Allow locking a bpf_spin_lock in an allocated object, in addition to
already supported map value pointers. The handling is similar to that of
map values, by just preserving the reg->id of PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC
as well, and adjusting process_spin_lock to work with them and remember
the id in verifier state.
Refactor the existing process_spin_lock to work with PTR_TO_BTF_ID |
MEM_ALLOC in addition to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. We need to update the
reg_may_point_to_spin_lock which is used in mark_ptr_or_null_reg to
preserve reg->id, that will be used in env->cur_state->active_spin_lock
to remember the currently held spin lock.
Also update the comment describing bpf_spin_lock implementation details
to also talk about PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC type.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-9-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Ensure that there can be no ownership cycles among different types by
way of having owning objects that can hold some other type as their
element. For instance, a map value can only hold allocated objects, but
these are allowed to have another bpf_list_head. To prevent unbounded
recursion while freeing resources, elements of bpf_list_head in local
kptrs can never have a bpf_list_head which are part of list in a map
value. Later patches will verify this by having dedicated BTF selftests.
Also, to make runtime destruction easier, once btf_struct_metas is fully
populated, we can stash the metadata of the value type directly in the
metadata of the list_head fields, as that allows easier access to the
value type's layout to destruct it at runtime from the btf_field entry
of the list head itself.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-8-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow specifying bpf_spin_lock, bpf_list_head, bpf_list_node fields in a
allocated object.
Also update btf_struct_access to reject direct access to these special
fields.
A bpf_list_head allows implementing map-in-map style use cases, where an
allocated object with bpf_list_head is linked into a list in a map
value. This would require embedding a bpf_list_node, support for which
is also included. The bpf_spin_lock is used to protect the bpf_list_head
and other data.
While we strictly don't require to hold a bpf_spin_lock while touching
the bpf_list_head in such objects, as when have access to it, we have
complete ownership of the object, the locking constraint is still kept
and may be conditionally lifted in the future.
Note that the specification of such types can be done just like map
values, e.g.:
struct bar {
struct bpf_list_node node;
};
struct foo {
struct bpf_spin_lock lock;
struct bpf_list_head head __contains(bar, node);
struct bpf_list_node node;
};
struct map_value {
struct bpf_spin_lock lock;
struct bpf_list_head head __contains(foo, node);
};
To recognize such types in user BTF, we build a btf_struct_metas array
of metadata items corresponding to each BTF ID. This is done once during
the btf_parse stage to avoid having to do it each time during the
verification process's requirement to inspect the metadata.
Moreover, the computed metadata needs to be passed to some helpers in
future patches which requires allocating them and storing them in the
BTF that is pinned by the program itself, so that valid access can be
assumed to such data during program runtime.
A key thing to note is that once a btf_struct_meta is available for a
type, both the btf_record and btf_field_offs should be available. It is
critical that btf_field_offs is available in case special fields are
present, as we extensively rely on special fields being zeroed out in
map values and allocated objects in later patches. The code ensures that
by bailing out in case of errors and ensuring both are available
together. If the record is not available, the special fields won't be
recognized, so not having both is also fine (in terms of being a
verification error and not a runtime bug).
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-7-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Introduce support for representing pointers to objects allocated by the
BPF program, i.e. PTR_TO_BTF_ID that point to a type in program BTF.
This is indicated by the presence of MEM_ALLOC type flag in reg->type to
avoid having to check btf_is_kernel when trying to match argument types
in helpers.
Whenever walking such types, any pointers being walked will always yield
a SCALAR instead of pointer. In the future we might permit kptr inside
such allocated objects (either kernel or program allocated), and it will
then form a PTR_TO_BTF_ID of the respective type.
For now, such allocated objects will always be referenced in verifier
context, hence ref_obj_id == 0 for them is a bug. It is allowed to write
to such objects, as long fields that are special are not touched
(support for which will be added in subsequent patches). Note that once
such a pointer is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, it is no longer allowed to write
to it.
No PROBE_MEM handling is therefore done for loads into this type unless
PTR_UNTRUSTED is part of the register type, since they can never be in
an undefined state, and their lifetime will always be valid.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-6-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Far too much code simply assumes that both btf_record and btf_field_offs
are set to valid pointers together, or both are unset. They go together
hand in hand as btf_record describes the special fields and
btf_field_offs is compact representation for runtime copying/zeroing.
