commit 45eaf45dfa upstream.
md_check_recovery will skip any recovery and also clear
MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED if MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN is set.
So when we clear _FROZEN, we must set _NEEDED and ensure that
md_check_recovery gets run.
Otherwise we could miss out on something that is needed.
In particular, this can make it impossible to remove a
failed device from an array is the 'recovery-needed' processing
didn't happen.
Suitable for stable kernels since 3.13.
Reported-and-tested-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@stratus.com>
Fixes: 30b8feb730
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 40d43c4b4c upstream.
The dm-raid superblock (struct dm_raid_superblock) is padded to 512
bytes and that size is being used to read it in from the metadata
device into one preallocated page.
Reading or writing this on a 512-byte sector device works fine but on
a 4096-byte sector device this fails.
Set the dm-raid superblock's size to the logical block size of the
metadata device, because IO at that size is guaranteed too work. Also
add a size check to avoid silent partial metadata loss in case the
superblock should ever grow past the logical block size or PAGE_SIZE.
[includes pointer math fix from Dan Carpenter]
Reported-by: "Liuhua Wang" <lwang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9b460d3699 upstream.
The walk code was using a 'ro_spine' to hold it's locked btree nodes.
But this data structure is designed for the rolling lock scheme, and
as such automatically unlocks blocks that are two steps up the call
chain. This is not suitable for the simple recursive walk algorithm,
which retraces its steps.
This code is only used by the persistent array code, which in turn is
only used by dm-cache. In order to trigger it you need to have a
mapping tree that is more than 2 levels deep; which equates to 8-16
million cache blocks. For instance a 4T ssd with a very small block
size of 32k only just triggers this bug.
The fix just places the locked blocks on the stack, and stops using
the ro_spine altogether.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9d28eb1244 upstream.
The shrinker uses gfp flags to indicate what kind of operation can the
driver wait for. If __GFP_IO flag is present, the driver can wait for
block I/O operations, if __GFP_FS flag is present, the driver can wait on
operations involving the filesystem.
dm-bufio tested for __GFP_IO. However, dm-bufio can run on a loop block
device that makes calls into the filesystem. If __GFP_IO is present and
__GFP_FS isn't, dm-bufio could still block on filesystem operations if it
runs on a loop block device.
The change from __GFP_IO to __GFP_FS supposedly fixes one observed (though
unreproducible) deadlock involving dm-bufio and loop device.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c822ed967c upstream.
Avoids normal IO racing with discard.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 56ec16cb1e upstream.
If cn_add_callback() fails in dm_ulog_tfr_init(), it does not
deallocate prealloced memory but calls cn_del_callback().
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Brassow <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0e825862f3 upstream.
When __scan frees the required number of buffer entries that the
shrinker requested (nr_to_scan becomes zero) it must return. Before
this fix the __scan code exited only the inner loop and continued in the
outer loop -- which could result in reduced performance due to extra
buffers being freed (e.g. unnecessarily evicted thinp metadata needing
to be synchronously re-read into bufio's cache).
Also, move dm_bufio_cond_resched to __scan's inner loop, so that
iterating the bufio client's lru lists doesn't result in scheduling
latency.
Reported-by: Joe Thornber <thornber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb76faf53b upstream.
The 'last_accessed' member of the dm_buffer structure was only set when
the the buffer was created. This led to each buffer being discarded
after dm_bufio_max_age time even if it was used recently. In practice
this resulted in all thinp metadata being evicted soon after being read
-- this is particularly problematic for metadata intensive workloads
like multithreaded small random IO.
'last_accessed' is now updated each time the buffer is moved to the head
of the LRU list, so the buffer is now properly discarded if it was not
used in dm_bufio_max_age time.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8e0e99ba64 upstream.
It has come to my attention (thanks Martin) that 'discard_zeroes_data'
is only a hint. Some devices in some cases don't do what it
says on the label.
The use of DISCARD in RAID5 depends on reads from discarded regions
being predictably zero. If a write to a previously discarded region
performs a read-modify-write cycle it assumes that the parity block
was consistent with the data blocks. If all were zero, this would
be the case. If some are and some aren't this would not be the case.
This could lead to data corruption after a device failure when
data needs to be reconstructed from the parity.
As we cannot trust 'discard_zeroes_data', ignore it by default
and so disallow DISCARD on all raid4/5/6 arrays.
