commit e7607f7d6d upstream.
ld.lld prior to 21.0.0 does not support using the KEEP keyword within an
overlay description, which may be needed to avoid discarding necessary
sections within an overlay with '--gc-sections', which can be enabled
for the kernel via CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION.
Disallow CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION without support for KEEP
within OVERLAY and introduce a macro, OVERLAY_KEEP, that can be used to
conditionally add KEEP when it is properly supported to avoid breaking
old versions of ld.lld.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: 381599f1fe
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
[nathan: Fix conflict in init/Kconfig due to lack of RUSTC symbols]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d26638bfcd upstream.
If KVM rejects an AP Creation event, leave the target vCPU state as-is.
Nothing in the GHCB suggests the hypervisor is *allowed* to muck with vCPU
state on failure, let alone required to do so. Furthermore, kicking only
in the !ON_INIT case leads to divergent behavior, and even the "kick" case
is non-deterministic.
E.g. if an ON_INIT request fails, the guest can successfully retry if the
fixed AP Creation request is made prior to sending INIT. And if a !ON_INIT
fails, the guest can successfully retry if the fixed AP Creation request is
handled before the target vCPU processes KVM's
KVM_REQ_UPDATE_PROTECTED_GUEST_STATE.
Fixes: e366f92ea9 ("KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227012541.3234589-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c3d944a367 upstream.
Without this, the vectors are removed if LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
is enabled. At startup, the CPU (silently) hangs in the undefined
instruction exception as soon as the first timer interrupt arrives.
On my setup, the system also boots fine without the 2nd and 3rd KEEP()
statements, so I cannot tell whether these are actually required.
[nathan: Use OVERLAY_KEEP() to avoid breaking old ld.lld versions]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ed0f941022 ("ARM: 9404/1: arm32: enable HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION")
Signed-off-by: Christian Eggers <ceggers@arri.de>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3ef938c350 upstream.
On the following path, flush_tlb_range() can be used for zapping normal
PMD entries (PMD entries that point to page tables) together with the PTE
entries in the pointed-to page table:
collapse_pte_mapped_thp
pmdp_collapse_flush
flush_tlb_range
The arm64 version of flush_tlb_range() has a comment describing that it can
be used for page table removal, and does not use any last-level
invalidation optimizations. Fix the X86 version by making it behave the
same way.
Currently, X86 only uses this information for the following two purposes,
which I think means the issue doesn't have much impact:
- In native_flush_tlb_multi() for checking if lazy TLB CPUs need to be
IPI'd to avoid issues with speculative page table walks.
- In Hyper-V TLB paravirtualization, again for lazy TLB stuff.
The patch "x86/mm: only invalidate final translations with INVLPGB" which
is currently under review (see
<https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241230175550.4046587-13-riel@surriel.com/>)
would probably be making the impact of this a lot worse.
Fixes: 016c4d92cd ("x86/mm/tlb: Add freed_tables argument to flush_tlb_mm_range")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250103-x86-collapse-flush-fix-v1-1-3c521856cfa6@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d90c9de9de upstream.
TSC could be reset in deep ACPI sleep states, even with invariant TSC.
That's the reason we have sched_clock() save/restore functions, to deal
with this situation. But what happens is that such functions are guarded
with a check for the stability of sched_clock - if not considered stable,
the save/restore routines aren't executed.
On top of that, we have a clear comment in native_sched_clock() saying
that *even* with TSC unstable, we continue using TSC for sched_clock due
to its speed.
In other words, if we have a situation of TSC getting detected as unstable,
it marks the sched_clock as unstable as well, so subsequent S3 sleep cycles
could bring bogus sched_clock values due to the lack of the save/restore
mechanism, causing warnings like this:
[22.954918] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[22.954923] Delta way too big! 18446743750843854390 ts=18446744072977390405 before=322133536015 after=322133536015 write stamp=18446744072977390405
[22.954923] If you just came from a suspend/resume,
[22.954923] please switch to the trace global clock:
[22.954923] echo global > /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_clock
[22.954923] or add trace_clock=global to the kernel command line
[22.954937] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 5728 at kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2890 rb_add_timestamp+0x193/0x1c0
Notice that the above was reproduced even with "trace_clock=global".
The fix for that is to _always_ save/restore the sched_clock on suspend
cycle _if TSC is used_ as sched_clock - only if we fallback to jiffies
the sched_clock_stable() check becomes relevant to save/restore the
sched_clock.
Debugged-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250215210314.351480-1-gpiccoli@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6ac43f2be9 upstream.
An older cleanup of mine inadvertently removed geode-gx1 and geode-lx
from the list of CPUs that are known to support a working cmpxchg8b.
Fixes: 88a2b4edda ("x86/Kconfig: Rework CONFIG_X86_PAE dependency")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250226213714.4040853-2-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fa6192adc3 upstream.
Jann reported a possible issue when trampoline_check_ip returns
address near the bottom of the address space that is allowed to
call into the syscall if uretprobes are not set up:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/202502081235.5A6F352985@keescook/T/#m9d416df341b8fbc11737dacbcd29f0054413cbbf
Though the mmap minimum address restrictions will typically prevent
creating mappings there, let's make sure uretprobe syscall checks
for that.
Fixes: ff474a78ce ("uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250212220433.3624297-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f9bdf1f953 upstream.
The WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_hw_events.enabled)) in the
intel_pmu_save_and_restart_reload() is triggered, when sampling read
topdown events.
In a NMI handler, the cpu_hw_events.enabled is set and used to indicate
the status of core PMU. The generic pmu->pmu_disable_count, updated in
the perf_pmu_disable/enable pair, is not touched.
However, the perf_pmu_disable/enable pair is invoked when sampling read
in a NMI handler. The cpuc->enabled is mistakenly set by the
perf_pmu_enable().
Avoid disabling PMU if the core PMU is already disabled.
Merge the logic together.
Fixes: 7b2c05a15d ("perf/x86/intel: Generic support for hardware TopDown metrics")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250121152303.3128733-2-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 314dfe1057 upstream.
