-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=waBr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'v7.2-rc1-smb3-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd
Pull smb server fixes from Steve French:
- Fix several use-after-free races in durable handle reconnect,
supersede, and oplock handling
- Avoid holding the inode oplock lock while waiting for a lease break
acknowledgement. This removes delays of up to 35 seconds when cifs.ko
closes a deferred handle in response to a lease break
- Fix malformed security descriptor handling, including an undersized
DACL allocation issue and an out-of-bounds ACE SID read
- Fix memory leaks in security descriptor and DOS attribute xattr
encoding/decoding error paths
- Fix outstanding SMB2 credit leaks on aborted requests and correct the
QUERY_INFO credit charge calculation
- Fix hard-link creation without replacement being incorrectly rejected
when the handle lacks DELETE access
- Avoid unnecessary zeroing of large SMB2 read buffers
- Add an oplock list lockdep annotation and update the documented
support status for durable handles and SMB3.1.1 compression
- Durable handle fixes to address ownership and lifetime races during
reconnect, session teardown, oplock handling, and superseding opens,
preventing stale session and file references from being used by
concurrent operations
* tag 'v7.2-rc1-smb3-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd:
ksmbd: fix app-instance durable supersede session UAF
ksmbd: snapshot previous oplock state before durable checks
ksmbd: close superseded durable handles through refcount handoff
ksmbd: fix use-after-free of fp->owner.name in durable handle owner check
smb/server: do not require delete access for non-replacing links
ksmbd: don't hold ci->m_lock while waiting for a lease break ack
ksmbd: doc: update feature support status for durable handles and compression
ksmbd: annotate oplock list traversals under m_lock
ksmbd: fix outstanding credit leak on abort and error paths
ksmbd: fix credit charge calculation for SMB2 QUERY_INFO
ksmbd: avoid zeroing the read buffer in smb2_read()
ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
ksmbd: reject undersized DACLs before parsing ACEs
ksmbd: fix n.data memory leak in ksmbd_vfs_set_dos_attrib_xattr
ksmbd: Fix acl.sd_buf memory leak and invalid sd_size error handling
ksmbd: fix sd_ndr.data memory leak in ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr
The server controls create-context DataOffset, so the POSIX context data
pointer may be misaligned on strict-alignment architectures. Use
get_unaligned_le32() when reading nlink, reparse_tag, and mode.
Fixes: 69dda3059e ("cifs: add SMB2_open() arg to return POSIX data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <xizh2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
posix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count,
but its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one
remaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client
paths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely.
Fixes: 349e13ad30 ("cifs: add smb2 POSIX info level")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <xizh2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
ksmbd_close_fd_app_instance_id() looks up a prior durable handle by
AppInstanceId and closes it through opinfo->sess->file_table. This is
unsafe after the original session has been torn down. session_fd_check()
preserves reconnectable durable handles in the global table and clears
opinfo->conn/fp->conn, but opinfo->sess can still point to the freed
ksmbd_session.
Use opinfo->conn as the orphan sentinel, but make the check reliable by
serializing it with session_fd_check(). That path clears opinfo->conn
under fp->f_ci->m_lock, so hold the same lock while testing opinfo->conn
and while dereferencing opinfo->sess->file_table. Also avoid closing
through the session file table if the volatile id has already been
unpublished by session teardown.
Durable reconnect must keep the two fields consistent. Rebinding only
opinfo->conn leaves opinfo->sess pointing at the old freed session, so
a later app-instance supersede can pass the conn check and write-lock the
freed session's file table. Clear opinfo->sess when preserving a durable
handle during session teardown, and set it to the reconnecting session
when opinfo->conn is rebound in ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd().
Fixes: 16c3064970 ("ksmbd: handle durable v2 app instance id")
Reported-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb_grant_oplock() checks the previous oplock holder's o_fp to decide
whether a durable handle should be invalidated when the oplock break
cannot be delivered. prev_opinfo is obtained with opinfo_get_list(),
which pins only the oplock_info. It does not pin the ksmbd_file stored
in opinfo->o_fp.
A concurrent last close can unlink the opinfo from ci->m_op_list under
ci->m_lock and then free the ksmbd_file. The oplock_info can still be
kept alive by the refcount taken by opinfo_get_list(), but o_fp may
already point at freed memory by the time smb_grant_oplock() reads
is_durable, conn, or tcon.