As many devices are trustworthy, and as there are benefits to using
DISCARD, add a module parameter to over-ride this caution and cause
DISCARD to work if discard_zeroes_data is set.
If a site want to enable DISCARD on some arrays but not on others they
should select DISCARD support at the filesystem level, and set the
raid456 module parameter.
raid456.devices_handle_discard_safely=Y
As this is a data-safety issue, I believe this patch is suitable for
-stable.
DISCARD support for RAID456 was added in 3.7
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Fixes: 620125f2bf
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f0cc9a0571 upstream.
r1_bio->start_next_window is not initialised in the READ
case, so allow_barrier may incorrectly decrement
conf->current_window_requests
which can cause raise_barrier() to block forever.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Reported-by: Brassow Jonathan <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b8cb6b4c12 upstream.
If a devices is being recovered it is not InSync and is not Faulty.
If a read error is experienced on that device, fix_read_error()
will be called, but it ignores non-InSync devices. So it will
neither fix the error nor fail the device.
It is incorrect that fix_read_error() ignores non-InSync devices.
It should only ignore Faulty devices. So fix it.
This became a bug when we allowed reading from a device that was being
recovered. It is suitable for any subsequent -stable kernel.
Fixes: da8840a747
Reported-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Lyakas <alex.bolshoy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 34e97f1701 upstream.
Both normal IO and resync IO can be retried with reschedule_retry()
and so be counted into ->nr_queued, but only normal IO gets counted in
->nr_pending.
Before the recent improvement to RAID1 resync there could only
possibly have been one or the other on the queue. When handling a
read failure it could only be normal IO. So when handle_read_error()
called freeze_array() the fact that freeze_array only compares
->nr_queued against ->nr_pending was safe.
But now that these two types can interleave, we can have both normal
and resync IO requests queued, so we need to count them both in
nr_pending.
This error can lead to freeze_array() hanging if there is a read
error, so it is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Reported-by: Brassow Jonathan <jbrassow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c2fd4c94de upstream.
raise_barrier() uses next_resync as part of its calculations, so it
really should be updated first, instead of afterwards.
next_resync is always used under resync_lock so update it under
resync lock to, just before it is used. That is safest.
This could cause normal IO and resync IO to interact badly so
it suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 235549605e upstream.
next_resync is (approximately) the location for the next resync request.
However it does *not* reliably determine the earliest location
at which resync might be happening.
This is because resync requests can complete out of order, and
we only limit the number of current requests, not the distance
from the earliest pending request to the latest.
mddev->curr_resync_completed is a reliable indicator of the earliest
position at which resync could be happening. It is updated less
frequently, but is actually reliable which is more important.
So use it to determine if a write request is before the region
being resynced and so safe from conflict.
This error can allow resync IO to interfere with normal IO which
could lead to data corruption. Hence: stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2f73d3c55d upstream.
The resync/recovery process for raid1 was recently changed
so that writes could happen in parallel with resync providing
they were in different regions of the device.
There is a problem though: While a write request will always
wait for conflicting resync to complete, a resync request
will *not* always wait for conflicting writes to complete.
Two changes are needed to fix this:
1/ raise_barrier (which waits until it is safe to do resync)
must wait until current_window_requests is zero
2/ wait_battier (which waits at the start of a new write request)
must update current_window_requests if the request could
possible conflict with a concurrent resync.
As concurrent writes and resync can lead to data loss,
this patch is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Cc: majianpeng <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c6d119cf1b upstream.
commit 79ef3a8aa1 made
it possible for reads to happen concurrently with resync.
This means that we need to be more careful where read_balancing
is allowed during resync - we can no longer be sure that any
resync that has already started will definitely finish.
So keep read_balancing to before recovery_cp, which is conservative
but safe.
This bug makes it possible to read from a device that doesn't
have up-to-date data, so it can cause data corruption.
So it is suitable for any kernel since 3.11.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 669cc7ba77 upstream.
If there are outstanding writes when close_sync is called,
the change to ->start_next_window might cause them to
decrement the wrong counter when they complete. Fix this
by merging the two counters into the one that will be decremented.
Having an incorrect value in a counter can cause raise_barrier()
to hangs, so this is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 79ef3a8aa1
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d49ec52ff6 upstream.
The DM crypt target accesses memory beyond allocated space resulting in
a crash on 32 bit x86 systems.