The x86_pmu_drain_pebs static call was introduced in commit 7c9903c9bf
("x86/perf, static_call: Optimize x86_pmu methods"), but it's not really
used to replace the old method.
Apply the static call for drain_pebs.
Fixes: 7c9903c9bf ("x86/perf, static_call: Optimize x86_pmu methods")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250121152303.3128733-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9f98a4f4e7 upstream.
Direct HLT instruction execution causes #VEs for TDX VMs which is routed
to hypervisor via TDCALL. If HLT is executed in STI-shadow, resulting #VE
handler will enable interrupts before TDCALL is routed to hypervisor
leading to missed wakeup events, as current TDX spec doesn't expose
interruptibility state information to allow #VE handler to selectively
enable interrupts.
Commit bfe6ed0c67 ("x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests")
prevented the idle routines from executing HLT instruction in STI-shadow.
But it missed the paravirt routine which can be reached via this path
as an example:
kvm_wait() =>
safe_halt() =>
raw_safe_halt() =>
arch_safe_halt() =>
irq.safe_halt() =>
pv_native_safe_halt()
To reliably handle arch_safe_halt() for TDX VMs, introduce explicit
dependency on CONFIG_PARAVIRT and override paravirt halt()/safe_halt()
routines with TDX-safe versions that execute direct TDCALL and needed
interrupt flag updates. Executing direct TDCALL brings in additional
benefit of avoiding HLT related #VEs altogether.
As tested by Ryan Afranji:
"Tested with the specjbb2015 benchmark. It has heavy lock contention which leads
to many halt calls. TDX VMs suffered a poor score before this patchset.
Verified the major performance improvement with this patchset applied."
Fixes: bfe6ed0c67 ("x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests")
Signed-off-by: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Ryan Afranji <afranji@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228014416.3925664-3-vannapurve@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1a15bb8303 upstream.
Patch series "mm/hwpoison: Fix regressions in memory failure handling",
v4.
## 1. What am I trying to do:
This patchset resolves two critical regressions related to memory failure
handling that have appeared in the upstream kernel since version 5.17, as
compared to 5.10 LTS.
- copyin case: poison found in user page while kernel copying from user space
- instr case: poison found while instruction fetching in user space
## 2. What is the expected outcome and why
- For copyin case:
Kernel can recover from poison found where kernel is doing get_user() or
copy_from_user() if those places get an error return and the kernel return
-EFAULT to the process instead of crashing. More specifily, MCE handler
checks the fixup handler type to decide whether an in kernel #MC can be
recovered. When EX_TYPE_UACCESS is found, the PC jumps to recovery code
specified in _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT() and return a -EFAULT to user space.
- For instr case:
If a poison found while instruction fetching in user space, full recovery
is possible. User process takes #PF, Linux allocates a new page and fills
by reading from storage.
## 3. What actually happens and why
- For copyin case: kernel panic since v5.17
Commit 4c132d1d84 ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") introduced a new
extable fixup type, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, and later patches updated the
extable fixup type for copy-from-user operations, changing it from
EX_TYPE_UACCESS to EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG. It breaks previous EX_TYPE_UACCESS
handling when posion found in get_user() or copy_from_user().
- For instr case: user process is killed by a SIGBUS signal due to #CMCI
and #MCE race
When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the
CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a UCNA
signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check when
the data is about to be consumed.
### Background: why *UN*corrected errors tied to *C*MCI in Intel platform [1]
Prior to Icelake memory controllers reported patrol scrub events that
detected a previously unseen uncorrected error in memory by signaling a
broadcast machine check with an SRAO (Software Recoverable Action
Optional) signature in the machine check bank. This was overkill because
it's not an urgent problem that no core is on the verge of consuming that
bad data. It's also found that multi SRAO UCE may cause nested MCE
interrupts and finally become an IERR.
Hence, Intel downgrades the machine check bank signature of patrol scrub
from SRAO to UCNA (Uncorrected, No Action required), and signal changed to
#CMCI. Just to add to the confusion, Linux does take an action (in
uc_decode_notifier()) to try to offline the page despite the UC*NA*
signature name.
### Background: why #CMCI and #MCE race when poison is consuming in
Intel platform [1]
Having decided that CMCI/UCNA is the best action for patrol scrub errors,
the memory controller uses it for reads too. But the memory controller is
executing asynchronously from the core, and can't tell the difference
between a "real" read and a speculative read. So it will do CMCI/UCNA if
an error is found in any read.
Thus:
1) Core is clever and thinks address A is needed soon, issues a
speculative read.
2) Core finds it is going to use address A soon after sending the read
request
3) The CMCI from the memory controller is in a race with MCE from the
core that will soon try to retire the load from address A.
Quite often (because speculation has got better) the CMCI from the memory
controller is delivered before the core is committed to the instruction
reading address A, so the interrupt is taken, and Linux offlines the page
(marking it as poison).
## Why user process is killed for instr case
Commit 046545a661 ("mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported
"not recovered"") tries to fix noise message "Memory error not recovered"
and skips duplicate SIGBUSs due to the race. But it also introduced a bug
that kill_accessing_process() return -EHWPOISON for instr case, as result,
kill_me_maybe() send a SIGBUS to user process.
# 4. The fix, in my opinion, should be:
- For copyin case:
The key point is whether the error context is in a read from user memory.
We do not care about the ex-type if we know its a MOV reading from
userspace.
is_copy_from_user() return true when both of the following two checks are
true:
- the current instruction is copy
- source address is user memory
If copy_user is true, we set
m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN | MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
Then do_machine_check() will try fixup_exception() first.
- For instr case: let kill_accessing_process() return 0 to prevent a SIGBUS.
- For patch 3:
The return value of memory_failure() is quite important while discussed
instr case regression with Tony and Miaohe for patch 2, so add comment
about the return value.
This patch (of 3):
Commit 4c132d1d84 ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") introduced a new
extable fixup type, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, and commit 4c132d1d84
("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") updated the extable fixup type for
copy-from-user operations, changing it from EX_TYPE_UACCESS to
EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG. The error context for copy-from-user operations no
longer functions as an in-kernel recovery context. Consequently, the
error context for copy-from-user operations no longer functions as an
in-kernel recovery context, resulting in kernel panics with the message:
"Machine check: Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel."