Snapshot the previous holder's durable state while ci->m_lock is held,
then use only the copied values after dropping the lock. This keeps the
o_fp lifetime tied to the inode lock without taking an extra ksmbd_file
reference. Taking such a reference is unsafe here because smb_grant_oplock()
does not necessarily have the previous holder's session work, and dropping
the temporary reference can otherwise become the final putter.
Fixes: 26fa88dc87 ("ksmbd: invalidate durable handles on oplock break")
Reported-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
ksmbd_close_disconnected_durable_delete_on_close() collects disconnected
durable handles for a name being superseded by a new delete-on-close
open, drops ci->m_lock, then closes each collected handle directly with
__ksmbd_close_fd().
That bypasses the FP_CLOSED and refcount handoff used by the other close
paths. If a durable reconnect or the durable scavenger already took a
reference to the same fp, the direct __ksmbd_close_fd() can free the
ksmbd_file while that other holder still owns a live reference.
Claim the disconnected durable handle before unlinking it from m_fp_list.
While holding ci->m_lock and global_ft.lock, only take ownership when the
durable lifetime reference is the only remaining reference. Then take a
transient reference, remove the fp from global_ft, mark it FP_CLOSED, and
move it to the local dispose list. If another holder already has a
reference, leave the fp linked and let that holder complete its path.
The dispose loop then drops both references owned by the claim. This keeps
the force-close path in the same refcount handoff model as the durable
scavenger and avoids leaving a live reconnected fp detached from
m_fp_list.
Fixes: 166e4c0702 ("ksmbd: supersede disconnected delete-on-close durable handle")
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Two concurrent SMB2 durable reconnects (DH2C/DHnC) on the same
persistent_id race the fp->owner.name compare-read in
ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner() against the kfree() in
ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd()'s reopen-success path. fp->owner.name is a
standalone kstrdup() buffer whose lifetime is independent of the fp
refcount, and the two sites share no lock: the compare reads the buffer
while the reopen frees it, so the strcmp() can dereference freed memory.
Commit 7ce4fc4001 ("ksmbd: fix durable reconnect double-bind race in
ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd") made the fp->conn claim atomic under
global_ft.lock (closing the owner.name double-free and the ksmbd_file
write-UAF), but the compare-read versus reopen-free pair was left
unserialized.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strcmp+0x2c/0x80
Read of size 1 by task kworker
strcmp
ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner
smb2_check_durable_oplock
smb2_open
Freed by task kworker:
kfree
ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd
smb2_open
Allocated by task kworker:
kstrdup
session_fd_check
smb2_session_logoff
The buggy address belongs to the cache kmalloc-8
Serialize both sides of the race with fp->f_lock. The global durable
file-table lock still protects the durable reconnect claim, but
fp->owner.name is per-open state and does not need to block unrelated
durable table lookups or reconnects. The teardown is left at its
existing location after the reopen-success point so that an __open_id()
rollback still retains owner.name for a later legitimate reconnect to
verify.
Fixes: 49110a8ce6 ("ksmbd: validate owner of durable handle on reconnect")
Assisted-by: Henry (Claude):claude-opus-4
Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy <dddhkts1@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
When a cifs.ko client caches a read-handle (RH) lease via deferred close
and a conflicting open arrives, ksmbd breaks the lease and waits for the
acknowledgment in wait_for_break_ack() for up to OPLOCK_WAIT_TIME (35s).
__smb_break_all_levII_oplock() runs that wait while holding ci->m_lock
for read.
cifs.ko reacts to a handle-lease break by closing the deferred handle
rather than sending a lease break acknowledgment. That close path
(close_id_del_oplock() -> opinfo_del()) takes ci->m_lock for write and
is exactly what would wake the waiter, but it blocks on the read lock
held by the waiting thread. The break is then resolved only by the 35s
timeout, so xfstests generic/001 takes ~78s with leases enabled versus
~4s with oplocks only.
Collect the target opinfos (each pinned with a reference) while holding
ci->m_lock, then break them after releasing it, matching how
smb_grant_oplock() already breaks a conflicting lease using only a
reference. The reference keeps the opinfo (and its conn and lease)
alive across the unlocked window, and a close racing the break is
handled by the existing OPLOCK_CLOSING state check. Apply the same fix
to the parent lease break paths.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
session_fd_check() and ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd() walk ci->m_op_list with
list_for_each_entry_rcu() while holding ci->m_lock for write. That is
the local inode/oplock serializer, but the RCU-list iterator does not
currently tell lockdep about it.
Pass lockdep_is_held(&ci->m_lock) to these iterators so
CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST can see the rwsem protection already in place.
