Currently we opencode the FLR sequence in lots of place; export a core
helper instead. We split out the probing for FLR support as all the
non-core callers already know their hardware.
Note that in the new pci_has_flr() function the quirk check has been moved
before the capability check as there is no point in reading the capability
in this case.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Sometimes it is not desirable to bind SR-IOV VFs to drivers. This can save
host side resource usage by VF instances that will be assigned to VMs.
Add a new PCI sysfs interface "sriov_drivers_autoprobe" to control that
from the PF. To modify it, echo 0/n/N (disable probe) or 1/y/Y (enable
probe) to:
/sys/bus/pci/devices/<DOMAIN:BUS:DEVICE.FUNCTION>/sriov_drivers_autoprobe
Note that this must be done before enabling VFs. The change will not take
effect if VFs are already enabled. Simply, one can disable VFs by setting
sriov_numvfs to 0, choose whether to probe or not, and then re-enable the
VFs by restoring sriov_numvfs.
[bhelgaas: changelog, ABI doc]
Signed-off-by: Bodong Wang <bodong@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Now that we eliminated the different behaviour in separately-reviewable
commits, we can switch IA64 to the generic implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
For a PCI MMIO BAR, phys_mem_access_prot() should always return UC or WC.
And while a mixture of cached and uncached mappings is forbidden, we were
already mixing WC and UC, which is OK. Just do as we're asked.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
We know we are within a valid MMIO BAR by the time this function gets
called; there's no need to check.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
This will need to call into an arch-provided pci_iobar_pfn() function.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
This was setting vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED. Not sure why...
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Starting to leave behind the legacy of the pci_mmap_page_range() interface
which takes "user-visible" BAR addresses. This takes just the resource and
offset.
For now, both APIs coexist and depending on the platform, one is
implemented as a wrapper around the other.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
In all cases we know which BAR it is. Passing it in means that arch code
(or generic code; watch this space) won't have to go looking for it again.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
We store the pointer, and then on *every* use of it we loop over the
device's resources to find out the index. That's kind of silly.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Before offlining a CPU its required to check whether there are enough free
irq vectors available so interrupts can be migrated away from the CPU.
This check is executed whether its required or not and neither stops
searching when the number of required free vectors are reached.
Bypass the free vector check if the current CPU has no irq to migrate and
leave the for_each_online_cpu() loop when the free vector count reaches the
number of required vectors.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.orq>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492357410-510-1-git-send-email-yu.c.chen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
On kprobe handler re-entry, try to emulate the instruction rather than single
stepping always.
Acked-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Factor out code to emulate instruction into a try_to_emulate()
helper function. This makes no functional changes.
Acked-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
With ABIv2, we offset 8 bytes into a function to get at the local entry
point.
mpe: NB this function is currently not called, the change to generic code to
call it is being merged via the tip tree.
Acked-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
commit 239aeba764 ("perf powerpc: Fix kprobe and kretprobe handling with
kallsyms on ppc64le") changed how we use the offset field in struct kprobe on
ABIv2. perf now offsets from the global entry point if an offset is specified
and otherwise chooses the local entry point.
Fix the same in kernel for kprobe API users. We do this by extending
kprobe_lookup_name() to accept an additional parameter to indicate the offset
specified with the kprobe registration. If offset is 0, we return the local
function entry and return the global entry point otherwise.
With:
# cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/
# echo "p _do_fork" >> kprobe_events
# echo "p _do_fork+0x10" >> kprobe_events
before this patch:
# cat ../kprobes/list
c0000000000d0748 k _do_fork+0x8 [DISABLED]
c0000000000d0758 k _do_fork+0x18 [DISABLED]
c0000000000412b0 k kretprobe_trampoline+0x0 [OPTIMIZED]
and after:
# cat ../kprobes/list
c0000000000d04c8 k _do_fork+0x8 [DISABLED]
c0000000000d04d0 k _do_fork+0x10 [DISABLED]
c0000000000412b0 k kretprobe_trampoline+0x0 [OPTIMIZED]
Acked-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
The macro is now pretty long and ugly on powerpc. In the light of further
changes needed here, convert it to a __weak variant to be over-ridden with a
nicer looking function.
