Commit graph

17,584 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Andy Lutomirski
116d8eebbd fs/proc: Stop trying to report thread stacks
commit b18cb64ead upstream.

This reverts more of:

  b76437579d ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc/<pid>/maps")

... which was partially reverted by:

  65376df582 ("proc: revert /proc/<pid>/maps [stack:TID] annotation")

Originally, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps was the same as /proc/TID/maps.

In current kernels, /proc/PID/maps (or /proc/TID/maps even for
threads) shows "[stack]" for VMAs in the mm's stack address range.

In contrast, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps uses KSTK_ESP to guess the
target thread's stack's VMA.  This is racy, probably returns garbage
and, on arches with CONFIG_TASK_INFO_IN_THREAD=y, is also crash-prone:
KSTK_ESP is not safe to use on tasks that aren't known to be running
ordinary process-context kernel code.

This patch removes the difference and just shows "[stack]" for VMAs
in the mm's stack range.  This is IMO much more sensible -- the
actual "stack" address really is treated specially by the VM code,
and the current thread stack isn't even well-defined for programs
that frequently switch stacks on their own.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3e678474ec14e0a0ec34c611016753eea2e1b8ba.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Squash in the earlier commits 58cb65487e
 "proc/maps: make vm_is_stack() logic namespace-friendly" and 
 65376df582 "proc: revert /proc/<pid>/maps [stack:TID] annotation",
 which would introduce build failures if applied separately.]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-11-20 18:05:58 +00:00
Eric Biggers
4675fb410d ppp: remove the PPPIOCDETACH ioctl
commit af8d3c7c00 upstream.

The PPPIOCDETACH ioctl effectively tries to "close" the given ppp file
before f_count has reached 0, which is fundamentally a bad idea.  It
does check 'f_count < 2', which excludes concurrent operations on the
file since they would only be possible with a shared fd table, in which
case each fdget() would take a file reference.  However, it fails to
account for the fact that even with 'f_count == 1' the file can still be
linked into epoll instances.  As reported by syzbot, this can trivially
be used to cause a use-after-free.

Yet, the only known user of PPPIOCDETACH is pppd versions older than
ppp-2.4.2, which was released almost 15 years ago (November 2003).
Also, PPPIOCDETACH apparently stopped working reliably at around the
same time, when the f_count check was added to the kernel, e.g. see
https://lkml.org/lkml/2002/12/31/83.  Also, the current 'f_count < 2'
check makes PPPIOCDETACH only work in single-threaded applications; it
always fails if called from a multithreaded application.

All pppd versions released in the last 15 years just close() the file
descriptor instead.

Therefore, instead of hacking around this bug by exporting epoll
internals to modules, and probably missing other related bugs, just
remove the PPPIOCDETACH ioctl and see if anyone actually notices.  Leave
a stub in place that prints a one-time warning and returns EINVAL.

Reported-by: syzbot+16363c99d4134717c05b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Tested-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-21 08:46:19 +01:00
Kirill A. Shutemov
e4c2e72564 rmap: drop support of non-linear mappings
commit 27ba0644ea upstream.

We don't create non-linear mappings anymore.  Let's drop code which
handles them in rmap.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Deleted code is slightly different
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:51 +01:00
Kirill A. Shutemov
097f98edde mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation
commit c8d78c1823 upstream.

remap_file_pages(2) was invented to be able efficiently map parts of
huge file into limited 32-bit virtual address space such as in database
workloads.

Nonlinear mappings are pain to support and it seems there's no
legitimate use-cases nowadays since 64-bit systems are widely available.

Let's drop it and get rid of all these special-cased code.

The patch replaces the syscall with emulation which creates new VMA on
each remap_file_pages(), unless they it can be merged with an adjacent
one.

I didn't find *any* real code that uses remap_file_pages(2) to test
emulation impact on.  I've checked Debian code search and source of all
packages in ALT Linux.  No real users: libc wrappers, mentions in
strace, gdb, valgrind and this kind of stuff.

There are few basic tests in LTP for the syscall.  They work just fine
with emulation.

To test performance impact, I've written small test case which
demonstrate pretty much worst case scenario: map 4G shmfs file, write to
begin of every page pgoff of the page, remap pages in reverse order,
read every page.

The test creates 1 million of VMAs if emulation is in use, so I had to
set vm.max_map_count to 1100000 to avoid -ENOMEM.