This bug is very old (it dates back to 2.6.25 commit 3a7f6c990a "dm
crypt: use async crypto"). However, this bug was masked by the fact
that kmalloc rounds the size up to the next power of two. This bug
wasn't exposed until 3.17-rc1 commit 298a9fa08a ("dm crypt: use per-bio
data"). By switching to using per-bio data there was no longer any
padding beyond the end of a dm-crypt allocated memory block.
To minimize allocation overhead dm-crypt puts several structures into one
block allocated with kmalloc. The block holds struct ablkcipher_request,
cipher-specific scratch pad (crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(any_tfm(cc))),
struct dm_crypt_request and an initialization vector.
The variable dmreq_start is set to offset of struct dm_crypt_request
within this memory block. dm-crypt allocates the block with this size:
cc->dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) + cc->iv_size.
When accessing the initialization vector, dm-crypt uses the function
iv_of_dmreq, which performs this calculation: ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq
+ 1), crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1).
dm-crypt allocated "cc->iv_size" bytes beyond the end of dm_crypt_request
structure. However, when dm-crypt accesses the initialization vector, it
takes a pointer to the end of dm_crypt_request, aligns it, and then uses
it as the initialization vector. If the end of dm_crypt_request is not
aligned on a crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) boundary the
alignment causes the initialization vector to point beyond the allocated
space.
Fix this bug by calculating the variable iv_size_padding and adding it
to the allocated size.
Also correct the alignment of dm_crypt_request. struct dm_crypt_request
is specific to dm-crypt (it isn't used by the crypto subsystem at all),
so it is aligned on __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request).
Also align per_bio_data_size on ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN, so that it is
aligned as if the block was allocated with kmalloc.
Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa <kkolasa@winsoft.pl>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 40aa978ecc upstream.
When a writeback or a promotion of a block is completed, the cell of
that block is removed from the prison, the block is marked as clean, and
the clear_dirty() callback of the cache policy is called.
Unfortunately, performing those actions in this order allows an incoming
new write bio for that block to come in before clearing the dirty status
is completed and therefore possibly causing one of these two scenarios:
Scenario A:
Thread 1 Thread 2
cell_defer() .
- cell removed from prison .
- detained bios queued .
. incoming write bio
. remapped to cache
. set_dirty() called,
. but block already dirty
. => it does nothing
clear_dirty() .
- block marked clean .
- policy clear_dirty() called .
Result: Block is marked clean even though it is actually dirty. No
writeback will occur.
Scenario B:
Thread 1 Thread 2
cell_defer() .
- cell removed from prison .
- detained bios queued .
clear_dirty() .
- block marked clean .
. incoming write bio
. remapped to cache
. set_dirty() called
. - block marked dirty
. - policy set_dirty() called
- policy clear_dirty() called .
Result: Block is properly marked as dirty, but policy thinks it is clean
and therefore never asks us to writeback it.
This case is visible in "dmsetup status" dirty block count (which
normally decreases to 0 on a quiet device).
Fix these issues by calling clear_dirty() before calling cell_defer().
Incoming bios for that block will then be detained in the cell and
released only after clear_dirty() has completed, so the race will not
occur.
Found by inspecting the code after noticing spurious dirty counts
(scenario B).
Signed-off-by: Anssi Hannula <anssi.hannula@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b39685526f upstream.
When a raid10 commences a resync/recovery/reshape it allocates
some buffer space.
When a resync/recovery completes the buffer space is freed. But not
when the reshape completes.
This can result in a small memory leak.
There is a subtle side-effect of this bug. When a RAID10 is reshaped
to a larger array (more devices), the reshape is immediately followed
by a "resync" of the new space. This "resync" will use the buffer
space which was allocated for "reshape". This can cause problems
including a "BUG" in the SCSI layer. So this is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: 3ea7daa5d7
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ce0b0a4695 upstream.
raid10 reshape clears unwanted bits from a bio->bi_flags using
a method which, while clumsy, worked until 3.10 when BIO_OWNS_VEC
was added.
Since then it clears that bit but shouldn't. This results in a
memory leak.
So change to used the approved method of clearing unwanted bits.
As this causes a memory leak which can consume all of memory
the fix is suitable for -stable.
Fixes: a38352e0ac
Reported-by: mdraid.pkoch@dfgh.net (Peter Koch)
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c4bdf697c upstream.
During recovery of a double-degraded RAID6 it is possible for
some blocks not to be recovered properly, leading to corruption.
If a write happens to one block in a stripe that would be written to a
missing device, and at the same time that stripe is recovering data
to the other missing device, then that recovered data may not be written.