This was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed
against the current tree. The dynamic triage evidence is a
target-matched CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST warning; the change is limited
to documenting the existing protection contract.
This is a lockdep annotation cleanup. It does not change oplock list
lifetime or durable-handle behavior.
Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao <runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2_validate_credit_charge() adds the request's CreditCharge to
conn->outstanding_credits when an SMB2 PDU is received, and
smb2_set_rsp_credits() subtracts it again when the response is built.
However smb2_set_rsp_credits() only runs on the normal response path:
- __process_request() returning SERVER_HANDLER_ABORT (unimplemented
command, command index out of range, signature check failure, or a
handler that sets send_no_response such as a cancelled blocking
lock) breaks out of the processing loop before set_rsp_credits() is
called;
- smb2_set_rsp_credits() itself returns early with -EINVAL (total
credit overflow or insufficient credits) before the subtraction.
On all of these paths the charge added at receive time is never
returned, so conn->outstanding_credits only grows. Because a client can
repeatedly trigger them (e.g. by sending unimplemented commands or by
issuing and cancelling blocking locks), outstanding_credits eventually
reaches total_credits and smb2_validate_credit_charge() then rejects
every subsequent request, wedging the connection.
Record the charge that was added in work->credit_charge and release any
charge still pending at the single send. exit point of
__handle_ksmbd_work(), which all abort and error paths fall through to.
smb2_set_rsp_credits() clears work->credit_charge once it has returned
the charge so the response path is unchanged and the credit is never
released twice. Paths that never charged a credit (no multi-credit
support, validation failure) leave work->credit_charge at zero and are
unaffected.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2_validate_credit_charge() computes the credit charge a request is
allowed to consume from the payload size:
CreditCharge = (max(SendPayloadSize, ResponsePayloadSize) - 1)/65536 + 1
For SMB2 QUERY_INFO, the server must validate CreditCharge based on the
*maximum* of InputBufferLength and OutputBufferLength. ksmbd instead
summed the two lengths, which overestimates the required charge.
As a result a single-credit QUERY_INFO whose InputBufferLength and
OutputBufferLength each fit in 64KB but whose sum exceeds 64KB is
rejected with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER, even though it is a valid
request. IOCTL already uses max() of the request and response sizes;
make QUERY_INFO consistent by feeding InputBufferLength as the request
length and OutputBufferLength as the expected response length so that
smb2_validate_credit_charge() takes their maximum.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2_read() allocates the read payload buffer with kvzalloc(), zeroing up
to max_read_size bytes (1MB or more with multichannel) on every read,
only to immediately overwrite the region with file data via kernel_read().
The zero-fill is pure overhead: ksmbd_vfs_read() returns the number of
bytes actually read ('nbytes'), and only those nbytes are ever consumed -
they are pinned into the response iov (ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp_read()), sent
over the RDMA channel (smb2_read_rdma_channel()), or copied by the
compression path (ksmbd_compress_response() uses iov_len == nbytes). The
ALIGN(length, 8) tail padding and any short-read remainder are never read
or transmitted, so they need not be initialized.
Use kvmalloc() instead to skip the redundant zeroing. This reduces CPU
and memory-bandwidth usage on large sequential reads.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored
security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking
sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)
originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is
stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE
with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns
success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.
On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a
POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() ->
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads
ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]
with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]
is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully
controlled by an authenticated client.
The sibling functions already gate this field:
parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.
Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying
the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().
Signed-off-by: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Suggested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
parse_dacl() limits the attacker-controlled ACE count by comparing it
with the number of minimal ACEs that fit in the DACL size. The DACL size
field is 16 bits, but the expression subtracts sizeof(struct smb_acl).
Because sizeof() is unsigned, a DACL size smaller than the ACL header
underflows to a large size_t.
A malicious client can reach this with:
SMB2_SET_INFO (InfoType=SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY)
-> smb2_set_info_sec()
-> set_info_sec()
-> parse_sec_desc()
-> parse_dacl()
-> init_acl_state(..., 0xffff)
-> init_acl_state(..., 0xffff)
-> kmalloc_objs(..., 0xffff)
Thus a malformed security descriptor can make num_aces pass the guard
and drive large temporary ACL state and pointer-array allocations.
Reject DACLs smaller than struct smb_acl before doing the subtraction,
so the ACE count check cannot be bypassed by the underflow.
