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8,077 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Paul Chaignon
feae34c992 bpf: Reject narrower access to pointer ctx fields
commit e09299225d upstream.

The following BPF program, simplified from a syzkaller repro, causes a
kernel warning:

    r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 169);
    exit;

With pointer field sk being at offset 168 in __sk_buff. This access is
detected as a narrower read in bpf_skb_is_valid_access because it
doesn't match offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk). It is therefore allowed
and later proceeds to bpf_convert_ctx_access. Note that for the
"is_narrower_load" case in the convert_ctx_accesses(), the insn->off
is aligned, so the cnt may not be 0 because it matches the
offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk) in the bpf_convert_ctx_access. However,
the target_size stays 0 and the verifier errors with a kernel warning:

    verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion(1)

This patch fixes that to return a proper "invalid bpf_context access
off=X size=Y" error on the load instruction.

The same issue affects multiple other fields in context structures that
allow narrow access. Some other non-affected fields (for sk_msg,
sk_lookup, and sockopt) were also changed to use bpf_ctx_range_ptr for
consistency.

Note this syzkaller crash was reported in the "Closes" link below, which
used to be about a different bug, fixed in
commit fce7bd8e38 ("bpf/verifier: Handle BPF_LOAD_ACQ instructions
in insn_def_regno()"). Because syzbot somehow confused the two bugs,
the new crash and repro didn't get reported to the mailing list.

Fixes: f96da09473 ("bpf: simplify narrower ctx access")
Fixes: 0df1a55afa ("bpf: Warn on internal verifier errors")
Reported-by: syzbot+0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3b8dcee67ff4296903351a974ddd9c4dca768b64.1753194596.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
[shung-hsi.yu: offset(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp) case was
dropped becasuse it was only added in v6.2 with commit 9bb053490f
("bpf: Add hwtstamp field for the sockops prog")]
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-02-06 16:41:59 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann
e0ffb64a2d bpf: Do not let BPF test infra emit invalid GSO types to stack
commit 04a899573f upstream.

Yinhao et al. reported that their fuzzer tool was able to trigger a
skb_warn_bad_offload() from netif_skb_features() -> gso_features_check().
When a BPF program - triggered via BPF test infra - pushes the packet
to the loopback device via bpf_clone_redirect() then mentioned offload
warning can be seen. GSO-related features are then rightfully disabled.

We get into this situation due to convert___skb_to_skb() setting
gso_segs and gso_size but not gso_type. Technically, it makes sense
that this warning triggers since the GSO properties are malformed due
to the gso_type. Potentially, the gso_type could be marked non-trustworthy
through setting it at least to SKB_GSO_DODGY without any other specific
assumptions, but that also feels wrong given we should not go further
into the GSO engine in the first place.

The checks were added in 121d57af30 ("gso: validate gso_type in GSO
handlers") because there were malicious (syzbot) senders that combine
a protocol with a non-matching gso_type. If we would want to drop such
packets, gso_features_check() currently only returns feature flags via
netif_skb_features(), so one location for potentially dropping such skbs
could be validate_xmit_unreadable_skb(), but then otoh it would be
an additional check in the fast-path for a very corner case. Given
bpf_clone_redirect() is the only place where BPF test infra could emit
such packets, lets reject them right there.

Fixes: 850a88cc40 ("bpf: Expose __sk_buff wire_len/gso_segs to BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN")
Fixes: cf62089b0e ("bpf: Add gso_size to __sk_buff")
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251020075441.127980-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-02-06 16:41:58 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
45126b1249 net: update netdev_lock_{type,name}
[ Upstream commit eb74c19fe1 ]

Add missing entries in netdev_lock_type[] and netdev_lock_name[] :

CAN, MCTP, RAWIP, CAIF, IP6GRE, 6LOWPAN, NETLINK, VSOCKMON,
IEEE802154_MONITOR.

Also add a WARN_ONCE() in netdev_lock_pos() to help future bug hunting
next time a protocol is added without updating these arrays.

Fixes: 1a33e10e4a ("net: partially revert dynamic lockdep key changes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108093244.830280-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-02-06 16:41:45 +01:00
Weiming Shi
c655d2167b net: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue
[ Upstream commit 2a71a1a8d0 ]

skbuff_fclone_cache was created without defining a usercopy region,
[1] unlike skbuff_head_cache which properly whitelists the cb[] field.
[2] This causes a usercopy BUG() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is
enabled and the kernel attempts to copy sk_buff.cb data to userspace
via sock_recv_errqueue() -> put_cmsg().

The crash occurs when: 1. TCP allocates an skb using alloc_skb_fclone()
   (from skbuff_fclone_cache) [1]
2. The skb is cloned via skb_clone() using the pre-allocated fclone
[3] 3. The cloned skb is queued to sk_error_queue for timestamp
reporting 4. Userspace reads the error queue via recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
5. sock_recv_errqueue() calls put_cmsg() to copy serr->ee from skb->cb
[4] 6. __check_heap_object() fails because skbuff_fclone_cache has no
   usercopy whitelist [5]

When cloned skbs allocated from skbuff_fclone_cache are used in the
socket error queue, accessing the sock_exterr_skb structure in skb->cb
via put_cmsg() triggers a usercopy hardening violation:

[    5.379589] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_fclone_cache' (offset 296, size 16)!
[    5.382796] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
[    5.383923] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[    5.384903] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 138 Comm: poc_put_cmsg Not tainted 6.12.57 #7
[    5.384903] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[    5.384903] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80
[    5.384903] Code: 1a 86 51 48 c7 c2 40 15 1a 86 41 52 48 c7 c7 c0 15 1a 86 48 0f 45 d6 48 c7 c6 80 15 1a 86 48 89 c1 49 0f 45 f3 e8 84 27 88 ff <0f> 0b 490
[    5.384903] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006f77a8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    5.384903] RAX: 000000000000006f RBX: ffff88800f0ad2a8 RCX: 1ffffffff0f72e74
[    5.384903] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff87b973a0
[    5.384903] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0f72e74
[    5.384903] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 79706f6372657375 R12: 0000000000000001
[    5.384903] R13: ffff88800f0ad2b8 R14: ffffea00003c2b40 R15: ffffea00003c2b00
[    5.384903] FS:  0000000011bc4380(0000) GS:ffff8880bf100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    5.384903] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    5.384903] CR2: 000056aa3b8e5fe4 CR3: 000000000ea26004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[    5.384903] PKRU: 55555554
[    5.384903] Call Trace:
[    5.384903]  <TASK>
[    5.384903]  __check_heap_object+0x9a/0xd0
[    5.384903]  __check_object_size+0x46c/0x690
[    5.384903]  put_cmsg+0x129/0x5e0
[    5.384903]  sock_recv_errqueue+0x22f/0x380
[    5.384903]  tls_sw_recvmsg+0x7ed/0x1960
[    5.384903]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[    5.384903]  ? schedule+0x6d/0x270
[    5.384903]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[    5.384903]  ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
[    5.384903]  ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[    5.384903]  ? __pfx_tls_sw_recvmsg+0x10/0x10
[    5.384903]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8f/0xf0
[    5.384903]  ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x40
[    5.384903]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5

The crash offset 296 corresponds to skb2->cb within skbuff_fclones:
  - sizeof(struct sk_buff) = 232 - offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb) = 40 -
  offset of skb2.cb in fclones = 232 + 40 = 272 - crash offset 296 =
  272 + 24 (inside sock_exterr_skb.ee)

This patch uses a local stack variable as a bounce buffer to avoid the hardened usercopy check failure.

[1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/ipv4/tcp.c#L885
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5104
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5566
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5491
[5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/mm/slub.c#L5719

Fixes: 6d07d1cd30 ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251223203534.1392218-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-19 13:10:16 +01:00
Dong Chenchen
d69f28ef7c page_pool: Fix use-after-free in page_pool_recycle_in_ring
[ Upstream commit 271683bb2c ]

syzbot reported a uaf in page_pool_recycle_in_ring:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x151/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5862
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880286045a0 by task syz.0.284/6943

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6943 Comm: syz.0.284 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-gdfa94ce54f41 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
 lock_release+0x151/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5862
 __raw_spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:165 [inline]
 _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1b/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:210
 spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:396 [inline]
 ptr_ring_produce_bh include/linux/ptr_ring.h:164 [inline]
 page_pool_recycle_in_ring net/core/page_pool.c:707 [inline]
 page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x748/0xb00 net/core/page_pool.c:826
 page_pool_put_netmem include/net/page_pool/helpers.h:323 [inline]
 page_pool_put_full_netmem include/net/page_pool/helpers.h:353 [inline]
 napi_pp_put_page+0x149/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1036
 skb_pp_recycle net/core/skbuff.c:1047 [inline]
 skb_free_head net/core/skbuff.c:1094 [inline]
 skb_release_data+0x6c4/0x8a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1125
 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1190 [inline]
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1204 [inline]
 sk_skb_reason_drop+0x1c9/0x380 net/core/skbuff.c:1242
 kfree_skb_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:1263 [inline]
 __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3343 [inline]

root cause is:

page_pool_recycle_in_ring
  ptr_ring_produce
    spin_lock(&r->producer_lock);
    WRITE_ONCE(r->queue[r->producer++], ptr)
      //recycle last page to pool
				page_pool_release
				  page_pool_scrub
				    page_pool_empty_ring
				      ptr_ring_consume
				      page_pool_return_page  //release all page
				  __page_pool_destroy
				     free_percpu(pool->recycle_stats);
				     free(pool) //free

     spin_unlock(&r->producer_lock); //pool->ring uaf read
  recycle_stat_inc(pool, ring);

page_pool can be free while page pool recycle the last page in ring.
Add producer-lock barrier to page_pool_release to prevent the page
pool from being free before all pages have been recycled.

recycle_stat_inc() is empty when CONFIG_PAGE_POOL_STATS is not
enabled, which will trigger Wempty-body build warning. Add definition
for pool stat macro to fix warning.

Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250513083123.3514193-1-dongchenchen2@huawei.com
Fixes: ff7d6b27f8 ("page_pool: refurbish version of page_pool code")
Reported-by: syzbot+204a4382fcb3311f3858@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=204a4382fcb3311f3858
Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250527114152.3119109-1-dongchenchen2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Linux 5.15.y does not support page pool statistics
  (CONFIG_PAGE_POOL_STATS), so remove the related source code
  changes from the patch. ]
Signed-off-by: Ruohan Lan <ruohanlan@aliyun.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-01-19 13:10:11 +01:00
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
f51e471cb1 net: Remove RTNL dance for SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF.
commit ed3ba9b6e2 upstream.

SIOCBRDELIF is passed to dev_ioctl() first and later forwarded to
br_ioctl_call(), which causes unnecessary RTNL dance and the splat
below [0] under RTNL pressure.

Let's say Thread A is trying to detach a device from a bridge and
Thread B is trying to remove the bridge.

In dev_ioctl(), Thread A bumps the bridge device's refcnt by
netdev_hold() and releases RTNL because the following br_ioctl_call()
also re-acquires RTNL.

In the race window, Thread B could acquire RTNL and try to remove
the bridge device.  Then, rtnl_unlock() by Thread B will release RTNL
and wait for netdev_put() by Thread A.

Thread A, however, must hold RTNL after the unlock in dev_ifsioc(),
which may take long under RTNL pressure, resulting in the splat by
Thread B.

