x6c/0xe0
 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0x100
 driver_unregister+0x34/0x60
 pci_unregister_driver+0x24/0xd8
 hibmc_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0xe858 [hibmc_drm]
 __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1fc/0x2d0
 el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xa8/0x188
 do_el0_svc+0x80/0xa0
 el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xb0
 el0_sync+0x15c/0x180
---[ end trace 00718630d6e5ff18 ]---

Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1607941973-32287-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com
2020-12-15 05:49:21 -05:00
Maxime Ripard
f3c420fe19
drm/vc4: kms: Convert to atomic helpers
Now that the semaphore is gone, our atomic_commit implementation is
basically drm_atomic_helper_commit with a somewhat custom commit_tail,
the main difference being that we're using wait_for_flip_done instead of
wait_for_vblanks used in the drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail helper.

Let's switch to using drm_atomic_helper_commit.

Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204151138.1739736-8-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-12-15 11:36:13 +01:00
Maxime Ripard
82faa32760
drm/vc4: kms: Remove async modeset semaphore
Now that we have proper ordering guaranteed by the previous patch, the
semaphore is redundant and can be removed.

Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204151138.1739736-7-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-12-15 11:36:13 +01:00
Maxime Ripard
03b03efebe
drm/vc4: kms: Remove unassigned_channels from the HVS state
The HVS state now has both unassigned_channels that reflects the
channels that are not used in the associated state, and the in_use
boolean for each channel that says whether or not a particular channel
is in use.

Both express pretty much the same thing, and we need the in_use variable
to properly track the commits, so let's get rid of unassigned_channels.

Suggested-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204151138.1739736-6-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-12-15 11:36:11 +01:00
Maxime Ripard
9ec03d7f1e
drm/vc4: kms: Wait on previous FIFO users before a commit
If we're having two subsequent, non-blocking, commits on two different
CRTCs that share no resources, there's no guarantee on the order of
execution of both commits.

However, the second one will consider the first one as the old state,
and will be in charge of freeing it once that second commit is done.

If the first commit happens after that second commit, it might access
some resources related to its state that has been freed, resulting in a
use-after-free bug.

The standard DRM objects are protected against this, but our HVS private
state isn't so let's make sure we wait for all the previous FIFO users
to finish their commit before going with our own.

Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204151138.1739736-5-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-12-15 11:33:34 +01:00
Maxime Ripard
d62a8ed767
drm/vc4: Simplify a bit the global atomic_check
When we can't allocate a new channel, we can simply return instead of
having to handle both cases, and that simplifies a bit the code.

Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204151138.1739736-4-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-12-15 11:33:29 +01:00
Maxime Ripard
27125e86b7
drm: Document use-after-free gotcha with private objects
The private objects have a gotcha that could result in a use-after-free,
make sure it's properly documented.

Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204151138.1739736-3-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-12-15 11:33:23 +01:00
Maxime Ripard
ddadd40892
drm: Introduce an atomic_commit_setup function
Private objects storing a state shared across all CRTCs need to be
carefully handled to avoid a use-after-free issue.

The proper way to do this to track all the commits using that shared
state and wait for the previous commits to be done before going on with
the current one to avoid the reordering of commits that could occur.

However, this commit setup needs to be done after
drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit(), because before the CRTC commit
structure hasn't been allocated before, and before the workqueue is
scheduled, because we would be potentially reordered already otherwise.

That means that drivers currently have to roll their own
drm_atomic_helper_commit() function, even though it would be identical
if not for the commit setup.

Let's introduce a hook to do so that would be called as part of
drm_atomic_helper_commit, allowing us to reuse the atomic helpers.

Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204151138.1739736-2-maxime@cerno.tech
2020-12-15 11:33:08 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra
ae79270232 sched: Optimize finish_lock_switch()
The kernel test robot measured a -1.6% performance regression on
will-it-scale/sched_yield due to commit:

  2558aacff8 ("sched/hotplug: Ensure only per-cpu kthreads run during hotplug")

Even though we were careful to replace a single load with another
single load from the same cacheline.