Fixes: e2f34481b2 ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Signed-off-by: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Free ndr buffer data when ndr_encode_dos_attr() returns error
to avoid memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Qiang Liu <liuqiang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
1. When ndr_decode_v4_ntacl() fails, the code jumped to free_n_data
which only freed n.data, skipping kfree(acl.sd_buf) and leaking
the buffer. Zero-initialize struct xattr_ntacl acl, reorder error
labels to out_free to release acl.sd_buf on all error paths.
2. if (acl.sd_size < sizeof(struct smb_ntsd)) is true, original code
returned success without freeing sd_buf and left stale *pntsd.
Set rc = -EINVAL before jumping to out_free to return error code and
free buffer.
Signed-off-by: Qiang Liu <liuqiang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
ndr_encode_v4_ntacl() allocates sd_ndr.data via kzalloc() at entry.
If any subsequent ndr_write_*() call returns error during encoding,
the allocated sd_ndr.data won't be freed and causes memory leak.
Move kfree(sd_ndr.data) into out label to ensure the buffer gets
released on all success and error return paths.
Signed-off-by: Qiang Liu <liuqiang@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=/FfE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'v7.2-rc-part2-smb3-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd
Pull smb server updates from Steve French:
"This is mostly a correctness and compatibility update for ksmbd's
SMB2/3 lease, oplock, durable handle, compound request, CREATE,
rename, stream and share-mode handling.
A large part of the series fixes cases found by smbtorture where ksmbd
diverged from the SMB2/3 protocol requirements.
The main changes are:
- Rework SMB2 lease state handling so lease state is shared per
ClientGuid/LeaseKey across opens, with better validation of lease
create contexts, ACK handling, epochs, break-in-progress reporting,
v2 lease notification routing, and chained lease breaks
- Fix several oplock break corner cases, including ACK validation,
timeout downgrade behavior, level-II break handling on unlink,
share-conflict lease breaks, and read-control/stat-open behavior
- Fix durable handle behavior around delete-on-close, stale
reconnects, reconnect context parsing, oplock/lease break
invalidation, and durable v2 AppInstanceId replacement
- Fix compound request handling so related commands propagate failed
statuses correctly, preserve response framing across chained
errors, keep compound FIDs across READ/WRITE/FLUSH, and send
interim STATUS_PENDING where clients expect cancellable compound
I/O
- Tighten CREATE and stream semantics, including create attribute
validation, allocation size reporting, explicit create security
descriptors, unnamed DATA stream handling, stream directory
validation, and stream delete sharing against the base file
- Fix rename and metadata behavior, including parent directory
sharing checks, denying directory rename with open children, and
preserving SMB ChangeTime across rename for open handles
- Fix two important safety issues: a multichannel byte-range lock
list owner race that could lead to use-after-free, and an NTLMv2
session key update before authentication proof validation
- Fix a concurrent SMB2 NEGOTIATE preauth use-after-free, a UBSAN
warning in compression capability parsing, a false hung-task
warning in the durable handle scavenger, endian debug logging,
Smatch indentation warnings, and kernel-doc warnings
- Increase the default SMB3 transaction size from 1MB to 4MB to
better match modern read/write negotiation and improve sequential
I/O behavior"
* tag 'v7.2-rc-part2-smb3-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd: (50 commits)
ksmbd: fix kernel-doc warnings in smb2_lease_break_noti()
ksmbd: fix inconsistent indenting warnings
ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key
ksmbd: increase SMB3_DEFAULT_TRANS_SIZE from 1MB to 4MB
ksmbd: fix UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds in decode_compress_ctxt()
ksmbd: sleep interruptibly in the durable handle scavenger
ksmbd: start file id allocation at 1
ksmbd: treat read-control opens as stat opens only for leases
ksmbd: validate :: stream type against directory create
ksmbd: break conflicting-open leases only as far as needed
ksmbd: break handle caching for share conflicts
ksmbd: normalize ungrantable lease states
ksmbd: return oplock protocol error for level II ack
ksmbd: avoid level II oplock break notification on unlink
ksmbd: downgrade oplock after break timeout
ksmbd: apply create security descriptor first
ksmbd: return requested create allocation size
ksmbd: tighten create file attribute validation
ksmbd: reject empty-attribute synchronize-only create
ksmbd: honor stream delete sharing for base file
...
QueryDirectory responses today are stored in one of two fixed
sized buffers: smallbuf (448 bytes) or bigbuf (16KB). These are
borrowed from server struct and are not sufficient for large-sized
query dir operations.
With this change we will now define a new buffer type specifically
for cifs_search_info to hold variable sized responses. These will
be allocated by kmalloc and freed by kfree.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
cifs_setsize() updates the local inode size after SetEOF succeeds. It also
used the new EOF as a local i_blocks estimate, but extending EOF does not
prove that the intervening range was allocated.