To address this, it is crucial to identify if an error context involves a
read operation from user memory. The function is_copy_from_user() can be
utilized to determine:
- the current operation is copy
- when reading user memory
When these conditions are met, is_copy_from_user() will return true,
confirming that it is indeed a direct copy from user memory. This check
is essential for correctly handling the context of errors in these
operations without relying on the extable fixup types that previously
allowed for in-kernel recovery.
So, use is_copy_from_user() to determine if a context is copy user directly.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250312112852.82415-1-xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250312112852.82415-2-xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 4c132d1d84 ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage")
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: Ruidong Tian <tianruidong@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 31ab12df72 upstream.
When verify_sha256_digest() fails, __apply_microcode_amd() should propagate
the failure by returning false (and not -1 which is promoted to true).
Fixes: 50cef76d5c ("x86/microcode/AMD: Load only SHA256-checksummed patches")
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250327230503.1850368-2-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 74c1807f6c upstream.
KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS does not make sense for VMs with protected guest state,
since the register values cannot actually be written. Return 0
when using the VM-level KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl, and accordingly
return -EINVAL from KVM_RUN if the valid/dirty fields are nonzero.
However, on exit from KVM_RUN userspace could have placed a nonzero
value into kvm_run->kvm_valid_regs, so check guest_state_protected
again and skip store_regs() in that case.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 517987e3fb ("KVM: x86: add fields to struct kvm_arch for CoCo features")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20250306202923.646075-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e792d843aa upstream.
snp_set_vmsa() returns 0 as success result and so fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 44676bb9d5 ("x86/hyperv: Add smp support for SEV-SNP guest")
Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250313085217.45483-1-ltykernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20250313085217.45483-1-ltykernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 52266f1015 upstream.
Vincent reported that running XDP synproxy program on LoongArch results
in the following error:
JIT doesn't support bpf-to-bpf calls
With dmesg:
multi-func JIT bug 1391 != 1390
The root cause is that verifier will refill the imm with the correct
addresses of bpf_calls for BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC instructions and then run
the last pass of JIT. So we generate different JIT code for the same
instruction in two passes (one for placeholder and the other for the
real address). Let's use move_addr() instead.
See commit 64f50f6575 ("LoongArch, bpf: Use 4 instructions for
function address in JIT") for a similar fix.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 69c087ba62 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper")
Fixes: bb035ef0cc ("LoongArch: BPF: Support mixing bpf2bpf and tailcalls")
Reported-by: Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2yfM9FTNiXvEQBkvtuoJrvzmN4c_NZsFXqEk4Cj1tsBNA@mail.gmail.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 60f3caff14 upstream.
The verifier test `calls: div by 0 in subprog` triggers a panic at the
ld.bu instruction. The ld.bu insn is trying to load byte from memory
address returned by the subprog. The subprog actually set the correct
address at the a5 register (dedicated register for BPF return values).
But at commit 73c359d1d3 ("LoongArch: BPF: Sign-extend return values")
we also sign extended a5 to the a0 register (return value in LoongArch).
For function call insn, we later propagate the a0 register back to a5
register. This is right for native calls but wrong for bpf2bpf calls
which expect zero-extended return value in a5 register. So only move a0
to a5 for native calls (i.e. non-BPF_PSEUDO_CALL).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 73c359d1d3 ("LoongArch: BPF: Sign-extend return values")
Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7e2586991e upstream.
Vincent reported that running BPF progs with tailcalls on LoongArch
causes kernel hard lockup. Debugging the issues shows that the JITed
image missing a jirl instruction at the end of the epilogue.
There are two passes in JIT compiling, the first pass set the flags and
the second pass generates JIT code based on those flags. With BPF progs
mixing bpf2bpf and tailcalls, build_prologue() generates N insns in the
first pass and then generates N+1 insns in the second pass. This makes
epilogue_offset off by one and we will jump to some unexpected insn and
cause lockup. Fix this by inserting a nop insn.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5dc615520c ("LoongArch: Add BPF JIT support")
Fixes: bb035ef0cc ("LoongArch: BPF: Support mixing bpf2bpf and tailcalls")
Reported-by: Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/CAK3+h2w6WESdBN3UCr3WKHByD7D6Q_Ve1EDAjotVrnx6Or_c8g@mail.gmail.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAK3+h2woEjG_N=-XzqEGaAeCmgu2eTCUc7p6bP4u8Q+DFHm-7g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ec105cadff upstream.
Begin with Loongson-3C6000, the number of PCI host can be as many as
8 for multi-chip machines, and this number should be the same for I/O
interrupt controllers. To support these machines we also increase the
MAX_IO_PICS up to 8.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Mingcong Bai <baimingcong@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4103cfe9dc upstream.
ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 1 by default, but some LoongArch-specific devices
(such as APBDMA) require 16 bytes alignment. When the data buffer length
is too small, the hardware may make an error writing cacheline. Thus, it
is dangerous to allocate a small memory buffer for DMA. It's always safe
to define ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN as L1_CACHE_BYTES but unnecessary (kmalloc()
need small memory objects). Therefore, just increase it to 16.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Binbin Zhou <zhoubinbin@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3f7023171d ]
When a crashkernel is launched on RISC-V, the entry to purgatory is
done by trapping via the stvec CSR. From riscv_kexec_norelocate():
| ...
| /*
| * Switch to physical addressing
| * This will also trigger a jump to CSR_STVEC
| * which in this case is the address of the new
| * kernel.
| */
| csrw CSR_STVEC, a2
| csrw CSR_SATP, zero
stvec requires that the address is 4B aligned, which was not the case,
e.g.:
| Loaded purgatory at 0xffffc000
| kexec_file: kexec_file_load: type:1, start:0xffffd232 head:0x4 flags:0x6
The address 0xffffd232 not 4B aligned.
Correct by adding proper function alignment.
With this change, crashkernels loaded with kexec-file will be able to
properly enter the purgatory.