This patch skips, in the double-degraded case, an optimisation that is
only safe for single-degraded arrays.
Bug was introduced in 2.6.32 and fix is suitable for any kernel since
then. In an older kernel with separate handle_stripe5() and
handle_stripe6() functions the patch must change handle_stripe6().
Fixes: 6c0069c0ae
Cc: Yuri Tikhonov <yur@emcraft.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reported-by: "Manibalan P" <pmanibalan@amiindia.co.in>
Tested-by: "Manibalan P" <pmanibalan@amiindia.co.in>
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1090423
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2446dba03f upstream.
Currently we don't abort recovery on a write error if the write error
to the recovering device was triggerd by normal IO (as opposed to
recovery IO).
This means that for one bitmap region, the recovery might write to the
recovering device for a few sectors, then not bother for subsequent
sectors (as it never writes to failed devices). In this case
the bitmap bit will be cleared, but it really shouldn't.
The result is that if the recovering device fails and is then re-added
(after fixing whatever hardware problem triggerred the failure),
the second recovery won't redo the region it was in the middle of,
so some of the device will not be recovered properly.
If we abort the recovery, the region being processes will be cancelled
(bit not cleared) and the whole region will be retried.
As the bug can result in data corruption the patch is suitable for
-stable. For kernels prior to 3.11 there is a conflict in raid10.c
which will require care.
Original-from: jiao hui <jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn>
Reported-and-tested-by: jiao hui <jiaohui@bwstor.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 44fa816bb7 upstream.
nr_dirty is updated without locking, causing it to drift so that it is
non-zero (either a small positive integer, or a very large one when an
underflow occurs) even when there are no actual dirty blocks. This was
due to a race between the workqueue and map function accessing nr_dirty
in parallel without proper protection.
People were seeing under runs due to a race on increment/decrement of
nr_dirty, see: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/6/3/648
Fix this by using an atomic_t for nr_dirty.
Reported-by: roma1390@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anssi Hannula <anssi.hannula@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d8c712ea47 upstream.
1d3d4437ea ("vmscan: per-node deferred work") added a flags field to
struct shrinker assuming that all shrinkers were zero filled. The dm
bufio shrinker is not zero filled, which leaves arbitrary kmalloc() data
in flags. So far the only defined flags bit is SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE.
But there are proposed patches which add other bits to shrinker.flags
(e.g. memcg awareness).
Rather than simply initializing the shrinker, this patch uses kzalloc()
when allocating the dm_bufio_client to ensure that the embedded shrinker
and any other similar structures are zeroed.
This fixes theoretical over aggressive shrinking of dm bufio objects.
If the uninitialized dm_bufio_client.shrinker.flags contains
SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE then shrink_slab() would call the dm shrinker for
each numa node rather than just once. This has been broken since 3.12.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 048e5a07f2 upstream.
The block size for the dm-cache's data device must remained fixed for
the life of the cache. Disallow any attempt to change the cache's data
block size.
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9aec8629ec upstream.
The block size for the thin-pool's data device must remained fixed for
the life of the thin-pool. Disallow any attempt to change the
thin-pool's data block size.
It should be noted that attempting to change the data block size via
thin-pool table reload will be ignored as a side-effect of the thin-pool
handover that the thin-pool target does during thin-pool table reload.
Here is an example outcome of attempting to load a thin-pool table that
reduced the thin-pool's data block size from 1024K to 512K.
Before:
kernel: device-mapper: thin: 253:4: growing the data device from 204800 to 409600 blocks
After:
kernel: device-mapper: thin metadata: changing the data block size (from 2048 to 1024) is not supported
kernel: device-mapper: table: 253:4: thin-pool: Error creating metadata object
kernel: device-mapper: ioctl: error adding target to table
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit acfe0ad74d upstream.
The commit 2c140a246d ("dm: allow remove to be deferred") introduced a
deferred removal feature for the device mapper. When this feature is
used (by passing a flag DM_DEFERRED_REMOVE to DM_DEV_REMOVE_CMD ioctl)
and the user tries to remove a device that is currently in use, the
device will be removed automatically in the future when the last user
closes it.
Device mapper used the system workqueue to perform deferred removals.
However, some targets (dm-raid1, dm-mpath, dm-stripe) flush work items
scheduled for the system workqueue from their destructor. If the
destructor itself is called from the system workqueue during deferred
removal, it introduces a possible deadlock - the workqueue tries to flush
itself.