For example, after writing 1 MiB and then extending EOF to 10 MiB, the
client can report the file as fully allocated even though the server still
reports a much smaller AllocationSize:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=test bs=1M count=1
$ truncate -s 10M test && stat -c 'size=%s blocks=%b' test
$ stat --cached=never -c 'size=%s blocks=%b' test
client stat: size=10485760 blocks=20480
server stat: size=10485760 blocks=2056
client stat after revalidation: size=10485760 blocks=2056
A later attribute revalidation may correct i_blocks, but callers such as
xfstests generic/495 invoke swapon immediately after truncate. The swapfile
hole check can therefore observe the inflated local i_blocks value and
accept a sparse file.
Do not grow i_blocks from cifs_setsize() on EOF extension. Only clamp it
on shrink; allocation growth must come from write completion or from
server-reported AllocationSize.
With this change, EOF extension no longer makes a sparse file appear
fully allocated before the next attribute revalidation, and xfstests
generic/495 no longer accepts it through the inflated local i_blocks value.
Signed-off-by: Huiwen He <hehuiwen@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2_set_sparse() converts every FSCTL_SET_SPARSE failure to false and
marks sparse support as broken for the share. Callers therefore report
EOPNOTSUPP even for errors such as ENOSPC or EACCES, and later sparse
operations remain disabled until the share is unmounted.
Return the SMB2 ioctl error directly. Set broken_sparse_sup only for
EOPNOTSUPP, which indicates that the server does not support the request.
Update smb3_punch_hole() to propagate the error returned by
smb2_set_sparse().
Fixes: 3d1a3745d8 ("Add sparse file support to SMB2/SMB3 mounts")
Signed-off-by: Huiwen He <hehuiwen@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
receive_encrypted_standard() allocates next_buffer before checking
whether the number of compound PDUs already reached MAX_COMPOUND. If
the limit check fails, the function returns immediately and the newly
allocated next_buffer is not assigned to server->smallbuf/server->bigbuf,
making it leaked.
Move the MAX_COMPOUND check before allocating next_buffer.
Fixes: b24df3e30c ("cifs: update receive_encrypted_standard to handle compounded responses")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <haoxiang_li2024@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Currently, __reconnect_target_locked() prints the error pointer
'hostname' using PTR_ERR() and %ld, printing only the error code.
Fix this by using by using %pe to print the error symbolic code instead,
and remove PTR_ERR().
Signed-off-by: Fredric Cover <fredric.cover.lkernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
FALLOC_FL_ALLOCATE_RANGE identifies the default fallocate
allocation mode and is defined as zero.
Use the symbolic name instead of a literal zero in
smb3_fallocate() to make the mode dispatch clearer. This
does not change behavior.
Signed-off-by: Huiwen He <hehuiwen@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Ownership (chown) and group (chgrp) modifications were being ignored when
mounting with SMB3 POSIX Extensions unless CIFS_MOUNT_CIFS_ACL or
CIFS_MOUNT_MODE_FROM_SID were also explicitly set.
Fix this by checking for posix_extensions in cifs_setattr_nounix() when
updating UID and GID, ensuring that id_mode_to_cifs_acl() is called to map
and set the ownership/group information on the server.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
In id_mode_to_cifs_acl(), aclflag was initialized to CIFS_ACL_DACL by default.
This forced the client to request setting the DACL even when only an ownership
(chown) or group (chgrp) change was being performed.
Let build_sec_desc() do the proper flag calculation by initializing aclflag
to 0. build_sec_desc() sets the appropriate bits (CIFS_ACL_OWNER, CIFS_ACL_GROUP,
or CIFS_ACL_DACL) depending on what actually changed. During ownership transfer,
CIFS_ACL_DACL is only set if replace_sids_and_copy_aces() actually replaces the
SIDs inside any of the DACL's ACEs.
If build_sec_desc() results in aclflag being 0 (meaning no changes were mapped),
exit early to avoid sending an empty security descriptor update to the server.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
kernel test robot report missing kernel-doc descriptions for the 'wait_ack'
and 'inc_epoch' parameters of smb2_lease_break_noti():
Warning: fs/smb/server/oplock.c:937 function parameter 'wait_ack' not
described in 'smb2_lease_break_noti'
Warning: fs/smb/server/oplock.c:937 function parameter 'inc_epoch' not
described in 'smb2_lease_break_noti'
Document both parameters to silence the warnings.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Detected by Smatch.
fs/smb/server/oplock.c:1446 smb_grant_oplock()
warn: inconsistent indenting
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into
sess->sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response.