Fixes: 736e30af58 ("RISC-V: Add purgatory")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250328085313.1193815-1-bjorn@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 28093cfef5 ]
Commit 58ff537109 ("riscv: Omit optimized string routines when
using KASAN") introduced calls to EXPORT_SYMBOL() in assembly string
routines, which result in R_RISCV_64 relocations against
.export_symbol section. As these rountines are reused by RISC-V
purgatory and our relocator doesn't recognize these relocations, this
fails kexec-file-load with dmesg like
[ 11.344251] kexec_image: Unknown rela relocation: 2
[ 11.345972] kexec_image: Error loading purgatory ret=-8
Let's support R_RISCV_64 relocation to fix kexec on 64-bit RISC-V.
32-bit variant isn't covered since KEXEC_FILE and KEXEC_PURGATORY isn't
available.
Fixes: 58ff537109 ("riscv: Omit optimized string routines when using KASAN")
Signed-off-by: Yao Zi <ziyao@disroot.org>
Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250326051445.55131-2-ziyao@disroot.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 83d78ac677 ]
Ryan sent a fix [1] for arm64 that applies to riscv too: in some hugetlb
functions, we must not use the pte value to get the size of a mapping
because the pte may not be present.
So use the already present size parameter for huge_pte_clear() and the
newly introduced size parameter for huge_ptep_get_and_clear(). And make
sure to gather A/D bits only on present ptes.
Fixes: 82a1a1f3bf ("riscv: mm: support Svnapot in hugetlb page")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250217140419.1702389-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250317072551.572169-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 121df45b37 ]
When lowcore relocation is enabled, the machine check handler doesn't
use the lowcore address when setting _CIF_MCCK_GUEST. Fix this by
adding the missing base register.
Fixes: 0001b7bbc5 ("s390/entry: Make mchk_int_handler() ready for lowcore relocation")
Reported-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b5322b6ec0 ]
History of the performance regression:
======================================
Since the following series of user copy updates were merged upstream
~2 years ago via:
a562456643 ("Merge branch 'x86-rep-insns': x86 user copy clarifications")
.. copy_user_generic() on x86_64 stopped doing alignment of the
writes to the destination to a 8 byte boundary for the non FSRM case.
Previously, this was done through the ALIGN_DESTINATION macro that
was used in the now removed copy_user_generic_unrolled function.
Turns out this change causes some loss of performance/throughput on
some use cases and specific CPU/platforms without FSRM and ERMS.
Lately I got two reports of performance/throughput issues after a
RHEL 9 kernel pulled the same upstream series with updates to user
copy functions. Both reports consisted of running specific
networking/TCP related testing using iperf3.
Partial upstream fix
====================
The first report was related to a Linux Bridge testing using VMs on a
specific machine with an AMD CPU (EPYC 7402), and after a brief
investigation it turned out that the later change via:
ca96b162bf ("x86: bring back rep movsq for user access on CPUs without ERMS")
... helped/fixed the performance issue.
However, after the later commit/fix was applied, then I got another
regression reported in a multistream TCP test on a 100Gbit mlx5 nic, also
running on an AMD based platform (AMD EPYC 7302 CPU), again that was using
iperf3 to run the test. That regression was after applying the later
fix/commit, but only this didn't help in telling the whole history.
Testing performed to pinpoint residual regression
=================================================
So I narrowed down the second regression use case, but running it
without traffic through a NIC, on localhost, in trying to narrow down
CPU usage and not being limited by other factor like network bandwidth.
I used another system also with an AMD CPU (AMD EPYC 7742). Basically,
I run iperf3 in server and client mode in the same system, for example:
- Start the server binding it to CPU core/thread 19:
$ taskset -c 19 iperf3 -D -s -B 127.0.0.1 -p 12000
- Start the client always binding/running on CPU core/thread 17, using
perf to get statistics:
$ perf stat -o stat.txt taskset -c 17 iperf3 -c 127.0.0.1 -b 0/1000 -V \
-n 50G --repeating-payload -l 16384 -p 12000 --cport 12001 2>&1 \
> stat-19.txt
For the client, always running/pinned to CPU 17. But for the iperf3 in
server mode, I did test runs using CPUs 19, 21, 23 or not pinned to any
specific CPU. So it basically consisted with four runs of the same
commands, just changing the CPU which the server is pinned, or without
pinning by removing the taskset call before the server command. The CPUs
were chosen based on NUMA node they were on, this is the relevant output
of lscpu on the system:
$ lscpu
...
Model name: AMD EPYC 7742 64-Core Processor
...
Caches (sum of all):
L1d: 2 MiB (64 instances)
L1i: 2 MiB (64 instances)
L2: 32 MiB (64 instances)
L3: 256 MiB (16 instances)
NUMA:
NUMA node(s): 4
NUMA node0 CPU(s): 0,1,8,9,16,17,24,25,32,33,40,41,48,49,56,57,64,65,72,73,80,81,88,89,96,97,104,105,112,113,120,121
NUMA node1 CPU(s): 2,3,10,11,18,19,26,27,34,35,42,43,50,51,58,59,66,67,74,75,82,83,90,91,98,99,106,107,114,115,122,123
NUMA node2 CPU(s): 4,5,12,13,20,21,28,29,36,37,44,45,52,53,60,61,68,69,76,77,84,85,92,93,100,101,108,109,116,117,124,125
NUMA node3 CPU(s): 6,7,14,15,22,23,30,31,38,39,46,47,54,55,62,63,70,71,78,79,86,87,94,95,102,103,110,111,118,119,126,127
...
So for the server run, when picking a CPU, I chose CPUs to be not on the same
node. The reason is with that I was able to get/measure relevant
performance differences when changing the alignment of the writes to the
destination in copy_user_generic.