  Thread A (SIOCBRDELIF)           Thread B (SIOCBRDELBR)
  ----------------------           ----------------------
  sock_ioctl                       sock_ioctl
  `- sock_do_ioctl                 `- br_ioctl_call
     `- dev_ioctl                     `- br_ioctl_stub
        |- rtnl_lock                     |
        |- dev_ifsioc                    '
        '  |- dev = __dev_get_by_name(...)
           |- netdev_hold(dev, ...)      .
       /   |- rtnl_unlock  ------.       |
       |   |- br_ioctl_call       `--->  |- rtnl_lock
  Race |   |  `- br_ioctl_stub           |- br_del_bridge
  Window   |     |                       |  |- dev = __dev_get_by_name(...)
       |   |     |  May take long        |  `- br_dev_delete(dev, ...)
       |   |     |  under RTNL pressure  |     `- unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, ...)
       |   |     |               |       `- rtnl_unlock
       \   |     |- rtnl_lock  <-'          `- netdev_run_todo
           |     |- ...                        `- netdev_run_todo
           |     `- rtnl_unlock                   |- __rtnl_unlock
           |                                      |- netdev_wait_allrefs_any
           |- netdev_put(dev, ...)  <----------------'
                                                Wait refcnt decrement
                                                and log splat below

To avoid blocking SIOCBRDELBR unnecessarily, let's not call
dev_ioctl() for SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF.

In the dev_ioctl() path, we do the following:

  1. Copy struct ifreq by get_user_ifreq in sock_do_ioctl()
  2. Check CAP_NET_ADMIN in dev_ioctl()
  3. Call dev_load() in dev_ioctl()
  4. Fetch the master dev from ifr.ifr_name in dev_ifsioc()

3. can be done by request_module() in br_ioctl_call(), so we move
1., 2., and 4. to br_ioctl_stub().

Note that 2. is also checked later in add_del_if(), but it's better
performed before RTNL.

SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF have been processed in dev_ioctl() since
the pre-git era, and there seems to be no specific reason to process
them there.

[0]:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for wpan3 to become free. Usage count = 2
ref_tracker: wpan3@ffff8880662d8608 has 1/1 users at
     __netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4282 [inline]
     netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4311 [inline]
     dev_ifsioc+0xc6a/0x1160 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:624
     dev_ioctl+0x255/0x10c0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:826
     sock_do_ioctl+0x1ca/0x260 net/socket.c:1213
     sock_ioctl+0x23a/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1318
     vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
     __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
     __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline]
     __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a4/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:892
     do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
     do_syscall_64+0xcb/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: 893b195875 ("net: bridge: fix ioctl locking")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: yan kang <kangyan91@outlook.com>
Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/SY8P300MB0421225D54EB92762AE8F0F2A1D32@SY8P300MB0421.AUSP300.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250316192851.19781-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[cascardo: fixed conflict at dev_ifsioc]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-01-19 13:10:11 +01:00
Breno Leitao
890472d6fb net: netpoll: fix incorrect refcount handling causing incorrect cleanup
[ Upstream commit 49c8d2c1f9 ]

commit efa95b01da ("netpoll: fix use after free") incorrectly
ignored the refcount and prematurely set dev->npinfo to NULL during
netpoll cleanup, leading to improper behavior and memory leaks.

Scenario causing lack of proper cleanup:

1) A netpoll is associated with a NIC (e.g., eth0) and netdev->npinfo is
   allocated, and refcnt = 1
   - Keep in mind that npinfo is shared among all netpoll instances. In
     this case, there is just one.

2) Another netpoll is also associated with the same NIC and
   npinfo->refcnt += 1.
   - Now dev->npinfo->refcnt = 2;
   - There is just one npinfo associated to the netdev.

3) When the first netpolls goes to clean up:
   - The first cleanup succeeds and clears np->dev->npinfo, ignoring
     refcnt.
     - It basically calls `RCU_INIT_POINTER(np->dev->npinfo, NULL);`
   - Set dev->npinfo = NULL, without proper cleanup
   - No ->ndo_netpoll_cleanup() is either called

4) Now the second target tries to clean up
   - The second cleanup fails because np->dev->npinfo is already NULL.
     * In this case, ops->ndo_netpoll_cleanup() was never called, and
       the skb pool is not cleaned as well (for the second netpoll
       instance)
  - This leaks npinfo and skbpool skbs, which is clearly reported by
    kmemleak.

Revert commit efa95b01da ("netpoll: fix use after free") and adds
clarifying comments emphasizing that npinfo cleanup should only happen
once the refcount reaches zero, ensuring stable and correct netpoll
behavior.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.17.x
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <jv@jvosburgh.net>
Fixes: efa95b01da ("netpoll: fix use after free")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251107-netconsole_torture-v10-1-749227b55f63@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Adjust context ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-12-07 06:09:32 +09:00
Dragos Tatulea
c12ebeacfb page_pool: Clamp pool size to max 16K pages
[ Upstream commit a1b501a8c6 ]

page_pool_init() returns E2BIG when the page_pool size goes above 32K
pages. As some drivers are configuring the page_pool size according to
the MTU and ring size, there are cases where this limit is exceeded and
the queue creation fails.

The page_pool size doesn't have to cover a full queue, especially for
larger ring size. So clamp the size instead of returning an error. Do
this in the core to avoid having each driver do the clamping.

The current limit was deemed to high [1] so it was reduced to 16K to avoid
page waste.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/1758532715-820422-3-git-send-email-tariqt@nvidia.com/

Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250926131605.2276734-2-dtatulea@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-12-07 06:09:24 +09:00
Jakub Kicinski
0ec2cd5c58 page_pool: always add GFP_NOWARN for ATOMIC allocations
[ Upstream commit f3b52167a0 ]

Driver authors often forget to add GFP_NOWARN for page allocation
from the datapath. This is annoying to users as OOMs are a fact
of life, and we pretty much expect network Rx to hit page allocation
failures during OOM. Make page pool add GFP_NOWARN for ATOMIC allocations
by default.

Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250912161703.361272-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-12-07 06:09:22 +09:00
Eric Dumazet
66bcd6c577 net: call cond_resched() less often in __release_sock()
[ Upstream commit 16c610162d ]

While stress testing TCP I had unexpected retransmits and sack packets
when a single cpu receives data from multiple high-throughput flows.

super_netperf 4 -H srv -T,10 -l 3000 &

Tcpdump extract:

 00:00:00.000007 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [.], seq 26062848:26124288, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460834 ecr 3100749131], length 61440
 00:00:00.000006 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [.], seq 26124288:26185728, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460834 ecr 3100749131], length 61440
 00:00:00.000005 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [P.], seq 26185728:26243072, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460834 ecr 3100749131], length 57344
 00:00:00.000006 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [.], seq 26243072:26304512, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460844 ecr 3100749141], length 61440
 00:00:00.000005 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [.], seq 26304512:26365952, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460844 ecr 3100749141], length 61440
 00:00:00.000007 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [P.], seq 26365952:26423296, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460844 ecr 3100749141], length 57344
 00:00:00.000006 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [.], seq 26423296:26484736, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460853 ecr 3100749150], length 61440
 00:00:00.000005 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [.], seq 26484736:26546176, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460853 ecr 3100749150], length 61440
 00:00:00.000005 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [P.], seq 26546176:26603520, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651460853 ecr 3100749150], length 57344
 00:00:00.003932 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [P.], seq 26603520:26619904, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651464844 ecr 3100753141], length 16384
 00:00:00.006602 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [.], seq 24862720:24866816, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651471419 ecr 3100759716], length 4096
 00:00:00.013000 IP6 clnt > srv: Flags [.], seq 24862720:24866816, ack 1, win 66, options [nop,nop,TS val 651484421 ecr 3100772718], length 4096
 00:00:00.000416 IP6 srv > clnt: Flags [.], ack 26619904, win 1393, options [nop,nop,TS val 3100773185 ecr 651484421,nop,nop,sack 1 {24862720:24866816}], length 0

After analysis, it appears this is because of the cond_resched()
call from  __release_sock().

When current thread is yielding, while still holding the TCP socket lock,
it might regain the cpu after a very long time.

Other peer TLP/RTO is firing (multiple times) and packets are retransmit,
while the initial copy is waiting in the socket backlog or receive queue.

In this patch, I call cond_resched() only once every 16 packets.

Modern TCP stack now spends less time per packet in the backlog,
especially because ACK are no longer sent (commit 133c4c0d37
"tcp: defer regular ACK while processing socket backlog")

Before:

clnt:/# nstat -n;sleep 10;nstat|egrep "TcpOutSegs|TcpRetransSegs|TCPFastRetrans|TCPTimeouts|Probes|TCPSpuriousRTOs|DSACK"
TcpOutSegs                      19046186           0.0
TcpRetransSegs                  1471               0.0
TcpExtTCPTimeouts               1397               0.0
TcpExtTCPLossProbes             1356               0.0
TcpExtTCPDSACKRecv              1352               0.0
TcpExtTCPSpuriousRTOs           114                0.0
TcpExtTCPDSACKRecvSegs          1352               0.0

After:

clnt:/# nstat -n;sleep 10;nstat|egrep "TcpOutSegs|TcpRetransSegs|TCPFastRetrans|TCPTimeouts|Probes|TCPSpuriousRTOs|DSACK"
TcpOutSegs                      19218936           0.0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250903174811.1930820-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-12-07 06:09:21 +09:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
38edfa2a5a net: Call trace_sock_exceed_buf_limit() for memcg failure with SK_MEM_RECV.
[ Upstream commit 9d85c565a7 ]

Initially, trace_sock_exceed_buf_limit() was invoked when
__sk_mem_raise_allocated() failed due to the memcg limit or the
global limit.

However, commit d6f19938eb ("net: expose sk wmem in
sock_exceed_buf_limit tracepoint") somehow suppressed the event
only when memcg failed to charge for SK_MEM_RECV, although the
memcg failure for SK_MEM_SEND still triggers the event.

Let's restore the event for SK_MEM_RECV.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815201712.1745332-5-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-12-07 06:09:19 +09:00
Zhengchao Shao
83a563fab5 net: rtnetlink: fix module reference count leak issue in rtnetlink_rcv_msg
commit 5b22f62724 upstream.

When bulk delete command is received in the rtnetlink_rcv_msg function,
if bulk delete is not supported, module_put is not called to release
the reference counting. As a result, module reference count is leaked.

Fixes: a6cec0bcd3 ("net: rtnetlink: add bulk delete support flag")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220815024629.240367-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-10-29 14:03:16 +01:00
Johannes Wiesböck
e7a8c57671 rtnetlink: Allow deleting FDB entries in user namespace
[ Upstream commit bf29555f5b ]

Creating FDB entries is possible from a non-initial user namespace when
having CAP_NET_ADMIN, yet, when deleting FDB entries, processes receive
an EPERM because the capability is always checked against the initial
user namespace. This restricts the FDB management from unprivileged
containers.

Drop the netlink_capable check in rtnl_fdb_del as it was originally
dropped in c5c351088a and reintroduced in 1690be63a2 without
intention.

This patch was tested using a container on GyroidOS, where it was
possible to delete FDB entries from an unprivileged user namespace and
private network namespace.