Before:		23.3 ( +-  4.31% ) seconds
After:		43.9 ( +-  0.85% ) seconds
Slowdown:	1.88x

I believe we can live with that.

Test case:

        #define _GNU_SOURCE
        #include <assert.h>
        #include <stdlib.h>
        #include <stdio.h>
        #include <sys/mman.h>

        #define MB	(1024UL * 1024)
        #define SIZE	(4096 * MB)

        int main(int argc, char **argv)
        {
                unsigned long *p;
                long i, pass;

                for (pass = 0; pass < 10; pass++) {
                        p = mmap(NULL, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
                                        MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
                        if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
                                perror("mmap");
                                return -1;
                        }

                        for (i = 0; i < SIZE / 4096; i++)
                                p[i * 4096 / sizeof(*p)] = i;

                        for (i = 0; i < SIZE / 4096; i++) {
                                if (remap_file_pages(p + i * 4096 / sizeof(*p), 4096,
                                                0, (SIZE - 4096 * (i + 1)) >> 12, 0)) {
                                        perror("remap_file_pages");
                                        return -1;
                                }
                        }

                        for (i = SIZE / 4096 - 1; i >= 0; i--)
                                assert(p[i * 4096 / sizeof(*p)] == SIZE / 4096 - i - 1);

                        munmap(p, SIZE);
                }

                return 0;
        }

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix spello]
[sasha.levin@oracle.com: initialize populate before usage]
[sasha.levin@oracle.com: grab file ref to prevent race while mmaping]
Signed-off-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Armin Rigo <arigo@tunes.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Deleted code is slightly different
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:50 +01:00
Borislav Petkov
704a0bcfa8 Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups
commit dd0792699c upstream.

Fix some typos, improve formulations, end sentences with a fullstop.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:44 +01:00
Kees Cook
f8983158cf x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass
commit f21b53b20c upstream.

Unless explicitly opted out of, anything running under seccomp will have
SSB mitigations enabled. Choosing the "prctl" mode will disable this.

[ tglx: Adjusted it to the new arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate() mechanism ]

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:43 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
0b51874e29 prctl: Add force disable speculation
commit 356e4bfff2 upstream.

For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:42 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
4781d92a04 x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
commit a73ec77ee1 upstream.

Add prctl based control for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation and make it
the default mitigation for Intel and AMD.

Andi Kleen provided the following rationale (slightly redacted):

 There are multiple levels of impact of Speculative Store Bypass:

 1) JITed sandbox.
    It cannot invoke system calls, but can do PRIME+PROBE and may have call
    interfaces to other code

 2) Native code process.
    No protection inside the process at this level.

 3) Kernel.

 4) Between processes.

 The prctl tries to protect against case (1) doing attacks.

 If the untrusted code can do random system calls then control is already
 lost in a much worse way. So there needs to be system call protection in
 some way (using a JIT not allowing them or seccomp). Or rather if the
 process can subvert its environment somehow to do the prctl it can already
 execute arbitrary code, which is much worse than SSB.

 To put it differently, the point of the prctl is to not allow JITed code
 to read data it shouldn't read from its JITed sandbox. If it already has
 escaped its sandbox then it can already read everything it wants in its
 address space, and do much worse.

 The ability to control Speculative Store Bypass allows to enable the
 protection selectively without affecting overall system performance.

Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:41 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
883b3421d7 prctl: Add speculation control prctls
commit b617cfc858 upstream.

Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.

PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:

Bit  Define           Description
0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL    Mitigation can be controlled per task by
                      PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE   The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
                      disabled
2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE  The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
                      enabled

If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.

If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.

PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.

The common return values are:

EINVAL  prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
        arguments are not 0
ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature

PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:

ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO   prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled

The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.

Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Add the documentation directly under Documentation/ since there is
   no userspace-api subdirectory or reST index
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:41 +01:00
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
1cd7b5bcb3 x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation
commit 24f7fc83b9 upstream.

Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide
optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from
addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an
older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which
is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability.

Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such
speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows
them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example,
malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks
against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack.

As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command
line control knobs:

 nospec_store_bypass_disable
 spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on]

By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative
Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written
from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not.
The parameters are as follows:

 - auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation
	  of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate
	  mitigation.

 - on   - disable Speculative Store Bypass
 - off  - enable Speculative Store Bypass

[ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done
  	when the CPU does not support RDS ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Renumber the feature bit
 - Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:39 +01:00
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
65d362d590 x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass
commit c456442cd3 upstream.

Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except
show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores.

Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are
some Atoms and some Xeon Phi.

It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Renumber X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS
 - Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-10-03 04:09:39 +01:00
mulhern
aa224ff745 dm thin: fix documentation relative to low water mark threshold
commit 9b28a1102e upstream.

Fixes:
1. The use of "exceeds" when the opposite of exceeds, falls below,
was meant.
2. Properly speaking, a table can not exceed a threshold.

It emphasizes the important point, which is that it is the userspace
daemon's responsibility to check for low free space when a device
is resumed, since it won't get a special event indicating low free
space in that situation.

Signed-off-by: mulhern <amulhern@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-06-16 22:21:54 +01:00
Viresh Kumar
2e56ab2ee8 arm: spear13xx: Fix dmas cells
commit cdd1040991 upstream.

The "dmas" cells for the designware DMA controller need to have only 3
properties apart from the phandle: request line, src master and
destination master. But the commit 6e8887f60f updated it incorrectly
while moving from platform code to DT. Fix it.

Fixes: 6e8887f60f ("ARM: SPEAr13xx: Pass generic DW DMAC platform data from DT")
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-06-16 22:21:50 +01:00
Ernesto A. Fernández
48b6f1b4e0 ext4: correct documentation for grpid mount option
commit 9f0372488c upstream.

The grpid option is currently described as being the same as nogrpid.

Signed-off-by: Ernesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-06-16 22:21:50 +01:00
Josh Poimboeuf
cb4ea8a760 x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option
commit 12c69f1e94 upstream.

The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the
original pv indirect calls in place.

That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify
paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines.

As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much
other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel
vulnerable to Spectre v2.  It was probably a debug option from the early
paravirt days.  So just remove it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19 18:59:14 +00:00
Mark Rutland
daa41d548d Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
commit f84a56f73d upstream.

Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19 18:59:12 +00:00
zhenwei.pi
5938f6b9d2 x86/pti: Document fix wrong index
commit 98f0fceec7 upstream.

In section <2. Runtime Cost>, fix wrong index.

Signed-off-by: zhenwei.pi <zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516237492-27739-1-git-send-email-zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19 18:59:09 +00:00
David Woodhouse
c4ed1bad53 x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
commit da28512156 upstream.

Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect
branch speculation vulnerability.

Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms.
This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features.

The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation
control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a
serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature.

[ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS
  	integration becomes simple ]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19 18:59:07 +00:00
David Woodhouse
84f67d9e27 sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation
commit 9ecccfaa7c upstream.

Fixes: 87590ce6e ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19 18:59:04 +00:00
Thomas Gleixner
56e8e5a33f sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder
commit 87590ce6e3 upstream.

As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes
sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a
particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the
mitigation should be common as well.

Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for
meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2.

Allow architectures to override the show function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19 18:59:04 +00:00
Dave Hansen
63d893d87b x86/Documentation: Add PTI description
commit 01c9b17bf6 upstream.

Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides
are, and how to debug it when things go wrong.

Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-19 18:59:02 +00:00
Andrew F. Davis
8e80006b40 ASoC: cs42l56: Fix reset GPIO name in example DT binding
commit 8adc430603 upstream.

The binding states the reset GPIO property shall be named
"cirrus,gpio-nreset" and this is what the driver looks for,
but the example uses "gpio-reset". Fix this here.

Fixes: 3bb40619ac ("ASoC: cs42l56: bindings: sound: Add bindings for CS42L56 CODEC")

Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-02-13 18:42:19 +00:00
Borislav Petkov
58370efdb9 x86/kaiser: Check boottime cmdline params
AMD (and possibly other vendors) are not affected by the leak
KAISER is protecting against.

Keep the "nopti" for traditional reasons and add pti=<on|off|auto>
like upstream.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-09 00:35:17 +00:00
Borislav Petkov
4a86410f47 x86/kaiser: Rename and simplify X86_FEATURE_KAISER handling
Concentrate it in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c and use the upstream string "nopti".