Testing shows up to +81% performance improvement under iperf3
=============================================================
Here's a summary of the iperf3 runs:
# Vanilla upstream alignment:
CPU RATE SYS TIME sender-receiver
Server bind 19: 13.0Gbits/sec 28.371851000 33.233499566 86.9%-70.8%
Server bind 21: 12.9Gbits/sec 28.283381000 33.586486621 85.8%-69.9%
Server bind 23: 11.1Gbits/sec 33.660190000 39.012243176 87.7%-64.5%
Server bind none: 18.9Gbits/sec 19.215339000 22.875117865 86.0%-80.5%
# With the attached patch (aligning writes in non ERMS/FSRM case):
CPU RATE SYS TIME sender-receiver
Server bind 19: 20.8Gbits/sec 14.897284000 20.811101382 75.7%-89.0%
Server bind 21: 20.4Gbits/sec 15.205055000 21.263165909 75.4%-89.7%
Server bind 23: 20.2Gbits/sec 15.433801000 21.456175000 75.5%-89.8%
Server bind none: 26.1Gbits/sec 12.534022000 16.632447315 79.8%-89.6%
So I consistently got better results when aligning the write. The
results above were run on 6.14.0-rc6/rc7 based kernels. The sys is sys
time and then the total time to run/transfer 50G of data. The last
field is the CPU usage of sender/receiver iperf3 process. It's also
worth to note that each pair of iperf3 runs may get slightly different
results on each run, but I always got consistent higher results with
the write alignment for this specific test of running the processes
on CPUs in different NUMA nodes.
Linus Torvalds helped/provided this version of the patch. Initially I
proposed a version which aligned writes for all cases in
rep_movs_alternative, however it used two extra registers and thus
Linus provided an enhanced version that only aligns the write on the
large_movsq case, which is sufficient since the problem happens only
on those AMD CPUs like ones mentioned above without ERMS/FSRM, and
also doesn't require using extra registers. Also, I validated that
aligning only on large_movsq case is really enough for getting the
performance back.
I also tested this patch on an old Intel based non-ERMS/FRMS system
(with Xeon E5-2667 - Sandy Bridge based) and didn't get any problems:
no performance enhancement but also no regression either, using the
same iperf3 based benchmark. Also newer Intel processors after
Sandy Bridge usually have ERMS and should not be affected by this change.
[ mingo: Updated the changelog. ]
Fixes: ca96b162bf ("x86: bring back rep movsq for user access on CPUs without ERMS")
Fixes: 034ff37d34 ("x86: rewrite '__copy_user_nocache' function")
Reported-by: Ondrej Lichtner <olichtne@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320142213.2623518-1-herton@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bb58e1579f ]
We're trying to mix non-PIC/PIE objects into the otherwise-PIE
relocatable kernels, to avoid GOT/PLT references during early boot
alternative resolution (which happens before the GOT/PLT are set up).
riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu-ld: arch/riscv/errata/sifive/errata.o: relocation R_RISCV_HI20 against `tlb_flush_all_threshold' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu-ld: arch/riscv/errata/thead/errata.o: relocation R_RISCV_HI20 against `riscv_cbom_block_size' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
Fixes: 8dc2a7e802 ("riscv: Fix relocatable kernels with early alternatives using -fno-pie")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250326224506.27165-2-palmer@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5f1a58ed91 ]
This patch adds parentheses to parameters caller and callee of macros
make_call_t0 and make_call_ra. Every existing invocation of these two
macros uses a single variable for each argument, so the absence of the
parentheses seems okay. However, future invocations might use more
complex expressions as arguments. For example, a future invocation might
look like this: make_call_t0(a - b, c, call). Without parentheses in the
macro definition, the macro invocation expands to:
...
unsigned int offset = (unsigned long) c - (unsigned long) a - b;
...
which is clearly wrong.
The use of parentheses ensures arguments are correctly evaluated and
potentially saves future users of make_call_t0 and make_call_ra debugging
trouble.
Fixes: 6724a76cff ("riscv: ftrace: Reduce the detour code size to half")
Signed-off-by: Juhan Jin <juhan.jin@foxmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_AE90AA59903A628E87E9F80E563DA5BA5508@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0f5cce3fc5 ]
Leak fixes back in 2008 missed one case - if we are trying to set affinity
and spufs_mkdir() fails, we need to drop the reference to neighbor.
Fixes: 58119068cb "[POWERPC] spufs: Fix memory leak on SPU affinity"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c134deabf4 ]
prior to "[POWERPC] spufs: Fix gang destroy leaks" we used to have
a problem with gang lifetimes - creation of a gang returns opened
gang directory, which normally gets removed when that gets closed,
but if somebody has created a context belonging to that gang and
kept it alive until the gang got closed, removal failed and we
ended up with a leak.
Unfortunately, it had been fixed the wrong way. Dentry of gang
directory was no longer pinned, and rmdir on close was gone.
One problem was that failure of open kept calling simple_rmdir()
as cleanup, which meant an unbalanced dput(). Another bug was
in the success case - gang creation incremented link count on
root directory, but that was no longer undone when gang got
destroyed.
Fix consists of
* reverting the commit in question
* adding a counter to gang, protected by ->i_rwsem
of gang directory inode.
* having it set to 1 at creation time, dropped
in both spufs_dir_close() and spufs_gang_close() and bumped
in spufs_create_context(), provided that it's not 0.
* using simple_recursive_removal() to take the gang
directory out when counter reaches zero.
Fixes: 877907d37d "[POWERPC] spufs: Fix gang destroy leaks"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d1ca8698ca ]
It's called from spufs_fill_dir(), and caller of that will do
spufs_rmdir() in case of failure. That does remove everything
we'd managed to create, but... the problem dentry is still
negative. IOW, it needs to be explicitly dropped.
Fixes: 3f51dd91c8 "[PATCH] spufs: fix spufs_fill_dir error path"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 65be5c95d0 ]
The kernel requires X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC to be able to create SGX enclaves,
not just X86_FEATURE_SGX.
There is quite a number of hardware which has X86_FEATURE_SGX but not
X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC. A kernel running on such hardware does not create
the /dev/sgx_enclave file and does so silently.
Explicitly warn if X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC is not enabled to properly notify
users that the kernel disabled the SGX driver.
