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932,869 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric W. Biederman
212a36a17e signal: Unify and correct copy_siginfo_from_user32
The function copy_siginfo_from_user32 is used for two things, in ptrace
since the dawn of siginfo for arbirarily modifying a signal that
user space sees, and in sigqueueinfo to send a signal with arbirary
siginfo data.

Create a single copy of copy_siginfo_from_user32 that all architectures
share, and teach it to handle all of the cases in the siginfo union.

In the generic version of copy_siginfo_from_user32 ensure that all
of the fields in siginfo are initialized so that the siginfo structure
can be safely copied to userspace if necessary.

When copying the embedded sigval union copy the si_int member.  That
ensures the 32bit values passes through the kernel unchanged.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:55:59 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
56b81456f4 signal/blackfin: Remove pointless UID16_SIGINFO_COMPAT_NEEDED
Nothing tests this define so just remove it.

I suspect the intention was to make the uid field in siginfo 16bit
however I can't find any code that ever tested this defined, and
even if it did it the layout has been this way for 8 years so
changing it now would break the ABI with userspace.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:42:36 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
71ee78d538 signal/blackfin: Move the blackfin specific si_codes to asm-generic/siginfo.h
Having si_codes in many different files simply encourages duplicate definitions
that can cause problems later.  To avoid that merge the blackfin specific si_codes
into uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h

Update copy_siginfo_to_user to copy with the absence of BUS_MCEERR_AR that blackfin
defines to be something else.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:42:35 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
753e5a8543 signal/tile: Move the tile specific si_codes to asm-generic/siginfo.h
Having si_codes in many different files simply encourages duplicate definitions
that can cause problems later.  To avoid that merge the tile specific si_codes
into uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:42:35 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
8bc9e33848 signal/frv: Move the frv specific si_codes to asm-generic/siginfo.h
Having si_codes in many different files simply encourages duplicate definitions
that can cause problems later.  To avoid that merce the frv specific si_codes
into uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h

This allows the removal of arch/frv/uapi/include/asm/siginfo.h as the last
last meaningful definition it held was FPE_MDAOVF.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:42:34 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
ac54058d77 signal/ia64: Move the ia64 specific si_codes to asm-generic/siginfo.h
Having si_codes in many different files simply encourages duplicate
definitions that can cause problems later.  To avoid that merge the
ia64 specific si_codes into uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h

Update the sanity checks in arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c to expect
the now lager NSIGILL and NSIGFPE.  As nothing excpe the larger count
is exposed on x86 no additional code needs to be updated.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:42:33 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
ad2b1ab57d signal/powerpc: Remove redefinition of NSIGTRAP on powerpc
NSIGTRAP is 4 in the generic siginfo and powerpc just undefines
NSGTRAP and redefine it as 4.  That accomplishes nothing so remove
the duplication.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:42:33 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
b68a68d3dc signal: Move addr_lsb into the _sigfault union for clarity
The addr_lsb fields is only valid and available when the
signal is SIGBUS and the si_code is BUS_MCEERR_AR or BUS_MCEERR_AO.
Document this with a comment and place the field in the _sigfault union
to make this clear.

All of the fields stay in the same physical location so both the old
and new definitions of struct siginfo will continue to work.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:42:32 -06:00
Al Viro
b713da69e4 signal: unify compat_siginfo_t
--EWB Added #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI to arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
      Changed #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32 to #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI in
      linux/compat.h

      CONFIG_X86_X32 is set when the user requests X32 support.

      CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI is set when the user requests X32 support
      and the tool-chain has X32 allowing X32 support to be built.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-15 17:40:31 -06:00
Wolfram Sang
7d2c17f021 i2c: rcar: implement bus recovery
We can force levels of SCL and SDA, so we can use that for bus recovery.
Note that we cannot read SDA back, because we will only get the internal
state of the bus free detection.

Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
2018-01-16 00:04:48 +01:00
Wolfram Sang
2806e6ad77 i2c: send STOP after successful bus recovery
If we managed to get a client release SDA again, send a STOP afterwards
to make sure we have a consistent state on the bus again.

Tested-by: Phil Reid <preid@electromag.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
2018-01-16 00:04:42 +01:00
Wolfram Sang
72b08fcc15 i2c: ensure SDA is released in recovery if SDA is controllable
If we have a function to control SDA, we should ensure that SDA is not
held down by us. So, release the GPIO in this case.

Tested-by: Phil Reid <preid@electromag.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
2018-01-16 00:04:30 +01:00
Wolfram Sang
8092178ffe i2c: add 'set_sda' to bus_recovery_info
This will be needed when we want to create STOP conditions, too, later.
Create the needed fields and populate them for the GPIO case if the GPIO
is set to output.

Tested-by: Phil Reid <preid@electromag.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
2018-01-16 00:04:19 +01:00
Wolfram Sang
6c92204e44 i2c: add identifier in declarations for i2c_bus_recovery
No reason to have them undefined, so let's add them.

Tested-by: Phil Reid <preid@electromag.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
2018-01-16 00:04:03 +01:00
Wolfram Sang
766a4f27f3 i2c: make kerneldoc about bus recovery more precise
"Used internally" is vague. What it actually means is that those fields
are populated by the core if valid GPIOs are provided. Change the
comments to reflect that.

Tested-by: Phil Reid <preid@electromag.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
2018-01-16 00:04:02 +01:00
Xiongfeng Wang
979a459c83 IB/cma: use strlcpy() instead of strncpy()
gcc-8 reports

drivers/infiniband/core/cma_configfs.c: In function 'make_cma_dev':
./include/linux/string.h:245:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified
bound 64 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]

We need to use strlcpy() to make sure the string is nul-terminated.

Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Parav Pandit
a6532e7139 RDMA/core: Clarify rdma_ah_find_type
iWARP does not use rdma_ah_attr_type, and for this reason we do not have a
RDMA_AH_ATTR_TYPE_IWARP. rdma_ah_find_type should not even be called on iwarp
ports and for clarity it shouldn't have a special test for iWarp.

This changes the result from RDMA_AH_ATTR_TYPE_ROCE to RDMA_AH_ATTR_TYPE_IB
when wrongly called on an iWarp port.

Fixes: 44c58487d5 ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Bodong Wang
cd2a6e7d38 IB/core: Fix ib_wc structure size to remain in 64 bytes boundary
The change of slid from u16 to u32 results in sizeof(struct ib_wc)
cross 64B boundary, which causes more cache misses. This patch
rearranges the fields and remain the size to 64B.

Pahole output before this change:

struct ib_wc {
        union {
                u64                wr_id;                /*           8 */
                struct ib_cqe *    wr_cqe;               /*           8 */
        };                                               /*     0     8 */
        enum ib_wc_status          status;               /*     8     4 */
        enum ib_wc_opcode          opcode;               /*    12     4 */
        u32                        vendor_err;           /*    16     4 */
        u32                        byte_len;             /*    20     4 */
        struct ib_qp *             qp;                   /*    24     8 */
        union {
                __be32             imm_data;             /*           4 */
                u32                invalidate_rkey;      /*           4 */
        } ex;                                            /*    32     4 */
        u32                        src_qp;               /*    36     4 */
        int                        wc_flags;             /*    40     4 */
        u16                        pkey_index;           /*    44     2 */

        /* XXX 2 bytes hole, try to pack */

        u32                        slid;                 /*    48     4 */
        u8                         sl;                   /*    52     1 */
        u8                         dlid_path_bits;       /*    53     1 */
        u8                         port_num;             /*    54     1 */
        u8                         smac[6];              /*    55     6 */

        /* XXX 1 byte hole, try to pack */

        u16                        vlan_id;              /*    62     2 */
        /* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
        u8                         network_hdr_type;     /*    64     1 */