It is very difficult to make this clear in the code when the only
exception to this universal invariant is inner_map_meta which is used
as reg->map_ptr in the verifier. This is simply a bug waiting to happen,
as in verifier context we cannot easily distinguish if PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE
is coming from an inner map, and if we ever end up using field_offs for
any reason in the future, we will silently ignore the special fields for
inner map case (as NULL is not an error but unset field_offs).
Hence, simply copy field_offs from inner map together with btf_record.
While at it, refactor code to unwind properly on errors with gotos.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Whenever btf_record_dup fails, we must free inner_map_meta that was
allocated before.
This fixes a memory leak (in case of errors) during inner map creation.
Fixes: aa3496accc ("bpf: Refactor kptr_off_tab into btf_record")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-4-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Since the commit being fixed, we now miss freeing btf_record for local
storage maps which will have a btf_record populated in case they have
bpf_spin_lock element.
This was missed because I made the choice of offloading the job to free
kptr_off_tab (now btf_record) to the map_free callback when adding
support for kptrs.
Revisiting the reason for this decision, there is the possibility that
the btf_record gets used inside map_free callback (e.g. in case of maps
embedding kptrs) to iterate over them and free them, hence doing it
before the map_free callback would be leaking special field memory, and
do invalid memory access. The btf_record keeps module references which
is critical to ensure the dtor call made for referenced kptr is safe to
do.
If doing it after map_free callback, the map area is already freed, so
we cannot access bpf_map structure anymore.
To fix this and prevent such lapses in future, move bpf_map_free_record
out of the map_free callback, and do it after map_free by remembering
the btf_record pointer. There is no need to access bpf_map structure in
that case, and we can avoid missing this case when support for new map
types is added for other special fields.
Since a btf_record and its btf_field_offs are used together, for
consistency delay freeing of field_offs as well. While not a problem
right now, a lot of code assumes that either both record and field_offs
are set or none at once.
Note that in case of map of maps (outer maps), inner_map_meta->record is
only used during verification, not to free fields in map value, hence we
simply keep the bpf_map_free_record call as is in bpf_map_meta_free and
never touch map->inner_map_meta in bpf_map_free_deferred.
Add a comment making note of these details.
Fixes: db55911782 ("bpf: Consolidate spin_lock, timer management into btf_record")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Instead of returning directly with -EOPNOTSUPP for the timer case, we
need to free the btf_record before returning to userspace.
Fixes: db55911782 ("bpf: Consolidate spin_lock, timer management into btf_record")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Entries in list 'tr->err_log' will be reused after entry number
exceed TRACING_LOG_ERRS_MAX.
The cmd string of the to be reused entry will be freed first then
allocated a new one. If the allocation failed, then the entry will
still be in list 'tr->err_log' but its 'cmd' field is set to be NULL,
later access of 'cmd' is risky.
Currently above problem can cause the loss of 'cmd' information of first
entry in 'tr->err_log'. When execute `cat /sys/kernel/tracing/error_log`,
reproduce logs like:
[ 37.495100] trace_kprobe: error: Maxactive is not for kprobe(null) ^
[ 38.412517] trace_kprobe: error: Maxactive is not for kprobe
Command: p4:myprobe2 do_sys_openat2
^
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20221114104632.3547266-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.com
Fixes: 1581a884b7 ("tracing: Remove size restriction on tracing_log_err cmd strings")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Currently, we reseed when random bytes are requested, if the current
seed is too old. Since random bytes can be requested from all contexts,
including hard IRQ, this means sometimes we wind up adding a bit of
latency to hard IRQ. This was so much of a problem on s390x that now
s390x just doesn't provide its architectural RNG from hard IRQ context,
so we miss out in that case.
Instead, let's just schedule a persistent delayed work, so that the
reseeding and potentially expensive operations will always happen from
process context, reducing unexpected latencies from hard IRQ.
This also has the nice effect of accumulating a transcript of random
inputs over time, since it means that we amass more input values. And it
should make future vDSO integration a bit easier.
Cc: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
add_latent_entropy() is called every time a process forks, in
kernel_clone(). This in turn calls add_device_randomness() using the
latent entropy global state. add_device_randomness() does two things:
2) Mixes into the input pool the latent entropy argument passed; and
1) Mixes in a cycle counter, a sort of measurement of when the event
took place, the high precision bits of which are presumably
difficult to predict.
