commit a1616a5ac9 upstream.
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit af3d5d1c87 upstream.
When doing option parsing for standard type values of 1, 2 or 4 octets,
the value is converted directly into a variable instead of a pointer. To
avoid being tricked into being a pointer, check that for these option
types that sizes actually match. In L2CAP every option is fixed size and
thus it is prudent anyway to ensure that the remote side sends us the
right option size along with option paramters.
If the option size is not matching the option type, then that option is
silently ignored. It is a protocol violation and instead of trying to
give the remote attacker any further hints just pretend that option is
not present and proceed with the default values. Implementation
following the specification and its qualification procedures will always
use the correct size and thus not being impacted here.
To keep the code readable and consistent accross all options, a few
cosmetic changes were also required.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 7c9cbd0b5e upstream.
The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len
as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user
and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the
actual packet.
To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that
the resulting len calculation after calling l2cap_get_conf_opt is not
below zero. A well formed packet will always return >= 0 here and will
end with the length value being zero after the last option has been
parsed. In case of malformed packets messing with the opt->len field the
length value will become negative. If that is the case, then just abort
and ignore the option.
In case an attacker uses a too short opt->len value, then garbage will
be parsed, but that is protected by the unknown option handling and also
the option parameter size checks.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 7992c18810 upstream.
CVE-2018-9363
The buffer length is unsigned at all layers, but gets cast to int and
checked in hidp_process_report and can lead to a buffer overflow.
Switch len parameter to unsigned int to resolve issue.
This affects 3.18 and newer kernels.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Fixes: a4b1b5877b ("HID: Bluetooth: hidp: make sure input buffers are big enough")
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 51bda2bca5 upstream.
it's OK after we'd verified the sockets, but not before that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 06e7e776ca upstream.
In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:
struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...
The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).
This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 71bb99a02b upstream.
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 96c26653ce upstream.
... rather than relying on ciptool(8) never passing it anything else. Give
it e.g. an AF_UNIX connected socket (from socketpair(2)) and it'll oops,
trying to evaluate &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit e860d2c904 upstream.
Validate the output buffer length for L2CAP config requests and responses
to avoid overflowing the stack buffer used for building the option blocks.
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 329d823098 upstream.
This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of
MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing
attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the
complexity, some other type of attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop inapplicable changes
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit ab89f0bdd6 upstream.
Running 32bit userspace on 64bit kernel results in MSG_CMSG_COMPAT being
defined as 0x80000000. This results in sendmsg failure if used from 32bit
userspace running on 64bit kernel. Fix this by accounting for MSG_CMSG_COMPAT
in flags check in hci_sock_sendmsg.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
Signed-off-by: Marko Kiiskila <marko@runtime.io>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 951b6a0717 upstream.
addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.
Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 23bc6ab0a0 upstream.
When we retrieve imtu value from userspace we should use 16 bit pointer
cast instead of 32 as it's defined that way in headers. Fixes setsockopt
calls on big-endian platforms.
Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński <amadeusz.slawinski@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 660f0fc07d upstream.
The HIDP specs define an idle-timeout which automatically disconnects a
device. This has always been implemented in the HIDP layer and forced a
synchronous shutdown of the hidp-scheduler. This works just fine, but
lacks a forced disconnect on the underlying l2cap channels. This has been
broken since:
commit 5205185d46
Author: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Date: Sat Apr 6 20:28:47 2013 +0200
Bluetooth: hidp: remove old session-management
The old session-management always forced an l2cap error on the ctrl/intr
channels when shutting down. The new session-management skips this, as we
don't want to enforce channel policy on the caller. In other words, if
user-space removes an HIDP device, the underlying channels (which are
*owned* and *referenced* by user-space) are still left active. User-space
needs to call shutdown(2) or close(2) to release them.
Unfortunately, this does not work with idle-timeouts. There is no way to
signal user-space that the HIDP layer has been stopped. The API simply
does not support any event-passing except for poll(2). Hence, we restore
old behavior and force EUNATCH on the sockets if the HIDP layer is
disconnected due to idle-timeouts (behavior of explicit disconnects
remains unmodified). User-space can still call
getsockopt(..., SO_ERROR, ...)
..to retrieve the EUNATCH error and clear sk_err. Hence, the channels can
still be re-used (which nobody does so far, though). Therefore, the API
still supports the new behavior, but with this patch it's also compatible
to the old implicit channel shutdown.
Reported-by: Mark Haun <haunma@keteu.org>
Reported-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
commit 980ffc0a2c upstream.
The le_conn_timeout() may call hci_le_conn_failed() which in turn may
call hci_conn_del(). Trying to use the _sync variant for cancelling the
conn timeout from hci_conn_del() could therefore result in a deadlock.