Fixes: 1690be63a2 ("bridge: Add vlan support to static neighbors")
Reviewed-by: Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Tested-by: Harshal Gohel <hg@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Wiesböck <johannes.wiesboeck@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251015201548.319871-1-johannes.wiesboeck@aisec.fraunhofer.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-29 14:03:11 +01:00
Nikolay Aleksandrov
bde6afe89a net: rtnetlink: add NLM_F_BULK support to rtnl_fdb_del
[ Upstream commit 9e83425993 ]

When NLM_F_BULK is specified in a fdb del message we need to handle it
differently. First since this is a new call we can strictly validate the
passed attributes, at first only ifindex and vlan are allowed as these
will be the initially supported filter attributes, any other attribute
is rejected. The mac address is no longer mandatory, but we use it
to error out in older kernels because it cannot be specified with bulk
request (the attribute is not allowed) and then we have to dispatch
the call to ndo_fdb_del_bulk if the device supports it. The del bulk
callback can do further validation of the attributes if necessary.

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: bf29555f5b ("rtnetlink: Allow deleting FDB entries in user namespace")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-29 14:03:11 +01:00
Nikolay Aleksandrov
31017cda99 net: rtnetlink: add bulk delete support flag
[ Upstream commit a6cec0bcd3 ]

Add a new rtnl flag (RTNL_FLAG_BULK_DEL_SUPPORTED) which is used to
verify that the delete operation allows bulk object deletion. Also emit
a warning if anyone tries to set it for non-delete kind.

Suggested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: bf29555f5b ("rtnetlink: Allow deleting FDB entries in user namespace")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-29 14:03:11 +01:00
Nikolay Aleksandrov
fc69b00561 net: rtnetlink: add helper to extract msg type's kind
[ Upstream commit 2e9ea3e30f ]

Add a helper which extracts the msg type's kind using the kind mask (0x3).

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: bf29555f5b ("rtnetlink: Allow deleting FDB entries in user namespace")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-29 14:03:10 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann
057764172f bpf: Fix metadata_dst leak __bpf_redirect_neigh_v{4,6}
[ Upstream commit 23f3770e1a ]

Cilium has a BPF egress gateway feature which forces outgoing K8s Pod
traffic to pass through dedicated egress gateways which then SNAT the
traffic in order to interact with stable IPs outside the cluster.

The traffic is directed to the gateway via vxlan tunnel in collect md
mode. A recent BPF change utilized the bpf_redirect_neigh() helper to
forward packets after the arrival and decap on vxlan, which turned out
over time that the kmalloc-256 slab usage in kernel was ever-increasing.

The issue was that vxlan allocates the metadata_dst object and attaches
it through a fake dst entry to the skb. The latter was never released
though given bpf_redirect_neigh() was merely setting the new dst entry
via skb_dst_set() without dropping an existing one first.

Fixes: b4ab314149 ("bpf: Add redirect_neigh helper as redirect drop-in")
Reported-by: Yusuke Suzuki <yusuke.suzuki@isovalent.com>
Reported-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251003073418.291171-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-19 16:21:42 +02:00
Paul Chaignon
6d8b1a21fd bpf: Explicitly check accesses to bpf_sock_addr
[ Upstream commit 6fabca2fc9 ]

Syzkaller found a kernel warning on the following sock_addr program:

    0: r0 = 0
    1: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +60)
    2: exit

which triggers:

    verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion (0)

This is happening because offset 60 in bpf_sock_addr corresponds to an
implicit padding of 4 bytes, right after msg_src_ip4. Access to this
padding isn't rejected in sock_addr_is_valid_access and it thus later
fails to convert the access.

This patch fixes it by explicitly checking the various fields of
bpf_sock_addr in sock_addr_is_valid_access.

I checked the other ctx structures and is_valid_access functions and
didn't find any other similar cases. Other cases of (properly handled)
padding are covered in new tests in a subsequent patch.

Fixes: 1cedee13d2 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
Reported-by: syzbot+136ca59d411f92e821b7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=136ca59d411f92e821b7
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/b58609d9490649e76e584b0361da0abd3c2c1779.1758094761.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-19 16:21:31 +02:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
d51e47e2ab net: Fix null-ptr-deref by sock_lock_init_class_and_name() and rmmod.
[ Upstream commit 0bb2f7a1ad ]

When I ran the repro [0] and waited a few seconds, I observed two
LOCKDEP splats: a warning immediately followed by a null-ptr-deref. [1]

Reproduction Steps:

  1) Mount CIFS
  2) Add an iptables rule to drop incoming FIN packets for CIFS
  3) Unmount CIFS
  4) Unload the CIFS module
  5) Remove the iptables rule

At step 3), the CIFS module calls sock_release() for the underlying
TCP socket, and it returns quickly.  However, the socket remains in
FIN_WAIT_1 because incoming FIN packets are dropped.

At this point, the module's refcnt is 0 while the socket is still
alive, so the following rmmod command succeeds.

  # ss -tan
  State      Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port  Peer Address:Port
  FIN-WAIT-1 0      477        10.0.2.15:51062   10.0.0.137:445

  # lsmod | grep cifs
  cifs                 1159168  0

This highlights a discrepancy between the lifetime of the CIFS module
and the underlying TCP socket.  Even after CIFS calls sock_release()
and it returns, the TCP socket does not die immediately in order to
close the connection gracefully.

While this is generally fine, it causes an issue with LOCKDEP because
CIFS assigns a different lock class to the TCP socket's sk->sk_lock
using sock_lock_init_class_and_name().

Once an incoming packet is processed for the socket or a timer fires,
sk->sk_lock is acquired.

Then, LOCKDEP checks the lock context in check_wait_context(), where
hlock_class() is called to retrieve the lock class.  However, since
the module has already been unloaded, hlock_class() logs a warning
and returns NULL, triggering the null-ptr-deref.

If LOCKDEP is enabled, we must ensure that a module calling
sock_lock_init_class_and_name() (CIFS, NFS, etc) cannot be unloaded
while such a socket is still alive to prevent this issue.

Let's hold the module reference in sock_lock_init_class_and_name()
and release it when the socket is freed in sk_prot_free().

Note that sock_lock_init() clears sk->sk_owner for svc_create_socket()
that calls sock_lock_init_class_and_name() for a listening socket,
which clones a socket by sk_clone_lock() without GFP_ZERO.

[0]:
CIFS_SERVER="10.0.0.137"
CIFS_PATH="//${CIFS_SERVER}/Users/Administrator/Desktop/CIFS_TEST"
DEV="enp0s3"
CRED="/root/WindowsCredential.txt"

MNT=$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXX)
mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${MNT} -o vers=3.0,credentials=${CRED},cache=none,echo_interval=1

iptables -A INPUT -s ${CIFS_SERVER} -j DROP

for i in $(seq 10);
do
    umount ${MNT}
    rmmod cifs
    sleep 1
done

rm -r ${MNT}

iptables -D INPUT -s ${CIFS_SERVER} -j DROP

[1]:
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1)
WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 hlock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:223)
Modules linked in: cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs]
CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/10 Not tainted 6.14.0 #36
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:hlock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:223)
...
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5178)
 lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:469 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5816)
 _raw_spin_lock_nested (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:379)
 tcp_v4_rcv (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1678 ./include/net/tcp.h:2547 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350)
...

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c4
 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/10 Tainted: G        W          6.14.0 #36
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4852 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5178)
Code: 15 41 09 c7 41 8b 44 24 20 25 ff 1f 00 00 41 09 c7 8b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 45 89 7c 24 20 41 89 44 24 24 e8 e1 bc ff ff 4c 89 e7 <44> 0f b6 b8 c4 00 00 00 e8 d1 bc ff ff 0f b6 80 c5 00 00 00 88 44
RSP: 0018:ffa0000000468a10 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff1100010091cc38 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ff1100081f09ca48 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ff1100010091cc88
RBP: ff1100010091c200 R08: ff1100083fe6e228 R09: 00000000ffffbfff
R10: ff1100081eca0000 R11: ff1100083fe10dc0 R12: ff1100010091cc88
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000424b1
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1100081f080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c4 CR3: 0000000002c4a003 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:469 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5816)
 _raw_spin_lock_nested (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:379)
 tcp_v4_rcv (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1678 ./include/net/tcp.h:2547 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350)
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 (discriminator 1))
 ip_local_deliver_finish (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:878 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234)
 ip_sublist_rcv_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:576)
 ip_list_rcv_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:628)
 ip_list_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:670)
 __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5939 net/core/dev.c:5986)
 netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:6040 net/core/dev.c:6129)
 napi_complete_done (./include/linux/list.h:37 ./include/net/gro.h:519 ./include/net/gro.h:514 net/core/dev.c:6496)
 e1000_clean (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3815)
 __napi_poll.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:7191)
 net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7262 net/core/dev.c:7382)
 handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561)
 __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:596 kernel/softirq.c:435 kernel/softirq.c:662)
 irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:680)
 common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:280 (discriminator 14))
  </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_common_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:693)
RIP: 0010:default_idle (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:37 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:92 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:744)
Code: 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa eb 07 0f 00 2d c3 2b 15 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffa00000000ffee8 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 000000000000640b RBX: ff1100010091c200 RCX: 0000000000061aa4
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff812f30c5
RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 ? do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:186 kernel/sched/idle.c:325)
 default_idle_call (./include/linux/cpuidle.h:143 kernel/sched/idle.c:118)
 do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:186 kernel/sched/idle.c:325)
 cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:422 (discriminator 1))
 start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:315)
 common_startup_64 (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:421)
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs]
CR2: 00000000000000c4

Fixes: ed07536ed6 ("[PATCH] lockdep: annotate nfs/nfsd in-kernel sockets")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250407163313.22682-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ no ns_tracker and sk_user_frags fields ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-10-02 13:38:59 +02:00
Kurt Kanzenbach
b4c2fb32f4 ptp: Add generic PTP is_sync() function
[ Upstream commit f72de02ebe ]

PHY drivers such as micrel or dp83640 need to analyze whether a given
skb is a PTP sync message for one step functionality.

In order to avoid code duplication introduce a generic function and
move it to ptp classify.

Signed-off-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 9b2bfdbf43 ("phy: mscc: Stop taking ts_lock for tx_queue and use its own lock")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-09-09 18:50:20 +02:00
Jakub Kicinski
0a0108796b netpoll: prevent hanging NAPI when netcons gets enabled
[ Upstream commit 2da4def0f4 ]

Paolo spotted hangs in NIPA running driver tests against virtio.
The tests hang in virtnet_close() -> virtnet_napi_tx_disable().

The problem is only reproducible if running multiple of our tests
in sequence (I used TEST_PROGS="xdp.py ping.py netcons_basic.sh \
netpoll_basic.py stats.py"). Initial suspicion was that this is
a simple case of double-disable of NAPI, but instrumenting the
code reveals:

 Deadlocked on NAPI ffff888007cd82c0 (virtnet_poll_tx):
   state: 0x37, disabled: false, owner: 0, listed: false, weight: 64

The NAPI was not in fact disabled, owner is 0 (rather than -1),
so the NAPI "thinks" it's scheduled for CPU 0 but it's not listed
(!list_empty(&n->poll_list) => false). It seems odd that normal NAPI
processing would wedge itself like this.