The X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, a.k.a. SGX Launch Control, is a CPU feature
that enables LE (Launch Enclave) hash MSRs to be writable (with
additional opt-in required in the 'feature control' MSR) when running
enclaves, i.e. using a custom root key rather than the Intel proprietary
key for enclave signing.
I've hit this issue myself and have spent some time researching where
my /dev/sgx_enclave file went on SGX-enabled hardware.
Related links:
https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx/issues/837https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/platform-driver-x86/patch/20180827185507.17087-3-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com/
[ mingo: Made the error message a bit more verbose, and added other cases
where the kernel fails to create the /dev/sgx_enclave device node. ]
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250309172215.21777-2-vdronov@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 09beefefb5 ]
The hypercall in hv_mark_gpa_visibility() is invoked with an input
argument and an output argument. The output argument ostensibly returns
the number of pages that were processed. But in fact, the hypercall does
not provide any output, so the output argument is spurious.
The spurious argument is harmless because Hyper-V ignores it, but in the
interest of correctness and to avoid the potential for future problems,
remove it.
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Reviewed-by: Nuno Das Neves <nunodasneves@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250226200612.2062-2-mhklinux@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20250226200612.2062-2-mhklinux@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 59115e2e25 ]
For Linux, running in Hyper-V VTL (Virtual Trust Level), kernel in VTL2
tries to access VTL0 low memory in probe_roms. This memory is not
described in the e820 map. Initialize probe_roms call to no-ops
during boot for VTL2 kernel to avoid this. The issue got identified
in OpenVMM which detects invalid accesses initiated from kernel running
in VTL2.
Co-developed-by: Saurabh Sengar <ssengar@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Saurabh Sengar <ssengar@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Naman Jain <namjain@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250116061224.1701-1-namjain@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20250116061224.1701-1-namjain@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7c977393b8 ]
If 'regs' points to a local stack variable, prepare_frametrace() stores
all registers to the stack. This confuses objtool as it expects them to
be restored from the stack later.
The stores don't affect stack tracing, so use unwind hints to hide them
from objtool.
Fixes the following warnings:
arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.o: warning: objtool: show_stack+0xe0: stack state mismatch: reg1[22]=-1+0 reg2[22]=-2-160
arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.o: warning: objtool: show_stack+0xe0: stack state mismatch: reg1[23]=-1+0 reg2[23]=-2-152
Fixes: cb8a2ef084 ("LoongArch: Add ORC stack unwinder support")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/270cadd8040dda74db2307f23497bb68e65db98d.1743481539.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202503280703.OARM8SrY-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 29c92a41c6 ]
The arch_kgdb_breakpoint() function defines the kgdb_breakinst symbol
using inline assembly.
1. There's a potential issue where the compiler might inline
arch_kgdb_breakpoint(), which would then define the kgdb_breakinst
symbol multiple times, leading to a linker error.
To prevent this, declare arch_kgdb_breakpoint() as noinline.
Fix follow error with LLVM-19 *only* when LTO_CLANG_FULL:
LD vmlinux.o
ld.lld-19: error: ld-temp.o <inline asm>:3:1: symbol 'kgdb_breakinst' is already defined
kgdb_breakinst: break 2
^
2. Remove "nop" in the inline assembly because it's meaningless for
LoongArch here.
3. Add "STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD" for arch_kgdb_breakpoint() to avoid
the objtool warning.
Fixes: e14dd07696 ("LoongArch: Add basic KGDB & KDB support")
Tested-by: Binbin Zhou <zhoubinbin@loongson.cn>
Co-developed-by: Winston Wen <wentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Winston Wen <wentao@uniontech.com>
Co-developed-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuli Wang <wangyuli@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit be216cbc1d ]
It is the built-in command line appended to the bootloader command line,
not the bootloader command line appended to the built-in command line.
Fixes: fa96b57c14 ("LoongArch: Add build infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: 谢致邦 (XIE Zhibang) <Yeking@Red54.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 84a6fc3784 ]
There is no need to override the default version of this function
anymore as UML now has proper _nofault memory access functions.
Doing this also fixes the fact that the implementation was incorrect as
using mincore() will incorrectly flag pages as inaccessible if they were
swapped out by the host.
Fixes: f75b1b1bed ("um: Implement probe_kernel_read()")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250210160926.420133-3-benjamin@sipsolutions.net
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5550187c4c ]
In order to work around some issues with disabling SSE on older versions
of gcc (compilation would fail upon seeing a function declaration
containing a float, even if it was never called or defined), the
corresponding CFLAGS and RUSTFLAGS were only set when using clang.
However, this led to two problems:
- Newer gcc versions also wouldn't get the correct flags, despite not
having the bug.
- The RUSTFLAGS for setting the rust target definition were not set,
despite being unrelated. This works by chance for x86_64, as the
built-in default target is close enough, but not for 32-bit x86.
Move the target definition outside the conditional block, and update the
condition to take into account the gcc version.
Fixes: a3046a618a ("um: Only disable SSE on clang to work around old GCC bugs")
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250210105353.2238769-2-davidgow@google.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2c118f50d7 ]
Commit:
2e4be0d011 ("x86/show_trace_log_lvl: Ensure stack pointer is aligned, again")
was intended to ensure alignment of the stack pointer; but it also moved
the initialization of the "stack" variable down into the loop header.
This was likely intended as a no-op cleanup, since the commit
message does not mention it; however, this caused a behavioral change
because the value of "regs" is different between the two places.
Originally, get_stack_pointer() used the regs provided by the caller; after
that commit, get_stack_pointer() instead uses the regs at the top of the
stack frame the unwinder is looking at. Often, there are no such regs at
all, and "regs" is NULL, causing get_stack_pointer() to fall back to the
task's current stack pointer, which is not what we want here, but probably
happens to mostly work. Other times, the original regs will point to
another regs frame - in that case, the linear guess unwind logic in
show_trace_log_lvl() will start unwinding too far up the stack, causing the
first frame found by the proper unwinder to never be visited, resulting in
a stack trace consisting purely of guess lines.
Fix it by moving the "stack = " assignment back where it belongs.