Fix this possible deadlock by introducing a new workqueue for deferred
removals. We allocate just one workqueue for all dm targets. The
ability of dm targets to process IOs isn't dependent on deferred removal
of unused targets, so a deadlock due to shared workqueue isn't possible.
Also, cleanup local_init() to eliminate potential for returning success
on failure.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 10f1d5d111 upstream.
There's a race condition between the atomic_dec_and_test(&io->count)
in dec_count() and the waking of the sync_io() thread. If the thread
is spuriously woken immediately after the decrement it may exit,
making the on stack io struct invalid, yet the dec_count could still
be using it.
Fix this race by using a completion in sync_io() and dec_count().
Reported-by: Minfei Huang <huangminfei@ucloud.cn>
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <thornber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 133d4527ea upstream.
When we write to a degraded array which has a bitmap, we
make sure the relevant bit in the bitmap remains set when
the write completes (so a 're-add' can quickly rebuilt a
temporarily-missing device).
If, immediately after such a write starts, we incorporate a spare,
commence recovery, and skip over the region where the write is
happening (because the 'needs recovery' flag isn't set yet),
then that write will not get to the new device.
Once the recovery finishes the new device will be trusted, but will
have incorrect data, leading to possible corruption.
We cannot set the 'needs recovery' flag when we start the write as we
do not know easily if the write will be "degraded" or not. That
depends on details of the particular raid level and particular write
request.
This patch fixes a corruption issue of long standing and so it
suitable for any -stable kernel. It applied correctly to 3.0 at
least and will minor editing to earlier kernels.
Reported-by: Bill <billstuff2001@sbcglobal.net>
Tested-by: Bill <billstuff2001@sbcglobal.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/53A518BB.60709@sbcglobal.net
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 09869de57e upstream.
DM thinp already checks whether the discard_granularity of the data
device is a factor of the thin-pool block size. But when using the
dm-thin-pool's discard passdown support, DM thinp was not selecting the
max of the underlying data device's discard_granularity and the
thin-pool's block size.
Update set_discard_limits() to set discard_granularity to the max of
these values. This enables blkdev_issue_discard() to properly align the
discards that are sent to the DM thin device on a full block boundary.
As such each discard will now cover an entire DM thin-pool block and the
block will be reclaimed.
Reported-by: Zdenek Kabelac <zkabelac@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ac295a544 upstream.
Commit 8313b8e57f
md: fix problem when adding device to read-only array with bitmap.
added a called to md_reap_sync_thread() which cause a reshape thread
to be interrupted (in particular, it could cause md_thread() to never even
call md_do_sync()).
However it didn't set MD_RECOVERY_INTR so ->finish_reshape() would not
know that the reshape didn't complete.
This only happens when mddev->ro is set and normally reshape threads
don't run in that situation. But raid5 and raid10 can start a reshape
thread during "run" is the array is in the middle of a reshape.
They do this even if ->ro is set.
So it is best to set MD_RECOVERY_INTR before abortingg the
sync thread, just in case.
Though it rare for this to trigger a problem it can cause data corruption
because the reshape isn't finished properly.
So it is suitable for any stable which the offending commit was applied to.
(3.2 or later)
Fixes: 8313b8e57f
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3991b31ea0 upstream.
If mddev->ro is set, md_to_sync will (correctly) abort.
However in that case MD_RECOVERY_INTR isn't set.
If a RESHAPE had been requested, then ->finish_reshape() will be
called and it will think the reshape was successful even though
nothing happened.
Normally a resync will not be requested if ->ro is set, but if an
array is stopped while a reshape is on-going, then when the array is
started, the reshape will be restarted. If the array is also set
read-only at this point, the reshape will instantly appear to success,
resulting in data corruption.
Consequently, this patch is suitable for any -stable kernel.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f1daa838e8 upstream.
The DM cache target cannot cope with discards that span multiple cache
blocks, so each discard bio that spans more than one cache block must
get split by the DM core.
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 80c578930c upstream.
Commit 85ad643b ("dm thin: add timeout to stop out-of-data-space mode
holding IO forever") introduced a fixed 60 second timeout. Users may
want to either disable or modify this timeout.
Allow the out-of-data-space timeout to be configured using the
'no_space_timeout' dm-thin-pool module param. Setting it to 0 will
disable the timeout, resulting in IO being queued until more data space
is added to the thin-pool.
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 85ad643b7e upstream.