Better suspicion is that netpoll gets enabled while NAPI is polling,
and also grabs the NAPI instance. This confuses napi_complete_done():

  [netpoll]                                   [normal NAPI]
                                        napi_poll()
                                          have = netpoll_poll_lock()
                                            rcu_access_pointer(dev->npinfo)
                                              return NULL # no netpoll
                                          __napi_poll()
					    ->poll(->weight)
  poll_napi()
    cmpxchg(->poll_owner, -1, cpu)
      poll_one_napi()
        set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, ->state)
                                              napi_complete_done()
                                                if (NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)
                                                  return false
                                           # exit without clearing SCHED

This feels very unlikely, but perhaps virtio has some interactions
with the hypervisor in the NAPI ->poll that makes the race window
larger?

Best I could to to prove the theory was to add and trigger this
warning in napi_poll (just before netpoll_poll_unlock()):

      WARN_ONCE(!have && rcu_access_pointer(n->dev->npinfo) &&
                napi_is_scheduled(n) && list_empty(&n->poll_list),
                "NAPI race with netpoll %px", n);

If this warning hits the next virtio_close() will hang.

This patch survived 30 test iterations without a hang (without it
the longest clean run was around 10). Credit for triggering this
goes to Breno's recent netconsole tests.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/c5a93ed1-9abe-4880-a3bb-8d1678018b1d@redhat.com
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250726010846.1105875-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-28 16:24:13 +02:00
Paul Chaignon
74a87aca09 bpf: Check flow_dissector ctx accesses are aligned
[ Upstream commit ead3d7b2b6 ]

flow_dissector_is_valid_access doesn't check that the context access is
aligned. As a consequence, an unaligned access within one of the exposed
field is considered valid and later rejected by
flow_dissector_convert_ctx_access when we try to convert it.

The later rejection is problematic because it's reported as a verifier
bug with a kernel warning and doesn't point to the right instruction in
verifier logs.

Fixes: d58e468b11 ("flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF hook")
Reported-by: syzbot+ccac90e482b2a81d74aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ccac90e482b2a81d74aa
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cc1b036be484c99be45eddf48bd78cc6f72839b1.1754039605.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-28 16:24:11 +02:00
Jiayuan Chen
c0efe4eae2 bpf, sockmap: Fix psock incorrectly pointing to sk
[ Upstream commit 76be5fae32 ]

We observed an issue from the latest selftest: sockmap_redir where
sk_psock(psock->sk) != psock in the backlog. The root cause is the special
behavior in sockmap_redir - it frequently performs map_update() and
map_delete() on the same socket. During map_update(), we create a new
psock and during map_delete(), we eventually free the psock via rcu_work
in sk_psock_drop(). However, pending workqueues might still exist and not
be processed yet. If users immediately perform another map_update(), a new
psock will be allocated for the same sk, resulting in two psocks pointing
to the same sk.

When the pending workqueue is later triggered, it uses the old psock to
access sk for I/O operations, which is incorrect.

Timing Diagram:

cpu0                        cpu1

map_update(sk):
    sk->psock = psock1
    psock1->sk = sk
map_delete(sk):
   rcu_work_free(psock1)

map_update(sk):
    sk->psock = psock2
    psock2->sk = sk
                            workqueue:
                                wakeup with psock1, but the sk of psock1
                                doesn't belong to psock1
rcu_handler:
    clean psock1
    free(psock1)

Previously, we used reference counting to address the concurrency issue
between backlog and sock_map_close(). This logic remains necessary as it
prevents the sk from being freed while processing the backlog. But this
patch prevents pending backlogs from using a psock after it has been
stopped.

Note: We cannot call cancel_delayed_work_sync() in map_delete() since this
might be invoked in BPF context by BPF helper, and the function may sleep.

Fixes: 604326b41a ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609025908.79331-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-28 16:24:07 +02:00
Jiayuan Chen
4dba44333a bpf, sockmap: Fix panic when calling skb_linearize
commit 5ca2e29f68 upstream.

The panic can be reproduced by executing the command:
./bench sockmap -c 2 -p 1 -a --rx-verdict-ingress --rx-strp 100000

Then a kernel panic was captured:
'''
[  657.460555] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2178!
[  657.462680] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[  657.463287] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
...
[  657.469610]  <TASK>
[  657.469738]  ? die+0x36/0x90
[  657.469916]  ? do_trap+0x1d0/0x270
[  657.470118]  ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[  657.470376]  ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[  657.470620]  ? do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
[  657.470846]  ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[  657.471092]  ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
[  657.471335]  ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[  657.471579]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x2d/0x40
[  657.471805]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[  657.472052]  ? pskb_expand_head+0xd1/0xf40
[  657.472292]  ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[  657.472540]  ? lock_acquire+0x18f/0x4e0
[  657.472766]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
[  657.472999]  ? __pfx_pskb_expand_head+0x10/0x10
[  657.473263]  ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x5b/0x470
[  657.473537]  ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10
[  657.473826]  __pskb_pull_tail+0xfd/0x1d20
[  657.474062]  ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x90
[  657.474707]  sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x3bf/0x510
[  657.475392]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[  657.476010]  sk_psock_backlog+0x5cf/0xd70
[  657.476637]  process_one_work+0x858/0x1a20
'''

The panic originates from the assertion BUG_ON(skb_shared(skb)) in
skb_linearize(). A previous commit(see Fixes tag) introduced skb_get()
to avoid race conditions between skb operations in the backlog and skb
release in the recvmsg path. However, this caused the panic to always
occur when skb_linearize is executed.

The "--rx-strp 100000" parameter forces the RX path to use the strparser
module which aggregates data until it reaches 100KB before calling sockmap
logic. The 100KB payload exceeds MAX_MSG_FRAGS, triggering skb_linearize.

To fix this issue, just move skb_get into sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue.

'''
sk_psock_backlog:
    sk_psock_handle_skb
       skb_get(skb) <== we move it into 'sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue'
       sk_psock_skb_ingress____________
                                       ↓
                                       |
                                       | → sk_psock_skb_ingress_self
                                       |      sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
sk_psock_verdict_apply_________________↑          skb_linearize
'''

Note that for verdict_apply path, the skb_get operation is unnecessary so
we add 'take_ref' param to control it's behavior.

Fixes: a454d84ee2 ("bpf, sockmap: Fix skb refcnt race after locking changes")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407142234.47591-4-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[ adapted skb_linearize() fix to 5.15's sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue implementation without the s_data parameter ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-28 16:24:03 +02:00
John Fastabend
65ad600b9b bpf, sockmap: Fix skb refcnt race after locking changes
commit a454d84ee2 upstream.

There is a race where skb's from the sk_psock_backlog can be referenced
after userspace side has already skb_consumed() the sk_buff and its refcnt
dropped to zer0 causing use after free.

The flow is the following:

  while ((skb = skb_peek(&psock->ingress_skb))
    sk_psock_handle_Skb(psock, skb, ..., ingress)
    if (!ingress) ...
    sk_psock_skb_ingress
       sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(skb)
          msg->skb = skb
          sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, msg)
    skb_dequeue(&psock->ingress_skb)

The sk_psock_queue_msg() puts the msg on the ingress_msg queue. This is
what the application reads when recvmsg() is called. An application can
read this anytime after the msg is placed on the queue. The recvmsg hook
will also read msg->skb and then after user space reads the msg will call
consume_skb(skb) on it effectively free'ing it.

But, the race is in above where backlog queue still has a reference to
the skb and calls skb_dequeue(). If the skb_dequeue happens after the
user reads and free's the skb we have a use after free.

The !ingress case does not suffer from this problem because it uses
sendmsg_*(sk, msg) which does not pass the sk_buff further down the
stack.

The following splat was observed with 'test_progs -t sockmap_listen':

  [ 1022.710250][ T2556] general protection fault, ...
  [...]
  [ 1022.712830][ T2556] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
  [ 1022.713262][ T2556] RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0x4c/0x80
  [ 1022.713653][ T2556] Code: ...
  [...]
  [ 1022.720699][ T2556] Call Trace:
  [ 1022.720984][ T2556]  <TASK>
  [ 1022.721254][ T2556]  ? die_addr+0x32/0x80^M
  [ 1022.721589][ T2556]  ? exc_general_protection+0x25a/0x4b0
  [ 1022.722026][ T2556]  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
  [ 1022.722489][ T2556]  ? skb_dequeue+0x4c/0x80
  [ 1022.722854][ T2556]  sk_psock_backlog+0x27a/0x300
  [ 1022.723243][ T2556]  process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5b0
  [ 1022.723633][ T2556]  worker_thread+0x4f/0x3a0
  [ 1022.723998][ T2556]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
  [ 1022.724386][ T2556]  kthread+0xfd/0x130
  [ 1022.724709][ T2556]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [ 1022.725066][ T2556]  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
  [ 1022.725409][ T2556]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
  [ 1022.725799][ T2556]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
  [ 1022.726201][ T2556]  </TASK>

To fix we add an skb_get() before passing the skb to be enqueued in the
engress queue. This bumps the skb->users refcnt so that consume_skb()
and kfree_skb will not immediately free the sk_buff. With this we can
be sure the skb is still around when we do the dequeue. Then we just
need to decrement the refcnt or free the skb in the backlog case which
we do by calling kfree_skb() on the ingress case as well as the sendmsg
case.

Before locking change from fixes tag we had the sock locked so we
couldn't race with user and there was no issue here.

Fixes: 799aa7f98d ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()")
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa  <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230901202137.214666-1-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-07-17 18:30:48 +02:00
Jakub Kicinski
9f7fd60fb8 net: selftests: fix TCP packet checksum
[ Upstream commit 8d89661a36 ]

The length in the pseudo header should be the length of the L3 payload
AKA the L4 header+payload. The selftest code builds the packet from
the lower layers up, so all the headers are pushed already when it
constructs L4. We need to subtract the lower layer headers from skb->len.

Fixes: 3e1e58d64c ("net: add generic selftest support")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Gerhard Engleder <gerhard@engleder-embedded.com>
Reported-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Tested-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250624183258.3377740-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-07-10 15:57:39 +02:00
Paul Chaignon
6d7fcd8a7a bpf: Fix L4 csum update on IPv6 in CHECKSUM_COMPLETE
commit ead7f9b8de upstream.

In Cilium, we use bpf_csum_diff + bpf_l4_csum_replace to, among other
things, update the L4 checksum after reverse SNATing IPv6 packets. That
use case is however not currently supported and leads to invalid
skb->csum values in some cases. This patch adds support for IPv6 address
changes in bpf_l4_csum_update via a new flag.

When calling bpf_l4_csum_replace in Cilium, it ends up calling
inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff:

    1:  void inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(__sum16 *sum, struct sk_buff *skb,
    2:                                       __wsum diff, bool pseudohdr)
    3:  {
    4:      if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
    5:          csum_replace_by_diff(sum, diff);
    6:          if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE && pseudohdr)
    7:              skb->csum = ~csum_sub(diff, skb->csum);
    8:      } else if (pseudohdr) {
    9:          *sum = ~csum_fold(csum_add(diff, csum_unfold(*sum)));
    10:     }
    11: }

The bug happens when we're in the CHECKSUM_COMPLETE state. We've just
updated one of the IPv6 addresses. The helper now updates the L4 header
checksum on line 5. Next, it updates skb->csum on line 7. It shouldn't.