Fixes: 2e4be0d011 ("x86/show_trace_log_lvl: Ensure stack pointer is aligned, again")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250325-2025-03-unwind-fixes-v1-2-acd774364768@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 57e2428f8d ]
PUSH_REGS with save_ret=1 is used by interrupt entry helper functions that
initially start with a UNWIND_HINT_FUNC ORC state.
However, save_ret=1 means that we clobber the helper function's return
address (and then later restore the return address further down on the
stack); after that point, the only thing on the stack we can unwind through
is the IRET frame, so use UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS until we have a full
pt_regs frame.
( An alternate approach would be to move the pt_regs->di overwrite down
such that it is the final step of pt_regs setup; but I don't want to
rearrange entry code just to make unwinding a tiny bit more elegant. )
Fixes: 9e809d15d6 ("x86/entry: Reduce the code footprint of the 'idtentry' macro")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250325-2025-03-unwind-fixes-v1-1-acd774364768@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c94bff63e4 ]
It turns out that while s390 architecture calls its memory-I/O mapping
variants write-through and write-back the implementation of ioremap_wt()
and pgprot_writethrough() does not match Linux notion of ioremap_wt().
In particular Linux expects ioremap_wt() to be weaker still than
ioremap_wc(), allowing not just gathering and re-ordering but also reads
to be served from cache. Instead s390's implementation is equivalent to
normal ioremap() while its ioremap_wc() allows re-ordering.
Note that there are no known users of ioremap_wt() on s390 and the
resulting behavior is in line with asm-generic defining ioremap_wt() as
ioremap(), if undefined, so no breakage is expected.
As s390 does not have a mapping type matching the Linux notion of
ioremap_wt() and pgprot_writethrough(), simply drop them and rely on the
asm-generic fallbacks instead.
Fixes: b02002cc4c ("s390/pci: Implement ioremap_wc/prot() with MIO")
Fixes: b43b3fff04 ("s390: mm: convert to GENERIC_IOREMAP")
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dc84bc2aba ]
If track_pfn_copy() fails, we already added the dst VMA to the maple
tree. As fork() fails, we'll cleanup the maple tree, and stumble over
the dst VMA for which we neither performed any reservation nor copied
any page tables.
Consequently untrack_pfn() will see VM_PAT and try obtaining the
PAT information from the page table -- which fails because the page
table was not copied.
The easiest fix would be to simply clear the VM_PAT flag of the dst VMA
if track_pfn_copy() fails. However, the whole thing is about "simply"
clearing the VM_PAT flag is shaky as well: if we passed track_pfn_copy()
and performed a reservation, but copying the page tables fails, we'll
simply clear the VM_PAT flag, not properly undoing the reservation ...
which is also wrong.
So let's fix it properly: set the VM_PAT flag only if the reservation
succeeded (leaving it clear initially), and undo the reservation if
anything goes wrong while copying the page tables: clearing the VM_PAT
flag after undoing the reservation.
Note that any copied page table entries will get zapped when the VMA will
get removed later, after copy_page_range() succeeded; as VM_PAT is not set
then, we won't try cleaning VM_PAT up once more and untrack_pfn() will be
happy. Note that leaving these page tables in place without a reservation
is not a problem, as we are aborting fork(); this process will never run.
A reproducer can trigger this usually at the first try:
https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/raw/main/reproducers/pat_fork.c
WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 11650 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:983 get_pat_info+0xf6/0x110
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 11650 Comm: repro3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5+ #92
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:get_pat_info+0xf6/0x110
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
...
untrack_pfn+0x52/0x110
unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0
unmap_vmas+0x105/0x1f0
exit_mmap+0xf6/0x460
__mmput+0x4b/0x120
copy_process+0x1bf6/0x2aa0
kernel_clone+0xab/0x440
__do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
Likely this case was missed in:
d155df53f3 ("x86/mm/pat: clear VM_PAT if copy_p4d_range failed")
... and instead of undoing the reservation we simply cleared the VM_PAT flag.
Keep the documentation of these functions in include/linux/pgtable.h,
one place is more than sufficient -- we should clean that up for the other
functions like track_pfn_remap/untrack_pfn separately.
Fixes: d155df53f3 ("x86/mm/pat: clear VM_PAT if copy_p4d_range failed")
Fixes: 2ab640379a ("x86: PAT: hooks in generic vm code to help archs to track pfnmap regions - v3")
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Reported-by: yuxin wang <wang1315768607@163.com>
Reported-by: Marius Fleischer <fleischermarius@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250321112323.153741-1-david@redhat.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABOYnLx_dnqzpCW99G81DmOr+2UzdmZMk=T3uxwNxwz+R1RAwg@mail.gmail.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAJg=8jwijTP5fre8woS4JVJQ8iUA6v+iNcsOgtj9Zfpc3obDOQ@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 861efb8a48 ]
In relocate_32.S, function clear_utlb_entry() goes into real mode. To
do so, it has to calculate the physical address based on the virtual
address. To get the virtual address it uses 'bl' which is problematic
(see commit c974809a26 ("powerpc/vdso: Avoid link stack corruption
in __get_datapage()")). In addition, the calculation is done on a
wrong address because 'bl' loads LR with the address of the following
instruction, not the address of the target. So when the target is not
the instruction following the 'bl' instruction, it may lead to
unexpected behaviour.
Fix it by re-writing the code so that is goes via another path which
is based 'bcl 20,31,.+4' which is the right instruction to use for that.
Fixes: 6834302003 ("powerpc/47x: Kernel support for KEXEC")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/dc4f9616fba9c05c5dbf9b4b5480eb1c362adc17.1741256651.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1e4d73d06c ]
The following build warning has been reported:
arch/powerpc/crypto/ghashp8-ppc.o: warning: objtool: .text+0x22c: unannotated intra-function call
This happens due to commit bb7f054f4d ("objtool/powerpc: Add support
for decoding all types of uncond branches")
Disassembly of arch/powerpc/crypto/ghashp8-ppc.o shows:
arch/powerpc/crypto/ghashp8-ppc.o: file format elf64-powerpcle
Disassembly of section .text:
0000000000000140 <gcm_ghash_p8>:
140: f8 ff 00 3c lis r0,-8
...