        /* size: 72, cachelines: 2, members: 17 */
        /* sum members: 62, holes: 2, sum holes: 3 */
        /* padding: 7 */
        /* last cacheline: 8 bytes */
};

Pahole output after this change:

struct ib_wc {
        union {
                u64                wr_id;                /*           8 */
                struct ib_cqe *    wr_cqe;               /*           8 */
        };                                               /*     0     8 */
        enum ib_wc_status          status;               /*     8     4 */
        enum ib_wc_opcode          opcode;               /*    12     4 */
        u32                        vendor_err;           /*    16     4 */
        u32                        byte_len;             /*    20     4 */
        struct ib_qp *             qp;                   /*    24     8 */
        union {
                __be32             imm_data;             /*           4 */
                u32                invalidate_rkey;      /*           4 */
        } ex;                                            /*    32     4 */
        u32                        src_qp;               /*    36     4 */
        u32                        slid;                 /*    40     4 */
        int                        wc_flags;             /*    44     4 */
        u16                        pkey_index;           /*    48     2 */
        u8                         sl;                   /*    50     1 */
        u8                         dlid_path_bits;       /*    51     1 */
        u8                         port_num;             /*    52     1 */
        u8                         smac[6];              /*    53     6 */

        /* XXX 1 byte hole, try to pack */

        u16                        vlan_id;              /*    60     2 */
        u8                         network_hdr_type;     /*    62     1 */

        /* size: 64, cachelines: 1, members: 17 */
        /* sum members: 62, holes: 1, sum holes: 1 */
        /* padding: 1 */
};

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13
Fixes: 7db20ecd1d ("IB/core: Change wc.slid from 16 to 32 bits")
Signed-off-by: Bodong Wang <bodong@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Jack Morgenstein
852f692759 IB/mlx4: Fix incorrectly releasing steerable UD QPs when have only ETH ports
Allocating steerable UD QPs depends on having at least one IB port,
while releasing those QPs does not.

As a result, when there are only ETH ports, the IB (RoCE) driver
requests releasing a qp range whose base qp is zero, with
qp count zero.

When SR-IOV is enabled, and the VF driver is running on a VM over
a hypervisor which treats such qp release calls as errors
(rather than NOPs), we see lines in the VM message log like:

 mlx4_core 0002:00:02.0: Failed to release qp range base:0 cnt:0

Fix this by adding a check for a zero count in mlx4_release_qp_range()
(which thus treats releasing 0 qps as a nop), and eliminating the
check for device managed flow steering when releasing steerable UD QPs.
(Freeing ib_uc_qpns_bitmap unconditionally is also OK, since it
remains NULL when steerable UD QPs are not allocated).

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4196670be7 ("IB/mlx4: Don't allocate range of steerable UD QPs for Ethernet-only device")
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Jason Gunthorpe
7bed7ebcb7 RDMA/qedr: Fix endian problems around imm_data
The double swap matches what user space rdma-core does to imm_data.

wc->imm_data is not used in the kernel so this change has no practical
impact.

Acked-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Jason Gunthorpe
ccb8a29e7d RDMA/hns: Fix endian problems around imm_data and rkey
This matches the changes made recently to the userspace hns
driver when it was made sparse clean.

See rdma-core commit bffd380cfe56 ("libhns: Make the provider sparse
clean")

wc->imm_data is not used in the kernel so this change has no practical
impact.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Jason Gunthorpe
c966ea12c0 RDMA: Mark imm_data as be32 in the verbs uapi header
This matches what the userspace copy of this header has been doing
for a while. imm_data is an opaque 4 byte array carried over the network,
and invalidate_rkey is in CPU byte order.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Parav Pandit
a6753c4d62 IB/core: Limit DMAC resolution to RoCE Connected QPs
Resolving DMAC for RoCE is applicable to only Connected mode QPs.
So resolve DMAC for only for Connected mode QPs.

Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Parav Pandit
f2290d6d52 IB/core: Attempt DMAC resolution for only RoCE
Instead of returning 0 (success) for RoCE scenarios where DMAC should
not be resolved, avoid such attempt and make code consistent with
ib_create_user_ah().

Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Parav Pandit
b96ac05a87 IB/core: Limit DMAC resolution to userspace QPs
Currently ah_attr is initialized by the ib_cm layer for rdma_cm
based applications. For RoCE transport ah_attr.roce.dmac is already
initialized by ib_cm, rdma_cm either from wc, path record, route
resolve, explicit path record setting depending on active or passive
side QP. Therefore avoid resolving DMAC for QP of kernel consumers.

Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Parav Pandit
b2bedfb395 IB/core: Perform modify QP on real one
Currently qp->port stores the port number whenever IB_QP_PORT
QP attribute mask is set (during QP state transition to INIT state).
This port number should be stored for the real QP when XRC target QP
is used.

Follow the ib_modify_qp() implementation and hide the access to ->real_qp.

Fixes: a512c2fbef ("IB/core: Introduce modify QP operation with udata")
Signed-off-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 15:33:21 -07:00
Tomasz Majchrzak
1532d9e87e raid5-ppl: PPL support for disks with write-back cache enabled
In order to provide data consistency with PPL for disks with write-back
cache enabled all data has to be flushed to disks before next PPL
entry. The disks to be flushed are marked in the bitmap. It's modified
under a mutex and it's only read after PPL io unit is submitted.

A limitation of 64 disks in the array has been introduced to keep data
structures and implementation simple. RAID5 arrays with so many disks are
not likely due to high risk of multiple disks failure. Such restriction
should not be a real life limitation.

With write-back cache disabled next PPL entry is submitted when data write
for current one completes. Data flush defers next log submission so trigger
it when there are no stripes for handling found.

As PPL assures all data is flushed to disk at request completion, just
acknowledge flush request when PPL is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Tomasz Majchrzak <tomasz.majchrzak@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <sh.li@alibaba-inc.com>
2018-01-15 14:29:42 -08:00
Leon Romanovsky
ae59c3f0b6 RDMA/mlx5: Fix out-of-bound access while querying AH
The rdma_ah_find_type() accesses the port array based on an index
controlled by userspace. The existing bounds check is after the first use
of the index, so userspace can generate an out of bounds access, as shown
by the KASN report below.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in to_rdma_ah_attr+0xa8/0x3b0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff880019ae2268 by task ibv_rc_pingpong/409

CPU: 0 PID: 409 Comm: ibv_rc_pingpong Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2-00031-gb60a3faf5b83-dirty #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xe9/0x18f
 print_address_description+0xa2/0x350
 kasan_report+0x3a5/0x400
 to_rdma_ah_attr+0xa8/0x3b0
 mlx5_ib_query_qp+0xd35/0x1330
 ib_query_qp+0x8a/0xb0
 ib_uverbs_query_qp+0x237/0x7f0
 ib_uverbs_write+0x617/0xd80
 __vfs_write+0xf7/0x500
 vfs_write+0x149/0x310
 SyS_write+0xca/0x190
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x85
RIP: 0033:0x7fe9c7a275a0
RSP: 002b:00007ffee5498738 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe9c7ce4b00 RCX: 00007fe9c7a275a0
RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: 00007ffee5498800 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055d0c8d3f010 R08: 00007ffee5498800 R09: 0000000000000018
R10: 00000000000000ba R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000008000
R13: 0000000000004fb0 R14: 000055d0c8d3f050 R15: 00007ffee5498560

Allocated by task 1:
 __kmalloc+0x3f9/0x430
 alloc_mad_private+0x25/0x50
 ib_mad_post_receive_mads+0x204/0xa60
 ib_mad_init_device+0xa59/0x1020
 ib_register_device+0x83a/0xbc0
 mlx5_ib_add+0x50e/0x5c0
 mlx5_add_device+0x142/0x410
 mlx5_register_interface+0x18f/0x210
 mlx5_ib_init+0x56/0x63
 do_one_initcall+0x15b/0x270
 kernel_init_freeable+0x2d8/0x3d0
 kernel_init+0x14/0x190
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30