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even
when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.
With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on
an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire
binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a
bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess->sess_key before
STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.
Relevant path:
smb2_sess_setup()
-> conn->binding = true
-> ntlm_authenticate()
-> session_user()
-> ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
-> ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()
-> calc_ntlmv2_hash()
-> hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess->sess_key)
-> crypto_memneq() returns mismatch
-> KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess->sess_key, ...)
-> out_err without expiring the binding session
Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to
sess->sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on
authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful
authentication.
Fixes: e2f34481b2 ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Fixes: f9929ef6a2 ("ksmbd: add support for key exchange")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
This patch raises `SMB3_DEFAULT_TRANS_SIZE` to 4MB to align it with
`smb2 max read/write`. This allows better I/O negotiation with modern
clients and improves sequential read/write performance on high-speed
networks.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
decode_compress_ctxt() walks CompressionAlgorithms[] using the client
supplied CompressionAlgorithmCount. That field is declared in
struct smb2_compression_capabilities_context as a fixed 4-element array,
but the number of algorithms is actually variable and clients such as
Windows advertise more than four (e.g. LZ77, LZ77+Huffman, LZNT1,
Pattern_V1 and LZ4).
The on-wire context length is already validated, so the access is within
the received buffer, but indexing the statically sized [4] array makes
UBSAN report an out-of-bounds access:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in smb2pdu.c:1122:48
index 4 is out of range for type '__le16 [4]'
Call Trace:
smb2_handle_negotiate+0xda7/0xde0 [ksmbd]
ksmbd_smb_negotiate_common+0x27b/0x3e0 [ksmbd]
smb2_negotiate_request+0x14/0x20 [ksmbd]
handle_ksmbd_work+0x181/0x500 [ksmbd]
Walk the algorithms through a pointer so the fixed-array bounds check is
not applied, while keeping the existing length validation that bounds the
loop to the data actually received.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
The durable handle scavenger kthread waits up to DURABLE_HANDLE_MAX_TIMEOUT
(300 seconds) between scans using wait_event_timeout(), which sleeps in
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE. When there are no durable handles pending expiry the
task stays in D state far longer than 120 seconds, so the hung task
detector prints a bogus "task ksmbd-durable-s blocked for more than 120
seconds" warning with a backtrace, even though the thread is only idle.
Use wait_event_interruptible_timeout() so the thread sleeps in
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, which the hung task detector ignores. This also suits
the already-freezable kthread. Treat a negative return (e.g. -ERESTARTSYS)
like a timeout when recomputing the next wake interval.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
ksmbd allocates both the volatile id (per-session file table) and the
persistent id (global file table) with idr_alloc_cyclic() starting at 0.
The first open after the module loads therefore gets volatile id 0 and
persistent id 0, and ksmbd returns an SMB2 FileId of {0, 0} in the create
response.
Clients treat an all-zero FileId as a null handle. smbtorture's
smb2_util_handle_empty() considers {0, 0} empty, so tests that guard the
close with it (e.g. smb2.oplock.statopen1, smb2.lease.statopen*) never
close that first handle. The leaked open keeps the inode's oplock count
non-zero, so a later batch oplock request on the same file is downgraded
to level II and the test fails.
Start the id allocation at 1 (KSMBD_START_FID) so no handle is ever
assigned a {0, 0} FileId, matching the behaviour of other SMB servers.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
A second open that requests only metadata-level access must not break
the existing caching state. ksmbd already skips the break for such opens
via fp->attrib_only (FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES,
FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES and FILE_SYNCHRONIZE).
An open requesting only READ_CONTROL (reading the security descriptor)
must be treated differently depending on the existing caching state.
smbtorture smb2.lease.statopen4 expects a read-control open NOT to break
a caching lease, while smb2.oplock.statopen1 expects the same open to
break a batch oplock. So READ_CONTROL is a stat open for leases but not
for oplocks.
Extend the stat-open break-skip in smb_grant_oplock() to also cover a
read-control-only open, but only when the existing holder is a lease.
The global fp->attrib_only flag (used for share-mode, rename and truncate
decisions) is left unchanged so oplock behaviour is preserved.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.streams.dir opens <dir>::$DATA with FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE and expects
STATUS_NOT_A_DIRECTORY, then opens <dir>::$DATA without it and expects
STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY.
