Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
v2: rebase
v3: switch some if statements to switch statements
v4: add yellow carp fix (Yifan)
v5: squash in fixes for YC and GS (Alex)
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Rather than hardcoding based on asic_type, use the IP
discovery table to configure the driver.
Only tested on Navi10 so far.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Drive the asic setup from the IP discovery table rather than
hardcoded settings based on asic type.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
v2: squash in gmc fixes
v3: rebase
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Bind to all 0x1002 GPU devices.
For now we explicitly return -ENODEV for generic bindings.
Remove this check once IP discovery based checking is in place.
v2: rebase (Alex)
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Once we claim all 0x1002 PCI display class devices, we will
need to filter out devices owned by radeon.
v2: rename radeon id array to make it more clear that
the devices are not supported by amdgpu.
add r128, mach64 pci ids as well
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> (v1)
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
v2: rebase, squash in navi10 fixes (Alex)
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Use IP versions rather than asic_type to differentiate
IP version specific features.
v2: rebase
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Add initial support for all navi based parts.
v2: rebase
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
So they can be driven by IP dicovery table.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
So we can track grab the appropriate XGMI info out of the
IP discovery table.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Prerequisite for using IP versions in the driver rather
than asic type.
v2: Use IP_VERSION() macro instead of new function
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> (v1)
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
So we can check the IP versions directly rather than using
asic type.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Useful for debugging and new asic validation.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
clear error count when persistant harvesting is not enabled
Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: John Clements <john.clements@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
[Why]
For some reason we're defining DP 2.0 definitions inside our
driver. Now that patches to introduce relevant definitions
are slated to be merged into drm-next this is causing conflicts.
In file included from drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c:33:
In file included from ./drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../amdgpu/amdgpu.h:70:
In file included from ./drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../amdgpu/amdgpu_mode.h:36:
./include/drm/drm_dp_helper.h:1322:9: error: 'DP_MAIN_LINK_CHANNEL_CODING_PHY_REPEATER' macro redefined [-Werror,-Wmacro-redefined]
^
./drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dc_dp_types.h:881:9: note: previous definition is here
^
1 error generated.
[How]
Guard all display driver defines with #ifndef for now. Once we pull
in the new definitions into amd-staging-drm-next we will follow
up and drop definitions from our driver and provide follow-up
header updates for any addition DP 2.0 definitions required
by our driver.
We also ensure drm_dp_helper.h is included before dc_dp_types.h.
v3: Ensure drm_dp_helper.h is included before dc_dp_types.h
v2: Add one missing endif
Reviewed-by: Manasi Navare <manasi.d.navare@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Fangzhi Zuo <Jerry.Zuo@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
In ras poison mode, page retirement will be handled by the irq handler of the
module which consumes corrupted data.
v2: rename ras_process_cb to ras_poison_consumption_handler.
move the handler's implementation from ASIC specific file to common
file.
v3: call gpu reset for xGMI connected mode.
Signed-off-by: Tao Zhou <tao.zhou1@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
In the s2idle stress test sdma resume fail occasionally,in the
failed case GPU is in the gfxoff state.This issue may introduce
by firmware miss handle doorbell S/R and now temporary fix the issue
by forcing exit gfxoff for sdma resume.
Signed-off-by: Prike Liang <Prike.Liang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
[Why]
add display related cyan_skillfish files in.
makefile controlled by CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC_DCN201 flag.
v2: squash in clang fixes from Harry, Nathan
v3: squash in missing CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC check (Alex)
Signed-off-by: Charlene Liu <charlene.liu@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhan Liu <zhan.liu@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlene Liu <charlene.liu@amd.com>
Acked-by: Jun Lei <jun.lei@amd.com>
Acked-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
This would need updating to make prctl be the new default, but it's
simpler to delete it and refer to the dup.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201105001406.13005-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Switch the kernel default of SSBD and STIBP to the ones with
CONFIG_SECCOMP=n (i.e. spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl
spectre_v2_user=prctl) even if CONFIG_SECCOMP=y.
Several motivations listed below:
- If SMT is enabled the seccomp jail can still attack the rest of the
system even with spectre_v2_user=seccomp by using MDS-HT (except on
XEON PHI where MDS can be tamed with SMT left enabled, but that's a
special case). Setting STIBP become a very expensive window dressing
after MDS-HT was discovered.