Restore finish_lock_switch() to the exact state before the offending
patch and solve the problem differently.

Fixes: 2558aacff8 ("sched/hotplug: Ensure only per-cpu kthreads run during hotplug")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201210161408.GX3021@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2020-12-15 11:27:53 +01:00
Tom Lendacky
ad73109ae7 KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest
An SEV-ES guest is started by invoking a new SEV initialization ioctl,
KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. This identifies the guest as an SEV-ES guest, which is
used to drive the appropriate ASID allocation, VMSA encryption, etc.

Before being able to run an SEV-ES vCPU, the vCPU VMSA must be encrypted
and measured. This is done using the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command after all
calls to LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA have been performed, but before LAUNCH_MEASURE
has been performed. In order to establish the encrypted VMSA, the current
(traditional) VMSA and the GPRs are synced to the page that will hold the
encrypted VMSA and then LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is invoked. The vCPU is then
marked as having protected guest state.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e9643245adb809caf3a87c09997926d2f3d6ff41.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:21:00 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
16809ecdc1 KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests
The run sequence is different for an SEV-ES guest compared to a legacy or
even an SEV guest. The guest vCPU register state of an SEV-ES guest will
be restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT. There is no need to restore the
guest registers directly and through VMLOAD before VMRUN and no need to
save the guest registers directly and through VMSAVE on VMEXIT.

Update the svm_vcpu_run() function to skip register state saving and
restoring and provide an alternative function for running an SEV-ES guest
in vmenter.S

Additionally, certain host state is restored across an SEV-ES VMRUN. As
a result certain register states are not required to be restored upon
VMEXIT (e.g. FS, GS, etc.), so only do that if the guest is not an SEV-ES
guest.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fb1c66d32f2194e171b95fc1a8affd6d326e10c1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:59 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
861377730a KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB vCPU load/put requirements. SEV-ES
hardware will restore certain registers on VMEXIT, but not save them on
VMRUN (see Table B-3 and Table B-4 of the AMD64 APM Volume 2), so make the
following changes:

General vCPU load changes:
  - During vCPU loading, perform a VMSAVE to the per-CPU SVM save area and
    save the current values of XCR0, XSS and PKRU to the per-CPU SVM save
    area as these registers will be restored on VMEXIT.

General vCPU put changes:
  - Do not attempt to restore registers that SEV-ES hardware has already
    restored on VMEXIT.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <019390e9cb5e93cd73014fa5a040c17d42588733.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:59 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
376c6d2850 KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB initialization requirements for
vCPU creation and vCPU load/put requirements. This includes:

General VMCB initialization changes:
  - Set a VMCB control bit to enable SEV-ES support on the vCPU.
  - Set the VMCB encrypted VM save area address.
  - CRx registers are part of the encrypted register state and cannot be
    updated. Remove the CRx register read and write intercepts and replace
    them with CRx register write traps to track the CRx register values.
  - Certain MSR values are part of the encrypted register state and cannot
    be updated. Remove certain MSR intercepts (EFER, CR_PAT, etc.).
  - Remove the #GP intercept (no support for "enable_vmware_backdoor").
  - Remove the XSETBV intercept since the hypervisor cannot modify XCR0.

General vCPU creation changes:
  - Set the initial GHCB gpa value as per the GHCB specification.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <3a8aef366416eddd5556dfa3fdc212aafa1ad0a2.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:58 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
80675b3ad4 KVM: SVM: Update ASID allocation to support SEV-ES guests
SEV and SEV-ES guests each have dedicated ASID ranges. Update the ASID
allocation routine to return an ASID in the respective range.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d7aed505e31e3954268b2015bb60a1486269c780.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:57 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
85ca8be938 KVM: SVM: Set the encryption mask for the SVM host save area
The SVM host save area is used to restore some host state on VMEXIT of an
SEV-ES guest. After allocating the save area, clear it and add the
encryption mask to the SVM host save area physical address that is
programmed into the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <b77aa28af6d7f1a0cb545959e08d6dc75e0c3cba.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:57 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
4444dfe405 KVM: SVM: Add NMI support for an SEV-ES guest
The GHCB specification defines how NMIs are to be handled for an SEV-ES
guest. To detect the completion of an NMI the hypervisor must not
intercept the IRET instruction (because a #VC while running the NMI will
issue an IRET) and, instead, must receive an NMI Complete exit event from
the guest.

