commit 3c79107631 upstream.
else, we leak the addresses to userspace via ctnetlink events
and dumps.
Compute an ID on demand based on the immutable parts of nf_conn struct.
Another advantage compared to using an address is that there is no
immediate re-use of the same ID in case the conntrack entry is freed and
reallocated again immediately.
Fixes: 3583240249 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_expect: kill unique ID")
Fixes: 7f85f91472 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: kill unique ID")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Include <net/netns/hash.h> in nf_conntrack_core.c
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit df453700e8 upstream.
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 5a352dd0a3 upstream.
As namespaces are sometimes used with overlapping ip address ranges,
we should also use the namespace as input to the hash to select the ip
fragmentation counter bucket.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Flavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 926a882f69 upstream.
The socket parameter might legally be NULL, thus sock_net is sometimes
causing a NULL pointer dereference. Using net_device pointer in dst_entry
is more reliable.
Fixes: b6a7719aed ("ipv4: hash net ptr into fragmentation bucket selection")
Reported-by: Rick Jones <rick.jones2@hp.com>
Cc: Rick Jones <rick.jones2@hp.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit b6a7719aed upstream.
As namespaces are sometimes used with overlapping ip address ranges,
we should also use the namespace as input to the hash to select the ip
fragmentation counter bucket.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Flavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 8e199dfd82 upstream.
Matt Grant reported frequent crashes in ipv6_select_ident when
udp6_ufo_fragment is called from openvswitch on a skb that doesn't
have a dst_entry set.
ipv6_proxy_select_ident generates the frag_id without using the dst
associated with the skb. This approach was suggested by Vladislav
Yasevich.
Fixes: 0508c07f5e ("ipv6: Select fragment id during UFO segmentation if not set.")
Cc: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Matt Grant <matt@mattgrant.net.nz>
Tested-by: Matt Grant <matt@mattgrant.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 8381eacf5c upstream.
Make __ipv6_select_ident() static as it isn't used outside
the file.
Fixes: 0508c07f5e (ipv6: Select fragment id during UFO segmentation if not set.)
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 51f30770e5 upstream.
Recent commit:
0508c07f5e
Author: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Feb 3 16:36:15 2015 -0500
ipv6: Select fragment id during UFO segmentation if not set.
Introduced a bug on LE in how ipv6 fragment id is assigned.
This was cought by nightly sparce check:
Resolve the following sparce error:
net/ipv6/output_core.c:57:38: sparse: incorrect type in assignment
(different base types)
net/ipv6/output_core.c:57:38: expected restricted __be32
[usertype] ip6_frag_id
net/ipv6/output_core.c:57:38: got unsigned int [unsigned]
[assigned] [usertype] id
Fixes: 0508c07f5e (ipv6: Select fragment id during UFO segmentation if not set.)
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 0508c07f5e upstream.
If the IPv6 fragment id has not been set and we perform
fragmentation due to UFO, select a new fragment id.
We now consider a fragment id of 0 as unset and if id selection
process returns 0 (after all the pertrubations), we set it to
0x80000000, thus giving us ample space not to create collisions
with the next packet we may have to fragment.
When doing UFO integrity checking, we also select the
fragment id if it has not be set yet. This is stored into
the skb_shinfo() thus allowing UFO to function correclty.
This patch also removes duplicate fragment id generation code
and moves ipv6_select_ident() into the header as it may be
used during GSO.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
This reverts commit 8b197d3ce5, which
was a stable-specific improvement to IP ID selection. I will apply
the upstream changes instead.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 486efdc8f6 upstream.
Packet sockets in datagram mode take a destination address. Verify its
length before passing to dev_hard_header.
Prior to 2.6.14-rc3, the send code ignored sll_halen. This is
established behavior. Directly compare msg_namelen to dev->addr_len.
Change v1->v2: initialize addr in all paths
Fixes: 6b8d95f179 ("packet: validate address length if non-zero")
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit b2cf86e156 upstream.
Packet send checks that msg_name is at least sizeof sockaddr_ll.
Packet recv must return at least this length, so that its output
can be passed unmodified to packet send.
This ceased to be true since adding support for lladdr longer than
sll_addr. Since, the return value uses true address length.
Always return at least sizeof sockaddr_ll, even if address length
is shorter. Zero the padding bytes.