- The seccomp jail cannot attack the kernel with spectre-v2-HT
regardless (even if STIBP is not set), but with MDS-HT the seccomp
jail can attack the kernel too.
- With spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl the seccomp jail can attack the
other userland (guest or host mode) using spectre-v2-HT, but the
userland attack is already mitigated by both ASLR and pid namespaces
for host userland and through virt isolation with libkrun or
kata. (if something if somebody is worried about spectre-v2-HT it's
best to mount proc with hidepid=2,gid=proc on workstations where not
all apps may run under container runtimes, rather than slowing down
all seccomp jails, but the best is to add pid namespaces to the
seccomp jail). As opposed MDS-HT is not mitigated and the seccomp
jail can still attack all other host and guest userland if SMT is
enabled even with spec_store_bypass_disable=seccomp.
- If full security is required then MDS-HT must also be mitigated with
nosmt and then spectre_v2_user=prctl and spectre_v2_user=seccomp
would become identical.
- Setting spectre_v2_user=seccomp is overall lower priority than to
setting javascript.options.wasm false in about:config to protect
against remote wasm MDS-HT, instead of worrying about Spectre-v2-HT
and STIBP which again is already statistically well mitigated by
other means in userland and it's fully mitigated in kernel with
retpolines (unlike the wasm assist call with MDS-HT).
- SSBD is needed to prevent reading the JIT memory and the primary
user being the OpenJDK. However the primary user of SSBD wouldn't be
covered by spec_store_bypass_disable=seccomp because it doesn't use
seccomp and the primary user also explicitly declined to set
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL+PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS despite it easily
could. In fact it would need to set it only when the sandboxing
mechanism is enabled for javaws applets, but it still declined it by
declaring security within the same user address space as an
untenable objective for their JIT, even in the sandboxing case where
performance would be a lesser concern (for the record: I kind of
disagree in not setting PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS in the sandbox case and
I prefer to run javaws through a wrapper that sets
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS if I need). In turn it can be inferred that
even if the primary user of SSBD would use seccomp, they would
invoke it with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW by now.
- runc/crun already set SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW by default, k8s
and podman have a default json seccomp allowlist that cannot be
slowed down, so for the #1 seccomp user this change is already a
noop.
- systemd/sshd or other apps that use seccomp, if they really need
STIBP or SSBD, they need to explicitly set the
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL by now. The stibp/ssbd seccomp blind
catch-all approach was done probably initially with a wishful
thinking objective to pretend to have a peace of mind that it could
magically fix it all. That was wishful thinking before MDS-HT was
discovered, but after MDS-HT has been discovered it become just
window dressing.
- For qemu "-sandbox" seccomp jail it wouldn't make sense to set STIBP
or SSBD. SSBD doesn't help with KVM because there's no JIT (if it's
needed with TCG it should be an opt-in with
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL+PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS and it shouldn't
slowdown KVM for nothing). For qemu+KVM STIBP would be even more
window dressing than it is for all other apps, because in the
qemu+KVM case there's not only the MDS attack to worry about with
SMT enabled. Even after disabling SMT, there's still a theoretical
spectre-v2 attack possible within the same thread context from guest
mode to host ring3 that the host kernel retpoline mitigation has no
theoretical chance to mitigate. On some kernels a
ibrs-always/ibrs-retpoline opt-in model is provided that will
enabled IBRS in the qemu host ring3 userland which fixes this
theoretical concern. Only after enabling IBRS in the host userland
it would then make sense to proceed and worry about STIBP and an
attack on the other host userland, but then again SMT would need to
be disabled for full security anyway, so that would render STIBP
again a noop.
- last but not the least: the lack of "spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl
spectre_v2_user=prctl" means the moment a guest boots and
sshd/systemd runs, the guest kernel will write to SPEC_CTRL MSR
which will make the guest vmexit forever slower, forcing KVM to
issue a very slow rdmsr instruction at every vmexit. So the end
result is that SPEC_CTRL MSR is only available in GCE. Most other
public cloud providers don't expose SPEC_CTRL, which means that not
only STIBP/SSBD isn't available, but IBPB isn't available either
(which would cause no overhead to the guest or the hypervisor
because it's write only and requires no reading during vmexit). So
the current default already net loss in security (missing IBPB)
which means most public cloud providers cannot achieve a fully
secure guest with nosmt (and nosmt is enough to fully mitigate
MDS-HT). It also means GCE and is unfairly penalized in performance
because it provides the option to enable full security in the guest
as an opt-in (i.e. nosmt and IBPB). So this change will allow all
cloud providers to expose SPEC_CTRL without incurring into any
hypervisor slowdown and at the same time it will remove the unfair
penalization of GCE performance for doing the right thing and it'll
allow to get full security with nosmt with IBPB being available (and
STIBP becoming meaningless).