Freed by task 0:
(stack is not available)

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff880019ae2000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 104 bytes to the right of
 512-byte region [ffff880019ae2000, ffff880019ae2200)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000000005d674e18 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head)
raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001000c000c
raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88001a402000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff880019ae2100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff880019ae2180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc
>ffff880019ae2200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                                                          ^
 ffff880019ae2280: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff880019ae2300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 44c58487d5 ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
2018-01-15 14:19:55 -07:00
David S. Miller
79d891c1bb linux-can-next-for-4.16-20180105
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Merge tag 'linux-can-next-for-4.16-20180105' of ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can-next

Marc Kleine-Budde says:

====================
pull-request: can-next 2017-12-01,Re: pull-request: can-next

this is a pull request of 7 patches for net-next/master.

All patches are by me. Patch 6 is for the "can_raw" protocol and add
error checking to the bind() function. All other patches clean up the
coding style and remove unused parameters in various CAN drivers and
infrastructure.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-15 16:13:34 -05:00
Andrzej Hajda
4d3ea4e1c3 i2c: exynos5: change internal transmission timeout to 100ms
Exynos-I2C uses default timeout of 1 second for the whole transaction,
including re-transmissions due to arbitration lost errors (-EAGAIN).
To allow re-transmissions driver's internal timeout should be significantly
lower, 100ms seems to be good candidate.

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
2018-01-15 21:54:28 +01:00
Randy Dunlap
4f258cf401 platform/x86: have ACPI_CMPC use depends instead of select for INPUT
Drivers should not 'select' a subsystem. Instead they should depend
on it. If the subsystem is disabled, the user probably did that for
a purpose and one driver shouldn't be changing that.

This also makes all platform/x86/ drivers consistent w.r.t depending on
INPUT instead of selecting it.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>
Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org>
2018-01-15 12:52:07 -08:00
Chris Wilson
beacbd1615 drm/i915: Use our singlethreaded wq for freeing objects
As freeing the objects require serialisation on struct_mutex, we should
prefer to use our singlethreaded driver wq that is dedicated to work
requiring struct_mutex (hence serialised).The benefit should be less
clutter on the system wq, allowing it to make progress even when the
driver/struct_mutex is heavily contended.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180115122846.15193-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
2018-01-15 20:33:01 +00:00
Johannes Berg
6311b7ce42 netlink: extack: avoid parenthesized string constant warning
NL_SET_ERR_MSG() and NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR() lead to the following warning
in newer versions of gcc:
  warning: array initialized from parenthesized string constant

Just remove the parentheses, they're not needed in this context since
anyway since there can be no operator precendence issues or similar.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-15 15:15:23 -05:00
David S. Miller
5138eb9b2a Merge branch 'sh_eth-simplify-TSU-initialization'
Sergei Shtylyov says:

====================
sh_eth: simplify TSU initialization

Here's a set of 2 patches against DaveM's 'net-next.git' repo. With those,
I'm somewhat simplifying the TSU init code in the driver probe() method...
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-15 15:09:46 -05:00
Sergei Shtylyov
9662ec1922 sh_eth: get Ether port # only when needed
The dual-port Ether configurations always have a shared TSU to e.g. pass
the packets between those  ports.  With the  TSU init. code gathered under
the single *if*, we now can only get the port # from 'platform_device::id'
only when we actually  need it  (and not recalculate it each time)...

Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-15 15:09:46 -05:00
Sergei Shtylyov
3e14c969a4 sh_eth: gather all TSU init code in one place
The  sh_eth_cpu_data::chip_reset() method  always resets using ARSTR and
this register is always located at the start of the  TSU register region.
Therefore, we can  only call  this method if we know TSU is there and thus
simplify  the probing code a  bit...

Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-15 15:09:45 -05:00
Kees Cook
e47e311843 lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
This updates the USERCOPY_HEAP_FLAG_* tests to USERCOPY_HEAP_WHITELIST_*,
since the final form of usercopy whitelisting ended up using an offset/size
window instead of the earlier proposed allocation flags.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:09 -08:00
Kees Cook
6d07d1cd30 usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
With all known usercopied cache whitelists now defined in the
kernel, switch the default usercopy region of kmem_cache_create()
to size 0. Any new caches with usercopy regions will now need to use
kmem_cache_create_usercopy() instead of kmem_cache_create().

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Cc: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:08 -08:00
Paolo Bonzini
51776043af kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
This ioctl is obsolete (it was used by Xenner as far as I know) but
still let's not break it gratuitously...  Its handler is copying
directly into struct kvm.  Go through a bounce buffer instead, with
the added benefit that we can actually do something useful with the
flags argument---the previous code was exiting with -EINVAL but still
doing the copy.

This technically is a userspace ABI breakage, but since no one should be
using the ioctl, it's a good occasion to see if someone actually
complains.

Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:07 -08:00
Paolo Bonzini
46515736f8 kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
On x86, ARM and s390, struct kvm_vcpu_arch has a usercopy region
that is read and written by the KVM_GET/SET_CPUID2 ioctls (x86)
or KVM_GET/SET_ONE_REG (ARM/s390).  Without whitelisting the area,
KVM is completely broken on those architectures with usercopy hardening
enabled.

For now, allow writing to the entire struct on all architectures.
The KVM tree will not refine this to an architecture-specific
subset of struct kvm_vcpu_arch.

Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:07 -08:00
Kees Cook
08626a6056 arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
While ARM32 carries FPU state in the thread structure that is saved and
restored during signal handling, it doesn't need to declare a usercopy
whitelist, since existing accessors are all either using a bounce buffer
(for which whitelisting isn't checking the slab), are statically sized
(which will bypass the hardened usercopy check), or both.

Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:06 -08:00
Kees Cook
9e8084d3f7 arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
While ARM64 carries FPU state in the thread structure that is saved and
restored during signal handling, it doesn't need to declare a usercopy
whitelist, since existing accessors are all either using a bounce buffer
(for which whitelisting isn't checking the slab), are statically sized
(which will bypass the hardened usercopy check), or both.

Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: zijun_hu <zijun_hu@htc.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:05 -08:00
Kees Cook
f7d83c1cf3 x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
This whitelists the FPU register state portion of the thread_struct for
copying to userspace, instead of the default entire struct. This is needed
because FPU register state is dynamically sized, so it doesn't bypass the
hardened usercopy checks.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2018-01-15 12:08:05 -08:00
Kees Cook
5905429ad8 fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
While the blocked and saved_sigmask fields of task_struct are copied to
userspace (via sigmask_to_save() and setup_rt_frame()), it is always
copied with a static length (i.e. sizeof(sigset_t)).

The only portion of task_struct that is potentially dynamically sized and
may be copied to userspace is in the architecture-specific thread_struct
at the end of task_struct.

cache object allocation:
    kernel/fork.c:
        alloc_task_struct_node(...):
            return kmem_cache_alloc_node(task_struct_cachep, ...);

        dup_task_struct(...):
            ...
            tsk = alloc_task_struct_node(node);

        copy_process(...):
            ...
            dup_task_struct(...)

        _do_fork(...):
            ...
            copy_process(...)

example usage trace:

    arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c:
        __fpu__restore_sig(...):
            ...
            struct task_struct *tsk = current;
            struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu;
            ...
            __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.xsave, ..., state_size);

        fpu__restore_sig(...):
            ...
            return __fpu__restore_sig(...);

    arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:
        restore_sigcontext(...):
            ...
            fpu__restore_sig(...)

This introduces arch_thread_struct_whitelist() to let an architecture
declare specifically where the whitelist should be within thread_struct.
If undefined, the entire thread_struct field is left whitelisted.

Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2018-01-15 12:08:04 -08:00
David Windsor
f9d29946c5 fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the
entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread
stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and
!CONFIG_VMAP_STACK.

cache object allocation:
    kernel/fork.c:
        alloc_thread_stack_node(...):
            return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...)

        dup_task_struct(...):
            ...
            stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...)
            ...
            tsk->stack = stack;

        copy_process(...):
            ...
            dup_task_struct(...)

        _do_fork(...):
            ...
            copy_process(...)

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2018-01-15 12:08:03 -08:00
David Windsor
07dcd7fe89 fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
mm_struct slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
Only the auxv field is copied to userspace.

cache object allocation:
    kernel/fork.c:
        #define allocate_mm()     (kmem_cache_alloc(mm_cachep, GFP_KERNEL))

        dup_mm():
            ...
            mm = allocate_mm();

        copy_mm(...):
            ...
            dup_mm();

        copy_process(...):
            ...
            copy_mm(...)

        _do_fork(...):
            ...
            copy_process(...)

example usage trace:

    fs/binfmt_elf.c:
        create_elf_tables(...):
            ...
            elf_info = (elf_addr_t *)current->mm->saved_auxv;
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., elf_info, ei_index * sizeof(elf_addr_t))

        load_elf_binary(...):
            ...
            create_elf_tables(...);

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
2018-01-15 12:08:02 -08:00
Kees Cook
289a4860d1 net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
Now that protocols have been annotated (the copy of icsk_ca_ops->name
is of an ops field from outside the slab cache):

$ git grep 'copy_.*_user.*sk.*->'
caif/caif_socket.c: copy_from_user(&cf_sk->conn_req.param.data, ov, ol)) {
ipv4/raw.c:   if (copy_from_user(&raw_sk(sk)->filter, optval, optlen))
ipv4/raw.c:       copy_to_user(optval, &raw_sk(sk)->filter, len))
ipv4/tcp.c:       if (copy_to_user(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len))
ipv4/tcp.c:       if (copy_to_user(optval, icsk->icsk_ulp_ops->name, len))
ipv6/raw.c:       if (copy_from_user(&raw6_sk(sk)->filter, optval, optlen))
ipv6/raw.c:           if (copy_to_user(optval, &raw6_sk(sk)->filter, len))
sctp/socket.c: if (copy_from_user(&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, optval, optlen))
sctp/socket.c: if (copy_to_user(optval, &sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, len))
sctp/socket.c: if (copy_to_user(optval, &sctp_sk(sk)->initmsg, len))

we can switch the default proto usercopy region to size 0. Any protocols
needing to add whitelisted regions must annotate the fields with the
useroffset and usersize fields of struct proto.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:02 -08:00
David Windsor
b2ce04c2a3 sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
The autoclose field can be copied with put_user(), so there is no need to
use copy_to_user(). In both cases, hardened usercopy is being bypassed
since the size is constant, and not open to runtime manipulation.

This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log]
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:01 -08:00
David Windsor
ab9ee8e38b sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
The SCTP socket event notification subscription information need to be
copied to/from userspace. In support of usercopy hardening, this patch
defines a region in the struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy
operations are allowed. Additionally moves the usercopy fields to be
adjacent for the region to cover both.

example usage trace:

    net/sctp/socket.c:
        sctp_getsockopt_events(...):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., &sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, len)

        sctp_setsockopt_events(...):
            ...
            copy_from_user(&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, ..., optlen)

        sctp_getsockopt_initmsg(...):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., &sctp_sk(sk)->initmsg, len)

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: split from network patch, move struct members adjacent]
[kees: add SCTPv6 struct whitelist, provide usage trace]
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:00 -08:00
David Windsor
93070d339d caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
The CAIF channel connection request parameters need to be copied to/from
userspace. In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region
in the struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.

example usage trace:

    net/caif/caif_socket.c:
        setsockopt(...):
            ...
            copy_from_user(&cf_sk->conn_req.param.data, ..., ol)

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: split from network patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:08:00 -08:00