Change v1->v2: do not overwrite zeroed padding again. use copy_len.
Fixes: 0fb375fb9b ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for > 8 byte hardware addresses.")
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 95c169251b upstream.
A request for a flowlabel fails in process or user exclusive mode must
fail if the caller pid or uid does not match. Invert the test.
Previously, the test was unsafe wrt PID recycling, but indeed tested
for inequality: fl1->owner != fl->owner
Fixes: 4f82f45730 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid* and kuid_t")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit c1c4772178 upstream.
Canonical way to fetch sk_user_data from an encap_rcv() handler called
from UDP stack in rcu protected section is to use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(),
otherwise compiler might read it multiple times.
Fixes: d00fa9adc5 ("il2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 5178791474 upstream.
We need to dereference the directory to get its parent to
be able to rename it, so it's clearly not safe to try to
do this with ERR_PTR() pointers. Skip in this case.
It seems that this is most likely what was causing the
report by syzbot, but I'm not entirely sure as it didn't
come with a reproducer this time.
Reported-by: syzbot+4ece1a28b8f4730547c9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 7caa56f006 upstream.
It means userspace gave us a ruleset where there is some other
data after the ebtables target but before the beginning of the next rule.
Fixes: 81e675c227 ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Reported-by: syzbot+659574e7bcc7f7eb4df7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 4bcd4ec101 upstream.
We find that sysctl_tipc_rmem and named_timeout do not have the right minimum
setting. sysctl_tipc_rmem should be larger than zero, like sysctl_tcp_rmem.
And named_timeout as a timeout setting should be not less than zero.
Fixes: cc79dd1ba9 ("tipc: change socket buffer overflow control to respect sk_rcvbuf")
Fixes: a5325ae5b8 ("tipc: add name distributor resiliency queue")
Signed-off-by: Jie Liu <liujie165@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Qiang Ning <ningqiang1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: only the tipc_rmem sysctl exists here]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit c5b493ce19 upstream.
br_multicast_start_querier() walks over the port list but it can be
called from a timer with only multicast_lock held which doesn't protect
the port list, so use RCU to walk over it.
Fixes: c83b8fab06 ("bridge: Restart queries when last querier expires")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit d58431eacb upstream.
A recent commit added a call to cache_fresh_locked()
when an expired item was found.
The call sets the CACHE_VALID flag, so it is important
that the item actually is valid.
There are two ways it could be valid:
1/ If ->update has been called to fill in relevant content
2/ if CACHE_NEGATIVE is set, to say that content doesn't exist.
An expired item that is waiting for an update will be neither.
Setting CACHE_VALID will mean that a subsequent call to cache_put()
will be likely to dereference uninitialised pointers.
So we must make sure the item is valid, and we already have code to do
that in try_to_negate_entry(). This takes the hash lock and so cannot
be used directly, so take out the two lines that we need and use them.
Now cache_fresh_locked() is certain to be called only on
a valid item.
Fixes: 4ecd55ea07 ("sunrpc: fix cache_head leak due to queued request")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 8742dc86d0 upstream.
We currently don't reload pointers pointing into skb header
after doing pskb_may_pull() in _decode_session4(). So in case
pskb_may_pull() changed the pointers, we read from random
memory. Fix this by putting all the needed infos on the
stack, so that we don't need to access the header pointers
after doing pskb_may_pull().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit ea673a4d3a upstream.
A call to pskb_may_pull may change the pointers into the packet,
so reload the pointers after the call.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 1a14f1e555 upstream.
We skip the header informations if the data pointer points
already behind the header in question for some protocols.
This is because we call pskb_may_pull with a negative value
converted to unsigened int from pskb_may_pull in this case.
Skipping the header informations can lead to incorrect policy
lookups, so fix it by a check of the data pointer position
before we call pskb_may_pull.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 1d3ff0950e upstream.
If dccp_feat_push_change fails, we forget free the mem
which is alloced by kmemdup in dccp_feat_clone_sp_val.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: e8ef967a54 ("dccp: Registration routines for changing feature values")
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit f131a56880 upstream.
The batadv_hash_remove is a function which searches the hashtable for an
entry using a needle, a hashtable bucket selection function and a compare
function. It will lock the bucket list and delete an entry when the compare
function matches it with the needle. It returns the pointer to the
hlist_node which matches or NULL when no entry matches the needle.