For an IPv6 packet, the updates of the IPv6 address and of the L4
checksum will cancel each other. The checksums are set such that
computing a checksum over the packet including its checksum will result
in a sum of 0. So the same is true here when we update the L4 checksum
on line 5. We'll update it as to cancel the previous IPv6 address
update. Hence skb->csum should remain untouched in this case.

The same bug doesn't affect IPv4 packets because, in that case, three
fields are updated: the IPv4 address, the IP checksum, and the L4
checksum. The change to the IPv4 address and one of the checksums still
cancel each other in skb->csum, but we're left with one checksum update
and should therefore update skb->csum accordingly. That's exactly what
inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff does.

This special case for IPv6 L4 checksums is also described atop
inet_proto_csum_replace16, the function we should be using in this case.

This patch introduces a new bpf_l4_csum_replace flag, BPF_F_IPV6,
to indicate that we're updating the L4 checksum of an IPv6 packet. When
the flag is set, inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff will skip the
skb->csum update.

Fixes: 7d672345ed ("bpf: add generic bpf_csum_diff helper")
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/96a6bc3a443e6f0b21ff7b7834000e17fb549e05.1748509484.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Note: Fixed conflict due to unrelated comment change. ]
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-06-27 11:05:38 +01:00
Paul Chaignon
f02c9c448e net: Fix checksum update for ILA adj-transport
commit 6043b794c7 upstream.

During ILA address translations, the L4 checksums can be handled in
different ways. One of them, adj-transport, consist in parsing the
transport layer and updating any found checksum. This logic relies on
inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff and produces an incorrect skb->csum when
in state CHECKSUM_COMPLETE.

This bug can be reproduced with a simple ILA to SIR mapping, assuming
packets are received with CHECKSUM_COMPLETE:

  $ ip a show dev eth0
  14: eth0@if15: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 62:ae:35:9e:0f:8d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
      inet6 3333:0:0:1::c078/64 scope global
         valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
      inet6 fd00:10:244:1::c078/128 scope global nodad
         valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
      inet6 fe80::60ae:35ff:fe9e:f8d/64 scope link proto kernel_ll
         valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
  $ ip ila add loc_match fd00:10:244:1 loc 3333:0:0:1 \
      csum-mode adj-transport ident-type luid dev eth0

Then I hit [fd00:10:244:1::c078]:8000 with a server listening only on
[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000. With the bug, the SYN packet is dropped with
SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_CSUM after inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff changed
skb->csum. The translation and drop are visible on pwru [1] traces:

  IFACE   TUPLE                                                        FUNC
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[fd00:10:244:1::c078]:8000(tcp)  ipv6_rcv
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[fd00:10:244:1::c078]:8000(tcp)  ip6_rcv_core
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[fd00:10:244:1::c078]:8000(tcp)  nf_hook_slow
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[fd00:10:244:1::c078]:8000(tcp)  inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     tcp_v6_early_demux
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     ip6_route_input
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     ip6_input
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     ip6_input_finish
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     raw6_local_deliver
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     ipv6_raw_deliver
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     tcp_v6_rcv
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     __skb_checksum_complete
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     kfree_skb_reason(SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_CSUM)
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     skb_release_head_state
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     skb_release_data
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     skb_free_head
  eth0:9  [fd00:10:244:3::3d8]:51420->[3333:0:0:1::c078]:8000(tcp)     kfree_skbmem

This is happening because inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff is updating
skb->csum when it shouldn't. The L4 checksum is updated such that it
"cancels" the IPv6 address change in terms of checksum computation, so
the impact on skb->csum is null.

Note this would be different for an IPv4 packet since three fields
would be updated: the IPv4 address, the IP checksum, and the L4
checksum. Two would cancel each other and skb->csum would still need
to be updated to take the L4 checksum change into account.

This patch fixes it by passing an ipv6 flag to
inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff, to skip the skb->csum update if we're
in the IPv6 case. Note the behavior of the only other user of
inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff, the BPF subsystem, is left as is in
this patch and fixed in the subsequent patch.

With the fix, using the reproduction from above, I can confirm
skb->csum is not touched by inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff and the TCP
SYN proceeds to the application after the ILA translation.

Link: https://github.com/cilium/pwru [1]
Fixes: 65d7ab8de5 ("net: Identifier Locator Addressing module")
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b5539869e3550d46068504feb02d37653d939c0b.1748509484.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Fixed conflict due to unrelated change in inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff. ]
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-06-27 11:05:38 +01:00
Jiayuan Chen
5badeca146 bpf, sockmap: Fix data lost during EAGAIN retries
[ Upstream commit 7683167196 ]

We call skb_bpf_redirect_clear() to clean _sk_redir before handling skb in
backlog, but when sk_psock_handle_skb() return EAGAIN due to sk_rcvbuf
limit, the redirect info in _sk_redir is not recovered.

Fix skb redir loss during EAGAIN retries by restoring _sk_redir
information using skb_bpf_set_redir().

Before this patch:
'''
./bench sockmap -c 2 -p 1 -a --rx-verdict-ingress
Setting up benchmark 'sockmap'...
create socket fd c1:13 p1:14 c2:15 p2:16
Benchmark 'sockmap' started.
Send Speed 1343.172 MB/s, BPF Speed 1343.238 MB/s, Rcv Speed   65.271 MB/s
Send Speed 1352.022 MB/s, BPF Speed 1352.088 MB/s, Rcv Speed   0 MB/s
Send Speed 1354.105 MB/s, BPF Speed 1354.105 MB/s, Rcv Speed   0 MB/s
Send Speed 1355.018 MB/s, BPF Speed 1354.887 MB/s, Rcv Speed   0 MB/s
'''
Due to the high send rate, the RX processing path may frequently hit the
sk_rcvbuf limit. Once triggered, incorrect _sk_redir will cause the flow
to mistakenly enter the "!ingress" path, leading to send failures.
(The Rcv speed depends on tcp_rmem).

After this patch:
'''
./bench sockmap -c 2 -p 1 -a --rx-verdict-ingress
Setting up benchmark 'sockmap'...
create socket fd c1:13 p1:14 c2:15 p2:16
Benchmark 'sockmap' started.
Send Speed 1347.236 MB/s, BPF Speed 1347.367 MB/s, Rcv Speed   65.402 MB/s
Send Speed 1353.320 MB/s, BPF Speed 1353.320 MB/s, Rcv Speed   65.536 MB/s
Send Speed 1353.186 MB/s, BPF Speed 1353.121 MB/s, Rcv Speed   65.536 MB/s
'''

Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407142234.47591-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-27 11:05:33 +01:00
Zijun Hu
cafc3c567e sock: Correct error checking condition for (assign|release)_proto_idx()
[ Upstream commit faeefc173b ]

(assign|release)_proto_idx() wrongly check find_first_zero_bit() failure
by condition '(prot->inuse_idx == PROTO_INUSE_NR - 1)' obviously.

Fix by correcting the condition to '(prot->inuse_idx == PROTO_INUSE_NR)'

Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250410-fix_net-v2-1-d69e7c5739a4@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-27 11:05:33 +01:00
Jiayuan Chen
4edb40b05c bpf, sockmap: Avoid using sk_socket after free when sending
[ Upstream commit 8259eb0e06 ]

The sk->sk_socket is not locked or referenced in backlog thread, and
during the call to skb_send_sock(), there is a race condition with
the release of sk_socket. All types of sockets(tcp/udp/unix/vsock)
will be affected.

Race conditions:
'''
CPU0                               CPU1

backlog::skb_send_sock
  sendmsg_unlocked
    sock_sendmsg
      sock_sendmsg_nosec
                                   close(fd):
                                     ...
                                     ops->release() -> sock_map_close()
                                     sk_socket->ops = NULL
                                     free(socket)
      sock->ops->sendmsg
            ^
            panic here
'''

The ref of psock become 0 after sock_map_close() executed.
'''
void sock_map_close()
{
    ...
    if (likely(psock)) {
    ...
    // !! here we remove psock and the ref of psock become 0
    sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock)
    psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
    if (unlikely(!psock))
        goto no_psock; <=== Control jumps here via goto
        ...
        cancel_delayed_work_sync(&psock->work); <=== not executed
        sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
        ...
}
'''

Based on the fact that we already wait for the workqueue to finish in
sock_map_close() if psock is held, we simply increase the psock
reference count to avoid race conditions.

With this patch, if the backlog thread is running, sock_map_close() will
wait for the backlog thread to complete and cancel all pending work.

If no backlog running, any pending work that hasn't started by then will
fail when invoked by sk_psock_get(), as the psock reference count have
been zeroed, and sk_psock_drop() will cancel all jobs via
cancel_delayed_work_sync().

In summary, we require synchronization to coordinate the backlog thread
and close() thread.

The panic I catched:
'''
Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000521fad8 RCX: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0
 ? exc_general_protection+0x14c/0x230
 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
 ? sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440
 ? sock_sendmsg+0x3e0/0x440
 ? __pfx_sock_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
 __skb_send_sock+0x543/0xb70
 sk_psock_backlog+0x247/0xb80
...
'''

Fixes: 4b4647add7 ("sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put")
Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250516141713.291150-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-27 11:05:13 +01:00
Jiayuan Chen
d6181bd1df bpf, sockmap: fix duplicated data transmission
[ Upstream commit 3b4f14b794 ]

In the !ingress path under sk_psock_handle_skb(), when sending data to the
remote under snd_buf limitations, partial skb data might be transmitted.

Although we preserved the partial transmission state (offset/length), the
state wasn't properly consumed during retries. This caused the retry path
to resend the entire skb data instead of continuing from the previous
offset, resulting in data overlap at the receiver side.

Fixes: 405df89dd5 ("bpf, sockmap: Improved check for empty queue")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407142234.47591-3-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-27 11:05:11 +01:00
Peter Seiderer
128cdb617a net: pktgen: fix access outside of user given buffer in pktgen_thread_write()
[ Upstream commit 425e64440a ]

Honour the user given buffer size for the strn_len() calls (otherwise
strn_len() will access memory outside of the user given buffer).

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250219084527.20488-8-ps.report@gmx.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-04 14:38:01 +02:00
Peter Seiderer
674b969287 net: pktgen: fix mpls maximum labels list parsing
[ Upstream commit 2b15a0693f ]

Fix mpls maximum labels list parsing up to MAX_MPLS_LABELS entries (instead
of up to MAX_MPLS_LABELS - 1).

Addresses the following:

	$ echo "mpls 00000f00,00000f01,00000f02,00000f03,00000f04,00000f05,00000f06,00000f07,00000f08,00000f09,00000f0a,00000f0b,00000f0c,00000f0d,00000f0e,00000f0f" > /proc/net/pktgen/lo\@0
	-bash: echo: write error: Argument list too long

Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-04 14:37:59 +02:00
Oleksij Rempel
a14b254c35 net: selftests: initialize TCP header and skb payload with zero
commit 9e8d1013b0 upstream.

Zero-initialize TCP header via memset() to avoid garbage values that
may affect checksum or behavior during test transmission.

Also zero-fill allocated payload and padding regions using memset()
after skb_put(), ensuring deterministic content for all outgoing
test packets.

Fixes: 3e1e58d64c ("net: add generic selftest support")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250416160125.2914724-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-02 07:44:30 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
dac465986a net: defer final 'struct net' free in netns dismantle
commit 0f6ede9fbc upstream.