(2) is impossible without CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=y. But (1) is
always possible. However, currently CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=n
disables both (1) and (2), instead of just (2).
This commit causes the CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=n case to still
do (1) by passing NULL (len 0) to add_device_randomness() when add_latent_
entropy() is called.
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Fixes: 38addce8b6 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Rather than calling add_device_randomness(), the add_early_randomness()
function should use add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that the early
entropy can be potentially credited, which allows for the RNG to
initialize earlier without having to wait for the kthread to come up.
This requires some minor API refactoring, by adding a `sleep_after`
parameter to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), so that we don't hit a
blocking sleep from add_early_randomness().
Tested-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
The prior text was very old and made outdated references to TCP sequence
numbers, which should use one of the integer functions instead, since
batched entropy was introduced. The current way of describing the
quality of functions is just to say that it's as good as /dev/urandom,
which now all the functions are.
Fixes: f5b98461cb ("random: use chacha20 for get_random_int/long")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Since de492c83ca ("prandom: remove unused functions"),
get_random_int() no longer exists, so remove its reference from this
comment.
Fixes: de492c83ca ("prandom: remove unused functions")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
The arch_get_random*_early() abstraction is not completely useful and
adds complexity, because it's not a given that there will be no calls to
arch_get_random*() between random_init_early(), which uses
arch_get_random*_early(), and init_cpu_features(). During that gap,
crng_reseed() might be called, which uses arch_get_random*(), since it's
mostly not init code.
Instead we can test whether we're in the early phase in
arch_get_random*() itself, and in doing so avoid all ambiguity about
where we are. Fortunately, the only architecture that currently
implements arch_get_random*_early() also has an alternatives-based cpu
feature system, one flag of which determines whether the other flags
have been initialized. This makes it possible to do the early check with
zero cost once the system is initialized.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
It's very unusual to have both a command line option and a compile time
option, and apparently that's confusing to people. Also, basically
everybody enables the compile time option now, which means people who
want to disable this wind up having to use the command line option to
ensure that anyway. So just reduce the number of moving pieces and nix
the compile time option in favor of the more versatile command line
option.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
The RNG always mixes in the Linux version extremely early in boot. It
also always includes a cycle counter, not only during early boot, but
each and every time it is invoked prior to being fully initialized.
Together, this means that the use of additional xors inside of the
various stackprotector.h files is superfluous and over-complicated.
Instead, we can get exactly the same thing, but better, by just calling
`get_random_canary()`.
Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> # for csky
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> # for arm64
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This has nothing to do with random.c and everything to do with stack
protectors. Yes, it uses randomness. But many things use randomness.
random.h and random.c are concerned with the generation of randomness,
not with each and every use. So move this function into the more
specific stackprotector.h file where it belongs.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
These cases were done with this Coccinelle:
@@
expression H;
expression L;
@@
- (get_random_u32_below(H) + L)
+ get_random_u32_inclusive(L, H + L - 1)
@@
expression H;
expression L;
expression E;
@@
get_random_u32_inclusive(L,
H
- + E
- - E
)
@@
expression H;
expression L;
expression E;
@@
get_random_u32_inclusive(L,
H
- - E
- + E
)
@@
expression H;
expression L;
expression E;
expression F;
@@
get_random_u32_inclusive(L,
H
- - E
+ F
- + E
)
@@
expression H;
expression L;
expression E;
expression F;
@@
get_random_u32_inclusive(L,
H
- + E
+ F
- - E
)
And then subsequently cleaned up by hand, with several automatic cases
rejected if it didn't make sense contextually.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> # for infiniband
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Since the eprobe filter was defined based on the eprobe's trace event
itself, it doesn't work correctly. Use the original trace event of
the eprobe when making the filter so that the filter works correctly.