Commit "treat unnamed DATA stream as base file" canonicalizes the ::$DATA
suffix to a NULL stream name so the open continues through the base-file
path. That skipped the stream/directory type validation, which was
guarded by "if (stream_name)", so opening a directory's ::$DATA stream
with FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE incorrectly returned STATUS_OK and a plain open
of it no longer reported STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY.
parse_stream_name() still records the explicit $DATA type in s_type even
when it clears stream_name. Run the data-stream vs directory validation
whenever s_type is DATA_STREAM, not only when stream_name is set, so the
canonicalized ::$DATA open is rejected with the correct status.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.lease.oplock and smb2.lease.breaking1 hold a lease and then issue a
single conflicting open on the same file. The held lease must break one
step to drop write caching (RWH->RH, RW->R) and then stop, so
lease_break_info.count is 1 and the lease keeps its read/handle caching.
ksmbd instead cascaded the break all the way down to none
(e.g. RWH->RH->R->none), so the break count was 2 or 3 and the reported
lease state ended at 0. Commit "chain pending lease breaks before waking
waiters" forces break_level to SMB2_OPLOCK_LEVEL_NONE for any non-lease
open against a handle-caching lease, which drives oplock_break()'s retry
loop down to none even when only one open is contending.
Drop that break_level override so a conflicting open breaks a lease only
to its own compatible level (level II, i.e. RH/R).
A deeper break is still required when a truncating open is also waiting
behind the same lease break. smb2.lease.breaking3 keeps a normal open
pending through RWH->RH and an overwrite open pending behind it, and
expects the lease to continue RH->R->none before either open completes.
The overwrite waiter sets open_trunc on the lease while it blocks on the
pending break, so extend the retry loop to chain another break while that
truncating waiter still needs the lease at none. The per-break open_trunc
snapshot stays cleared, so the cascade steps down (RH->R->none) instead of
collapsing straight to none, and the normal open stays pending until the
lease is fully broken.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.lease.break_twice first opens a file with an RHW lease and then tries
a second open with restrictive sharing. That open must fail with a sharing
violation, but the existing lease should be broken from RHW to RW because
only handle caching conflicts with the requested sharing.
ksmbd used the normal write-cache break calculation for this path, so RHW
was broken to RH. The following successful open then did not generate the
expected second break from RW to R.
Pass share-conflict context into the lease break helper and, for lease
breaks caused by sharing, drop only SMB2_LEASE_HANDLE_CACHING from the
current lease state. Other break paths keep the existing write/truncate
break behavior.
A share-conflict break must also remain a single break. The triggering
open fails with a sharing violation and is never granted, so there is no
target oplock level to converge on. The lease break retry loop, however,
keeps breaking while the lease level is still above req_op_level, which
broke RHW all the way down to R in one open (lease_break_info.count became
2 instead of 1). Skip the again loop for share-conflict breaks so the
sharing open produces exactly one RHW->RW break and the later successful
open produces the separate RW->R break the test expects.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.lease.request verifies which SMB2 lease state combinations are granted
by the server. Requests for H-only, W-only, and HW leases are valid lease
state bitmasks, but they are not grantable combinations and should be
returned as lease state none.
ksmbd only checked that the requested bits were inside the SMB2 lease state
mask. As a result it could grant H-only, W-only, or HW requests and return
non-zero lease states where the client expects no lease.
Keep the bitmask validation, but normalize ungrantable combinations to zero
before allocating or looking up the lease. The grantable combinations
remain unchanged: R, RH, RW, and RHW.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
SMB2 level II to none oplock breaks do not require an acknowledgment from
the client. smb2.oplock.levelii500 intentionally acknowledges such a break
and expects the server to reject it with STATUS_INVALID_OPLOCK_PROTOCOL.
ksmbd drops the local level II oplock to none immediately after sending the
break notification because it does not wait for an ACK. When the client
then sends the invalid ACK, smb20_oplock_break_ack() sees that the oplock
is not in OPLOCK_ACK_WAIT state and returns STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_STATE
before checking the current oplock level.
If the oplock is already none when an unexpected SMB2 oplock break ACK
arrives, report STATUS_INVALID_OPLOCK_PROTOCOL. Keep the existing
STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_STATE response for other unexpected non-wait states.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2_util_unlink() opens the target with FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE and then
closes that handle. Other clients can also mark a file for delete with
SMB2 SET_INFO FileDispositionInformation.
When these unlink paths break existing SMB2 level II oplocks, ksmbd sends
an unsolicited SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK notification to none. This races with the
synchronous CREATE or SET_INFO response expected by the client, and
smbtorture reports NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE while running
smb2.oplock.exclusive2.