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-09 00:35:17 +00:00
Hugh Dickins
5a322c0ca6 kaiser: add "nokaiser" boot option, using ALTERNATIVE
Added "nokaiser" boot option: an early param like "noinvpcid".
Most places now check int kaiser_enabled (#defined 0 when not
CONFIG_KAISER) instead of #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER; but entry_64.S
and entry_64_compat.S are using the ALTERNATIVE technique, which
patches in the preferred instructions at runtime.  That technique
is tied to x86 cpu features, so X86_FEATURE_KAISER fabricated
("" in its comment so "kaiser" not magicked into /proc/cpuinfo).

Prior to "nokaiser", Kaiser #defined _PAGE_GLOBAL 0: revert that,
but be careful with both _PAGE_GLOBAL and CR4.PGE: setting them when
nokaiser like when !CONFIG_KAISER, but not setting either when kaiser -
neither matters on its own, but it's hard to be sure that _PAGE_GLOBAL
won't get set in some obscure corner, or something add PGE into CR4.
By omitting _PAGE_GLOBAL from __supported_pte_mask when kaiser_enabled,
all page table setup which uses pte_pfn() masks it out of the ptes.

It's slightly shameful that the same declaration versus definition of
kaiser_enabled appears in not one, not two, but in three header files
(asm/kaiser.h, asm/pgtable.h, asm/tlbflush.h).  I felt safer that way,
than with #including any of those in any of the others; and did not
feel it worth an asm/kaiser_enabled.h - kernel/cpu/common.c includes
them all, so we shall hear about it if they get out of synch.

Cleanups while in the area: removed the silly #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER
from kaiser.c; removed the unused native_get_normal_pgd(); removed
the spurious reg clutter from SWITCH_*_CR3 macro stubs; corrected some
comments.  But more interestingly, set CR4.PSE in secondary_startup_64:
the manual is clear that it does not matter whether it's 0 or 1 when
4-level-pts are enabled, but I was distracted to find cr4 different on
BSP and auxiliaries - BSP alone was adding PSE, in probe_page_size_mask().

(cherry picked from Change-Id: I8e5bec716944444359cbd19f6729311eff943e9a)

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-09 00:35:15 +00:00
Andy Lutomirski
18daed7ec7 x86/mm: Add the 'nopcid' boot option to turn off PCID
commit 0790c9aad8 upstream.
The parameter is only present on x86_64 systems to save a few bytes,
as PCID is always disabled on x86_32.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8bbb2e65bcd249a5f18bfb8128b4689f08ac2b60.1498751203.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[Hugh Dickins: Backported to 3.18:
 - Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt (not in this tree)
 - Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt (patched instead of that)
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-09 00:35:12 +00:00
Andy Lutomirski
9372713cde x86/mm: Add a 'noinvpcid' boot option to turn off INVPCID
commit d12a72b844 upstream.

This adds a chicken bit to turn off INVPCID in case something goes
wrong.  It's an early_param() because we do TLB flushes before we
parse __setup() parameters.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f586317ed1bc2b87aee652267e515b90051af385.1454096309.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-09 00:35:08 +00:00
Dave Hansen
a9848c77ed x86/mm: New tunable for single vs full TLB flush
commit 2d040a1ce9 upstream.

Most of the logic here is in the documentation file.  Please take
a look at it.

I know we've come full-circle here back to a tunable, but this
new one is *WAY* simpler.  I challenge anyone to describe in one
sentence how the old one worked.  Here's the way the new one
works:

	If we are flushing more pages than the ceiling, we use
	the full flush, otherwise we use per-page flushes.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140731154101.12B52CAF@viggo.jf.intel.com
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2018-01-09 00:35:06 +00:00
Sakari Ailus
fa1cfd34ba media: docs-rst: v4l: Fix sink compose selection target documentation
commit 74dcb29a38 upstream.

The rectangle which the sink compose rectangle is related to is documented
to be the source compose bounds rectangle. This is in obvious conflict with
the ground rule of the format propagation (from sink to source). The reason
behind this is that this was always supposed to be the sink compose bounds
rectangle. Fix it.

Fixes: 955f645aea ("[media] v4l: Add subdev selections documentation")

Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-11-26 13:50:14 +00:00
Andrew Morton
8627b587a5 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE: fix some callsites
commit 0f989f749b upstream.

The patch "module: fix types of device tables aliases" newly requires that
invocations of

MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(type, name);

come *after* the definition of `name'.  That is reasonable, but some
drivers weren't doing this.  Fix them.

Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-11-11 13:33:42 +00:00
Zefan Li
d1cadb6597 cpuset: PF_SPREAD_PAGE and PF_SPREAD_SLAB should be atomic flags
commit 2ad654bc5e upstream.