If the pool runs out of data space, dm-thin can be configured to
either error IOs that would trigger provisioning, or hold those IOs
until the pool is resized. Unfortunately, holding IOs until the pool is
resized can result in a cascade of tasks hitting the hung_task_timeout,
which may render the system unavailable.
Add a fixed timeout so IOs can only be held for a maximum of 60 seconds.
If LVM is going to resize a thin-pool that is out of data space it needs
to be prompt about it.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8d07e8a5f5 upstream.
Commit 3e1a0699 ("dm thin: fix out of data space handling") introduced
a regression in the metadata commit() method by returning an error if
the pool is in PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE mode. This oversight caused a thin
device to return errors even if the default queue_if_no_space ENOSPC
handling mode is used.
Fix commit() to only fail if pool is in PM_READ_ONLY or PM_FAIL mode.
Reported-by: qindehua@163.com
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 610f2de355 upstream.
The DM crypt target used per-cpu structures to hold pointers to a
ablkcipher_request structure. The code assumed that the work item keeps
executing on a single CPU, so it didn't use synchronization when
accessing this structure.
If a CPU is disabled by writing 0 to /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/online,
the work item could be moved to another CPU. This causes dm-crypt
crashes, like the following, because the code starts using an incorrect
ablkcipher_request:
smpboot: CPU 7 is now offline
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000130
IP: [<ffffffffa1862b3d>] crypt_convert+0x12d/0x3c0 [dm_crypt]
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa1864415>] ? kcryptd_crypt+0x305/0x470 [dm_crypt]
[<ffffffff81062060>] ? finish_task_switch+0x40/0xc0
[<ffffffff81052a28>] ? process_one_work+0x168/0x470
[<ffffffff8105366b>] ? worker_thread+0x10b/0x390
[<ffffffff81053560>] ? manage_workers.isra.26+0x290/0x290
[<ffffffff81058d9f>] ? kthread+0xaf/0xc0
[<ffffffff81058cf0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x120/0x120
[<ffffffff813464ac>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[<ffffffff81058cf0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x120/0x120
Fix this bug by removing the per-cpu definition. The structure
ablkcipher_request is accessed via a pointer from convert_context.
Consequently, if the work item is rescheduled to a different CPU, the
thread still uses the same ablkcipher_request.
This change may undermine performance improvements intended by commit
c0297721 ("dm crypt: scale to multiple cpus") on select hardware. In
practice no performance difference was observed on recent hardware. But
regardless, correctness is more important than performance.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f62fb220a upstream.
If an md array with externally managed metadata (e.g. DDF or IMSM)
is in use, then we should not set safemode==2 at shutdown because:
1/ this is ineffective: user-space need to be involved in any 'safemode' handling,
2/ The safemode management code doesn't cope with safemode==2 on external metadata
and md_check_recover enters an infinite loop.
Even at shutdown, an infinite-looping process can be problematic, so this
could cause shutdown to hang.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cc13b1d150 upstream.
wait_barrier() includes a counter, so we must call it precisely once
(unless balanced by allow_barrier()) for each request submitted.
Since
commit 20d0189b10
block: Introduce new bio_split()
in 3.14-rc1, we don't call it for the extra requests generated when
we need to split a bio.
When this happens the counter goes negative, any resync/recovery will
never start, and "mdadm --stop" will hang.
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Fixes: 20d0189b10
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 131cd131a9 upstream.
Commit 2ee57d5873 ("dm cache: add passthrough mode") inadvertently
removed the deferred set reference that was taken in cache_map()'s
writethrough mode support. Restore taking this reference.
This issue was found with code inspection.
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3a7745215e upstream.
Commit 003b5c5719 ("block: Convert drivers
to immutable biovecs") incorrectly converted biovec iteration in
dm-verity to always calculate the hash from a full biovec, but the
function only needs to calculate the hash from part of the biovec (up to
the calculated "todo" value).
Fix this issue by limiting hash input to only the requested data size.
This problem was identified using the cryptsetup regression test for
veritysetup (verity-compat-test).
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit da1aab3dca upstream.
When performing a user-request check/repair (MD_RECOVERY_REQUEST is set)
on a raid1, we allocate multiple bios each with their own set of pages.
If the page allocations for one bio fails, we currently do *not* free
the pages allocated for the previous bios, nor do we free the bio itself.
This patch frees all the already-allocate pages, and makes sure that
all the bios are freed as well.