This patch converts hci_conn_del() to use the non-sync variant so the
deadlock is not possible.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
commit 5eb596f55c upstream.
We can only determine the final security level when both pairing request
and response have been exchanged. When initiating pairing the starting
target security level is set to MEDIUM unless explicitly specified to be
HIGH, so that we can still perform pairing even if the remote doesn't
have MITM capabilities. However, once we've received the pairing
response we should re-consult the remote and local IO capabilities and
upgrade the target security level if necessary.
Without this patch the resulting Long Term Key will occasionally be
reported to be unauthenticated when it in reality is an authenticated
one.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 72c6fb915f upstream.
The l2cap_create_le_flowctl_pdu() function that l2cap_segment_le_sdu()
calls is perfectly capable of doing packet fragmentation if given bigger
PDUs than the HCI buffers allow. Forcing the PDU length based on the HCI
MTU (conn->mtu) would therefore needlessly strict operation on hardware
with limited LE buffers (e.g. both Intel and Broadcom seem to have this
set to just 27 bytes).
This patch removes the restriction and makes it possible to send PDUs of
the full length that the remote MPS value allows.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 32333edb82 upstream.
The commits 08c30aca9e "Bluetooth: Remove
RFCOMM session refcnt" and 8ff52f7d04
"Bluetooth: Return RFCOMM session ptrs to avoid freed session"
allow rfcomm_recv_ua and rfcomm_session_close to delete the session
(and free the corresponding socket) and propagate NULL session pointer
to the upper callers.
Additional fix is required to terminate the loop in rfcomm_process_rx
function to avoid use of freed 'sk' memory.
The issue is only reproducible with kernel option CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING
enabled making freed memory being changed and filled up with fixed char
value used to unmask use-after-free issues.
Signed-off-by: Vignesh Raman <Vignesh_Raman@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuzmichev <Vitaly_Kuzmichev@mentor.com>
Acked-by: Dean Jenkins <Dean_Jenkins@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9f743d7499 upstream.
Commit 6c53823ae0 reshuffled the way the
authentication requirement gets set in the hci_io_capa_request_evt()
function, but at the same time it failed to update an if-statement where
cp.authentication is used before it has been initialized. The correct
value the code should be looking for in this if-statement is
conn->auth_type.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6c53823ae0 upstream.
When we need to make the decision whether to perform just-works or real
user confirmation we need to know the exact local authentication
requirement that was passed to the controller. So far conn->auth_type
(the local requirement) wasn't in one case updated appropriately in fear
of the user confirmation being rejected later.
The real problem however was not really that conn->auth_type couldn't
represent the true value but that we were checking the local MITM
requirement in an incorrect way. It's perfectly fine to let auth_type
follow what we tell the controller since we're still tracking the target
security level with conn->pending_sec_level.
This patch updates the check for local MITM requirement in the
hci_user_confirm_request_evt function to use the locally requested
security level and ensures that auth_type always represents what we tell
the controller. All other code in hci_user_confirm_request_evt still
uses the auth_type instead of pending_sec_level for determining whether
to do just-works or not, since that's the only value that's in sync with
what the remote device knows.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Tested-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 42bd6a56ed upstream.
The advertising data and scan response data are merged in the wrong
order. It should be advertsing data first and then scan response data
and not the other way around.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If we need an MITM protected connection but the local and remote IO
capabilities cannot provide it we should reject the pairing attempt in
the appropriate way. This patch adds the missing checks for such a
situation to the smp_cmd_pairing_req() and smp_cmd_pairing_rsp()
functions.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
We'll need to do authentication method lookups from more than one place,
so refactor the lookup into its own function.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
When we receive a pairing request or an internal request to start
pairing we shouldn't blindly overwrite the existing pending_sec_level
value as that may actually be higher than the new one. This patch fixes
the SMP code to only overwrite the value in case the new one is higher
than the old.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Kernel supports SMP Security Request so don't block increasing security
when we are slave.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Kraglak <marcin.kraglak@tieto.com>
Acked-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The SMP code expects hdev to be unlocked since e.g. crypto functions
will try to (re)lock it. Therefore, we need to release the lock before
calling into smp.c from mgmt.c. Without this we risk a deadlock whenever
the smp_user_confirm_reply() function is called.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Tested-by: Lukasz Rymanowski <lukasz.rymanowski@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
A deadlock occurs when PDU containing invalid SMP opcode is received on
Security Manager Channel over LE link and conn->pending_rx_work worker
has not run yet.
When LE link is created l2cap_conn_ready() is called and before
returning it schedules conn->pending_rx_work worker to hdev->workqueue.