Update the KVM support for detecting the completion of NMIs in the guest
to follow the GHCB specification. When an SEV-ES guest is active, the
IRET instruction will no longer be intercepted. Now, when the NMI Complete
exit event is received, the iret_interception() function will be called
to simulate the completion of the NMI.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5ea3dd69b8d4396cefdc9048ebc1ab7caa70a847.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:56 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
ed02b21309 KVM: SVM: Guest FPU state save/restore not needed for SEV-ES guest
The guest FPU state is automatically restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT
by the hardware, so there is no reason to do this in KVM. Eliminate the
allocation of the guest_fpu save area and key off that to skip operations
related to the guest FPU state.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <173e429b4d0d962c6a443c4553ffdaf31b7665a4.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:56 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
5719455fbd KVM: SVM: Do not report support for SMM for an SEV-ES guest
SEV-ES guests do not currently support SMM. Update the has_emulated_msr()
kvm_x86_ops function to take a struct kvm parameter so that the capability
can be reported at a VM level.

Since this op is also called during KVM initialization and before a struct
kvm instance is available, comments will be added to each implementation
of has_emulated_msr() to indicate the kvm parameter can be null.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <75de5138e33b945d2fb17f81ae507bda381808e3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:55 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
5265713a07 KVM: x86: Update __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to support SEV-ES
Since many of the registers used by the SEV-ES are encrypted and cannot
be read or written, adjust the __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to take into
account whether the VMSA/guest state is encrypted.

For __get_sregs(), return the actual value that is in use by the guest
for all registers being tracked using the write trap support.

For __set_sregs(), skip setting of all guest registers values.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <23051868db76400a9b07a2020525483a1e62dbcf.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:54 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
d1949b93c6 KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:54 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
5b51cb1316 KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:53 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
f27ad38aac KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.

SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.

Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:52 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
2985afbcdb KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not
recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and
the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is
located in the encrypted register state.

SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides
intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new
EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the
hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER.

Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER
write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:51 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
7ed9abfe8e KVM: SVM: Support string IO operations for an SEV-ES guest
For an SEV-ES guest, string-based port IO is performed to a shared
(un-encrypted) page so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or
write to it and each see the contents.

For string-based port IO operations, invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the operation using common KVM port IO support.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <9d61daf0ffda496703717218f415cdc8fd487100.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:51 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
8f423a80d2 KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest
For an SEV-ES guest, MMIO is performed to a shared (un-encrypted) page
so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or write to it and each
see the contents.

The GHCB specification provides software-defined VMGEXIT exit codes to
indicate a request for an MMIO read or an MMIO write. Add support to
recognize the MMIO requests and invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the MMIO operation. These routines use common KVM support
to complete the MMIO operation.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <af8de55127d5bcc3253d9b6084a0144c12307d4d.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:50 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
59e38b58de KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT MSR protocol processing
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT MSR protocol
processing. The vCPU will be common for the trace events. The MSR
protocol processing is guided by the GHCB GPA in the VMCB, so the GHCB
GPA will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively. Additionally, the exit event will contain the
return code for the event.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c5b3b440c3e0db43ff2fc02813faa94fa54896b0.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:49 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
d523ab6ba2 KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT processing
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT processing. The vCPU
id and the exit reason will be common for the trace events. The exit info
fields will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <25357dca49a38372e8f483753fb0c1c2a70a6898.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:49 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
e1d71116b6 KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x100
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).

Function 0x100 is a request for termination of the guest. The guest has
encountered some situation for which it has requested to be terminated.
The GHCB MSR value contains the reason for the request.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f3a1f7850c75b6ea4101e15bbb4a3af1a203f1dc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:48 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
d36946679e KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x004
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).