Example to put things in prospective: the STIBP enabled in seccomp has
never been about protecting apps using seccomp like sshd from an
attack from a malicious userland, but to the contrary it has always
been about protecting the system from an attack from sshd, after a
successful remote network exploit against sshd. In fact initially it
wasn't obvious STIBP would work both ways (STIBP was about preventing
the task that runs with STIBP to be attacked with spectre-v2-HT, but
accidentally in the STIBP case it also prevents the attack in the
other direction). In the hypothetical case that sshd has been remotely
exploited the last concern should be STIBP being set, because it'll be
still possible to obtain info even from the kernel by using MDS if
nosmt wasn't set (and if it was set, STIBP is a noop in the first
place). As opposed kernel cannot leak anything with spectre-v2 HT
because of retpolines and the userland is mitigated by ASLR already
and ideally PID namespaces too. If something it'd be worth checking if
sshd run the seccomp thread under pid namespaces too if available in
the running kernel. SSBD also would be a noop for sshd, since sshd
uses no JIT. If sshd prefers to keep doing the STIBP window dressing
exercise, it still can even after this change of defaults by opting-in
with PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH.
Ultimately setting SSBD and STIBP by default for all seccomp jails is
a bad sweet spot and bad default with more cons than pros that end up
reducing security in the public cloud (by giving an huge incentive to
not expose SPEC_CTRL which would be needed to get full security with
IBPB after setting nosmt in the guest) and by excessively hurting
performance to more secure apps using seccomp that end up having to
opt out with SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW.
The following is the verified result of the new default with SMT
enabled:
(gdb) print spectre_v2_user_stibp
$1 = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL
(gdb) print spectre_v2_user_ibpb
$2 = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL
(gdb) print ssb_mode
$3 = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201104235054.5678-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/AAA2EF2C-293D-4D5B-BFA6-FF655105CD84@redhat.com
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0722838-06f7-da6b-138f-e0f26362f16a@redhat.com
Two list heads in the rdma_id_private are being used for multiple
purposes, to save a few bytes of memory. Give the different purposes
different names and union the memory that is clearly exclusive.
list splits into device_item and listen_any_item. device_item is threaded
onto the cma_device's list and listen_any goes onto the
listen_any_list. IDs doing any listen cannot have devices.
listen_list splits into listen_item and listen_list. listen_list is on the
parent listen any rdma_id_private and listen_item is on child listen that
is bound to a specific cma_dev.
Which name should be used in which case depends on the state and other
factors of the rdma_id_private. Remap all the confusing references to make
sense with the new names, so at least there is some hope of matching the
necessary preconditions with each access.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0-v1-a5ead4a0c19d+c3a-cma_list_head_jgg@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Since the VT-d vs. async flip issues are plaguing a wider range
of supported hw let's try to minimize the impact on normal
operation by flipping the relevant chicken bits on and off
as needed. I presume there is some power/perf impact on since
this is reducing some prefetching I think.
Cc: Karthik B S <karthik.b.s@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210930190943.17547-2-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Looks like skl/bxt/derivatives also need the plane stride
stretch w/a when using async flips and VT-d is enabled, or
else we get corruption on screen. To my surprise this was
even documented in bspec, but only as a note on the
CHICHKEN_PIPESL register description rather than on the
w/a list.
So very much the same thing as on HSW/BDW, except the bits
moved yet again.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Karthik B S <karthik.b.s@intel.com>
Fixes: 55ea1cb178 ("drm/i915: Enable async flips in i915")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210930190943.17547-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
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Merge tag 'v5.15-rc4' into rdma.get for-next
Merged due to dependencies in following patches.
Conflict in drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/ipoib_tx.c resolved by hand to take
the %p change and txq stats rename together.