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Skip preparing optprobe if the probe is ftrace-based, since anyway, it
must not be optimized (or already optimized by ftrace).
Tested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
In development period for Linux v4.10, ktime_t became an alias of s64,
instead of union. I forgot it. We can just assign zero, instead of usage
of ktime_set(0, 0).
Fixes: 1917429578 ("ALSA: fireface: add transaction support")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
timer_migration sysctl acts as a boolean switch, so the allowed values
should be restricted to 0 and 1.
Add the necessary extra fields to the sysctl table entry to enforce that.
[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492640690-3550-1-git-send-email-mhjungk@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
In some rare randconfig builds, we end up with two functions being entirely
unused:
drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c:342:12: error: 'erratum_set_next_event_tval_phys' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
static int erratum_set_next_event_tval_phys(unsigned long evt,
drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c:335:12: error: 'erratum_set_next_event_tval_virt' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
static int erratum_set_next_event_tval_virt(unsigned long evt,
We could add an #ifdef around them, but we would already have to check for
several symbols there and there is a chance this would get more complicated
over time, so marking them as __maybe_unused is the simplest way to avoid the
harmless warnings.
Fixes: 01d3e3ff26 ("arm64: arch_timer: Rework the set_next_event workarounds")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170419173737.3846098-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Malta was the only platform probing this driver from platform code
without using device tree. With that code removed, gic_clocksource_init
is redundant so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492604806-23420-2-git-send-email-matt.redfearn@imgtec.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The Malta platform is the only platform remaining to probe the GIC
clocksource via gic_clocksource_init. This route hardcodes an expected
virq number based on MIPS_GIC_IRQ_BASE, which can be fragile to the
eventual virq layout. Instread, probe the driver using the preferred and
more modern devicetree method.
Before the driver is probed, set the "clock-frequency" property of the
devicetree node to the value detected by Malta platform code.
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492604806-23420-1-git-send-email-matt.redfearn@imgtec.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Besides reusing existing code this removes the special case handling
for 64-bit masks, which causes clang to raise a shift count overflow
warning due to https://bugs.llvm.org//show_bug.cgi?id=10030.
Suggested-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: Grant Grundler <grundler@chromium.org>
Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Cc: Michael Davidson <md@google.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170418233037.70990-1-mka@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Currently for DDR50 card, it need tuning in default. We meet tuning fail
issue for DDR50 card and some data CRC error when DDR50 sd card works.
This is because the default pad I/O drive strength can't make sure DDR50
card work stable. So increase the pad I/O drive strength for DDR50 card,
and use pins_100mhz.
This fixes DDR50 card support for IMX since DDR50 tuning was enabled from
commit 9faac7b95e ("mmc: sdhci: enable tuning for DDR50")
Tested-and-reported-by: Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Haibo Chen <haibo.chen@nxp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Acked-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Add use_cmma field to mm_context_t, like we do for storage keys.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Add PGSTE manipulation functions:
* set_pgste_bits sets specific bits in a PGSTE
* get_pgste returns the whole PGSTE
* pgste_perform_essa manipulates a PGSTE to set specific storage states
* ESSA_[SG]ET_* macros used to indicate the action for manipulate_pgste
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in sound/pci/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>
cc: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in sound/oss/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>
cc: Andrew Veliath <andrewtv@usa.net>
cc: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in sound/isa/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>
cc: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in sound/drivers/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
cc: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in fs/pstore/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/watchdog/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be>
cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com>
cc: linux-watchdog@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/video/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
cc: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com>
cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/tty/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/vme/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Martyn Welch <martyn@welchs.me.uk>
cc: Manohar Vanga <manohar.vanga@gmail.com>
cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/speakup/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: speakup@linux-speakup.org
cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/media/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/scsi/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: "Juergen E. Fischer" <fischer@norbit.de>
cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
cc: Dario Ballabio <ballabio_dario@emc.com>
cc: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
cc: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
cc: Achim Leubner <achim_leubner@adaptec.com>
cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/pcmcia/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-pcmcia@lists.infradead.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/pci/hotplug/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
cc: Scott Murray <scott@spiteful.org>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/parport/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/wireless/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/wan/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: "Jan \"Yenya\" Kasprzak" <kas@fi.muni.cz>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org