The batadv_tt_global_free is not itself protected in anyway to avoid that
any other function is modifying the hashtable between the search for the
entry and the call to batadv_hash_remove. It can therefore happen that the
entry either doesn't exist anymore or an entry was deleted which is not the
same object as the needle. In such an situation, the reference counter (for
the reference stored in the hashtable) must not be reduced for the needle.
Instead the reference counter of the actually removed entry has to be
reduced.
Otherwise the reference counter will underflow and the object might be
freed before all its references were dropped. The kref helpers reported
this problem as:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
Fixes: 7683fdc1e8 ("batman-adv: protect the local and the global trans-tables with rcu")
Reported-by: Martin Weinelt <martin@linuxlounge.net>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 3d65b9acca upstream.
The batadv_hash_remove is a function which searches the hashtable for an
entry using a needle, a hashtable bucket selection function and a compare
function. It will lock the bucket list and delete an entry when the compare
function matches it with the needle. It returns the pointer to the
hlist_node which matches or NULL when no entry matches the needle.
The batadv_tt_local_remove is not itself protected in anyway to avoid that
any other function is modifying the hashtable between the search for the
entry and the call to batadv_hash_remove. It can therefore happen that the
entry either doesn't exist anymore or an entry was deleted which is not the
same object as the needle. In such an situation, the reference counter (for
the reference stored in the hashtable) must not be reduced for the needle.
Instead the reference counter of the actually removed entry has to be
reduced.
Otherwise the reference counter will underflow and the object might be
freed before all its references were dropped. The kref helpers reported
this problem as:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
Fixes: ef72706a05 ("batman-adv: protect tt_local_entry from concurrent delete events")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 4ba104f468 upstream.
The batadv_hash_remove is a function which searches the hashtable for an
entry using a needle, a hashtable bucket selection function and a compare
function. It will lock the bucket list and delete an entry when the compare
function matches it with the needle. It returns the pointer to the
hlist_node which matches or NULL when no entry matches the needle.
The batadv_bla_del_claim is not itself protected in anyway to avoid that
any other function is modifying the hashtable between the search for the
entry and the call to batadv_hash_remove. It can therefore happen that the
entry either doesn't exist anymore or an entry was deleted which is not the
same object as the needle. In such an situation, the reference counter (for
the reference stored in the hashtable) must not be reduced for the needle.
Instead the reference counter of the actually removed entry has to be
reduced.
Otherwise the reference counter will underflow and the object might be
freed before all its references were dropped. The kref helpers reported
this problem as:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
Fixes: 23721387c4 ("batman-adv: add basic bridge loop avoidance code")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: keep using batadv_claim_free_ref()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit e0aa67709f upstream.
When a dual stack dccp listener accepts an ipv4 flow,
it should not attempt to use an ipv6 header or
inet6_iif() helper.
Fixes: 3df80d9320 ("[DCCP]: Introduce DCCPv6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 89e4130939 upstream.
When a dual stack tcp listener accepts an ipv4 flow,
it should not attempt to use an ipv6 header or tcp_v6_iif() helper.
Fixes: 1397ed35f2 ("ipv6: add flowinfo for tcp6 pkt_options for all cases")
Fixes: df3687ffc6 ("ipv6: add the IPV6_FL_F_REFLECT flag to IPV6_FL_A_GET")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit a3e23f719f upstream.
In netdev_queue_add_kobject and rx_queue_add_kobject,
if sysfs_create_group failed, kobject_put will call
netdev_queue_release to decrease dev refcont, however
dev_hold has not be called. So we will see this while
unregistering dev:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for bcsh0 to become free. Usage count = -1
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: d0d6683716 ("net: don't decrement kobj reference count on init failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit e166e4fdac upstream.
Since Commit 21d1196a35 ("ipv4: set transport header earlier"),
skb->transport_header has been always set before entering INET
netfilter. This patch is to set skb->transport_header for bridge
before entering INET netfilter by bridge-nf-call-iptables.
It also fixes an issue that sctp_error() couldn't compute a right
csum due to unset skb->transport_header.
Fixes: e6d8b64b34 ("net: sctp: fix and consolidate SCTP checksumming code")
Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 6ee02a54ef upstream.