Without this fix:
# echo 'e syscalls/sys_enter_openat \
flags_rename=$flags:u32 if flags < 1000' >> dynamic_events
# echo 1 > events/eprobes/sys_enter_openat/enable
[ 114.551550] event trace: Could not enable event sys_enter_openat
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
With this fix:
# echo 'e syscalls/sys_enter_openat \
flags_rename=$flags:u32 if flags < 1000' >> dynamic_events
# echo 1 > events/eprobes/sys_enter_openat/enable
# tail trace
cat-241 [000] ...1. 266.498449: sys_enter_openat: (syscalls.sys_enter_openat) flags_rename=0
cat-242 [000] ...1. 266.977640: sys_enter_openat: (syscalls.sys_enter_openat) flags_rename=0
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/166823166395.1385292.8931770640212414483.stgit@devnote3/
Fixes: 752be5c5c9 ("tracing/eprobe: Add eprobe filter support")
Reported-by: Rafael Mendonca <rafaelmendsr@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Rafael Mendonca <rafaelmendsr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
In __unregister_kprobe_top(), if the currently unregistered probe has
post_handler but other child probes of the aggrprobe do not have
post_handler, the post_handler of the aggrprobe is cleared. If this is
a ftrace-based probe, there is a problem. In later calls to
disarm_kprobe(), we will use kprobe_ftrace_ops because post_handler is
NULL. But we're armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This triggers a WARN in
__disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and may even cause use-after-free:
Failed to disarm kprobe-ftrace at kernel_clone+0x0/0x3c0 (error -2)
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 137 at kernel/kprobes.c:1135 __disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.21+0xcf/0xe0
Modules linked in: testKprobe_007(-)
CPU: 5 PID: 137 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-dirty #18
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__disable_kprobe+0xcd/0xe0
__unregister_kprobe_top+0x12/0x150
? mutex_lock+0xe/0x30
unregister_kprobes.part.23+0x31/0xa0
unregister_kprobe+0x32/0x40
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x15e/0x260
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2cd/0x6b0
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[...]
For the kprobe-on-ftrace case, we keep the post_handler setting to
identify this aggrprobe armed with kprobe_ipmodify_ops. This way we
can disarm it correctly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221112070000.35299-1-lihuafei1@huawei.com/
Fixes: 0bc11ed5ab ("kprobes: Allow kprobes coexist with livepatch")
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <zhaogongyi@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
In rethook_alloc(), the variable rh is not freed or passed out
if handler is NULL, which could lead to a memleak, fix it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221110104438.88099-1-yiyang13@huawei.com/
[Masami: Add "rethook:" tag to the title.]
Fixes: 54ecbe6f1e ("rethook: Add a generic return hook")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com>
Acke-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
These cases were done with this Coccinelle:
@@
expression E;
identifier I;
@@
- do {
... when != I
- I = get_random_u32();
... when != I
- } while (I > E);
+ I = get_random_u32_below(E + 1);
@@
expression E;
identifier I;
@@
- do {
... when != I
- I = get_random_u32();
... when != I
- } while (I >= E);
+ I = get_random_u32_below(E);
@@
expression E;
identifier I;
@@
- do {
... when != I
- I = get_random_u32();
... when != I
- } while (I < E);
+ I = get_random_u32_above(E - 1);
@@
expression E;
identifier I;
@@
- do {
... when != I
- I = get_random_u32();
... when != I
- } while (I <= E);
+ I = get_random_u32_above(E);
@@
identifier I;
@@
- do {
... when != I
- I = get_random_u32();
... when != I
- } while (!I);
+ I = get_random_u32_above(0);
@@
identifier I;
@@
- do {
... when != I
- I = get_random_u32();
... when != I
- } while (I == 0);
+ I = get_random_u32_above(0);
@@
expression E;
@@
- E + 1 + get_random_u32_below(U32_MAX - E)
+ get_random_u32_above(E)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This is a simple mechanical transformation done by:
@@
expression E;
@@
- prandom_u32_max
+ get_random_u32_below
(E)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # for xfs
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> # for damon
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> # for infiniband
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> # for arm
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # for mmc
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Now that we have get_random_u32_below(), it's nearly trivial to make
inline helpers to compute get_random_u32_above() and
get_random_u32_inclusive(), which will help clean up open coded loops
and manual computations throughout the tree.
One snag is that in order to make get_random_u32_inclusive() operate on
closed intervals, we have to do some (unlikely) special case handling if
get_random_u32_inclusive(0, U32_MAX) is called. The least expensive way
of doing this is actually to adjust the slowpath of
get_random_u32_below() to have its undefined 0 result just return the
output of get_random_u32(). We can make this basically free by calling
get_random_u32() before the branch, so that the branch latency gets
interleaved.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # to ease future backports that use this api
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
It does not appear that FOLL_FORCE should be needed for setting up the
stack pages. They are allocated using the nascent brpm->vma, which was
newly created with VM_STACK_FLAGS, which an arch can override, but they
all appear to include VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE. Remove FOLL_FORCE.