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
In our internal testing we have found that default maximum values are too
small. Ideally there should be no limits, but since maximum values are
reported via ibv_query_device, we have to return some value. So, the
default maximums have been changed to large values.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210915011220.307585-1-Rao.Shoaib@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Rao Shoaib <Rao.Shoaib@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
There is no device node for the empty NUMA node. However, the
corresponding NUMA node ID and distance map is still valid in
"numa-distance-map-v1" compatible device node.
This fetches the NUMA node ID and distance map for these empty
NUMA node from "numa-distance-map-v1" compatible device node.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210927064119.127285-3-gshan@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
The empty memory nodes, where no memory resides in, are allowed.
The NUMA node IDs are still valid and parsed, but memory may be
added to them through hotplug afterwards. Currently, QEMU fails
to boot when multiple empty memory nodes are specified. It's
caused by device-tree population failure and duplicated memory
node names.
The device-tree specification doesn't provide how empty NUMA
nodes are handled. Besides, I finds difficulty to get where
this case is documented. So lets add a section for empty memory
nodes to cover it in NUMA binding document.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210927064119.127285-2-gshan@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Drop another redundant maxItems that snuck into w1-gpio binding.
If a property has an 'items' list, then a 'minItems' or 'maxItems' with the
same size as the list is redundant and can be dropped. Note that is DT
schema specific behavior and not standard json-schema behavior. The tooling
will fixup the final schema adding any unspecified minItems/maxItems.
Fixes: dd2c898bc2 ("dt-bindings: w1: Convert 1-Wire GPIO binding to a schema")
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Similar to:
commit 8b8e6b5d3b ("kallsyms: strip ThinLTO hashes from static
functions")
It's very common for compilers to modify the symbol name for static
functions as part of optimizing transformations. That makes hooking
static functions (that weren't inlined or DCE'd) with kprobes difficult.
LLVM has yet another name mangling scheme used by thin LTO.
Combine handling of the various schemes by truncating after the first
'.'. Strip off these suffixes so that we can continue to hook such
static functions. Clang releases prior to clang-13 would use '$'
instead of '.'
Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/rGc6e5c4654bd5045fe22a1a52779e48e2038a404c
Reported-by: KE.LI(Lieke) <like1@oppo.com>
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Padmanabha Srinivasaiah <treasure4paddy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211004162936.21961-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
The minimum GCC version has been bumped to 5.1, so we can get rid of all
the compatibility code for anything older than that.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210922182632.633394-1-ardb@kernel.org
i915 enables a wider set of warnings with '-Wall -Wextra' then disables
several with cc-disable-warning. If an unknown flag gets added to
KBUILD_CFLAGS when building with clang, all subsequent calls to
cc-{disable-warning,option} will fail, meaning that all of these
warnings do not get disabled [1].
A separate series will address the root cause of the issue by not adding
these flags when building with clang [2]; however, the symptom of these
extra warnings appearing can be addressed separately by just removing
the calls to cc-disable-warning, which makes the build ever so slightly
faster because the compiler does not need to be called as much before
building.
The following warnings are supported by GCC 4.9 and clang 10.0.1, which
are the minimum supported versions of these compilers so the call to
cc-disable-warning is not necessary. Masahiro cleaned this up for the
reset of the kernel in commit 4c8dd95a72 ("kbuild: add some extra
warning flags unconditionally").
* -Wmissing-field-initializers
* -Wsign-compare
* -Wtype-limits
* -Wunused-parameter
-Wunused-but-set-variable was implemented in clang 13.0.0 and
-Wframe-address was implemented in clang 12.0.0 so the
cc-disable-warning calls are kept for these two warnings.
Lastly, -Winitializer-overrides is clang's version of -Woverride-init,
which is disabled for the specific files that are problematic. clang
added a compatibility alias in clang 8.0.0 so -Winitializer-overrides
can be removed.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202108210311.CBtcgoUL-lkp@intel.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210824022640.2170859-1-nathan@kernel.org/
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210914194944.4004260-1-nathan@kernel.org
Now that all the pieces are in place we can add a description of how the
feature works. Also modify the comments in struct intel_pxp into
kerneldoc.
v2: improve doc (Rodrigo)
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-17-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
2 debugfs files, one to query the current status of the pxp session and one
to trigger an invalidation for testing.
v2: rename debugfs, fix date (Alan)
v12: rebased to latest drm-tip (rename of files/structs from
debugfs_gt to intel_debugfs_gt caused compiler errors).