When unloading xfrm6_tunnel module, xfrm6_tunnel_fini directly
frees the xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem. Maybe someone has gotten the
xfrm6_tunnel_spi, so need to wait it.
Fixes: 91cc3bb0b04ff("xfrm6_tunnel: RCU conversion")
Signed-off-by: Su Yanjun <suyj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit b805d78d30 upstream.
UBSAN report this:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289:24
index 6 is out of range for type 'unsigned int [6]'
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.4.162-514.55.6.9.x86_64+ #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
0000000000000000 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffff8801f6b07a58 ffffffff81cb35f4
0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff83230f9c ffffffff81cb34e0 ffff8801f6b07a80
ffff8801f6b07a20 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffffffff851706e0 ffff8801f6b07ae8
Call Trace:
<IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
<IRQ> [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] dump_stack+0x114/0x1a0 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff81d94225>] ubsan_epilogue+0x12/0x8f lib/ubsan.c:164
[<ffffffff81d954db>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x16e/0x1b2 lib/ubsan.c:382
[<ffffffff82a25acd>] __xfrm_policy_unlink+0x3dd/0x5b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289
[<ffffffff82a2e572>] xfrm_policy_delete+0x52/0xb0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1309
[<ffffffff82a3319b>] xfrm_policy_timer+0x30b/0x590 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:243
[<ffffffff813d3927>] call_timer_fn+0x237/0x990 kernel/time/timer.c:1144
[<ffffffff813d8e7e>] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1218 [inline]
[<ffffffff813d8e7e>] run_timer_softirq+0x6ce/0xb80 kernel/time/timer.c:1401
[<ffffffff8120d6f9>] __do_softirq+0x299/0xe10 kernel/softirq.c:273
[<ffffffff8120e676>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:350 [inline]
[<ffffffff8120e676>] irq_exit+0x216/0x2c0 kernel/softirq.c:391
[<ffffffff82c5edab>] exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:652 [inline]
[<ffffffff82c5edab>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8b/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:926
[<ffffffff82c5c985>] apic_timer_interrupt+0xa5/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:735
<EOI> [<ffffffff81188096>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:52
[<ffffffff810834d7>] arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:111 [inline]
[<ffffffff810834d7>] default_idle+0x27/0x430 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:446
[<ffffffff81085f05>] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:437
[<ffffffff8132abc3>] default_idle_call+0x53/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:92
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:156 [inline]
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_idle_loop kernel/sched/idle.c:251 [inline]
[<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_startup_entry+0x60d/0x9a0 kernel/sched/idle.c:299
[<ffffffff8113e119>] start_secondary+0x3c9/0x560 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:245
The issue is triggered as this:
xfrm_add_policy
-->verify_newpolicy_info //check the index provided by user with XFRM_POLICY_MAX
//In my case, the index is 0x6E6BB6, so it pass the check.
-->xfrm_policy_construct //copy the user's policy and set xfrm_policy_timer
-->xfrm_policy_insert
--> __xfrm_policy_link //use the orgin dir, in my case is 2
--> xfrm_gen_index //generate policy index, there is 0x6E6BB6
then xfrm_policy_timer be fired
xfrm_policy_timer
--> xfrm_policy_id2dir //get dir from (policy index & 7), in my case is 6
--> xfrm_policy_delete
--> __xfrm_policy_unlink //access policy_count[dir], trigger out of range access
Add xfrm_policy_id2dir check in verify_newpolicy_info, make sure the computed dir is
valid, to fix the issue.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: e682adf021 ("xfrm: Try to honor policy index if it's supplied by user")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 99253eb750 upstream.
Commit 5e1859fbcc ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 355b985537 upstream.
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162a ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit b6653b3629 upstream.
tcp_fragment() might be called for skbs in the write queue.
Memory limits might have been exceeded because tcp_sendmsg() only
checks limits at full skb (64KB) boundaries.
Therefore, we need to make sure tcp_fragment() wont punish applications
that might have setup very low SO_SNDBUF values.
Fixes: f070ef2ac6 ("tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit ee60ad219f upstream.