Ilya reported a slab-use-after-free in dst_destroy [1]

Issue is in xfrm6_net_init() and xfrm4_net_init() :

They copy xfrm[46]_dst_ops_template into net->xfrm.xfrm[46]_dst_ops.

But net structure might be freed before all the dst callbacks are
called. So when dst_destroy() calls later :

if (dst->ops->destroy)
    dst->ops->destroy(dst);

dst->ops points to the old net->xfrm.xfrm[46]_dst_ops, which has been freed.

See a relevant issue fixed in :

ac888d5886 ("net: do not delay dst_entries_add() in dst_release()")

A fix is to queue the 'struct net' to be freed after one
another cleanup_net() round (and existing rcu_barrier())

[1]

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8882137ccab0 by task swapper/37/0
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
CPU: 37 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0 #67
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL, BIOS 1.16.1-1.el9 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:124)
print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:489)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
? kasan_addr_to_slab (mm/kasan/common.c:37)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)
? dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
? rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567)
dst_destroy (net/core/dst.c:112)
rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567)
? __pfx_rcu_do_batch (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2491)
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4339 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406)
rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2825)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:554)
__irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:589 kernel/softirq.c:428 kernel/softirq.c:637)
irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:651)
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049)
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702)
RIP: 0010:default_idle (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:37 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:92 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:743)
Code: 00 4d 29 c8 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 6e ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 90 0f 00 2d c7 c9 27 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 90
RSP: 0018:ffff888100d2fe00 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000001870ed RBX: 1ffff110201a5fc2 RCX: ffffffffb61a3e46
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffb3d4d123
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed11c7e1835d
R10: ffff888e3f0c1aeb R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888100d20000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0 (kernel/context_tracking.c:148)
? cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:186)
default_idle_call (./include/linux/cpuidle.h:143 kernel/sched/idle.c:118)
cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:186)
? __pfx_cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:168)
? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5848)
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4347 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406)
? tsc_verify_tsc_adjust (arch/x86/kernel/tsc_sync.c:59)
do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:326)
cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:423 (discriminator 1))
start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:202 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:282)
? __pfx_start_secondary (arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:232)
? soft_restart_cpu (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:452)
common_startup_64 (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:414)
 </TASK>
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
Allocated by task 12184:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:49 mm/kasan/common.c:60 mm/kasan/common.c:69)
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:319 mm/kasan/common.c:345)
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:4085 mm/slub.c:4134 mm/slub.c:4141)
copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:421 net/core/net_namespace.c:480)
create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:110)
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:228 (discriminator 4))
ksys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3313)
__x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3382)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
Freed by task 11:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:49 mm/kasan/common.c:60 mm/kasan/common.c:69)
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:582)
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:271)
kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4579 mm/slub.c:4681)
cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:456 net/core/net_namespace.c:446 net/core/net_namespace.c:647)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3229)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3304 kernel/workqueue.c:3391)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257)
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
__kasan_record_aux_stack (mm/kasan/generic.c:541)
insert_work (./include/linux/instrumented.h:68 ./include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 kernel/workqueue.c:788 kernel/workqueue.c:795 kernel/workqueue.c:2186)
__queue_work (kernel/workqueue.c:2340)
queue_work_on (kernel/workqueue.c:2391)
xfrm_policy_insert (net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1610)
xfrm_add_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2116)
xfrm_user_rcv_msg (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3321)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2536)
xfrm_netlink_rcv (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3344)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1316 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1342)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1886)
sock_write_iter (net/socket.c:729 net/socket.c:744 net/socket.c:1165)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:590 fs/read_write.c:683)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:736)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Dec 03 05:46:18 kernel:
Second to last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
__kasan_record_aux_stack (mm/kasan/generic.c:541)
insert_work (./include/linux/instrumented.h:68 ./include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 kernel/workqueue.c:788 kernel/workqueue.c:795 kernel/workqueue.c:2186)
__queue_work (kernel/workqueue.c:2340)
queue_work_on (kernel/workqueue.c:2391)
__xfrm_state_insert (./include/linux/workqueue.h:723 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:1150 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:1145 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:1513)
xfrm_state_update (./include/linux/spinlock.h:396 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:1940)
xfrm_add_sa (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:912)
xfrm_user_rcv_msg (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3321)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2536)
xfrm_netlink_rcv (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3344)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1316 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1342)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1886)
sock_write_iter (net/socket.c:729 net/socket.c:744 net/socket.c:1165)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:590 fs/read_write.c:683)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:736)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

Fixes: a8a572a6b5 ("xfrm: dst_entries_init() per-net dst_ops")
Reported-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iKKYDVpB=MtmfH7nyv2p=rJWSLedO5k7wSZgtY_tO8WQg@mail.gmail.com/T/#m02c98c3009fe66382b73cfb4db9cf1df6fab3fbf
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204125455.3871859-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[Minor conflict resolved due to code context change.]
Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <jianqi.ren.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-02 07:44:23 +02:00
Felix Huettner
5efcb30152 net: openvswitch: fix race on port output
commit 066b86787f upstream.

assume the following setup on a single machine:
1. An openvswitch instance with one bridge and default flows
2. two network namespaces "server" and "client"
3. two ovs interfaces "server" and "client" on the bridge
4. for each ovs interface a veth pair with a matching name and 32 rx and
   tx queues
5. move the ends of the veth pairs to the respective network namespaces
6. assign ip addresses to each of the veth ends in the namespaces (needs
   to be the same subnet)
7. start some http server on the server network namespace
8. test if a client in the client namespace can reach the http server

when following the actions below the host has a chance of getting a cpu
stuck in a infinite loop:
1. send a large amount of parallel requests to the http server (around
   3000 curls should work)
2. in parallel delete the network namespace (do not delete interfaces or
   stop the server, just kill the namespace)

there is a low chance that this will cause the below kernel cpu stuck
message. If this does not happen just retry.
Below there is also the output of bpftrace for the functions mentioned
in the output.

The series of events happening here is:
1. the network namespace is deleted calling
   `unregister_netdevice_many_notify` somewhere in the process
2. this sets first `NETREG_UNREGISTERING` on both ends of the veth and
   then runs `synchronize_net`
3. it then calls `call_netdevice_notifiers` with `NETDEV_UNREGISTER`
4. this is then handled by `dp_device_event` which calls
   `ovs_netdev_detach_dev` (if a vport is found, which is the case for
   the veth interface attached to ovs)
5. this removes the rx_handlers of the device but does not prevent
   packages to be sent to the device
6. `dp_device_event` then queues the vport deletion to work in
   background as a ovs_lock is needed that we do not hold in the
   unregistration path
7. `unregister_netdevice_many_notify` continues to call
   `netdev_unregister_kobject` which sets `real_num_tx_queues` to 0
8. port deletion continues (but details are not relevant for this issue)
9. at some future point the background task deletes the vport

If after 7. but before 9. a packet is send to the ovs vport (which is
not deleted at this point in time) which forwards it to the
`dev_queue_xmit` flow even though the device is unregistering.
In `skb_tx_hash` (which is called in the `dev_queue_xmit`) path there is
a while loop (if the packet has a rx_queue recorded) that is infinite if
`dev->real_num_tx_queues` is zero.

To prevent this from happening we update `do_output` to handle devices
without carrier the same as if the device is not found (which would
be the code path after 9. is done).

Additionally we now produce a warning in `skb_tx_hash` if we will hit
the infinite loop.

bpftrace (first word is function name):

__dev_queue_xmit server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 1
netdev_core_pick_tx server: addr: 0xffff9f0a46d4a000 real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 1
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 2, reg_state: 1
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 6, reg_state: 2
ovs_netdev_detach_dev server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
netdev_rx_handler_unregister server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
netdev_rx_handler_unregister ret server: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, reg_state: 2
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 27, reg_state: 2
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 22, reg_state: 2
dp_device_event server: real_num_tx_queues: 1 cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024, event 18, reg_state: 2
netdev_unregister_kobject: real_num_tx_queues: 1, cpu: 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 21024, tid: 21024
ovs_vport_send server: real_num_tx_queues: 0, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 2
__dev_queue_xmit server: real_num_tx_queues: 0, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 2
netdev_core_pick_tx server: addr: 0xffff9f0a46d4a000 real_num_tx_queues: 0, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024, skb_addr: 0xffff9edb6f207000, reg_state: 2
broken device server: real_num_tx_queues: 0, cpu: 2, pid: 28024, tid: 28024
ovs_dp_detach_port server: real_num_tx_queues: 0 cpu 9, pid: 9124, tid: 9124, reg_state: 2
synchronize_rcu_expedited: cpu 9, pid: 33604, tid: 33604

stuck message:

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 26s! [curl:1929279]
Modules linked in: veth pktgen bridge stp llc ip_set_hash_net nft_counter xt_set nft_compat nf_tables ip_set_hash_ip ip_set nfnetlink_cttimeout nfnetlink openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 tls binfmt_misc nls_iso8859_1 input_leds joydev serio_raw dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua sch_fq_codel drm efi_pstore virtio_rng ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear hid_generic usbhid hid crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel virtio_net ahci net_failover crypto_simd cryptd psmouse libahci virtio_blk failover
CPU: 5 PID: 1929279 Comm: curl Not tainted 5.15.0-67-generic #74-Ubuntu
Hardware name: OpenStack Foundation OpenStack Nova, BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:netdev_pick_tx+0xf1/0x320
Code: 00 00 8d 48 ff 0f b7 c1 66 39 ca 0f 86 e9 01 00 00 45 0f b7 ff 41 39 c7 0f 87 5b 01 00 00 44 29 f8 41 39 c7 0f 87 4f 01 00 00 <eb> f2 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 8b 94 24 28 04 00 00 48 85 d2 0f 84 53 01
RSP: 0018:ffffb78b40298820 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9c8773adc2e0 RCX: 000000000000083f
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9c8773adc2e0 RDI: ffff9c870a25e000
RBP: ffffb78b40298858 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9c870a25e000
R13: ffff9c870a25e000 R14: ffff9c87fe043480 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f7b80008f00(0000) GS:ffff9c8e5f740000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7b80f6a0b0 CR3: 0000000329d66000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 netdev_core_pick_tx+0xa4/0xb0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0xf8/0x510
 ? __bpf_prog_exit+0x1e/0x30
 dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
 ovs_vport_send+0xad/0x170 [openvswitch]
 do_output+0x59/0x180 [openvswitch]
 do_execute_actions+0xa80/0xaa0 [openvswitch]
 ? kfree+0x1/0x250
 ? kfree+0x1/0x250
 ? kprobe_perf_func+0x4f/0x2b0
 ? flow_lookup.constprop.0+0x5c/0x110 [openvswitch]
 ovs_execute_actions+0x4c/0x120 [openvswitch]
 ovs_dp_process_packet+0xa1/0x200 [openvswitch]
 ? ovs_ct_update_key.isra.0+0xa8/0x120 [openvswitch]
 ? ovs_ct_fill_key+0x1d/0x30 [openvswitch]
 ? ovs_flow_key_extract+0x2db/0x350 [openvswitch]
 ovs_vport_receive+0x77/0xd0 [openvswitch]
 ? __htab_map_lookup_elem+0x4e/0x60
 ? bpf_prog_680e8aff8547aec1_kfree+0x3b/0x714
 ? trace_call_bpf+0xc8/0x150
 ? kfree+0x1/0x250
 ? kfree+0x1/0x250
 ? kprobe_perf_func+0x4f/0x2b0
 ? kprobe_perf_func+0x4f/0x2b0
 ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0x63/0xe0
 netdev_port_receive+0xc4/0x180 [openvswitch]
 ? netdev_port_receive+0x180/0x180 [openvswitch]
 netdev_frame_hook+0x1f/0x40 [openvswitch]
 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x23d/0xf00
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x3f/0xa0
 __netif_receive_skb+0x15/0x60
 process_backlog+0x9e/0x170
 __napi_poll+0x33/0x180
 net_rx_action+0x126/0x280
 ? ttwu_do_activate+0x72/0xf0
 __do_softirq+0xd9/0x2e7
 ? rcu_report_exp_cpu_mult+0x1b0/0x1b0
 do_softirq+0x7d/0xb0
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x54/0x60
 ip_finish_output2+0x191/0x460
 __ip_finish_output+0xb7/0x180
 ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xc0
 ip_output+0x78/0x100
 ? __ip_finish_output+0x180/0x180
 ip_local_out+0x5e/0x70
 __ip_queue_xmit+0x184/0x440
 ? tcp_syn_options+0x1f9/0x300
 ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x20
 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x910/0x9c0
 ? __mod_memcg_state+0x44/0xa0
 tcp_connect+0x437/0x4e0
 ? ktime_get_with_offset+0x60/0xf0
 tcp_v4_connect+0x436/0x530
 __inet_stream_connect+0xd4/0x3a0
 ? kprobe_perf_func+0x4f/0x2b0
 ? aa_sk_perm+0x43/0x1c0
 inet_stream_connect+0x3b/0x60
 __sys_connect_file+0x63/0x70
 __sys_connect+0xa6/0xd0
 ? setfl+0x108/0x170
 ? do_fcntl+0xe8/0x5a0
 __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0
 ? __x64_sys_fcntl+0xa9/0xd0
 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
 ? __sys_setsockopt+0xea/0x1e0
 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
 ? __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x1f/0x30
 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
 ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30
 ? exc_page_fault+0x89/0x170
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7f7b8101c6a7
Code: 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2a 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 54 24 0c 48 89 34 24 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffffd6b2198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7b8101c6a7
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007ffffd6b2360 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000561f1370d560 R08: 00002795ad21d1ac R09: 0030312e302e302e
R10: 00007ffffd73f080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000561f1370c410
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fixes: 7f8a436eaa ("openvswitch: Add conntrack action")
Co-developed-by: Luca Czesla <luca.czesla@mail.schwarz>
Signed-off-by: Luca Czesla <luca.czesla@mail.schwarz>
Signed-off-by: Felix Huettner <felix.huettner@mail.schwarz>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZC0pBXBAgh7c76CA@kernel-bug-kernel-bug
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Soto <carlos.soto@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-02 07:44:22 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
58de45f4d6 net: make sock_inuse_add() available
commit d477eb9004 upstream.

MPTCP hard codes it, let us instead provide this helper.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
[ cherry-pick from amazon-linux amazon-5.15.y/mainline ]
Link: 7154d8eaac
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-02 07:44:20 +02:00
Wang Liang
90c8482a5d net: fix crash when config small gso_max_size/gso_ipv4_max_size
[ Upstream commit 9ab5cf19fb ]

Config a small gso_max_size/gso_ipv4_max_size will lead to an underflow
in sk_dst_gso_max_size(), which may trigger a BUG_ON crash,
because sk->sk_gso_max_size would be much bigger than device limits.
Call Trace:
tcp_write_xmit
    tso_segs = tcp_init_tso_segs(skb, mss_now);
        tcp_set_skb_tso_segs
            tcp_skb_pcount_set
                // skb->len = 524288, mss_now = 8
                // u16 tso_segs = 524288/8 = 65535 -> 0
                tso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss_now)
    BUG_ON(!tso_segs)
Add check for the minimum value of gso_max_size and gso_ipv4_max_size.

Fixes: 46e6b992c2 ("rtnetlink: allow GSO maximums to be set on device creation")
Fixes: 9eefedd58a ("net: add gso_ipv4_max_size and gro_ipv4_max_size per device")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241023035213.517386-1-wangliang74@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Resolve minor conflicts to fix CVE-2024-50258 ]
Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <bin.lan.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[Harshit: Clean cherrypick from 6.1.y commit]
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-02 07:44:18 +02:00
Willem de Bruijn
8273ae8030 bpf: support SKF_NET_OFF and SKF_LL_OFF on skb frags
[ Upstream commit d4bac0288a ]

Classic BPF socket filters with SKB_NET_OFF and SKB_LL_OFF fail to
read when these offsets extend into frags.

This has been observed with iwlwifi and reproduced with tun with
IFF_NAPI_FRAGS. The below straightforward socket filter on UDP port,
applied to a RAW socket, will silently miss matching packets.

    const int offset_proto = offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_nxt);
    const int offset_dport = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + offsetof(struct udphdr, dest);
    struct sock_filter filter_code[] = {
            BPF_STMT(BPF_LD  + BPF_B   + BPF_ABS, SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_PKTTYPE),
            BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, PACKET_HOST, 0, 4),
            BPF_STMT(BPF_LD  + BPF_B   + BPF_ABS, SKF_NET_OFF + offset_proto),
            BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, IPPROTO_UDP, 0, 2),
            BPF_STMT(BPF_LD  + BPF_H   + BPF_ABS, SKF_NET_OFF + offset_dport),

This is unexpected behavior. Socket filter programs should be
consistent regardless of environment. Silent misses are
particularly concerning as hard to detect.

Use skb_copy_bits for offsets outside linear, same as done for
non-SKF_(LL|NET) offsets.

Offset is always positive after subtracting the reference threshold
SKB_(LL|NET)_OFF, so is always >= skb_(mac|network)_offset. The sum of
the two is an offset against skb->data, and may be negative, but it
cannot point before skb->head, as skb_(mac|network)_offset would too.

This appears to go back to when frag support was introduced to
sk_run_filter in linux-2.4.4, before the introduction of git.

The amount of code change and 8/16/32 bit duplication are unfortunate.
But any attempt I made to be smarter saved very few LoC while
complicating the code.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250122200402.3461154-1-maze@google.com/
Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/2.4.4/source/net/core/filter.c#L244
Reported-by: Matt Moeller <moeller.matt@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250408132833.195491-2-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-02 07:43:58 +02:00
Ben Dooks
831062d76d bpf: Add endian modifiers to fix endian warnings
[ Upstream commit 96a233e600 ]

A couple of the syscalls which load values (bpf_skb_load_helper_16() and
bpf_skb_load_helper_32()) are using u16/u32 types which are triggering
warnings as they are then converted from big-endian to CPU-endian. Fix
these by making the types __be instead.

Fixes the following sparse warnings:

  net/core/filter.c:246:32: warning: cast to restricted __be16
  net/core/filter.c:246:32: warning: cast to restricted __be16
  net/core/filter.c:246:32: warning: cast to restricted __be16
  net/core/filter.c:246:32: warning: cast to restricted __be16
  net/core/filter.c:273:32: warning: cast to restricted __be32
  net/core/filter.c:273:32: warning: cast to restricted __be32
  net/core/filter.c:273:32: warning: cast to restricted __be32
  net/core/filter.c:273:32: warning: cast to restricted __be32
  net/core/filter.c:273:32: warning: cast to restricted __be32
  net/core/filter.c:273:32: warning: cast to restricted __be32

Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220714105101.297304-1-ben.dooks@sifive.com
Stable-dep-of: d4bac0288a ("bpf: support SKF_NET_OFF and SKF_LL_OFF on skb frags")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-02 07:43:58 +02:00
Jason Xing
91522aba56 page_pool: avoid infinite loop to schedule delayed worker
[ Upstream commit 43130d02ba ]

We noticed the kworker in page_pool_release_retry() was waken
up repeatedly and infinitely in production because of the
buggy driver causing the inflight less than 0 and warning
us in page_pool_inflight()[1].

Since the inflight value goes negative, it means we should
not expect the whole page_pool to get back to work normally.

This patch mitigates the adverse effect by not rescheduling
the kworker when detecting the inflight negative in
page_pool_release_retry().

[1]
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] Negative(-51446) inflight packet-pages
...
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] Call Trace:
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025]  page_pool_release_retry+0x23/0x70
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025]  process_one_work+0x1b1/0x370
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025]  worker_thread+0x37/0x3a0
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025]  kthread+0x11a/0x140
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025]  ? process_one_work+0x370/0x370
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025]  ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[Mon Feb 10 20:36:11 2025] ---[ end trace ebffe800f33e7e34 ]---
Note: before this patch, the above calltrace would flood the
dmesg due to repeated reschedule of release_dw kworker.

Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250214064250.85987-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-02 07:43:54 +02:00
Mark Zhang
bb7bdf636c rtnetlink: Allocate vfinfo size for VF GUIDs when supported
[ Upstream commit 23f0080761 ]

Commit 30aad41721 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs")
added support for getting VF port and node GUIDs in netlink ifinfo
messages, but their size was not taken into consideration in the
function that allocates the netlink message, causing the following
warning when a netlink message is filled with many VF port and node
GUIDs:
 # echo 64 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:08\:00.0/sriov_numvfs
 # ip link show dev ib0
 RTNETLINK answers: Message too long
 Cannot send link get request: Message too long

Kernel warning:

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1930 at net/core/rtnetlink.c:4151 rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0
 Modules linked in: xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter overlay mlx5_ib macsec mlx5_core tls rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm iw_cm ib_ipoib fuse ib_cm ib_core
 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1930 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #1
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0
 Code: cb 82 e8 3d af 0a 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 08 ff ff ff 4c 89 ff 41 be ea ff ff ff e8 66 63 5b ff 49 c7 07 80 4f cb 82 e9 36 fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff e8 de a0 56 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
 RSP: 0018:ffff888113557348 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 00000000ffffffa6 RBX: ffff88817e87aa34 RCX: dffffc0000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88817e87afb8
 RBP: 0000000000000009 R08: ffffffff821f44aa R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: ffff8881260f79a8 R11: ffff88817e87af00 R12: ffff88817e87aa00
 R13: ffffffff8563d300 R14: 00000000ffffffa6 R15: 00000000ffffffff
 FS:  00007f63a5dbf280(0000) GS:ffff88881ee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f63a5ba4493 CR3: 00000001700fe002 CR4: 0000000000772eb0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __warn+0xa5/0x230
  ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0
  ? report_bug+0x22d/0x240
  ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0
  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50
  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
  ? skb_trim+0x6a/0x80
  ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0
  ? __pfx_rtnl_getlink+0x10/0x10
  ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1e5/0x860
  ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0
  ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1d/0x70
  ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40
  ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
  ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x860
  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210
  ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? __pfx___netlink_lookup+0x10/0x10
  ? lock_release+0x62/0x200
  ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xfd/0x290
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? lock_release+0x62/0x200
  ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x95/0x290
  netlink_unicast+0x31f/0x480
  ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410
  netlink_sendmsg+0x369/0x660
  ? lock_release+0x62/0x200
  ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
  ? import_ubuf+0xb9/0xf0
  ? __import_iovec+0x254/0x2b0
  ? lock_release+0x62/0x200
  ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x559/0x5a0
  ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? do_read_fault+0x213/0x4a0
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe4/0x150
  ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
  ? do_fault+0x2cc/0x6f0
  ? handle_pte_fault+0x2e3/0x3d0
  ? __pfx_handle_pte_fault+0x10/0x10
  ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0
  ? __down_read_trylock+0x150/0x270
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x404/0x8e0
  ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10
  ? lock_release+0x62/0x200
  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  __sys_sendmsg+0xd5/0x150
  ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
  ? __up_read+0x192/0x480
  ? lock_release+0x62/0x200
  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7f63a5b13367
 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
 RSP: 002b:00007fff8c726bc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000067b687c2 RCX: 00007f63a5b13367
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff8c726c30 RDI: 0000000000000004
 RBP: 00007fff8c726cb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000034
 R10: 00007fff8c726c7c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff8c726cd0 R15: 00007fff8c726cd0
  </TASK>
 irq event stamp: 0
 hardirqs last  enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830
 softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830
 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Thus, when calculating ifinfo message size, take VF GUIDs sizes into
account when supported.