When we change cpuset.memory_spread_{page,slab}, cpuset will flip
PF_SPREAD_{PAGE,SLAB} bit of tsk->flags for each task in that cpuset.
This should be done using atomic bitops, but currently we don't,
which is broken.

Tetsuo reported a hard-to-reproduce kernel crash on RHEL6, which happened
when one thread tried to clear PF_USED_MATH while at the same time another
thread tried to flip PF_SPREAD_PAGE/PF_SPREAD_SLAB. They both operate on
the same task.

Here's the full report:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/19/230

To fix this, we make PF_SPREAD_PAGE and PF_SPREAD_SLAB atomic flags.

v4:
- updated mm/slab.c. (Fengguang Wu)
- updated Documentation.

Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fixes: 950592f7b9 ("cpusets: update tasks' page/slab spread flags in time")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-10-12 15:28:22 +01:00
Wolfram Sang
d8811a7891 Documentation: DMA API: fix a typo in a function name
commit 6a08d83e43 upstream.

Correct the typo, the wrongly typed function does not exist.

Fixes: 6c9c6d6301 ("dma-debug: New interfaces to debug dma mapping errors")
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-10-12 15:27:44 +01:00
Hugh Dickins
978b8aa164 mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas
commit 1be7107fbe upstream.

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[Hugh Dickins: Backported to 3.16]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-07-02 17:13:02 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
843fd93d1e x86/platform/goldfish: Prevent unconditional loading
commit 47512cfd0d upstream.

The goldfish platform code registers the platform device unconditionally
which causes havoc in several ways if the goldfish_pdev_bus driver is
enabled:

 - Access to the hardcoded physical memory region, which is either not
   available or contains stuff which is completely unrelated.

 - Prevents that the interrupt of the serial port can be requested

 - In case of a spurious interrupt it goes into a infinite loop in the
   interrupt handler of the pdev_bus driver (which needs to be fixed
   seperately).

Add a 'goldfish' command line option to make the registration opt-in when
the platform is compiled in.

I'm seriously grumpy about this engineering trainwreck, which has seven
SOBs from Intel developers for 50 lines of code. And none of them figured
out that this is broken. Impressive fail!

Fixes: ddd70cf93d ("goldfish: platform device for x86")
Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-06-05 21:17:09 +01:00
Peter Rosin
0d5d98c4fc i2c: i2c-mux-gpio: rename i2c-gpio-mux to i2c-mux-gpio
commit 6b66a6f27e upstream.

The rename did the wrong thing for this documentation file all those
years ago. Fix that as well as the neglected rename of the platform
data structure.

Fixes: e7065e20d9 ("i2c: Rename last mux driver to standard pattern")
Signed-off-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-06-05 21:17:06 +01:00
Florian Westphal
07a365dd69 netlink: remove mmapped netlink support
commit d1b4c689d4 upstream.

mmapped netlink has a number of unresolved issues:

- TX zerocopy support had to be disabled more than a year ago via
  commit 4682a03586 ("netlink: Always copy on mmap TX.")
  because the content of the mmapped area can change after netlink
  attribute validation but before message processing.

- RX support was implemented mainly to speed up nfqueue dumping packet
  payload to userspace.  However, since commit ae08ce0021
  ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: zero copy support") we avoid one copy
  with the socket-based interface too (via the skb_zerocopy helper).

The other problem is that skbs attached to mmaped netlink socket
behave different from normal skbs:

- they don't have a shinfo area, so all functions that use skb_shinfo()
(e.g. skb_clone) cannot be used.

- reserving headroom prevents userspace from seeing the content as
it expects message to start at skb->head.
See for instance
commit aa3a022094 ("netlink: not trim skb for mmaped socket when dump").

- skbs handed e.g. to netlink_ack must have non-NULL skb->sk, else we
crash because it needs the sk to check if a tx ring is attached.