SMB2 level II oplock breaks do not require an acknowledgment in the delete
path. Keep lease handling unchanged, but drop plain SMB2 level II oplocks
locally for unlink requests without sending a break notification. Normal
write/truncate paths still send the level II to none notification,
preserving the behavior covered by smb2.oplock.levelII500.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.oplock.batch22a opens a file with a batch oplock and then issues a
second open that waits for the oplock break timeout. After the timeout the
second open should succeed, but the granted oplock level must be level II.
When the break times out, oplock_break() returns -ENOENT after invalidating
the previous opener. smb_grant_oplock() went straight to set_lev with the
original requested oplock level, so the second open could be granted a new
batch oplock. Downgrade the requested oplock to level II on the -ENOENT
break-timeout path before granting the oplock to the new open.
A break that completes because the previous owner closed its handle from
the oplock break handler must be distinguished from a real timeout.
smb2.oplock.batch7 closes the first handle during the break wait, and the
second open is then expected to be granted the originally requested batch
oplock. Return -EAGAIN from the non-lease break path when the previous
opener closed during the break wait, recheck sharing in smb_grant_oplock(),
and grant the requested oplock if the close removed the conflict. Real
break timeouts still return -ENOENT and keep the downgrade to level II.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.create.aclfile creates files with an SMB2_CREATE_SD_BUFFER create
context and expects the resulting security descriptor to match
the descriptor supplied by the client.
ksmbd currently tries to inherit the parent DACL first and only parses
the SMB2_CREATE_SD_BUFFER context when DACL inheritance fails.
If inheritance succeeds, the explicit security descriptor supplied on
create is ignored. This breaks create requests that include owner/group
information in the security descriptor.
Apply the create security descriptor first when the context is present.
Fall back to the existing inherited/default ACL path only when no create
security descriptor was supplied.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.create.blob sends an SMB2_CREATE_ALLOCATION_SIZE create context with
a 1MiB allocation size and expects the create response AllocationSize field
to match the requested size. smb2.create.open additionally compares the
AllocationSize returned in the CREATE response with the AllocationSize
returned by FILE_ALL_INFORMATION on the same handle.
ksmbd applies the allocation with fallocate(), but then fills both the
create response and handle-based information from stat.blocks << 9. On
filesystems such as ext4 this can include filesystem allocation rounding
and metadata effects, causing a response larger than the SMB2 allocation
size context and a disagreement between the two queries.
Remember the requested allocation size while processing the create context,
store the reported allocation size in struct ksmbd_file, and use it for
both the create response and handle-based allocation size responses. Update
the stored value when FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION changes it, and fall back
to stat.blocks << 9 when no allocation size context was provided.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.create.gentest checks each create FileAttributes bit independently and
expects FILE_ATTRIBUTE_INTEGRITY_STREAM and FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NO_SCRUB_DATA to
be rejected with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
ksmbd validates create FileAttributes against FILE_ATTRIBUTE_MASK, which
includes those bits. It also rejects only requests that have no known
attribute bit at all, so a request containing both known and unknown bits
can pass validation.
Use a create-specific attribute mask that excludes INTEGRITY_STREAM and
NO_SCRUB_DATA, and reject any bit outside that mask.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.create.gentest checks each desired access bit independently and
expects an open that requests only SYNCHRONIZE with CreateDisposition
OPEN_IF and FileAttributes 0 to fail with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED.
Rejecting all SYNCHRONIZE-only opens is too broad: SYNCHRONIZE does not
imply read, write, or delete data access, and
smb2.sharemode.sharemode-access expects a SYNCHRONIZE-only open to succeed
when it does not conflict with the existing share mode.
Limit the rejection to the gentest create shape: SYNCHRONIZE-only access,
OPEN_IF disposition, and no file attributes. Other synchronize-only opens
are handled by the normal permission and share-mode checks.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
smb2.streams.delete opens an alternate data stream without
FILE_SHARE_DELETE and then tries to delete the base file. Windows rejects
the base-file delete with STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION while the stream handle
is open. ksmbd tracks stream opens on the same ksmbd_inode as the base
file, but the delete-on-close path only checked delete access on the base
handle before marking the inode delete-pending. As a result, deleting
the base file succeeded even though an open stream handle denied delete
sharing. Add a helper to detect open stream handles on the same inode that
do not allow FILE_SHARE_DELETE, and reject base-file delete pending and
DELETE opens with a sharing violation in that case.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>