This bug can cause a memory leak which can ultimately OOM a machine.
It was introduced in 3.10-rc1.
Fixes: a07876064a
Cc: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
Reported-by: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0596661f0a upstream.
When suspending a cache the policy is walked and the individual policy
hints written to the metadata via sync_metadata(). This led to this
lock order:
policy->lock
cache_metadata->root_lock
When loading the cache target the policy is populated while the metadata
lock is held:
cache_metadata->root_lock
policy->lock
Fix this potential lock-inversion (ABBA) deadlock in sync_metadata() by
ensuring the cache_metadata root_lock is held whilst all the hints are
written, rather than being repeatedly locked while policy->lock is held
(as was the case with each callout that policy_walk_mappings() made to
the old save_hint() method).
Found by turning on the CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING ("Lock debugging: prove
locking correctness") build option. However, it is not clear how the
LOCKDEP reported paths can lead to a deadlock since the two paths,
suspending a target and loading a target, never occur at the same time.
But that doesn't mean the same lock-inversion couldn't have occurred
elsewhere.
Reported-by: Marian Csontos <mcsontos@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fe76cd88e6 upstream.
If unable to ensure_next_mapping() we must add the current bio, which
was removed from the @bios list via bio_list_pop, back to the
deferred_bios list before all the remaining @bios.
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5a32083d03 upstream.
In theory copying the space map root can fail, but in practice it never
does because we're careful to check what size buffer is needed.
But make certain we're able to copy the space map roots before
locking the superblock.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a9d45396f5 upstream.
The persistent-data library used by dm-thin, dm-cache, etc is
transactional. If anything goes wrong, such as an io error when writing
new metadata or a power failure, then we roll back to the last
transaction.
Atomicity when committing a transaction is achieved by:
a) Never overwriting data from the previous transaction.
b) Writing the superblock last, after all other metadata has hit the
disk.
This commit and the following commit ("dm: take care to copy the space
map roots before locking the superblock") fix a bug associated with (b).
When committing it was possible for the superblock to still be written
in spite of an io error occurring during the preceeding metadata flush.
With these commits we're careful not to take the write lock out on the
superblock until after the metadata flush has completed.
Change the transaction manager's semantics for dm_tm_commit() to assume
all data has been flushed _before_ the single superblock that is passed
in.
As a prerequisite, split the block manager's block unlocking and
flushing by simplifying dm_bm_flush_and_unlock() to dm_bm_flush(). Now
the unlocking must be done separately.
This issue was discovered by forcing io errors at the crucial time
using dm-flakey.
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d132cc6d9e upstream.
If the discard block size is larger than the cache block size we will
not properly quiesce IO to a region that is about to be discarded. This
results in a race between a cache migration where no copy is needed, and
a write to an adjacent cache block that's within the same large discard
block.
Workaround this by limiting the discard_block_size to cache_block_size.
Also limit the max_discard_sectors to cache_block_size.
A more comprehensive fix that introduces range locking support in the
bio_prison and proper quiescing of a discard range that spans multiple
cache blocks is already in development.
Reported-by: Morgan Mears <Morgan.Mears@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In order to avoid wasting cache space a partial block at the end of the
origin device is not cached. Unfortunately, the check for such a
partial block at the end of the origin device was flawed.
Fix accesses beyond the end of the origin device that occured due to
attempted promotion of an undetected partial block by:
- initializing the per bio data struct to allow cache_end_io to work properly
- recognizing access to the partial block at the end of the origin device
- avoiding out of bounds access to the discard bitset
Otherwise, users can experience errors like the following:
attempt to access beyond end of device
dm-5: rw=0, want=20971520, limit=20971456
...
device-mapper: cache: promotion failed; couldn't copy block
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
During demotion or promotion to a cache's >2TB fast device we must not
truncate the cache block's associated sector to 32bits. The 32bit
temporary result of from_cblock() caused a 32bit multiplication when
calculating the sector of the fast device in issue_copy_real().
Use an intermediate 64bit type to store the 32bit from_cblock() to allow
for proper 64bit multiplication.
Here is an example of how this bug manifests on an ext4 filesystem:
EXT4-fs error (device dm-0): ext4_mb_generate_buddy:756: group 17136, 32768 clusters in bitmap, 30688 in gd; block bitmap corrupt.
JBD2: Spotted dirty metadata buffer (dev = dm-0, blocknr = 0). There's a risk of filesystem corruption in case of system crash.
Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