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202211171439.CDE720EAD@keescook/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Hou Tao says:
====================
From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Hi,
The patch set tries to fix the problems found when testing ringbuf by
using 4KB and 2GB size. Patch 1 fixes the probe of ring buffer map on
host with 64KB page (e.g., an ARM64 host). Patch 2 & 3 fix the overflow
of length when mmaping 2GB kernel ringbuf or user ringbuf on libbpf.
Patch 4 just reject the reservation with invalid size.
Please see individual patch for details. And comments are always
welcome.
Change Log:
v2:
* patch 1: use page size instead of adjust_ringbuf_sz(4096) as main_entries (suggested by Stanislav)
* patch 2 & 3: use "mmap_sz" instead of "ro_size/wr_size" as name of mmap length (From Andrii)
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221111092642.2333724-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
====================
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
The top two bits of size are used as busy and discard flags, so reject
the reservation that has any of these special bits in the size. With the
addition of validity check, these is also no need to check whether or
not total_size is overflowed.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221116072351.1168938-5-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Similar with the overflow problem on ringbuf mmap, in user_ringbuf_map()
2 * max_entries may overflow u32 when mapping writeable region.
Fixing it by casting the size of writable mmap region into a __u64 and
checking whether or not there will be overflow during mmap.
Fixes: b66ccae01f ("bpf: Add libbpf logic for user-space ring buffer")
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221116072351.1168938-4-houtao@huaweicloud.com
The maximum size of ringbuf is 2GB on x86-64 host, so 2 * max_entries
will overflow u32 when mapping producer page and data pages. Only
casting max_entries to size_t is not enough, because for 32-bits
application on 64-bits kernel the size of read-only mmap region
also could overflow size_t.
So fixing it by casting the size of read-only mmap region into a __u64
and checking whether or not there will be overflow during mmap.
Fixes: bf99c936f9 ("libbpf: Add BPF ring buffer support")
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221116072351.1168938-3-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Using page size as max_entries when probing ring buffer map, else the
probe may fail on host with 64KB page size (e.g., an ARM64 host).
After the fix, the output of "bpftool feature" on above host will be
correct.
Before :
eBPF map_type ringbuf is NOT available
eBPF map_type user_ringbuf is NOT available
After :
eBPF map_type ringbuf is available
eBPF map_type user_ringbuf is available
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221116072351.1168938-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com
For Tegra30 Pegatron Chagall, the sdmmc3_dat3_pb5 pin was defined
multiple times, leading to a DT validation error. Remove the duplicate
entry.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Some boards are using the interrupt-parent property to point at the GPIO
controller since it handles the interrupts for the GPIO keys. However, a
node needs an interrupts property for interrupt-parent to be meaningful,
which these boards don't have.
gpio-keys in these cases will directly use the GPIO lines specified in
the key definitions and rely on the implicit conversion of those GPIOs
to interrupts by the operating system, so explicit specification of the
interrupts is not required.
Remove the unnecessary interrupt-parent properties.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Rename the unknown nvidia,ioreset property to nvidia,io-reset, as
specified in the DT bindings and supported by the driver.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Tegra124 Nyan and Venice 2 boards were missing the required power-supply
property in their display panel device tree nodes. Add these properties
to fix validation errors.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Pinmux node names should have a pinmux- prefix and not use underscores.
Fix up some cases that didn't follow those rules.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
When cross-compiling [1], the get_sys_includes make macro should use
the target system include path, and not the build hosts system include
path.
Make clang honor the CROSS_COMPILE triple.
[1] e.g. "ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=riscv64-linux-gnu- make"
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221115182051.582962-2-bjorn@kernel.org
When cross-compiling selftests/bpf, the resolve_btfids binary end up
in a different directory, than the regular resolve_btfids
builds. Populate RESOLVE_BTFIDS for sub-make, so it can find the
binary.
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221115182051.582962-1-bjorn@kernel.org
All of the IP specific versions are the same now, so
we can just use a common function.
Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
This matches what we do for psp 3.1 and makes ring_init
common for all PSP versions.
Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