Also not obvious, leads to non-intuitive bug fixes such as 7c7bdf359
("netfilter: nfnetlink: use original skbuff when acking batches").

mmaped netlink also didn't play nicely with the skb_zerocopy helper
used by nfqueue and openvswitch.  Daniel Borkmann fixed this via
commit 6bb0fef489 ("netlink, mmap: fix edge-case leakages in nf queue
zero-copy")' but at the cost of also needing to provide remaining
length to the allocation function.

nfqueue also has problems when used with mmaped rx netlink:
- mmaped netlink doesn't allow use of nfqueue batch verdict messages.
  Problem is that in the mmap case, the allocation time also determines
  the ordering in which the frame will be seen by userspace (A
  allocating before B means that A is located in earlier ring slot,
  but this also means that B might get a lower sequence number then A
  since seqno is decided later.  To fix this we would need to extend the
  spinlocked region to also cover the allocation and message setup which
  isn't desirable.
- nfqueue can now be configured to queue large (GSO) skbs to userspace.
  Queing GSO packets is faster than having to force a software segmentation
  in the kernel, so this is a desirable option.  However, with a mmap based
  ring one has to use 64kb per ring slot element, else mmap has to fall back
  to the socket path (NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY) for all large packets.

To use the mmap interface, userspace not only has to probe for mmap netlink
support, it also has to implement a recv/socket receive path in order to
handle messages that exceed the size of an rx ring element.

Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA <chamaken@gmail.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: deleted code and documentation is different in places]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Shi Yuejie <shiyuejie@outlook.com>
2017-04-04 22:21:56 +01:00
Paul Mackerras
50bf72d08f KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Save/restore XER in checkpointed register state
commit 0d808df06a upstream.

When switching from/to a guest that has a transaction in progress,
we need to save/restore the checkpointed register state.  Although
XER is part of the CPU state that gets checkpointed, the code that
does this saving and restoring doesn't save/restore XER.

This fixes it by saving and restoring the XER.  To allow userspace
to read/write the checkpointed XER value, we also add a new ONE_REG
specifier.

The visible effect of this bug is that the guest may see its XER
value being corrupted when it uses transactions.

Fixes: e4e3812150 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add transactional memory support")
Fixes: 0a8eccefcb ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add missing code for transaction reclaim on guest exit")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context, spacing]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-03-16 02:26:24 +00:00
Vladimir Zapolskiy
8c4aa195a6 ARM: dts: imx31: fix clock control module interrupts description
commit 2e575cbc93 upstream.

The type of AVIC interrupt controller found on i.MX31 is one-cell,
namely 31 for CCM DVFS and 53 for CCM, however for clock control
module its interrupts are specified as 3-cells, fix it.

Fixes: ef0e4a606f ("ARM: mx31: Replace clk_register_clkdev with clock DT lookup")
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy <vz@mleia.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-03-16 02:26:18 +00:00
Eric W. Biederman
b71f455440 mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
commit d29216842a upstream.

CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.

    mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
    mount --make-rshared /
    for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done

Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.

As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.

Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:

> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.

So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000.  This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts.  Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.

For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.

Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Use ACCESS_ONCE() instead of READ_ONCE()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-02-26 20:01:48 +00:00
Jan Kara
50b070e822 fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inode
commit 31051c85b5 upstream.

inode_change_ok() will be resposible for clearing capabilities and IMA
extended attributes and as such will need dentry. Give it as an argument
to inode_change_ok() instead of an inode. Also rename inode_change_ok()
to setattr_prepare() to better relect that it does also some
modifications in addition to checks.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop changes to orangefs, overlayfs
 - Adjust filenames, context
 - In nfsd, pass dentry to nfsd_sanitize_attrs()
 - Update ext3 as well]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-02-23 03:53:52 +00:00
Ben Hutchings
1c608c2d1a Revert "fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inode"
This reverts commit be9df69943, which was
commit 31051c85b5 upstream.  The backport
breaks fuse and makes a mess of xfs, which can be improved by picking
further upstream commits as I should have done in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2017-02-23 03:53:52 +00:00
Jan Kara
be9df69943 fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inode
commit 31051c85b5 upstream.

inode_change_ok() will be resposible for clearing capabilities and IMA
extended attributes and as such will need dentry. Give it as an argument
to inode_change_ok() instead of an inode. Also rename inode_change_ok()
to setattr_prepare() to better relect that it does also some
modifications in addition to checks.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop changes to orangefs, overlayfs
 - Adjust filenames, context
 - In fuse, pass dentry to fuse_do_setattr()
 - In nfsd, pass dentry to nfsd_sanitize_attrs()
 - In xfs, pass dentry to xfs_setattr_nonsize() and xfs_setattr_size()
 - Update ext3 as well]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-11-20 01:17:38 +00:00
Ben Hutchings
2631a3bcb7 Documentation/module-signing.txt: Note need for version info if reusing a key
commit b8612e517c upstream.

Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else.  If a module signing key is used for
multiple ABI-incompatible kernels, the modules need to include enough
version information to distinguish them.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2016-11-20 01:16:58 +00:00
Wei Fang
926358013a scsi: fix race between simultaneous decrements of ->host_failed
commit 72d8c36ec3 upstream.

sas_ata_strategy_handler() adds the works of the ata error handler to
system_unbound_wq. This workqueue asynchronously runs work items, so the
ata error handler will be performed concurrently on different CPUs. In
this case, ->host_failed will be decreased simultaneously in
scsi_eh_finish_cmd() on different CPUs, and become abnormal.

It will lead to permanently inequality between ->host_failed and
->host_busy, and scsi error handler thread won't start running. IO
errors after that won't be handled.

Since all scmds must have been handled in the strategy handler, just
remove the decrement in scsi_eh_finish_cmd() and zero ->host_busy after
the strategy handler to fix this race.

Fixes: 50824d6c56 ("[SCSI] libsas: async ata-eh")
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-08-22 22:38:13 +01:00
Matt Ranostay
b72c1d07bc iio: proximity: as3935: correct IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW output
commit 5138806f16 upstream.

IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW was returning processed data which was incorrect.
This also adds the IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE value to convert to a processed value.

Signed-off-by: Matt Ranostay <mranostay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-08-22 22:38:11 +01:00
Geert Uytterhoeven
35d7cfb3d3 serial: doc: Re-add paragraph documenting uart_console_write()
commit d124fd3bb3 upstream.

Commit 834392a7d9 ("serial: doc: Un-document non-existing
uart_write_console()") removed a paragraph about a helper function that
seemed to never exist.

Peter Hurley pointed out that the function does exist, but is called
differently. Re-add the paragraph, with the function name corrected.

Fixes: 834392a7d9 ("serial: doc: Un-document non-existing uart_write_console()")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-08-22 22:37:50 +01:00
Geert Uytterhoeven
d5b2f304a7 serial: doc: Un-document non-existing uart_write_console()
commit 834392a7d9 upstream.

uart_write_console() never existed, not even when the "new
uart_write_console function" was documented.

Fixes: 67ab7f596b ("[SERIAL] Update serial driver documentation")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-08-22 22:37:48 +01:00
Hans de Goede
4bba2ce7c1 USB: uas: Add a new NO_REPORT_LUNS quirk
commit 1363074667 upstream.

Add a new NO_REPORT_LUNS quirk and set it for Seagate drives with
an usb-id of: 0bc2:331a, as these will fail to respond to a
REPORT_LUNS command.

Reported-and-tested-by: David Webb <djw@noc.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
2016-06-15 21:29:23 +01:00
Peter Jones
a3c70636ed efi: Make efivarfs entries immutable by default
commit ed8b0de5a3 upstream.

"rm -rf" is bricking some peoples' laptops because of variables being
used to store non-reinitializable firmware driver data that's required
to POST the hardware.

These are 100% bugs, and they need to be fixed, but in the mean time it
shouldn't be easy to *accidentally* brick machines.

We have to have delete working, and picking which variables do and don't
work for deletion is quite intractable, so instead make everything
immutable by default (except for a whitelist), and make tools that
aren't quite so broad-spectrum unset the immutable flag.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
  - use mutex_lock/unlock() instead of inode_lock/unlock()
  - use root->d_inode instead of d_inode()  ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
2016-03-24 10:01:20 +00:00
Hangbin Liu
efd019f933 net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit
commit 8013d1d7ea upstream.

Commit 6fd99094de ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface")
disabled accept hop limit from RA if it is smaller than the current hop
limit for security stuff. But this behavior kind of break the RFC definition.

RFC 4861, 6.3.4.  Processing Received Router Advertisements
   A Router Advertisement field (e.g., Cur Hop Limit, Reachable Time,
   and Retrans Timer) may contain a value denoting that it is
   unspecified.  In such cases, the parameter should be ignored and the
   host should continue using whatever value it is already using.

   If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set
   its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

So add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit to let user choose the minimum
hop limit value they can accept from RA. And set default to 1 to meet RFC
standards.

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[ luis: backported to 3.16:
  - added missing DEVCONF_* as suggested by Yoshfuji so that uapi contains
    the same values as mainline
  - adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
2016-03-24 09:59:05 +00:00