Fixes: 30aad41721 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs")
Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250325090226.749730-1-mbloch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-04-10 14:32:02 +02:00
Michal Luczaj
fdb2cd8957 bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close()
commit ed1fc5d76b upstream.

Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race
with socket's close() link popping & unlinking. __sock_map_delete()
unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element:

// set map[0] = s0
map_update_elem(map, 0, s0)

// drop fd of s0
close(s0)
  sock_map_close()
    lock_sock(sk)               (s0!)
    sock_map_remove_links(sk)
      link = sk_psock_link_pop()
      sock_map_unlink(sk, link)
        sock_map_delete_from_link
                                        // replace map[0] with s1
                                        map_update_elem(map, 0, s1)
                                          sock_map_update_elem
                                (s1!)       lock_sock(sk)
                                            sock_map_update_common
                                              psock = sk_psock(sk)
                                              spin_lock(&stab->lock)
                                              osk = stab->sks[idx]
                                              sock_map_add_link(..., &stab->sks[idx])
                                              sock_map_unref(osk, &stab->sks[idx])
                                                psock = sk_psock(osk)
                                                sk_psock_put(sk, psock)
                                                  if (refcount_dec_and_test(&psock))
                                                    sk_psock_drop(sk, psock)
                                              spin_unlock(&stab->lock)
                                            unlock_sock(sk)
          __sock_map_delete
            spin_lock(&stab->lock)
            sk = *psk                        // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1
            if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk)   // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch
              sk = xchg(psk, NULL)
            if (sk)
              sock_map_unref(sk, psk)        // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle
                psock = sk_psock(sk)
                sk_psock_put(sk, psock)
                  if (refcount_dec_and_test())
                    sk_psock_drop(sk, psock)
            spin_unlock(&stab->lock)
    release_sock(sk)

Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls
sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with
a KASAN splat [1].

Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that
may have been replaced.

[1]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063

CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90
 print_report+0x174/0x4f6
 kasan_report+0xb9/0x190
 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0
 sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330
 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320
 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
 kthread+0x29e/0x360
 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 1202:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90
 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450
 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220
 sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870
 unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0
 unix_create+0xc5/0x180
 __sock_create+0x241/0x650
 __sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420
 __x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100
 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Freed by task 46:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70
 kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590
 __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0
 sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50
 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
 kthread+0x29e/0x360
 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811f5b9080
 which belongs to the cache UNIX-STREAM of size 1984
The buggy address is located 128 bytes inside of
 freed 1984-byte region [ffff88811f5b9080, ffff88811f5b9840)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11f5b8
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
memcg:ffff888127d49401
flags: 0x17ffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401
head: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff8881042e4500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001f5000000 ffff888127d49401
head: 0017ffffc0000003 ffffea00047d6e01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88811f5b9000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88811f5b9080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                   ^
 ffff88811f5b9180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88811f5b9200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G    B              6.12.0+ #125
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
Code: 34 73 eb 03 01 e8 82 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb b1 80 3d 27 73 eb 03 00 75 a8 48 c7 c7 80 bd 95 84 c6 05 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe <0f> 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05
RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349
R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000
R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390
 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150
 sock_map_free+0x2e5/0x330
 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320
 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
 kthread+0x29e/0x360
 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>
irq event stamp: 10741
hardirqs last  enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770
softirqs last  enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210
softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210

refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1063 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Tainted: G    B   W          6.12.0+ #125
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
Code: 17 73 eb 03 01 e8 62 53 ad fe 0f 0b eb 91 80 3d 06 73 eb 03 00 75 88 48 c7 c7 e0 bd 95 84 c6 05 f6 72 eb 03 01 e8 42 53 ad fe <0f> 0b e9 6e ff ff ff 80 3d e6 72 eb 03 00 0f 85 61 ff ff ff 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffff88815c49fc70 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811f5b9100 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10bcde6349
R10: ffff8885e6f31a4b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813be0b000
R13: ffff88811f5b9100 R14: ffff88811f5b9080 R15: ffff88813be0b024
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055dda99b0250 CR3: 000000015dbac000 CR4: 0000000000752ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __warn.cold+0x5f/0x1ff
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
 ? report_bug+0x1ec/0x390
 ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x40
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150
 sock_map_free+0x2d3/0x330
 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320
 process_one_work+0x846/0x1420
 worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80
 kthread+0x29e/0x360
 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>
irq event stamp: 10741
hardirqs last  enabled at (10741): [<ffffffff84400ec6>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
hardirqs last disabled at (10740): [<ffffffff811e532d>] handle_softirqs+0x60d/0x770
softirqs last  enabled at (10506): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210
softirqs last disabled at (10301): [<ffffffff811e55a9>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x210

Fixes: 604326b41a ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241202-sockmap-replace-v1-3-1e88579e7bd5@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <bin.lan.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-04-10 14:31:55 +02:00
Lin Ma
fc0f223ea3 net/neighbor: add missing policy for NDTPA_QUEUE_LENBYTES
[ Upstream commit 90a7138619 ]

Previous commit 8b5c171bb3 ("neigh: new unresolved queue limits")
introduces new netlink attribute NDTPA_QUEUE_LENBYTES to represent
approximative value for deprecated QUEUE_LEN. However, it forgot to add
the associated nla_policy in nl_ntbl_parm_policy array. Fix it with one
simple NLA_U32 type policy.

Fixes: 8b5c171bb3 ("neigh: new unresolved queue limits")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250315165113.37600-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-04-10 14:31:54 +02:00
Breno Leitao
b018706f5f netpoll: hold rcu read lock in __netpoll_send_skb()
[ Upstream commit 505ead7ab7 ]

The function __netpoll_send_skb() is being invoked without holding the
RCU read lock. This oversight triggers a warning message when
CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST is enabled:

	net/core/netpoll.c:330 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

	 netpoll_send_skb
	 netpoll_send_udp
	 write_ext_msg
	 console_flush_all
	 console_unlock
	 vprintk_emit

To prevent npinfo from disappearing unexpectedly, ensure that
__netpoll_send_skb() is protected with the RCU read lock.

Fixes: 2899656b49 ("netpoll: take rcu_read_lock_bh() in netpoll_send_skb_on_dev()")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250306-netpoll_rcu_v2-v2-1-bc4f5c51742a@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-04-10 14:31:49 +02:00
Philo Lu
a3c25f8374 ipvs: Always clear ipvs_property flag in skb_scrub_packet()
[ Upstream commit de2c211868 ]

We found an issue when using bpf_redirect with ipvs NAT mode after
commit ff70202b2d ("dev_forward_skb: do not scrub skb mark within
the same name space"). Particularly, we use bpf_redirect to return
the skb directly back to the netif it comes from, i.e., xnet is
false in skb_scrub_packet(), and then ipvs_property is preserved
and SNAT is skipped in the rx path.

ipvs_property has been already cleared when netns is changed in
commit 2b5ec1a5f9 ("netfilter/ipvs: clear ipvs_property flag when
SKB net namespace changed"). This patch just clears it in spite of
netns.

Fixes: 2b5ec1a5f9 ("netfilter/ipvs: clear ipvs_property flag when SKB net namespace changed")
Signed-off-by: Philo Lu <lulie@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250222033518.126087-1-lulie@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 12:50:57 +01:00
Gavrilov Ilia
872c7c7e57 drop_monitor: fix incorrect initialization order
commit 07b598c0e6 upstream.

Syzkaller reports the following bug:

BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#1, syz-executor.0/7995
 lock: 0xffff88805303f3e0, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
CPU: 1 PID: 7995 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G            E     5.10.209+ #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x119/0x179 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:83 [inline]
 do_raw_spin_lock+0x1f6/0x270 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:112
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:117 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
 reset_per_cpu_data+0xe6/0x240 [drop_monitor]
 net_dm_cmd_trace+0x43d/0x17a0 [drop_monitor]
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22f/0x330 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x341/0x5a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2497
 genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x54b/0x800 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
 netlink_sendmsg+0x914/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1916
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x157/0x190 net/socket.c:663
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x870 net/socket.c:2378
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2432
 __sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2461
 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xc7
RIP: 0033:0x7f3f9815aee9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3f972bf0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3f9826d050 RCX: 00007f3f9815aee9
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020001300 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007f3f981b63bd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f3f9826d050 R15: 00007ffe01ee6768

If drop_monitor is built as a kernel module, syzkaller may have time
to send a netlink NET_DM_CMD_START message during the module loading.
This will call the net_dm_monitor_start() function that uses
a spinlock that has not yet been initialized.

To fix this, let's place resource initialization above the registration
of a generic netlink family.

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 9a8afc8d39 ("Network Drop Monitor: Adding drop monitor implementation & Netlink protocol")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilia Gavrilov <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250213152054.2785669-1-Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-03-13 12:50:53 +01:00
Breno Leitao
e860d51035 net: Add non-RCU dev_getbyhwaddr() helper
[ Upstream commit 4b5a28b38c ]

Add dedicated helper for finding devices by hardware address when
holding rtnl_lock, similar to existing dev_getbyhwaddr_rcu(). This prevents
PROVE_LOCKING warnings when rtnl_lock is held but RCU read lock is not.

Extract common address comparison logic into dev_addr_cmp().

The context about this change could be found in the following
discussion:

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250206-scarlet-ermine-of-improvement-1fcac5@leitao/

Cc: kuniyu@amazon.com
Cc: ushankar@purestorage.com
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218-arm_fix_selftest-v5-1-d3d6892db9e1@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 4eae0ee0f1 ("arp: switch to dev_getbyhwaddr() in arp_req_set_public()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 12:50:53 +01:00
Cong Wang
2af45b1f29 flow_dissector: Fix port range key handling in BPF conversion
[ Upstream commit 69ab34f705 ]

Fix how port range keys are handled in __skb_flow_bpf_to_target() by:
- Separating PORTS and PORTS_RANGE key handling
- Using correct key_ports_range structure for range keys
- Properly initializing both key types independently

This ensures port range information is correctly stored in its dedicated
structure rather than incorrectly using the regular ports key structure.

Fixes: 59fb9b62fb ("flow_dissector: Fix to use new variables for port ranges in bpf hook")
Reported-by: Qiang Zhang <dtzq01@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAPx+-5uvFxkhkz4=j_Xuwkezjn9U6kzKTD5jz4tZ9msSJ0fOJA@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: Yoshiki Komachi <komachi.yoshiki@gmail.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218043210.732959-4-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 12:50:52 +01:00