Incoming data to SMP fixed channel is handled by l2cap_recv_frame()
which calls smp_sig_channel() to handle the SMP PDU. If
smp_sig_channel() indicates failure l2cap_conn_del() is called to delete
the connection. When deleting the connection, l2cap_conn_del() purges
the pending_rx queue and calls flush_work() to wait for the
pending_rx_work worker to complete.
Since incoming data is handled by a worker running from the same
workqueue as the pending_rx_work is being scheduled on, we will deadlock
on waiting for pending_rx_work to complete.
This patch fixes the deadlock by calling cancel_work_sync() instead of
flush_work().
Signed-off-by: Jukka Taimisto <jtt@codenomicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When cleaning up the HCI state as part of the power-off procedure we can
reuse the hci_stop_discovery() function instead of explicitly sending
HCI command related to discovery. The added benefit of this is that it
takes care of canceling name resolving and inquiry which were not
previously covered by the code.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
We'll need to reuse the same logic for stopping discovery also when
cleaning up HCI state when powering off. This patch refactors the code
out to its own function that can later (in a subsequent patch) be used
also for the power off case.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When inquiry is canceled through the HCI_Cancel_Inquiry command there is
no Inquiry Complete event generated. Instead, all we get is the command
complete for the HCI_Inquiry_Cancel command. This means that we must
call the hci_discovery_set_state() function from the respective command
complete handler in order to ensure that user space knows the correct
discovery state.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When we store the STK in slave role we should set the correct
authentication information for it. If the pairing is producing a HIGH
security level the STK is considered authenticated, and otherwise it's
considered unauthenticated. This patch fixes the value passed to the
hci_add_ltk() function when adding the STK on the slave side.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Tested-by: Marcin Kraglak <marcin.kraglak@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When responding to an IO capability request when we're the initiators of
the pairing we will not yet have the remote IO capability information.
Since the conn->auth_type variable is treated as an "absolute"
requirement instead of a hint of what's needed later in the user
confirmation request handler it's important that it doesn't have the
MITM bit set if there's any chance that the remote device doesn't have
the necessary IO capabilities.
This patch adds a clarifying comment so that conn->auth_type is left
untouched in this scenario.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
From the Bluetooth Core Specification 4.1 page 1958:
"if both devices have set the Authentication_Requirements parameter to
one of the MITM Protection Not Required options, authentication stage 1
shall function as if both devices set their IO capabilities to
DisplayOnly (e.g., Numeric comparison with automatic confirmation on
both devices)"
So far our implementation has done user confirmation for all just-works
cases regardless of the MITM requirements, however following the
specification to the word means that we should not be doing confirmation
when neither side has the MITM flag set.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Tested-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The conn->link_key variable tracks the type of link key in use. It is
set whenever we respond to a link key request as well as when we get a
link key notification event.
These two events do not however always guarantee that encryption is
enabled: getting a link key request and responding to it may only mean
that the remote side has requested authentication but not encryption. On
the other hand, the encrypt change event is a certain guarantee that
encryption is enabled. The real encryption state is already tracked in
the conn->link_mode variable through the HCI_LM_ENCRYPT bit.
This patch fixes a check for encryption in the hci_conn_auth function to
use the proper conn->link_mode value and thereby eliminates the chance
of a false positive result.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The src_type member of struct hci_conn should always reflect the address
type of the src_member. It should never be overridden. There is already
code in place in the command status handler of HCI_LE_Create_Connection
to copy the right initiator address into conn->init_addr_type.
Without this patch, if privacy is enabled, we will send the wrong
address type in the SMP identity address information PDU (it'll e.g.
contain our public address but a random address type).
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov.
2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J
Benniston.
3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn
Mork.
4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez.
5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee.
7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software
TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers. From Ezequiel Garcia.
8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy.
9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli.
10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large
numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu.
11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses,
from Lorenzo Colitti.
12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal
Cardwell.
13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman.
14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru.
15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich.
16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it
performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits)
rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0
tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery
net: fec: Add software TSO support
net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support
net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number
net: fec: Factorize feature setting
net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum
net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function
bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support
bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference
via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable
bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs
bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch
bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link
bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane
sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem
net/core: Add VF link state control policy
net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO
net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful
net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving
...
There are several instances where a pskb_copy or __pskb_copy is
immediately followed by an skb_clone.
Add a couple of new functions to allow the copy skb to be allocated
from the fclone cache and thus speed up subsequent skb_clone calls.
Cc: Alexander Smirnov <alex.bluesman.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com>
Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
Cc: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Cc: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@meshcoding.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Arvid Brodin <arvid.brodin@alten.se>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Cc: Andrew Hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now that 3.15 is released, this merges the 'next' branch into 'master',
bringing us to the normal situation where my 'master' branch is the
merge window.