20c: 20 00 80 4e blr
210: 00 00 00 00 .long 0x0
214: 00 0c 14 00 .long 0x140c00
218: 00 00 04 00 .long 0x40000
21c: 00 00 00 00 .long 0x0
220: 47 48 41 53 rlwimi. r1,r26,9,1,3
224: 48 20 66 6f xoris r6,r27,8264
228: 72 20 50 6f xoris r16,r26,8306
22c: 77 65 72 49 bla 1726574 <gcm_ghash_p8+0x1726434> <==
...
It corresponds to the following code in ghashp8-ppc.o :
_GLOBAL(gcm_ghash_p8)
lis 0,0xfff8
...
blr
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
.long 0
.size gcm_ghash_p8,.-gcm_ghash_p8
.byte 71,72,65,83,72,32,102,111,114,32,80,111,119,101,114,73,83,65,32,50,46,48,55,44,32,67,82,89,80,84,79,71,65,77,83,32,98,121,32,60,97,112,112,114,111,64,111,112,101,110,115,115,108,46,111,114,103,62,0
.align 2
.align 2
In fact this is raw data that is after the function end and that is
not text so shouldn't be disassembled as text. But ghashp8-ppc.S is
generated by a perl script and should have been marked as
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD.
Now that 'bla' is understood as a call instruction, that raw data
is mis-interpreted as an infra-function call.
Mark ghashp8-ppc.o as a OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD to avoid this
warning.
Reported-by: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8c4c3fc2-2bd7-4148-af68-2f504d6119e0@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 109303336a ("crypto: vmx - Move to arch/powerpc/crypto")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Tested-By: Venkat Rao Bagalkote <venkat88@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sathvika Vasireddy <sv@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7aa7eb73fe6bc95ac210510e22394ca0ae227b69.1741128786.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d55f31e290 ]
ia32_emulation_override_cmdline() is an early_param() arg and these
are only needed at boot time. In fact, all other early_param() functions
in arch/x86 seem to have '__init' annotation and
ia32_emulation_override_cmdline() is the only exception.
Fixes: a11e097504 ("x86: Make IA32_EMULATION boot time configurable")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241210151650.1746022-1-vkuznets%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dda366083e ]
Guest FPUs manage vCPU FPU states. They are allocated via
fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate() and are resized in fpstate_realloc() when XFD
features are enabled.
Since the introduction of guest FPUs, there have been inconsistencies in
the kernel buffer size and xfeatures:
1. fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate() uses fpu_user_cfg since its introduction. See:
69f6ed1d14 ("x86/fpu: Provide infrastructure for KVM FPU cleanup")
36487e6228 ("x86/fpu: Prepare guest FPU for dynamically enabled FPU features")
2. __fpstate_reset() references fpu_kernel_cfg to set storage attributes.
3. fpu->guest_perm uses fpu_kernel_cfg, affecting fpstate_realloc().
A recent commit in the tip:x86/fpu tree partially addressed the inconsistency
between (1) and (3) by using fpu_kernel_cfg for size calculation in (1),
but left fpu_guest->xfeatures and fpu_guest->perm still referencing
fpu_user_cfg:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250218141045.85201-1-stanspas@amazon.de/1937e18cc3 ("x86/fpu: Fix guest FPU state buffer allocation size")
The inconsistencies within fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate() and across the
mentioned functions cause confusion.
Fix them by using fpu_kernel_cfg consistently in fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(),
except for fields related to the UABI buffer. Referencing fpu_kernel_cfg
won't impact functionalities, as:
1. fpu_guest->perm is overwritten shortly in fpu_init_guest_permissions()
with fpstate->guest_perm, which already uses fpu_kernel_cfg.
2. fpu_guest->xfeatures is solely used to check if XFD features are enabled.
Including supervisor xfeatures doesn't affect the check.
Fixes: 36487e6228 ("x86/fpu: Prepare guest FPU for dynamically enabled FPU features")
Suggested-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250317140613.1761633-1-chao.gao@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8085fcd78c ]
The CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64 version of exc_double_fault() can return to its
caller, but the !CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64 version never does. In the latter
case the compiler and/or objtool may consider it to be implicitly
noreturn.
However, due to the currently inflexible way objtool detects noreturns,
a function's noreturn status needs to be consistent across configs.
The current workaround for this issue is to suppress unreachable
warnings for exc_double_fault()'s callers. Unfortunately that can
result in ORC coverage gaps and potentially worse issues like inert
static calls and silently disabled CPU mitigations.
Instead, prevent exc_double_fault() from ever being implicitly marked
noreturn by forcing a return behind a never-taken conditional.
Until a more integrated noreturn detection method exists, this is likely
the least objectionable workaround.
Fixes: 55eeab2a8a ("objtool: Ignore exc_double_fault() __noreturn warnings")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d1f4026f8dc35d0de6cc61f2684e0cb6484009d1.1741975349.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a121798ae6 ]
Commit
6eac36bb9e ("x86/resctrl: Allocate the cleanest CLOSID by searching closid_num_dirty_rmid")
added logic that causes resctrl to search for the CLOSID with the fewest dirty
cache lines when creating a new control group, if requested by the arch code.
This depends on the values read from the llc_occupancy counters. The logic is
applicable to architectures where the CLOSID effectively forms part of the
monitoring identifier and so do not allow complete freedom to choose an unused
monitoring identifier for a given CLOSID.
This support missed that some platforms may not have these counters. This
causes a NULL pointer dereference when creating a new control group as the
array was not allocated by dom_data_init().
As this feature isn't necessary on platforms that don't have cache occupancy
monitors, add this to the check that occurs when a new control group is
allocated.
Fixes: 6eac36bb9e ("x86/resctrl: Allocate the cleanest CLOSID by searching closid_num_dirty_rmid")
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghuay@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64
Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com>
Tested-by: Amit Singh Tomar <amitsinght@marvell.com> # arm64
Tested-by: Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@nvidia.com> # arm64
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250311183715.16445-2-james.morse@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