Function 0x004 is a request for CPUID information. Only a single CPUID
result register can be sent per invocation, so the protocol defines the
register that is requested. The GHCB MSR value is set to the CPUID
register value as per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fd7ee347d3936e484c06e9001e340bf6387092cd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:48 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
1edc14599e KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x002
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).

Function 0x002 is a request to set the GHCB MSR value to the SEV INFO as
per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c23c163a505290a0d1b9efc4659b838c8c902cbc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:47 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
291bd20d5d KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT
SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a
VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is
obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs
for the VMGEXIT exit reason.

Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT
reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control
exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are
invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the
vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by
the hypervisor.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:47 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
e9093fd492 KVM: SVM: Prepare for SEV-ES exit handling in the sev.c file
This is a pre-patch to consolidate some exit handling code into callable
functions. Follow-on patches for SEV-ES exit handling will then be able
to use them from the sev.c file.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5b8b0ffca8137f3e1e257f83df9f5c881c8a96a3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:47 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
8164a5ffe4 KVM: SVM: Cannot re-initialize the VMCB after shutdown with SEV-ES
When a SHUTDOWN VMEXIT is encountered, normally the VMCB is re-initialized
so that the guest can be re-launched. But when a guest is running as an
SEV-ES guest, the VMSA cannot be re-initialized because it has been
encrypted. For now, just return -EINVAL to prevent a possible attempt at
a guest reset.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <aa6506000f6f3a574de8dbcdab0707df844cb00c.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:46 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
bc624d9f1b KVM: SVM: Do not allow instruction emulation under SEV-ES
When a guest is running as an SEV-ES guest, it is not possible to emulate
instructions. Add support to prevent instruction emulation.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f6355ea3024fda0a3eb5eb99c6b62dca10d792bd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:46 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
8d4846b9b1 KVM: SVM: Prevent debugging under SEV-ES
Since the guest register state of an SEV-ES guest is encrypted, debugging
is not supported. Update the code to prevent guest debugging when the
guest has protected state.

Additionally, an SEV-ES guest must only and always intercept DR7 reads and
writes. Update set_dr_intercepts() and clr_dr_intercepts() to account for
this.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8db966fa2f9803d6454ce773863025d0e2e7f3cc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:46 -05:00
Tom Lendacky
f1c6366e30 KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES
When a guest is running under SEV-ES, the hypervisor cannot access the
guest register state. There are numerous places in the KVM code where
certain registers are accessed that are not allowed to be accessed (e.g.
RIP, CR0, etc). Add checks to prevent register accesses and add intercept
update support at various points within the KVM code.

Also, when handling a VMGEXIT, exceptions are passed back through the
GHCB. Since the RDMSR/WRMSR intercepts (may) inject a #GP on error,
update the SVM intercepts to handle this for SEV-ES guests.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[Redo MSR part using the .complete_emulated_msr callback. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:45 -05:00
Paolo Bonzini
f9a4d62176 KVM: x86: introduce complete_emulated_msr callback
This will be used by SEV-ES to inject MSR failure via the GHCB.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:34 -05:00
Paolo Bonzini
8b474427cb KVM: x86: use kvm_complete_insn_gp in emulating RDMSR/WRMSR
Simplify the four functions that handle {kernel,user} {rd,wr}msr, there
is still some repetition between the two instances of rdmsr but the
whole business of calling kvm_inject_gp and kvm_skip_emulated_instruction
can be unified nicely.

Because complete_emulated_wrmsr now becomes essentially a call to
kvm_complete_insn_gp, remove complete_emulated_msr.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:20:09 -05:00
Paolo Bonzini
9caec4bf1d KVM: x86: remove bogus #GP injection
There is no need to inject a #GP from kvm_mtrr_set_msr, kvm_emulate_wrmsr will
handle it.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-15 05:18:30 -05:00
Maarten Lankhorst
ae75a0431f Merge drm/drm-next into drm-misc-next
Required backmerge since we will be based on top of v5.11, and there
has been a request to backmerge already to upstream some features.

Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
2020-12-15 11:05:43 +01:00