* accumulated work in next: (6809 commits)
ufs: sb mutex merge + mutex_destroy
powerpc: update comments for generic idle conversion
cris: update comments for generic idle conversion
idle: remove cpu_idle() forward declarations
nbd: zero from and len fields in NBD_CMD_DISCONNECT.
mm: convert some level-less printks to pr_*
MAINTAINERS: adi-buildroot-devel is moderated
MAINTAINERS: add linux-api for review of API/ABI changes
mm/kmemleak-test.c: use pr_fmt for logging
fs/dlm/debug_fs.c: replace seq_printf by seq_puts
fs/dlm/lockspace.c: convert simple_str to kstr
fs/dlm/config.c: convert simple_str to kstr
mm: mark remap_file_pages() syscall as deprecated
mm: memcontrol: remove unnecessary memcg argument from soft limit functions
mm: memcontrol: clean up memcg zoneinfo lookup
mm/memblock.c: call kmemleak directly from memblock_(alloc|free)
mm/mempool.c: update the kmemleak stack trace for mempool allocations
lib/radix-tree.c: update the kmemleak stack trace for radix tree allocations
mm: introduce kmemleak_update_trace()
mm/kmemleak.c: use %u to print ->checksum
...
-[0x01 Introduction
We have found a programming error causing a deadlock in Bluetooth subsystem
of Linux kernel. The problem is caused by missing release_sock() call when
L2CAP connection creation fails due full accept queue.
The issue can be reproduced with 3.15-rc5 kernel and is also present in
earlier kernels.
-[0x02 Details
The problem occurs when multiple L2CAP connections are created to a PSM which
contains listening socket (like SDP) and left pending, for example,
configuration (the underlying ACL link is not disconnected between
connections).
When L2CAP connection request is received and listening socket is found the
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() function (net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c) is called.
This function locks the 'parent' socket and then checks if the accept queue
is full.
1178 lock_sock(parent);
1179
1180 /* Check for backlog size */
1181 if (sk_acceptq_is_full(parent)) {
1182 BT_DBG("backlog full %d", parent->sk_ack_backlog);
1183 return NULL;
1184 }
If case the accept queue is full NULL is returned, but the 'parent' socket
is not released. Thus when next L2CAP connection request is received the code
blocks on lock_sock() since the parent is still locked.
Also note that for connections already established and waiting for
configuration to complete a timeout will occur and l2cap_chan_timeout()
(net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c) will be called. All threads calling this
function will also be blocked waiting for the channel mutex since the thread
which is waiting on lock_sock() alread holds the channel mutex.
We were able to reproduce this by sending continuously L2CAP connection
request followed by disconnection request containing invalid CID. This left
the created connections pending configuration.
After the deadlock occurs it is impossible to kill bluetoothd, btmon will not
get any more data etc. requiring reboot to recover.
-[0x03 Fix
Releasing the 'parent' socket when l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() returns NULL
seems to fix the issue.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Taimisto <jtt@codenomicon.com>
Reported-by: Tommi Mäkilä <tmakila@codenomicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When checking whether a legacy link key provides at least HIGH security
level we also need to check for FIPS level which is one step above HIGH.
This patch fixes a missing check in the hci_link_key_request_evt()
function.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Due to recent changes to the way that the MITM requirement is set for
outgoing pairing attempts we can no longer rely on the hcon->auth_type
variable (which is actually good since it was formed from BR/EDR
concepts that don't really exist for SMP).
To match the logic that BR/EDR now uses simply rely on the local IO
capability and/or needed security level to set the MITM requirement for
outgoing pairing requests.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Default values for various channel settings were missing. This
way channel users do not need to set default values themselves.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
The universal/local bit handling was incorrectly done in the code.
So when setting EUI address from BD address we do this:
- If BD address type is PUBLIC, then we clear the universal bit
in EUI address. If the address type is RANDOM, then the universal
bit is set (BT 6lowpan draft chapter 3.2.2)
- After this we invert the universal/local bit according to RFC 2464
When figuring out BD address we do the reverse:
- Take EUI address from stateless IPv6 address, invert the
universal/local bit according to RFC 2464
- If universal bit is 1 in this modified EUI address, then address
type is set to RANDOM, otherwise it is PUBLIC
Note that 6lowpan_iphc.[ch] does the final toggling of U/L bit
before sending or receiving the network packet.
Signed-off-by: Jukka Rissanen <jukka.rissanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When checking whether we need to request authentication or not we should
include HCI_SECURITY_FIPS to the levels that always need authentication.
This patch fixes check for it in the hci_outgoing_auth_needed()
function.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
In case there are new LTK types in the future we shouldn't just blindly
assume that != MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED means that the key is
authenticated. This patch adds explicit checks for each allowed key type
in the form of a switch statement and skips any key which has an unknown
value.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