The race occurs in __mkroute_output() when 2 threads lookup a dst:
CPU A CPU B
find_exception()
find_exception() [fnhe expires]
ip_del_fnhe() [fnhe is deleted]
rt_bind_exception()
In rt_bind_exception() it will bind a deleted fnhe with the new dst, and
this dst will get no chance to be freed. It causes a dev defcnt leak and
consecutive dmesg warnings:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for ethX to become free. Usage count = 1
Especially thanks Jon to identify the issue.
This patch fixes it by setting fnhe_daddr to 0 in ip_del_fnhe() to stop
binding the deleted fnhe with a new dst when checking fnhe's fnhe_daddr
and daddr in rt_bind_exception().
It works as both ip_del_fnhe() and rt_bind_exception() are protected by
fnhe_lock and the fhne is freed by kfree_rcu().
Fixes: deed49df73 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route")
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 87c11f1ddb upstream.
Similar to commit 44f49dd8b5 ("ipmr: fix possible race resulting from
improper usage of IP_INC_STATS_BH() in preemptible context."), we cannot
assume preemption is disabled when incrementing the counter and
accessing a per-CPU variable.
Preemption can be enabled when we add a route in process context that
corresponds to packets stored in the unresolved queue, which are then
forwarded using this route [1].
Fix this by using IP6_INC_STATS() which takes care of disabling
preemption on architectures where it is needed.
[1]
[ 157.451447] BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: smcrouted/2314
[ 157.460409] caller is ip6mr_forward2+0x73e/0x10e0
[ 157.460434] CPU: 3 PID: 2314 Comm: smcrouted Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7-custom-03635-g22f2712113f1 #1336
[ 157.460449] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN2100-CB2FO/SA001017, BIOS 5.6.5 06/07/2016
[ 157.460461] Call Trace:
[ 157.460486] dump_stack+0xf9/0x1be
[ 157.460553] check_preemption_disabled+0x1d6/0x200
[ 157.460576] ip6mr_forward2+0x73e/0x10e0
[ 157.460705] ip6_mr_forward+0x9a0/0x1510
[ 157.460771] ip6mr_mfc_add+0x16b3/0x1e00
[ 157.461155] ip6_mroute_setsockopt+0x3cb/0x13c0
[ 157.461384] do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.8+0x348/0x4060
[ 157.462013] ipv6_setsockopt+0x90/0x110
[ 157.462036] rawv6_setsockopt+0x4a/0x120
[ 157.462058] __sys_setsockopt+0x16b/0x340
[ 157.462198] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbf/0x160
[ 157.462220] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x610
[ 157.462349] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: 0912ea38de ("[IPV6] MROUTE: Add stats in multicast routing module method ip6_mr_forward().")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Amit Cohen <amitc@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 967c05aee4 upstream.
If mtu probing is enabled tcp_mtu_probing() could very well end up
with a too small MSS.
Use the new sysctl tcp_min_snd_mss to make sure MSS search
is performed in an acceptable range.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport for context changes in 4.9.168]
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: The sysctl is global]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 5f3e2bf008 upstream.
Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.
This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.
Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.
In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.
We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.
Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f1 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.
We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport for context changes in 4.9.168]
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Make the sysctl global, consistent with
net.ipv4.tcp_base_mss]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit f070ef2ac6 upstream.
Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.
TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.
A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.
Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.
CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
socket is already using more than half the allowed space
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Adjust context for backport to 4.9.168]
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 3b4929f65b upstream.
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :
BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48
An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.
This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.
Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.
CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
Backport notes, provided by Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
v4.15 or since commit 737ff31456 ("tcp: use sequence distance to
detect reordering") had switched from the packet-based FACK tracking and
switched to sequence-based.
v4.14 and older still have the old logic and hence on
tcp_skb_shift_data() needs to retain its original logic and have
@fack_count in sync. In other words, we keep the increment of pcount with
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) to later used that to update fack_count. To make it
more explicit we track the new skb that gets incremented to pcount in
@next_pcount, and we get to avoid the constant invocation of
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) all together.
Fixes: 832d11c5cd ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Adjust for context changes to backport to
4.9.168]
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit a1616a5ac9 upstream.
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit caa415270c upstream.
nh_exceptions is effectively used under rcu, but lacks proper
barriers. Between kzalloc() and setting of nh->nh_exceptions(),
we need a proper memory barrier.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 4895c771c7 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Commit 355b985537 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