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Reviewed-by : Alan Previn <alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alan Previn <alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-16-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
When protected sufaces has flipped and pxp session is disabled,
display black pixels by using plane color CTM correction.
v2:
- Display black pixels in async flip too.
v3:
- Removed the black pixels logic for async flip. [Ville]
- Used plane state to force black pixels. [Ville]
v4 (Daniele): update pxp_is_borked check.
v5: rebase on top of v9 plane decryption moving the decrypt check
(Juston)
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Gaurav Kumar <kumar.gaurav@intel.com>
Cc: Shankar Uma <uma.shankar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Gupta <anshuman.gupta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Juston Li <juston.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Uma Shankar <uma.shankar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-15-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
Add support to enable/disable PLANE_SURF Decryption Request bit.
It requires only to enable plane decryption support when following
condition met.
1. PXP session is enabled.
2. Buffer object is protected.
v2:
- Used gen fb obj user_flags instead gem_object_metadata. [Krishna]
v3:
- intel_pxp_gem_object_status() API changes.
v4: use intel_pxp_is_active (Daniele)
v5: rebase and use the new protected object status checker (Daniele)
v6: used plane state for plane_decryption to handle async flip
as suggested by Ville.
v7: check pxp session while plane decrypt state computation. [Ville]
removed pointless code. [Ville]
v8 (Daniele): update PXP check
v9: move decrypt check after icl_check_nv12_planes() when overlays
have fb set (Juston)
v10 (Daniele): update PXP check again to match rework in earlier
patches and don't consider protection valid if the object has not
been used in an execbuf beforehand.
Cc: Bommu Krishnaiah <krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com>
Cc: Huang Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Gaurav Kumar <kumar.gaurav@intel.com>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Gupta <anshuman.gupta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Juston Li <juston.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Uma Shankar <uma.shankar@intel.com> #v9
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-14-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
During the power event S3+ sleep/resume, hardware will lose all the
encryption keys for every hardware session, even though the
session state might still be marked as alive after resume. Therefore,
we should consider the session as dead on suspend and invalidate all the
objects. The session will be automatically restarted on the first
protected submission on resume.
v2: runtime suspend also invalidates the keys
v3: fix return codes, simplify rpm ops (Chris), use the new worker func
v4: invalidate the objects on suspend, don't re-create the arb sesson on
resume (delayed to first submission).
v5: move irq changes back to irq patch (Rodrigo)
v6: drop invalidation in runtime suspend (Rodrigo)
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-13-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
Now that we can handle destruction and re-creation of the arb session,
we can postpone the start of the session to the first submission that
requires it, to avoid keeping it running with no user.
v10: increase timeout when waiting in intel_pxp_start as firmware
session startup is slower right after boot.
v13: increase the same timeout by 50 milisec because previous timeout
was not enough to cover two lower level 100 milisec timeouts
in the session termination + creation steps.
Signed-off-by: Alan Previn <alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-12-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
This api allow user mode to create protected buffers and to mark
contexts as making use of such objects. Only when using contexts
marked in such a way is the execution guaranteed to work as expected.
Contexts can only be marked as using protected content at creation time
(i.e. the parameter is immutable) and they must be both bannable and not
recoverable. Given that the protected session gets invalidated on
suspend, contexts created this way hold a runtime pm wakeref until
they're either destroyed or invalidated.
All protected objects and contexts will be considered invalid when the
PXP session is destroyed and all new submissions using them will be
rejected. All intel contexts within the invalidated gem contexts will be
marked banned. Userspace can detect that an invalidation has occurred via
the RESET_STATS ioctl, where we report it the same way as a ban due to a
hang.
v5: squash patches, rebase on proto_ctx, update kerneldoc
v6: rebase on obj create_ext changes
v7: Use session counter to check if an object it valid, hold wakeref in
context, don't add a new flag to RESET_STATS (Daniel)
v8: don't increase guilty count for contexts banned during pxp
invalidation (Rodrigo)
v9: better comments, avoid wakeref put race between pxp_inval and
context_close, add usage examples (Rodrigo)
v10: modify internal set/get-protected-context functions to not
return -ENODEV when setting PXP param to false or getting param
when running on pxp-unsupported hw or getting param when i915
was built with CONFIG_PXP off
Signed-off-by: Alan Previn <alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bommu Krishnaiah <krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Ekstrand <jason@jlekstrand.net>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-11-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
